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ABSTRACT 
This study looks at the ex ante review of fundamental rights in the EU 
legislative process. It examines the rights-based review, which is carried out at 
different phases of EU law-making procedure before the EU legal act 
concerned is formally adopted and entered into force. An ex ante review of EU 
legislative proposals is examined here with relation to selected substantive 
fundamental rights, most notably the right to privacy and the right to data 
protection. Therefore, the normative framework of the analysis of the EU 
legislative process consists of fundamental rights which derive from the EU 
Charter of Fundamental Rights and the European Convention on Human 
Rights and the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union and the 
European Court of Human Rights. 
 
Continuity and change in ex ante review of EU legislation will be examined 
by analyzing selected case studies involving concrete pieces of EU legislation 
that mainly fall under the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice - a highly 
sensitive policy sector from the point of view of fundamental rights. Most of 
the chosen legislative dossiers are inextricably linked with anti-terrorism 
measures. The research is predominantly of legal-empirical nature and 
intends to merge theory with practice in an analytical-descriptive way. The 
analysis of the selected case studies is guided by a reliance on such doctrinal 
and theoretical constructs of fundamental and human rights law as the test of 
permissible limitations on fundamental rights with the proportionality test at 
its apex. Moreover, aside from understanding fundamental rights as a set of 
negative obligations binding upon the legislature, due attention will also be 
paid to assessing how positive obligations regarding fundamental rights have 
been dealt with by the EU legislature.  
 
In light of the major findings of the study, the EU system of rights-based 
constitutional review has significantly changed. This is due to the impact of 
the legally-binding EU Charter of Fundamental Rights entry into force in 
2009, which carries fundamental rights aspects assuming increasing 
significance at the level of daily legislative activities by the EU institutions. 
Similarly, the Member States also appear to increasingly use “rights-language” 
in their national observations on EU legislative proposals. We are witnessing 
a considerable empowerment of EU ex ante review, but in a manner that this 
does not entail a corresponding weakening of the rights-based review by the 
courts, especially the CJEU. It is claimed that the EU system of rights-based 
review of EU legislation is evolving gradually towards a hybrid and essentially 
pluralistic system of review in which ex ante and ex post phases of review 
complement each other. Similarly, the fundamental rights review system of 
the EU involves a number of institutions and actors, at different levels and 
phases, carrying out their own part in the rights-based review of EU legislation 
as a whole. Given its essentially pluralistic normative and institutional 
composition, the EU’s rights-based review system as a whole contributes to 
topical discussion on European constitutionalism and constitutional 
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pluralism. This evolution has led to fundamental rights being taken more 
seriously in the EU legislative process, which has also impacted institutions. 
 
Keywords: Constitutional law, European Union, European Union law, 
Fundamental rights, Ex ante rights-based review of legislative proposals, 
legislative procedures of the EU  
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TIIVISTELMÄ 
 
Väitöskirjassa tutkitaan EU-säädösten perustuslainmukaisuuden 
ennakollista valvontaa erityisesti perusoikeusherkällä EU:n vapauden, 
turvallisuuden ja oikeuden alueella. Kyseessä on eri tasoilla 
lainsäädäntöprosessin aikana tapahtuva perusoikeusvalvonta, johon 
osallistuu EU-toimielimiä ja muita toimijatahoja. Valvonta tapahtuu täten 
säätämisvaiheessa, ennen kuin EU-säädös on muodollisesti hyväksytty. 
Joulukuussa 2009 Lissabonin sopimuksen voimaantulon yhteydessä EU:n 
primäärioikeuden asemaan nostettu EU:n perusoikeuskirja on tärkeällä 
tavalla vaikuttanut perusoikeuksien asemaan EU-lainsäädäntöä 
valmisteltaessa. 
 
Valtiosääntöoikeudellinen tutkimus pyrkii vastaamaan kysymykseen, 
miten perusoikeuksien valvontaa toteutetaan EU-päätöksenteon yhteydessä ja 
mikä on ollut perusoikeuksien vaikutus EU-säädösten muodostumisessa. 
Perusoikeuksien vaikutusta voidaan lähestyä lainsäätäjän negatiivisten ja 
positiivisten velvoitteiden kautta. Negatiiviset velvoitteet liittyvät 
perusoikeuksien rajoittamiseen, joka on mahdollista monen aineellisen 
perusoikeuden osalta perusoikeuskirjan ns. rajoitusartiklan nojalla. Tästä 
johtuen tutkimuksen tärkeä analyyttinen viitekehys on eurooppalainen 
perusoikeuksien rajoitustesti, joka rakentuu pitkälti kyseiselle määräykselle.  
Perusoikeuksien positiiviset velvoitteet koskevat perusoikeuksien 
edistämisvelvoitteita, jotka eivät ole olleet yhtä keskeisessä asemassa 
lainsäätäjän toiminnassa kuin rajoittaminen. Tästä huolimatta 
perusoikeuksien edistäminen on aiempaa näkyvämmässä asemassa EU-
instituutioiden ja asiantuntijatahojen kannanotoissa eri 
lainsäädäntöhankkeissa. Tutkimuksessa lähestytään tutkimuskysymyksiä 
konkreettisten EU-lainsäädäntötapausten valossa. Monet säädösehdotuksista 
liittyvät tietosuojaan ja terrorisminvastaisiin lainsäädäntötoimenpiteisiin.  
 
Tutkimuksen keskeisin tulos on, että EU-tasolla perinteisesti vahvan 
perusoikeuksien jälkikäteisen  tuomioistuinvalvonnan rinnalla on 
kehittymässä ja merkittävästi voimistumassa ennakollinen 
perusoikeusvalvonta, jossa EU-lainsäätäjä on keskeisessä asemassa. 
Merkillepantavaa on, että EU-toimielimistä erityisesti Euroopan parlamentti 
on ottanut tärkeän roolin perusoikeuksien edistämisessä ja perusoikeuksien 
huomioonottamisessa perusoikeuksien rajoittamistilanteissa. Euroopan 
parlamentti on toiminut erityisen aktiivisesti saatuaan Lissabonin 
sopimuksen yhteydessä lisää toimivaltaa perusoikeuksien osa-alueella. Myös 
komissio on  viimeisen vuosikymmenen aikana paremmin huomioinut 
perusoikeudet säädösvalmistelussa. Niin ikään asiantuntijatahojen, kuten 
EU:n perusoikeusviraston ja Euroopan tietosuojavaltuutetun, kannanotot 
ovat edistäneet perusoikeuksien asemaa osana EU-säädöksiä.  
 
Huolimatta ennakollisen valvonnan vahvistumisesta, on EU-tuomioistuin 
edelleen tärkein perusoikeusvalvonnan toimija ja se toimii aktiivisesti, jos EU-
lainsäätäjä epäonnistuu perusoikeuksien turvaamisessa. EU-tuomioistuimen 
lisäksi lainsäädäntöprosessissa toimivat instituutiot kuitenkin merkittävästi 
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aiempaa enemmän osallistuvat perusoikeusvalvontaan. Tämän kehityksen 
voidaan yleisesti nähdä vahvistavan perusoikeuksien asemaa osana EU-
oikeutta, mikä heijastuu myös kansalliselle tasolle. Järjestelmä, jossa monet 
toimijat EU-lainsäädännön säätämisvaiheessa, toimeenpanossa ja 
soveltamisessa valvovat yksilön perusoikeuksien toteutumista, vahvistaa 
Unionin perusoikeusulottuvuutta. EU:n perusoikeuskirjalla on ollut erittäin 
myönteinen vaikutus tähän kehitykseen myös EU-lainsäädännön 
valmistelussa ja säätämisvaiheessa. 
 
Asiasanat: Eurooppaoikeus, Euroopan unioni, Euroopan unionin 
lainsäädäntömenettelyt, perusoikeudet, perusoikeuksien ennakollinen 
valvonta, valtiosääntöoikeus 
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I INTRODUCTION: SCOPE AND AIMS OF THE 
RESEARCH 
1. Point of departure 
 
This study explores ex ante review of EU legislative proposals for their 
compatibility with fundamental rights, as enshrined in the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union. In other words, this study is 
about rights-based review of legislative measures within the EU. For this 
purpose, various phases of the EU’s legislative process will be reviewed with a 
focus on questions such as the following: How are fundamental rights 
guaranteed by the Charter taken into account in the varieties of EU legislative 
processes? Who assesses the compliance of legislative proposals with 
fundamental rights? What are the grounds for such review? Why and how has 
rights-based ex ante review evolved? What is the relationship between ex ante 
review by the institutions of the EU and ex post review by the EU courts with 
the Court of Justice at their apex?  
 
The status of fundamental rights in EU law is nowadays unchallenged, thus 
an in-depth analysis is unwarranted for such issues as: whether fundamental 
rights prevail over such fundamental market freedoms, free movement of 
goods, or the status of fundamental rights within the EU legal order. This is 
because the dominance of economic -  or internal market oriented -  
fundamental rights has withered away due to the entry into force of the Lisbon 
Treaty in 2009, including the case law of the Court of Justice of the European 
Union (CJEU).1 Indeed, the starting point of this research is that the entry into 
force of the Lisbon Treaty in December 2009 rendered the EU Charter of 
Fundamental Rights a legally binding rights catalogue with the same legal 
value as the founding treaties of the EU themselves, thereby revealing the 
constitutional dynamics of the EU Charter, particularly insofar as the CJEU is 
concerned. Indeed, while the other EU institutions started taking the Charter 
into account in their practices in the 2000s, the CJEU took notice of the 
Charter against a backdrop of judicial self-restraint until 2009.2 However, the 
Charter has really become a point of reference for the Court from the Lisbon 
Treaty onwards.  
 
For some time, the constitutional review architecture of the EU was 
predominantly, if not exclusively, based on the judicial review of the CJEU. 
                                                 
1 It is important to notice that here I will utilize the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) 
instead of the European Court of Justice (ECJ). The name of the Court was changed when the Lisbon 
Treaty entered into force. For the sake of coherence, I refer to CJEU throughout the text even if I refer 
to the time before it formally came into existence. Exceptions to this rule are direct quotations. 
2 Prior to the Lisbon Treaty, there were a few cases in which the Court did take judicial notice of the 
Charter as the acquis of fundamental rights recognized in the EU legal order in the 2000s. See e.g. the 
first reference by the CJEU to the Charter in Case C-540/03, Parliament v the Commission and the 
Council, paragraph 38. 
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The CJEU has always had the competence to declare invalid such EU 
legislative measures that conflict with the founding treaties of the EU or other 
norms of the EU primary law, including fundamental rights as part of the 
general principles of EU law. However, during the last decade we have 
witnessed a significant development in the EU law-making process as the EU 
institutions have taken a stronger role in assessing the compatibility of draft 
EU legislation with fundamental rights. The overarching objective of this study 
is to examine this rights-based ex ante review of EU legislative instruments at 
different levels and phases of EU legislative process. In light of the findings of 
this study, I dare to suggest that the evolution of ex ante review has 
significantly transformed the overall EU system of rights-based review. This 
shift has anchored rights-based review as an integral part of EU legislative 
process. It has also had a marked impact on the way that the substance of 
fundamental rights has been assessed. 
 
Concrete EU legislative measures will be focused on later in this thesis through 
the prism of selected substantive fundamental rights, notably the right to 
privacy and right to data protection. This analysis will be guided by a reliance 
on such doctrinal and theoretical constructs of fundamental and human rights 
law as the test of permissible limitations on fundamental rights with emphasis 
on the proportionality test. Moreover, aside from understanding fundamental 
rights as a set of negative obligations binding upon the legislature, due 
attention will also be paid to assessing how positive obligations regarding 
fundamental rights have been dealt with by the EU legislature. What will be 
seen in the end is fundamental rights being taken increasingly more seriously 
in the EU law-making process. This fits well in the overall constitutional 
development of EU law, which has undergone significant changes over the 
years in relation to fundamental rights and constitutional issues in general. 
The role of constitutional issues has increased remarkably in European 
integration and in the same vein, the Charter has brought fundamental rights 
to the essential core of EU law. Therefore, it is possible to see that fundamental 
rights are nowadays probably stronger than ever in the EU legal order and the 
megatrend seems to be that their significance in the constitutional system of 
the EU is bound to grow even more in the future. This has an enormous impact 
on the pluralistic European constitutionalism, which sets the overall 
constitutional framework for fundamental rights protection within European 
integration.  
 
 
2. Research objectives and major limitations 
 
Given the development described above the primary research question to 
be answered in this study is: 
 
How is ex ante review of fundamental rights carried out in the EU 
legislative process particularly in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice 
and what is the impact of fundamental rights on the legislation? 
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In light of this question, I will tackle this research topic by analyzing how 
fundamental rights based ex ante review is executed in the EU law-making 
process. The most important issues therefore are the EU legislation and the 
impact of fundamental rights, as enshrined in the Charter, during legislative 
process. What pulls these two threads together are the various ex ante review 
mechanisms that aim at securing compliance with fundamental rights of the 
EU legal instrument before it is formally adopted and enters into force. At the 
heart of this activity are the EU institutions and the other actors participating 
in the law-making process. Constitutional review dealt with in this study is 
based on fundamental rights and is targeted on legislation. 
 
The primary research question can be divided in the following sub-
questions, which for their part refine the primary question and set it in the 
thematic context. This set of sub-questions consists of the following questions: 
 
1) What are the tools at the disposal of EU institutions in ex ante review 
in terms of limitation and promotion of fundamental rights? 
2) Has the rights-based ex ante review proved effective in light of the 
selected EU legislative files? 
3) How have ex ante review mechanisms shifted the balance of power 
between the EU institutions? 
4) What has been the impact of European constitutionalism on ex ante 
review with many actors involved in the preview process? 
 
If we perform a conceptual analysis on the primary question, we should 
first look at the main concepts, namely the legislative process and the 
fundamental rights. Regarding the legislative process, I refer to the law-
making process of the EU. I chiefly concentrate on the ordinary legislative 
procedure under the Lisbon Treaty.3 This can be justified with the temporal 
restriction of this study - it focuses on the post-Lisbon era. I will tackle the 
legislative process in a rather straightforward fashion and present how ex ante 
review is conducted in an order of the legislative process. The presentation is 
therefore process-oriented instead of an institution-specific solution, since a 
procedural approach is more viable than too rigid an institution-specific 
approach. In addition, work economic reasons frame this choice. What I do 
not study is the EU decision-making process as such. Even though the ordinary 
legislative procedure is a focus of this dissertation it is unintended to represent 
the sole topic addressed. In addition to procedural aspects, the research 
discusses much in terms of substance, fundamental rights and their role in 
legislation. 
 
This dissertation does not cover fundamental rights en bloc - the overall 
umbrella of an important group of general principles of EU law. The idea is to 
concentrate on a quite restricted number of substantive fundamental rights in 
the context of concrete EU legislative dossiers. It is quite natural that 
coherence needs to be built in linking the discussion to the EU regime of 
                                                 
3 Special legislative procedures are largely excluded from the analysis. The same also goes for 
comitology and delegated acts, which represent very different forms of legislative process from the 
ordinary legislative procedure.  
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fundamental rights and the legislative procedure. The presented question 
suggests that I concentrate on legislative dossiers falling under Title V of 
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU): the Area of 
Freedom, Security and Justice (AFSJ). This choice can be justified with the 
fact that the fundamental rights related problems and issues are most often 
encountered in the AFSJ files. Before the Lisbon Treaty this was the case with 
the former third pillar issues. The focus on AFSJ files is also warranted because 
after the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, far-reaching institutional 
changes have been introduced into the decision-making in this field with the 
European Parliament's (EP) enhanced role as the co-legislator.4 
 
Many of the case studies fall within the category of anti-terrorism legal 
instruments. These pieces of legislation in the field of anti-terrorism are very 
sensitive from the point of view of fundamental rights. Experience from these 
examples has shown that very often these legal acts can be problematic with 
regard to data protection. There are, however, also other legislative dossiers 
falling under the AFSJ that have been tackled in this study. The reason for this 
is that they demonstrate some common lines in the institutional changes in 
relation to ex ante review. Furthermore, the aim has been to get some critical 
mass for the analysis instead of having only one or two cases in the analysis.  
 
The novelty of the research is therefore the overarching focus on how the 
key institutions involved in the EU legislative process carry out ex ante review 
instead of the traditional focus on ex post review of the CJEU. This study 
should therefore be considered as a new opening towards ex ante review of 
fundamental rights at the EU level. It also aims at contributing to linking the 
practical ex ante review in the legislative process to the wider theoretical 
framework of European constitutional pluralism. I will argue that this budding 
form of ex ante review has in very recent times become an integral part of EU 
legislative process and contributed to taking fundamental rights seriously in 
law-making. We can identify especially the advantage of having in place a 
system of checks and balances with regard to fundamental rights, which in my 
view has been a beneficial way to guarantee that if one institution omits a 
fundamental rights aspect of a draft EU legal instrument, there will be another 
institution to fill the gap by providing positions promoting fundamental rights. 
We have a reason to state that ex ante review is no longer in an embryonic 
form. We must nonetheless admit that change does not happen overnight and 
in some cases the CJEU has been forced to step in to the scene to remedy the 
situation when the legislature has not secured compliance with fundamental 
rights during the legislative proceedings. 
 
 
The issue of permissible limitations to fundamental rights is of utmost 
importance for the output of this study. I first of all present the general context 
where permissible limitations find their way to the EU drafting phase of 
                                                 
4 In spite of this conscious limitation I have not entirely excluded other pieces of EU legislation 
because also in the sectorial legislation in other policy areas, fundamental rights problems may become 
real. Such problems can often go unnoticed in these legislative files with no direct and obvious link to 
fundamental rights. 
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legislation. The presentation not only derives from European law as it stands, 
most notably Article 52(1) of the Charter, but equally importantly from the 
interpretation practice of the CJEU and European Court of Human Rights 
(ECtHR). By the same token legal research aiming at systematization of 
general dogmas regarding permissible limitations have been precious for 
visualizing the environment, in which permissible limitations are considered 
and operated. Furthermore, as for the case of proportionality, permissible 
limitations deriving from general dogmas will be set in the context of the 
concrete EU legislative dossiers.  In light of the selected concrete examples, 
the importance of testing permissible limitations to fundamental rights will be 
shown. As the analysis draws to a close, we will be able to conclude that tests 
for permissible limitations carried out in the EU ex ante review have had a 
great impact on the final outcomes of legislative processes regarding various 
EU legal acts. The analysis focuses on proportionality, in particular. As will be 
demonstrated, proportionality has not been a mere principle to be taken into 
account in the law-making process but has indeed proved a gatekeeper with a 
decisive function of determining whether a draft legal act will be passed or not.  
 
The test of permissible limitations is essential as a framework for the analysis. 
This is due to the fact that most of the fundamental rights set out in the Charter 
are subject to limitations and this is why the test can be utilized as yardstick in 
assessing the impact of substantive fundamental rights on legislation. 
Permissible limitations hence function as both analytic and systematic as well 
as a practical tool in tackling the research questions.5 
 
Despite the fact that permissible limitations - i.e. negative obligations - are a 
key element in this study, I will also embark on the issue of positive 
obligations. The focus of this presentation has clearly been set on negative 
obligations, but for the realization of fundamental rights positive obligations 
imposed on the EU legislature to promote fundamental rights in the legislation 
in different ways is equally important. The first sub-question is related exactly 
to limitation and promotion of fundamental rights. In the analysis the 
practical tools that are being used by the EU institutions in ex ante review will 
be revealed with a view to assessing the limitation and promotion of 
fundamental rights in the selected EU legislative files.   
 
The second sub-question of this dissertation focuses on the effectiveness of ex 
ante review carried out by different EU institutions. The answers provided are 
intended to shed light on changes made to EU legislative texts in the course of 
ex ante review of fundamental rights. I aim to identify how different EU 
institutions have removed problematic issues from the legal texts and 
addressed fundamental rights-related concerns in the ex ante review.  
 
                                                 
5 The opinion of the FRA on Passenger Name Record is a neat illustration of the application of the 
permissible limitation test, not least because on p. 6 the FRA notes that the impact assessment of the 
Commission Services did not specifically mention this test and accordingly, the Agency regarded 
requirements for limitations of fundamental rights as meriting a deeper analysis in this context. Opinion 
of the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights on the Proposal for a Directive on the use of 
Passenger Name Record (PNR) data for the prevention, detection, investigation and prosecution of 
terrorist offences and serious crime. Vienna 14 June 2011. 
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The third sub-question stems from the primary question to a large extent and 
is intended to identify the impacts of ex ante review of fundamental rights on 
power relations of the institutions. The goal is to determine the recent 
developments in terms of continuity and change, thus the analysis must be of 
a more general nature. It should also be noted that this question is not 
answered by providing an institution-specific analysis. Conclusions to be 
presented rather spring from the legislative process as positions of the 
institutions are analyzed in the course of the law-making process in a 
chronological order. Due to the need to focus mainly on the prevailing primary 
question I have chosen to give somewhat less attention to this secondary, but 
nevertheless interesting, question. 
 
The fourth sub-question tackles the impacts of pluralistic European 
constitutionalism on the emerging ex ante review at the EU level. Here, I seek 
to address the interrelationship between ex ante review and ex post review. 
Furthermore, the relations between different forms of ex ante review 
conducted by institutions and stakeholders involved in the EU legislative 
process will be touched upon. The aim is to reveal different types of co-
operation between institutions that are springing from the pluralistic 
European constitutionalism on one hand, and contributing to strengthening it 
on the other. 
 
An overview will be made of interplay of democracy and fundamental rights 
within the frame of different models of constitutional review, be they vested in 
parliamentary organs or the courts. This point is pertinent with regard to the 
primary research question. It should also be noted that the intention is not to 
engage in a deeply theoretical discussion, but rather to offer some practical 
insights into different methods of ex ante review. An in-depth analysis would 
have required a very theoretical approach. In this presentation I have chosen 
the approach of tackling the issue in a more general way. I consider that 
changes in the institutional relations springing from ex ante review of 
fundamental rights are extremely important and that is why this evolution 
deserves to be discussed in even more detail.  
 
In practical terms, I will examine how legal texts have changed in the course 
of EU legislative process. This means starting from the initial legislative 
proposals and going through consecutive amendments, comparing different 
text versions with each other, looking at legal discourses utilized by different 
EU institutions and bodies, and analyzing the impact of different positions in 
light of final legal texts. The analysis will be carried out based on rights, taking 
into account proportionality and the test of permissible limitations to 
fundamental rights. The hypothesis, at this point, assumes that the 
fundamental rights in legal texts have strengthened overall during the last 
years.  
 
In connection with the analysis on evolving legislative texts, one inevitably 
comes across with the issue of competence.6 Nonetheless, the analysis of the 
                                                 
6 Pursuant to Article 5 (1) of TEU "The limits of Union competences are governed by the principle of 
conferral. The use of Union competences is governed by the principles of subsidiarity and 
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selected cases from the angle of competence is intentionally excluded from this 
thesis. Instead, the topic will be approached from the perspective of 
fundamental rights. 
 
It is necessary to stress that I am operating at the EU level for this analysis, 
thus I do not study the national preparation of EU legislative initiatives, 
including the review of their compatibility with fundamental rights. Brief 
excursive remarks in this regard have, however, been made in the 
presentation. 
 
 
3. Sources, methodology and key concepts 
 
Fundamental rights, a body of substantive fundamental rights deriving from 
the EUCFR and the ECHR and the interpretation practice of the CJEU and the 
ECtHR, provide a critical normative framework for analysis of the EU 
legislative process. This framework builds especially on the Charter and as a 
consequence, in accordance with Article 52(3) of the Charter, also the role of 
ECHR is essential. The analytical-descriptive perspective of the study means 
that I will describe the phenomena relevant for this study and analyze their 
substance and impacts. An example could be a legislative proposal, which will 
be analyzed from the angle of different EU institutions' positions in the 
framework of law-making process. 
 
For the analysis of law in action it seems to be the case that a jurist’s toolkit 
is simply not good enough. When we try to get below the surface of law-making 
process, methods and scientific tools of social and political science prove 
especially useful and valuable. This is clearly due to the extremely political 
nature of legislative processes in the EU, with many EU institutions and other 
significant players involved in the multi-level process of EU regulation. The 
law-in-action component discusses to impact assessments in particular, an 
important source material for this study. A brief mapping exercise on 
durations of AFSJ legislative processes has also been carried out. For these 
reasons, this study finds its home-base somewhere in the intersection of law 
and political science. Even though this research can be positioned in between 
several branches of law, notably European Union law, constitutional law and 
international law, “the school” which this research has perhaps the closest link 
to is that of European constitutional law. This study focuses particularly on 
constitutional elements in safeguarding fundamental rights, especially in the 
EU. It can also be regarded to be of interdisciplinary nature due to its links to 
political science.  
 
                                                 
proportionality". The EU competence can be exclusive competence but also, and more often, shared 
competence with the Member States. The Union exclusive competences are defined in Article 3 and 
shared competence with Member States in Article 4 of TFEU. There is also a third but minor category of 
competence, namely supporting competence that is set out in Article 6 of TFEU. The extent and limits of 
the EU competence is always governed by the Treaty and consequently it is the CJEU that is the ultimate 
interpreter of the limits of the EU competence on a case-by-case basis in light of the Treaty. 
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Due to its legal-empirical character, this study is somewhat different from 
studies inspired by traditional legal dogmatics. It is a humble attempt to bring 
a quite novel approach to a field of research dominated by legal dogmatism.7  
In light of the results of the study it is rather easy to disagree with the views 
presented mostly in past times highlighting the need to exclude empirical 
elements from the research on constitutional law.8  In my opinion, empirical 
research can bring added value to the discipline of constitutional law. In the 
following tome, a strong emphasis has been placed on the legislative process 
per se, and thus a very close link exists with legislative studies. Throughout 
this study I strive to merge theory and practice. In the pursuit of this goal, 
theories and studies on constitutional review have proved essential. Therefore, 
I sincerely hope that this thesis provides inputs to all disciplines interested in 
fundamental rights in the EU framework.  
 
In order to gain some idea of the other sources used, the material may be 
divided into five main categories. First, we have to deal with the legislation 
itself. For a study on EU law, both primary and secondary EU legislation is 
needed. The constantly-present constitutional and fundamental rights angle 
requires observing the primary EU law, the Treaties. Secondary EU legislation, 
such as Directives are analyzed when we approach the sectorial AFSJ policies 
and the related legal instruments. This is the black-letter law part of the study. 
Second, we need to take onboard the analysis on travaux préparatoires of 
these EU legal instruments. This is the phase where the ex ante control of 
fundamental rights is present. Travaux préparatoires relevant for this topic 
is the preparatory material produced by the institutions involved in the 
legislative process – the initiator of EU legislation; the Commission and the 
co-legislators; the Council and the EP.9 Third, the EU is a legal system 
constructed above all on court jurisdiction although at different levels. 
Therefore, court cases by various courts, most notably the CJEU, the ECtHR 
and national constitutional courts have been used. This is certainly important, 
regardless of the focus being set on the ex ante control. Fourth, even though 
the legal and practical value of statements and opinions of the EU Agency for 
Fundamental Rights (FRA) is not yet completely clear, the inputs of FRA can 
also be considered to fall within this group due to their strong steering effect 
                                                 
7 For a classical notion of constitutional law it is worth quoting Georg Jellinek who found that "die 
Staatsrechtslehre ist, wie bereits erwähnt, eine Normwissenschaft. Ihre Normen sind von den Aussagen 
über das Sein des Staates als sozialer Erscheinung scharf zu trennen". Jellinek Georg: Allgemeine 
Staatslehre. Zweite, durchgesehene und vermehrte Auflage. Verlag von O. Häring. Berlin 1905, p. 49. In 
the same vein, Jellinek continues on the dogmatic content of legal norms making a sharp distinction 
between juridical method and methods springing from other disciplines: "Allein der dogmatische Gehalt 
der Rechtsnormen kann nur durch die ausschliefslich vom Juristen geübte Kunst der Abstraktion aus 
den rechtlichen Erscheinungen und der Deduktion aus den also gefundenen Normen geübt werden. 
Diese Rechtsdogmatik ist durch andersgeartete Wissenschaft nicht zu ersetzen." Ibid.       
8 Compare with Jellinek, "Alle Untersuchungen über empirische, biologische, 
naturwissenschaftliche, soziologische Behandlungsweise des Staatsrechtes betreffen in Wahrheit die 
soziale Staatslehre. Für das Staatsrecht gilt aber nur die juristische Methode.", p. 50. 
9 Examples of this are for instance the Commission’s impact assessments and explanatory 
memoranda, the EP reports on EU legislative dossiers, the proposed EP amendments and Council 
preparatory documents. The use of Council preparatory material is however somewhat complicated due 
to limited access to documents. This should not, nevertheless, prevent us from addressing the whole 
scale of EU legislative work on the AFSJ. It should be noted that in the EU generally the value attached 
to travaux préparatoires in interpretation is not that significant as in some national legal systems. This 
material however can be regarded as an important expression of the political will of the legislator. 
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in the legislative process. FRA contributions have a significant impact on the 
outcomes of ex ante review mechanisms of the EU, most notably within the EP 
preview procedures. The effect of EP statements and opinions is therefore 
important but predominantly of indirect nature. In the discussed data 
protection EU files, the opinions and comments of the EDPS are of great 
relevance for this study and they have been used to a large extent.10 Fifth, we 
can distinguish the group of legally non-binding sources, such as 
communications of the Commission, Council Conclusions and EP resolutions. 
Although these documents lack legal effect, they very often reflect the political 
objectives and upcoming or envisaged legal initiatives. For example, in the 
impact assessment work these non-binding instruments may function as 
important practical tools in everyday analysis on legal instruments. Relevant 
research literature on EU fundamental rights and law-making in the EU forms 
a considerable part of the research material.  
 
Much has been written about fundamental rights in the context of the EU. 
A great number of studies concerning enforcement of these rights under the 
auspices of the EU already exist. However, an area that has not attracted that 
much attention is related to soft-law-oriented mechanisms that aim to protect 
and promote fundamental rights in the EU already at the preparatory phase of 
legislation. Some general studies describe the fundamental rights regime of 
the EU, of which especially one is worth mentioning. The EU and human rights 
edited by Philip Alston et al. is perhaps, even today, the most exhaustive study 
on fundamental rights in the EU, touching on several topical issues in this field 
of research.11 It is clear that interest in fundamental rights aspects of European 
Union law has increased significantly during the last decade or so. This can be 
seen especially in the increasing number of academic dissertations on this 
topic. As a consequence I have been able to take advantage of the results of 
these studies concerning this important area of European constitutional law.12 
As this research is stressing constitutional aspects of EU law I have used a great 
extent of existing research literature on European constitutional law, of which 
numerous examples could be mentioned. However, I will simply reference one 
distinguished scholar, Joseph Weiler, whose works have been of great help to 
me in understanding the nature of European constitutionalism especially and 
the specific question of final authority in EU law. 
 
The national control of EU fundamental rights is also addressed in this 
dissertation; In this context especially Juha Lavapuro’s dissertation  is 
considered due to analogies that can be drawn from review of national systems 
of constitutional control adapted to the EU level. The dissertation study of 
                                                 
10 It is also possible to identify material at the national level that can in practical terms be juxtaposed 
with court rulings. This is the case with opinions and statements of the bodies conferred with 
constitutional powers in the preparatory phase of legislation, such as the Finnish CLC. In practice 
opinions and statements have strong impact in the constitutional control system. Moreover, this kind of 
material is very helpful in analyzing the ex ante review mechanisms at the national level. 
11 Alston Philip et al. (eds.): The EU and Human Rights. Oxford University Press. Oxford 1999. This 
book is, nevertheless, starting to be outdated mainly because of constitutional changes that have taken 
place or are currently occurring within the EU legal architecture. 
12 Human rights in international law are a topic of which one can find remarkably more source 
material for a legal study. This is not least because human rights have been an issue in international law 
much longer than in the EU law. 
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interest covers the new constitutional review of fundamental rights, where the 
scope has been set on the fundamental rights review mechanisms at the 
national level in Finland.13 Lavapuro’s focuses on the recent changes in the 
fundamental rights review in Finland also effectively covering the 
international and European impacts of these international and supranational 
impacts on the Finnish system, although these aspects are not directly the 
scope of the study. In addition to its institutional approach, the work also 
presents interesting argumentation in the margins of dimensions related to 
fundamental rights and democracy. 
 
The research literature that has been used in order to capture the 
institutional framework has dealt with general EU law and also the particular 
EU institutions at stake in the ex ante review of fundamental rights in the EU 
legislative process. Previous research in the field of ex ante review is relatively 
scarce and it has centred more on the national systems of ex ante review. A lot 
has been written about judicial review aspects at the European level and the 
research has concentrated on the one hand on the CJEU and on the other hand 
the national courts, most importantly the prestigious constitutional courts of 
some Member States. So far one has looked more or less in vain for studies on 
ex ante review carried out by the EU legislative institutions. There are, 
however, quite recent example studies on European law with focus on 
constitutionalization and law-making. In particular the Constitutionalization 
of European Private Law by Hans-Wolfgang Micklitz deserves to be 
mentioned, but there are also other interesting strands of research in this 
regard.14 This is especially true when it comes to the novel domain of the 
Lisbon Treaty, the AFSJ. The EU legislation being the backbone for the 
analysis of this study, it is clear that general studies on law-making process of 
the EU as such are of great importance.15 Despite the fact that the AFSJ has so 
far been of less academic interest, simply because of its brief existence, it is 
possible to turn to previous research on the former third pillar matters– very 
often due to the palpable sensitivity of its legislation from the point of view of 
fundamental rights.16 
 
The most important theoretical contribution that this thesis has benefited 
from comes from the debate on new models of constitutional control that took 
place at the turn of the millennium. The forerunners in this debate were, above 
                                                 
13 Lavapuro Juha: Uusi perustuslakikontrolli. Suomalalainen lakimiesyhdistys. Helsinki 2010. 
14 Micklitz Hans-Wolfgang: Constitutionalization of European Private Law. Oxford University Press. 
Oxford 2014. For interesting insights into the impact of EUCFR on the EU law-making see also Di 
Federico Giacomo (Ed.): EU Charter of Fundamental Rights: From Declaration to Binding Instrument. 
Springer Netherlands. Dordrecht 2011. Equally intriguing an article in this sense is Muir Elise: The 
Fundamental Rights Implications of EU legislation. Some Constitutional Challenges. Common Market 
Law Review 51. 2014.  
15 For concise presentations on the ordinary legislative procedure of the EU see Craig Paul and De 
Búrca Grainne: The Evolution of EU Law. Second Edition. Oxford University Press. Oxford 2011. and 
Hartley T.C. The Foundations of European Union Law. Seventh Edition. Oxford University Press. Oxford 
2010. Anna Hyvärinen offers in her article fresh insights into the ordinary legislative procedure by 
unveiling also interesting practices in the legislative procedure that are not necessarily evident if one 
only reads the relevant EU primary law provisions. See Hyvärinen Anna: Lainsäätäminen Euroopan 
unionissa - säännöt ja käytännöt. Defensor Legis 6/2012. 
16 A good example of a quite recent study on the evolution, or even revolution, of the former third 
pillar and its transformation into the AFSJ is Hinarejos Alicia: Judicial Control in the European Union: 
Reforming Jurisdiction in the Intergovernmental Pillar. Oxford University Press. Oxford 2009. 
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all, Stephen Gardbaum and Ran Hirschl, who particularly touched upon the 
constitutional control in the axis of sovereignty of the Parliament and judicial 
review.17 They elaborated the change in this scale towards judicial review, also 
drawing attention to the idea of some hybrid models of constitutional control 
that aim to provide middle ground in terms of constitutional control. This 
happens by not vesting the control too deeply into either of these counter-poles 
exercising review, be that ex ante or ex post. The model constructed by 
Gardbaum especially emphasizes the importance of pluralism and 
constitutional dialogue and it is a useful tool when approaching the multitude 
of EU institutions and their role in the ex ante review of fundamental rights. 
This leads us then to handle the next topic, namely the often problematic 
relationship between democracy and fundamental rights. This harkens back 
to models that are in place in the pre-adoption and the judicial phases of 
constitutional control. Research on these topics has been highly valuable and 
in this connection I have also often encountered the democracy deficit of the 
EU. This is the case when I have tried to illustrate the status of democratic 
control over the legislative process on EU legislative dossiers that in this case 
have had a direct link to the sensitive sphere of fundamental rights. 
 
Research on Finnish constitutional law has also been included to this study 
where research on the role of the CLC of the Finnish Parliament that is in a 
pivotal position in the interpretation of the Finnish constitution vis-à-vis 
European legislation is of great significance in particular.18 Especially articles 
and books by Tuomas Ojanen have been a constant source of inspiration in 
this sense. The Finnish experience of ex ante review of legislation has a lot to 
offer also to the European discussion on fundamental rights and intermediary 
models in rights-based review. Even though many national circumstances 
steer the functioning of the Finnish system, we can also identify some useful 
elements that can be utilized in a wider European context. Finnish studies on 
ex ante review and the CLC can offer an interesting surface against which 
European fundamental rights questions and systems of preview can be 
reflected. The same goes for the Finnish test of permissible limitations to 
fundamental rights, where the research of Veli-Pekka Viljanen must be paid 
tribute to, in particular.19    
 
Before we address the previously-presented research questions, it is 
necessary to resolve the conceptual apparatus that will be used in this study. 
The research concerns fundamental and human rights. One really cannot 
make a distinction between human rights and fundamental rights because 
these rights constitute a wholeness of rights, which is basically of undivided 
nature.20 Considering fundamental and human rights as a mutually exclusive 
                                                 
17 See Gardbaum Stephen: New Commonwealth Model of Constitutionalism. The American Journal 
of Comparative Law. Volume 49. Nr. 4, 2001 and Hirschl Ran: Towards Juristocracy. The Origins and 
Consequences of New Constitutionalism. Harvard University Press. Cambridge, Massachusetts, 2004. 
18 After the Finnish accession to the EU in 1995 more and more attention in the discipline of law has 
been paid to the Europeanization of the Finnish law. In the focus in this development have been the 
fundamental rights whose development has undergone different remarkable turns due to the impacts of 
EU law and also the ECHR fundamental rights system. 
19 Viljanen Veli-Pekka: Perusoikeuksien rajoitusedellytykset. WSOY. Helsinki 2001.  
20 It may be recalled that it is stated in paragraph 5 of the Vienna Declaration and the Programme 
of Action adopted in the World Conference on Human Rights on 14-25 June 1993 that: “All human rights 
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dichotomy is thus futile. There are, however, differences in the utilization of 
these concepts. Many scholars in this field of law have utilized the concept of 
human rights in their studies instead of fundamental rights. The difference 
between the two concepts has been explained, for example as follows: “human 
rights are of universal nature, i.e. are generally taken granted to everyone 
within a State’s jurisdiction while some of the EU’s ‘fundamental rights’ that 
originate from the general principles of law in some cases only belong to the 
EU citizens”.21 Consequently, the EU system of protection has faced criticism, 
especially regarding the condition of an individual to be a citizen of an EU 
Member State in order to be able to enjoy fundamental rights safeguarded by 
the EU. Another issue is the need of the case concerned to have a sufficient 
link to EU law. This situation is somewhat different from the system of 
protection provided, for example, by the ECHR system. However, it is 
characteristic for the EU system to link granting certain rights only for 
citizens.22 Although this distinction remains valid, I have decided to use the 
term “fundamental rights” throughout the study. 
 
Fundamental rights include several substantive fundamental rights. For 
the reason of work economy, these will not all be discussed here, however due 
to the importance of at least the right to data protection, the right to privacy 
and the prohibition of discrimination need to be discussed in a more detailed 
manner. This is mainly because of the significance of these rights for the 
legislative dossiers utilized in this thesis. It is important to acknowledge that 
some substantial fundamental rights have a stronger impact on fundamental 
rights than others. For example, the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (ICCPR) and International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights (ICESCR) could be used to evaluate these rights. 
 
The impacts of fundamental rights can be quite different depending on the 
angle from which they are being viewed. It is quite evident that impacts on the 
legislator and the process of preparing legislation can vary from effects that 
fundamental rights may have on the courts. This means that the approach that 
has been accepted as the point of departure in this study differs from the 
traditional dogmatic approaches focusing on judicial activities and 
interpretations of the courts. We should not, however, omit this part of the 
legal cycle, as it provides important signals to the legislator in addition to the 
normative framework of the written EU law. In this case we should also briefly 
touch upon the form of fundamental rights. We can make a distinction 
between prohibitions of something and rights to something. In relation to 
prohibitions we should note that there are absolute fundamental rights, which 
                                                 
are universal, indivisible and interdependent and interrelated. The international community must treat 
human rights globally in a fair and equal manner, on the same footing, and with the same emphasis. 
While the significance of national and regional particularities and various historical, cultural and 
religious backgrounds must be borne in mind, it is the duty of States, regardless of their political, 
economic and cultural systems, to promote and protect all human rights and fundamental freedoms”. 
21 Leino-Sandberg Päivi: Particularity as Universality. The Politics of Human Rights in the European 
Union. University of Helsinki. Helsinki 2005. p. 23. 
22 When dealing with fundamental rights protection in the EU there are some major differences in 
even EU Member States’ notions of fundamental rights although the EU can be regarded as a culturally 
and historically unified actor in this field, at least at a general level. For discussion on the differences in 
conception of human rights in light of good examples see ibid., pp. 75-115.  
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cannot be interfered.23   In other fundamental rights, the EU legislator has a 
wider room for manoeuvre. 
 
On the non-derogable nature of certain fundamental rights, one should 
start by studying the emergency clauses of the ICCPR. In fact, Article 4 of the 
ICCPR only enables restricted possibilities to derogate from the obligations24. 
According to this provision, non-discrimination is indeed the gatekeeper when 
considering whether to open the door for derogation.25 In this context, we 
should also pay attention to the form of these fundamental rights. We can 
distinguish between fundamental rights set out in the form of prohibitions and 
fundamental rights provided in the form of positive obligations. The latter can, 
for example, oblige the legislator to take action in order to promote or 
contribute to the realization of fundamental rights in its activities. These 
activities can include, for instance, legislation or budgetary decisions. 
 
Fundamental rights issues may emerge eventually in the adjudicative 
phase, either in a national court or in the CJEU. National courts may and 
sometimes are obliged to lodge a preliminary reference to the CJEU with 
regard to accomplishing harmonious interpretation of EU law.26 What effect, 
then, do fundamental rights have on policy-making of the EU and the EU 
Member States and the interpretation practice of the CJEU? Some major 
factors can be identified when considering the CJEU interpretation practice. 
Fundamental rights may have a function of an aid in the interpretation 
practice. Furthermore, fundamental rights as general principles of EU law can 
be regarded as grounds for judicial review of EU instruments.27 In this regard, 
fundamental rights also apply when EU Member States are implementing EU 
measures at a national level28 as well as in circumstances dealing with EU 
Member States’ derogations from the EU competition rules29. 
 
 
4. The structure of the dissertation 
 
The dissertation can be divided into three main parts. Part I provides an 
introduction to the whole research and leads the reader to the green pastures 
of the normative framework and theory relevant for this study. Part I thus 
                                                 
23 In the EUCFR we can pinpoint above all Articles 4 (prohibition of torture and inhuman or 
degrading treatment or punishment), Article 5 (prohibition of slavery and forced labour), Article 19 
(protection in the event of removal, expulsion or extradition) and Article 21 (non-discrimination). 
24 It is set out in Article 4, paragraph 1 “In time of public emergency which threatens the life of the 
nation and the existence of which is officially proclaimed, the States Parties to the present Covenant may 
take measures derogating from their obligations under the present Covenant to the extent strictly 
required by the exigencies of the situation, provided that such measures are not inconsistent with their 
other obligations under international law and do not involve discrimination solely on the ground of race, 
colour, sex, language, religion or social origin”. 
25 It is worth remembering that ICCPR explicitly prohibits derogations under this emergency clause 
in relation to certain key Articles of the Covenant. 
26 For CJEU case law on conformity in interpretation of EC law see such cases as C-14/83 Von 
Colson, C-157/86 Mary Murphy, C-106/89 Marleasing and C-91/92 Faccini Dori. 
27 For further clarification see Tridimas Takis: General Principles of EC Law. Oxford University 
Press. Oxford 1999, pp. 23-27. 
28 See C-5/88 Wachauf. 
29 See C-260/89 ERT. 
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paves the way for Part II of the research, which is in a way the "steak" of the 
study. It builds on this general part of the study and examines law in action 
with the means of concrete EU legislative files. Part II can be regarded as an 
applied case study or rather as a collection of several legislative case studies. 
This is the legal-empirical part. The theory presented in part I will be in 
practical terms interconnected with concrete legislative files. Instead of 
focusing on one or two legislative files I have chosen another approach: In 
order to have a critical mass to illuminate continuity and change in this field 
of research, the number of main cases is altogether seven. The thesis will draw 
to a close in the concluding Part III. In Part III, the time is ripe to present de 
lege ferenda conclusions and findings that the study has given rise to. 
Furthermore, concrete proposals of how to develop ex ante review in the EU 
will be touched upon. Part I is launched by introducing the EU legislative 
process, which functions as the starting point for analysing the phases where 
and how ex ante review is carried out.  
 
The challenge of this study is to establish a link between the theoretically 
oriented Part I and the practical Part II, which presents concrete legislative 
dossiers. I have tried to "facilitate the dialogue" between these two main 
elements of the study by applying the theory of Part I to these legislative files. 
The interaction of the two parts reveals some interesting insights into the 
recent development of the AFSJ specifically that go back to such important 
issues as institutional balance, competence, democratic legitimacy and effects 
of some substantive fundamental rights on the law-making process as such. 
The connection between the balancing of fundamental rights and due 
requirements for their limitation will be illustrated. Light will also be shed on 
the issue of how the impacts of fundamental rights on the legislator differ from 
the impacts on the courts. As we will see, there is a clear difference between 
these two forms of impacts and it is relatively easy to enter a caveat to the 
notion highlighting the unity of the two aspects.  
 
"The own voice of the study" can mainly be heard in Part II, which sets the 
selected EU legislative dossiers in the normative framework consisting of 
fundamental rights. As will be demonstrated at a later stage, very often the 
issues of proportionality and permissible limitations have played a significant 
role in fundamental right considerations of different EU bodies involved in the 
EU decision-making. The contribution of this study to the scientific discussion 
on this topic therefore emerges in Part II and the final conclusions presented 
in Part III. The hypothesis at this stage would be that the ex ante review of 
fundamental rights is about to break through to the EU system of protection 
of fundamental rights. I will be arguing that the development can be 
constructed by reflecting concrete legislative exercises within the frame of 
theoretical and normative models regarding proportionality, permissible 
limitations and positive obligations. All this can be considered as a 
contribution to the strengthening of institutionally pluralistic and rights-
based ex ante review of fundamental rights and hence also the democratization 
of fundamental rights in the EU.  A ubiquitous issue, which in many ways 
determines the structural choices made in this study, is the procedural 
approach focusing on the subsequent steps of the EU legislative process. 
Despite the above described two-fold basic structure, the EU law-making 
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process is the general idea, which in a cross-cutting way gives the form to the 
presentation.  
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PART ONE: GENERAL FRAMEWORK 
OF ANALYSIS 
 
II SETTING THE SCENE 
 
1. The evolution of fundamental rights protection 
in the EU: A short introduction 
 
The EU legal system is indeed one of its kind with such fundamental 
doctrines as the direct effect and supremacy/primacy of EU law.30 EU law is 
supreme to the national law even if the conflicting norms deal with a norm of 
the EU law and a constitutional provision of an EU Member State.31 The EU 
legal system carries an effective judicial control mechanism because the CJEU 
manages this task and sanctions have been put in place for not complying with 
EU law. Liability is the ultima ratio in securing compliance.32 
 
The story of the evolution of the fundamental rights regime in the EC/EU 
legal order is well known. Nevertheless, we must be retrospective in order to 
have prospective views on the future developments. Fundamental rights have 
their roots deep in the historical European soil.33 For a long time, this 
development was largely due to the activism of the CJEU. As a consequence of 
several bold judgments of the Court, fundamental rights guaranteed by 
constitutional traditions of Member States, the European Convention on 
Human Rights and international human rights agreements have, over time, 
become accepted as general principles of EC/EU law. Only later did these 
fundamental rights become codified in the Charter. The turning point in many 
respects was the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty on 1 December 2009 and 
the subsequent change in the status of the EUCFR from a legally non-binding 
document to legally binding set of provisions with the position of primary EU 
law. The Treaty of Lisbon and the elevation of the status of the EUCFR is also 
the starting point of this study notwithstanding the importance of the 
development fundamental rights in the EU law.  
 
As the European Community legal system began to be developed, 
fundamental rights did not play a very central role. The first cases concerning 
the protection of fundamental rights were dealt with by the Court of Justice of 
the ECSC. The landmark ruling of the Court in case Stork made it quite evident 
that fundamental rights fell outside the scope of the then still emerging 
Community law.34 The absence of fundamental rights was not merely due to 
                                                 
30 Case C-26/62 Van Gend en Loos and Case C- 6/64 Costa v ENEL.  
31 See case C-35/76 Simmenthal. 
32 See cases C-6/90 Francovich and C-46/93 Brasserie du Pêcheur. 
33 It should be noted that the WWII experience solidified the need to protect human rights at the 
international level since during the war, nation-states had executed unbelievable and extreme atrocities 
in the name of racist ideologies but also disguised behind the ideas of national sovereignty and exclusive 
national jurisdiction. Lauren Paul Gordon: The Evolution of International Human Rights. Visions seen. 
University of Pennsylvania Press. Philadelphia 1998.  p. 139. 
34 Case C-1/58 Stork. 
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the way that judge-made law evolved, but because it was not present in the 
primary law of the Communities. The text of the ECSC Treaty was quite limited 
in its scope and lacked considerable fundamental rights provisions. The 
emphasis of EC Treaty, then, was mainly on the economic domain with a view 
to making the four freedoms a reality. The Treaty was largely silent on issues 
related directly to fundamental rights.35 
 
In the late 1960s, the CJEU took the first steps to construct the doctrine of 
fundamental rights as general principles of EC law.36 First, in its praxis the 
CJEU raised the constitutions of Member States as sources whence these 
fundamental rights in the EC legal framework derive. Second, the CJEU stated 
that international agreements are regarded as sources of these rights. The 
ECHR was given a special status in this regard. However, this bold and far-
reaching manoeuvre was soon to receive a counter-reaction, especially from 
the Italian and German constitutional courts, mainly due to the absence of a 
written catalogue of fundamental rights at the EC level. There is, however, no 
need to engage in a presentation of the dialogue between the CJEU and 
national constitutional courts on the relation between EU law and national 
law37 nor the discussion with ECtHR on the relation between EU fundamental 
rights and the ECHR38. 
 
 
2. The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights: From a 
political declaration to EU primary law  
 
There are no uniform rules for ex ante review. Attempts thus far in turning 
the tide in this regard have mainly found their expression in the form of soft-
law instruments. This is important because it may often be the case that soft-
law at some point cascades down to hard-law. The EU has paid increasing 
attention to the assessment of how proposals for EU legislation meet the target 
of being in line with fundamental rights during the last few years. Especially 
the EUCFR has proved a major driver in this regard.39 The Charter was 
                                                 
35 We should note that Euratom Treaty lacks fundamental rights provisions and is furthermore quite 
limited in its scope. This being the case, Community law instruments deriving their legal basis from the 
Euratom Treaty are much fewer in number than those springing from the EU Treaty. Therefore the 
Euratom Treaty receives little attention in this presentation. See article Cusack Thomas F.: A Tale of the 
Two Treaties: An Assessment of the Euratom Treaty in relation to the EC Treaty. 40 Common Market 
Law Review 2003.  
36 Regarding the CJEU and the notion of fundamental rights as general principles of EC law, see the 
following CJEU cases: C-29/69  Stauder, C-11/70 Internationale Handelsgesellschaft, C-4/73 Nold, C-
36/75 Rutili and C-44/79 Hauer. 
37 See Frontini (1974), Solange I (1974), Solange II (1986), Brunner v. Maastricht Vertrag (1993). 
38 For notable ECHR cases see Open Door Counselling v Ireland (1992) and Informationsverein 
Lentia v Austria (1993), Matthews v the UK (1999), Bosphorus v Ireland (2005). For important CJEU 
cases, see C-12/86 Demirel, joined cases C-46/87 and C-227/88 Hoechst (Level of protection regarding 
right to be heard in administrative processes and the limits of the right to privacy), C-374/87 Orkem 
(CJEU may adopt views on the interpretation of the ECHR differing from those of the ECtHR) and C-
159/90 Grogan (The level of right to life of the unborn guaranteed by the Irish Constitution vis-à-vis 
economic freedoms/access to services, namely abortion). 
39 The Charter can and should be used in the EU legislative process in the same way as in the 
interpretation practice of the courts. On how judges use the Charter see Eriksen Erik Oddvar, Fossum 
John Erik and Agustín José Menéndez: The Charter in Context. In Eriksen Erik Oddvar, Fossum John 
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adopted in 2000 in the legally non-binding form of a solemn proclamation. 
After that, the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe was submitted for 
Member States’ ratification. As a consequence of the failure to do so, the idea 
of Charter in a legally binding form was revived in the context of the Lisbon 
Treaty. On 1 December the EUCFR became a part of primary EU law. 
 
Marek Safjan pinpoints five important features of the EUCFR: first, in 
addition to its legal significance, it is also an act expressing EU values. Second, 
it has the status of primary law. Third, it can be used for assessing the validity 
of secondary EU law. Fourth, the importance of “connecting points” between 
national law and EU law in the context of application of guarantees set out in 
the EUCFR has been taken up. Fifth, the EUCFR cannot be considered to be 
an autonomous source for EU powers with respect to national systems, nor 
can it be regarded as defining the autonomous field of the application of EU 
law.40   
 
Article 51 of the Charter sets out important normative framework for the 
field of application of the EUCFR: 
Article 51  
Field of application  
1. The provisions of this Charter are addressed to the institutions, bodies, 
offices and agencies of the Union with due regard for the principle of 
subsidiarity and to the Member States only when they are implementing 
Union law. They shall therefore respect the rights, observe the principles and 
promote the application thereof in accordance with their respective powers 
and respecting the limits of the powers of the Union as conferred on it in the 
Treaties.  
2. The Charter does not extend the field of application of Union law 
beyond the powers of the Union or establish any new power or task 
for the Union, or modify powers and tasks as defined in the 
Treaties. 
 
This does not mean that the Charter could not have an impact on the 
legislative process.41 In fact, it is extremely important to note that the Charter 
                                                 
Erik and Agustín José Menéndez (eds.): The Chartering of Europe. The European Charter of 
Fundamental Rights and its Constitutional Implications. Nomos. Baden-Baden 2003, p. 27. 
40 Safjan Marek: Areas of Application of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union: 
Fields of Conflict? EUI Working Papers. LAW 2012/22. Department of Law. p. 2. The usefulness of a 
Kelsenian approach in current constitutional debate on interaction between legal systems can be rather 
found in providing different options in clarifying validity and authority of EU law. See Richmond 
Catherine: Preserving the Identity Crisis: Autonomy, System and Sovereignty in European Law. In 
MacCormick Neil (ed.): Constructing Legal Systems. European Union in Legal Theory. Kluwer. 
Dordrecht 1997. 
41 A valuable research material that is available for researchers on EU policy-making is the 
eurobarometers. All the way since 1973 these surveys have been conducted on behalf of the Commission 
on various policy topics. It is a good way to find out how EU citizens feel about different EU policies. In 
2012 a eurobarometer survey was published with a view to enlightening EU citizens’ attitudes towards 
and notions of the EUCFR. The main finding of this research was that general knowledge on the 
application of the Charter was low among respondents. Furthermore, there was a common tendency to 
consider the EU institutions as having the same redress function as national courts or independent 
bodies. Generally, however, awareness of the Charter had increased compared to the previous survey 
finalized in 2007 before the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty and the change in the legal status of the 
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is binding on the EU institutions. Therefore, the Commission, the Council and 
the EP must comply with the Charter when preparing EU legislation. The 
scope also includes other bodies involved in the legislative process, such as 
FRA. One could even argue that these aspects related to the scope call for a 
reinforced mechanism to comply with the Charter in the EU law-making. In 
the following section I will tackle the issue of how fundamental rights can 
contribute to the acts and behaviour of the EU legislator. Even though the 
Charter does not create new EU competence, we can see that it has an effect 
on the law-making process, both in a positive and a negative fashion. The EU 
now has a written catalogue of fundamental rights, which it lacked in its 
current form in the pre-Lisbon era, but which is now codified in the Treaty. 
For the European legislator the EUCFR will serve as a guideline. What is 
extremely important is to understand that the interpretation practice of the 
CJEU on fundamental rights also occupies a pivotal position in steering the 
activities of the legislator. In this context, we should not forget the ECHR, and 
related case law of the ECtHR, that has had a special impact on the evolution 
of EU law on fundamental rights. 
 
Article 53 of the Charter sets out the level of protection of fundamental 
rights.42 In the context of this dissertation, it is unnecessary to discuss the level 
of protection because once in the EU legislative process, the issues of legal 
basis, subsidiarity and proportionality have been considered adequate. We can 
therefore take it for granted that the level of protection is sufficient. It is 
enough simply to state that very often the EU level of protection has been in 
national discourses considered as some kind of a minimum standard that does 
not hold true.43 
 
 
2.1. Drafting the Charter: aims and purposes 
 
The Charter was drafted by the European Convention building on the 
mandate of the Cologne European Council.44 The codification of the 
fundamental rights into one document was thus focused on in order to provide 
a response to the criticism expressed, for example, by constitutional courts of 
some Member States on the occasion of non-existence of an EU fundamental 
rights catalogue. In this sense, this exercise can be regarded as simplification. 
Conversely, the purpose was to strengthen the visibility and impact of 
                                                 
EUCFR. See Flash Eurobarometer 340. The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. 
Published in April 2012. Conducted by TNS Political & Social at the request of Directorate-General 
Justice. Survey co-ordinated by Directorate-General for Communications, p. 7. 
42 Pursuant to Article 53 of the Charter on the level of protection "nothing in this Charter shall be 
interpreted as restricting or adversely affecting human rights and fundamental freedoms as recognized, 
in their respective fields of application, by Union law and international law and by international 
agreements to which the Union or all the Member States are party, including the European Convention 
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, and by the Member States' 
constitutions". 
43 This has been the case in Finland where, in my opinion, only the right to property and maybe some 
aspects related to transparency like the public access to documents can regarded to be at a  higher level 
of protection than in the EU. Similarly, many other fundamental rights would probably be at a lower 
level in Finland without the current EU and ECHR fundamental right protection regimes. 
44 Cologne European Council Conclusions of 3-4 June 1999 and particularly the Annex IV on the 
Drawing up of a Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.  
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fundamental rights in the face of some major internal fundamental right issues 
being raised in the EU.45  
 
One of the aims of the Charter was to better integrate fundamental rights 
into the legislative work of the Union. The note from the Praesidium is a 
particularly interesting document in relation to aims and purposes of the 
Charter in its initial mode, as it provides explanations to the complete text of 
the Charter. An especially important explanation is related to Article 51 on the 
Scope of the Charter. It is stated in the explanations that "the aim of Article 51 
is to determine the scope of the Charter. It seeks to establish clearly that the 
Charter applies primarily to the institutions and bodies of the Union, in 
compliance with the principle of subsidiarity".46 It follows very clearly from 
this that the EU legislature, consisting of EU institutions, must act in 
compliance and within the framework of the Charter. 
 
One of the key goals of the Charter was to gather the fundamental rights as 
interpreted by the CJEU into one EU document. As was clear at the time of the 
drafting of the Charter, the time for discussion about the legal status of the 
Charter would come later. In fact, this occurred quite soon with the 
intergovernmental conferences related to amending the Treaties during the 
2000's and the work of the European Convention which prepared the 
European Constitutional Treaty that was to be rejected in the French and 
Dutch referenda in 2005. Practical work of the European Convention was 
carried out in Working Group II on Charter.47 
 
 
2.2. The effects of the Charter in the EU's decision-making 
processes in the 2000s 
 
After the solemn proclamation the Charter clearly functioned as guideline 
for both the Court and the EU legislature. The impact of the Charter is more 
visible in the interpretation practice of the Court than in the legislative 
proceedings of the EU legislature. There is one obvious reason for this: The 
Charter as a codification of the Court's fundamental rights doctrine is more an 
expression of the line of the Court than the will of the EU legislature.  
 
                                                 
45 See Shaw Jo: Law of the European Union. Palgrave. Basingstoke 2000, pp. 361-363. It should be 
recalled that in February 2000 fourteen EU Member States took bilateral actions against Austria as a 
result of nomination of the Austrian Federal Government in which also the right wing populist Austrian 
Freedom Party participated. The sanctions which were carried out outside the EU structure were lifted 
in September 2000 after a report by the so-called three wise men recommended putting an end to the 
sanctions. The sanctions against the nomination of the government coalition have been considered to be 
predominantly of political, not of legal nature. See Report by Martti Ahtisaari, Jochen Frowein and 
Marcelino Oreja. Adopted in Paris on 8 September 2000. 
46 Note from the Praesidium. Draft Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. Text of 
the explanations relating to the complete text of the Charter as set out in CHARTE 4487/00 Convent 50. 
CHARTE 4473/00, Brussels 11 October 2000. p. 46. 
47 See Mandate of the Working Group on the Charter. The European Convention. CONV 72/02. 
Brussels 31 May 2002. There were two main aspects in the Working Group's tasks, namely the 
procedures for and consequences of any incorporation of the Charter into the Treaties and the 
consequences of any accession by the Union/Community to the ECHR. 
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From an institutional point of view, we can therefore conclude that the 
Charter played an important role already prior to its entry into force in a legally 
binding form in 2009 in the interpretation practice of the Court. We should 
nonetheless not overdo this impact simply because the Charter per se was 
already an incarnation of the case law of the Court. The bundling of these 
doctrines in an aspirational EU document failed to change the Court's stance 
on fundamental rights. The position of fundamental rights was already strong 
in the EU law before the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty and this was 
mainly thanks to the Court's activism in the field of fundamental rights. 
 
Notably during the 2000’s, especially the CJEU has contributed to this 
development by its adjudication in some landmark rulings. In Schmidberger, 
the CJEU ruled that fundamental rights which were predominantly of a 
general nature prevailed over economic-oriented rights which have been 
considered until now a sacrosanct cornerstone of EU law.48 It would be very 
difficult indeed to imagine that the Court would have adjudicated in a given 
case in a similar manner some 20 years ago. The view presented in 
Schmidberger was further confirmed in case Omega Spielhallen in which the 
Court weighed and balanced between freedom to provide services and rights 
to human dignity and found the case concerned in favour of latter aspects.49 
The Charter, taking into account Advocates General opinions on these cases, 
may also have had an impact in putting "non-economic" fundamental rights 
on an equal footing with other fundamental rights. 
 
The effect of the legally non-binding Charter was much greater in the 
functioning of the EU legislature. At least the proclamation of the Charter gave 
rise to a considerable change in the way how the Commission started to deal 
with fundamental rights in the preparation of EU legislation.  
 
A good example of a matter deriving from the Charter is the 
Communication on compliance with the Charter dating back to 2005.50 This 
Communication draws attention especially to impact assessments in the 
legislative process, but also takes up other viable options in securing 
compliance with fundamental rights at the preparatory phase of the legislative 
process. In the Communication, the Commission identifies the cornerstone 
instruments to be used for making this objective real. The first one is impact 
assessment that must be conducted in connection with legislative initiatives. 
Impact assessments must include an evaluation of the different impacts on 
individual rights. The second aspect deals with explanatory memoranda 
included in the legislative proposals. The Commission finds that the 
explanatory memorandum should contain a section on the legal basis for 
                                                 
48 Case C-112/00 Schmidberger. In this case at issue was weighing and balancing between free 
movement of goods which was the basis of transport company Schmidberger’s argumentation and a 
decision of Austria not to prohibit an environmental protest that caused closure of Brenner motorway 
and thus impeded deliveries of cargo. The CJEU ruled the case in favour of Austria.  
49 C-36/02 Omega Spielhallen. In this judgment, the CJEU referred to its recent case law that has 
highlighted the significance of the ECHR. Furthermore, the Court held that “in Germany the principle of 
respect for human dignity has a particular status as an independent fundamental right”. See paragraphs 
33 and 34. 
50 See Communication from the Commission. Compliance with the Charter of Fundamental Rights 
in Commission legislative proposals. COM(2005) 172 final. 
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compliance with fundamental rights.51 Nevertheless, these EU level initiatives 
are clearly closely connected to the pursuit for better regulation – a principle 
that has been pushed forward by institutions of the EU. Better regulation and 
better quality in the legislative process of the EU has been one of the most 
visible objectives of consecutive EU Presidencies during the last decade. The 
Commission has also placed more efforts on scrutinizing that any proposal for 
legislation is compatible with fundamental rights, particularly those set out in 
the Charter.52  
 
The fact that the Nice European Council brought such a political 
commitment of taking fundamental rights seriously in EU activities probably 
gave significant impetus to the EP which at the time did not have legislative 
competence in the field of fundamental right sensitive third pillar. The EP has 
always taken a high profile in the promotion of fundamental rights despite the 
fact that it fell outside legislative proceedings of fundamental right related 
legislative files.   
 
The Council, which is even today lagging behind in impact assessments of 
its amendments, could not stay out of this development. It had to increasingly 
strengthen its ex ante review of fundamental rights and generally reinforce the 
status of fundamental rights in its policies. 
 
The outcome of Nice also gave input for the Convention whose task was to 
prepare the Constitutional Treaty of the EU. As is known, the Convention 
approach to the Charter, i.e. making it legally binding, was sustained and 
preserved in the architecture of the Lisbon Treaty. For the time after Lisbon it 
is difficult to exhaustively state how much of the changes was due to the 
changes in competences of EU institutions, dissolution of pillar structure and 
how much due to entry into force of the Charter in a legally binding form.  
 
The entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty and the significant change in the 
status of the Charter have also changed the position of fundamental rights in 
EU law. I would, however, suggest that fundamental rights had a strong 
position in the EU law already before the Charter was turned into a legally 
binding document. If fundamental rights held a strong position already in 
CJEU interpretation practice, the legal situation does not change a great deal 
if these rights are now set out in the EU primary law. I would rather claim that 
the change in the status of the Charter has been an important message also to 
                                                 
51 Ibid. p. 3. Impact assessments on fundamental rights aspects of legislative proposals bring 
added value to the important preparatory phase. The second point dealing with explanatory 
memoranda in my opinion risks becoming an empty shell with mere references to some key 
documents, such as the Charter. Furthermore, explanatory memorandum only reflects the 
Commission’s thinking behind the initiative and will not become part of an EU legal instrument 
when it is adopted.  
52 See e.g. Communication on application of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European 
Union. SEC(2001) 380/3. 
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the EU legislature.53 It has significantly contributed to bringing EU 
institutions to the apex of safeguarding Charter rights in law-making.54 
 
 
2.3. The Lisbon Treaty and the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice 
 
The EU offers its citizens an Area of Freedom, Security and Justice.55 In 
Title 1 of TFEU where policy area-specific competences and their natures have 
been defined and set out, we should look especially at Article 4 that lists the 
areas of shared competence. This includes also the AFSJ.56 The important bulk 
of provisions on AFSJ has been set out in Title V of the TFEU. To begin, the 
importance that should be attached particularly to the first paragraph of 
Article 67 cannot be overstated. It is stated in this paragraph that “The Union 
shall constitute an area of freedom, security and justice with respect for 
fundamental rights and the different legal systems and traditions of the 
Member States”.57 The fundamental right dimension has hence been elevated 
to the same level as the establishment of the AFSJ with all the related rules. 
The change in the EU legislative framework has brought significant changes to 
roles of the institutions especially in the AFSJ. One could well argue that the 
Union dimension in this policy area has increased and consequently the 
former third pillar of the EU has faced significant communitarization.58 This 
can be seen in the empowerment of the EP the CJEU and the erosion of 
Member States’ dominance in legislative dossiers concerning fundamental 
rights issues. This trend seems to enhance the possibility of the Commission 
to provide middle ground between the Council and the EP, the new actor in 
terms of equal status in the legislative process.  
 
In the AFSJ, the Member States have maintained the partial right of 
initiative in this field but conditions for submitting initiatives are now stricter. 
Under the TFEU, it can now be made by at least seven Member States while 
under the EU Treaty it was possible for one single Member State to make the 
proposal.59 This can be foreseen to anchor the right of initiative in the AFSJ 
more deeply to the Commission in the future to come. Additionally, we should 
see the role of the Commission also within the framework of the competences 
of the CJEU in the new constitutional framework in the field of fundamental 
rights.60 This is the case because of the Commission’s position as the Guardian 
                                                 
53 For the development of the influence of the Charter on EU legislation see Violini Lorenza: The 
Impact of the Charter of Fundamental Rights on European Union Policies and Legislation. In Palmisano 
Giuseppe (Ed.): Making the Charter Rights a Living Instrument. Brill Nijhoff. Leiden 2014. 
54 For recent observations of impact of the Charter see De Vries Sybe, Bernitz Ulf and  Weatherill 
Stephen. (Eds.): EU Charter of Fundamental Rights as a binding Instrument. Five Years and growing. 
Hart publishing. Oxford 2015.  
55 See Article 2 of TEU. 
56 In accordance with Article 4 “Shared competence between the Union and the Member States 
applies in the following principal areas:... (j) area of freedom, security and justice. 
57 Article 67 (1) of TFEU. 
58 Piris Jean-Claude: The Lisbon Treaty. A Legal and Political Analysis. Cambridge University Press. 
Cambridge 2010, p. 225. 
59 Piris, p. 191. 
60 On the role of the CJEU in the context of the Lisbon Treaty see Andriantsimbazovina Joël: A qui 
appartient le contrôle des droits fondamentaux en Europe? In Favreau Bertrand (Ed.) La Charte des 
Droits Fondamentaux de l’Union européenne après le traité de Lisbonne. Bruylant. Bruxelles, 2010, pp. 
39-40. 
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of the Treaties. In the field of judicial co-operation in criminal matters and 
police co-operation the Commission is now also allowed to bring infringement 
actions.61 Drawing inspiration from international organizations it can be noted 
that much depends on the Member States’ willingness to change the 
fundamental matters such as power exercised over the Member States.62 
 
This thesis aims to pre-eminently tackle the fundamental rights-based 
review that takes place in the legislative phase. Despite this perspective, the 
very recent approach of the CJEU especially in the AFSJ should also be 
highlight. It has become evident that with the entry into force of the Lisbon 
Treaty, the CJEU has also been among those institutions whose powers have 
grown. Previously, the CJEU held a restricted role in the matters falling under 
the intergovernmental pillars of the EU, but as a consequence of the latest 
Treaty amendments, the CJEU has penetrated into the interpretation of the 
former third pillar that is currently called the AFSJ.63 This is of particular 
interest for this study because after all, the CJEU is the ultimate interpreter of 
the primary law of the EU and has before the Lisbon era been the major 
contributor to the emergence of fundamental rights in EU law.  
 
The EU law regulating the third pillar of the EU was long considered to be 
a type of public international law, while lacking certain elements of EC 
measures, such as direct effect and primacy.64 This is the case despite 
similarities to legislation under the former Community pillar. Furthermore, 
this legislation adopted outside the framework of the Community was different 
from legal instruments adopted within the framework, especially because of 
its enforcement with less importance attached to the CJEU for reasons of less 
room for legal manoeuvre. This, for its part, had an empowering effect on the 
national courts in this sphere. In spite of this, the CJEU engaged in bold 
interpretations also in the sphere of the third pillar ranging from cases Pupino 
to Kadi.65 In Pupino, the CJEU stretched the obligation of loyal cooperation 
conform interpretation to cover also third pillar matters and secondly in Kadi 
blurred the demarcation line between pillars by pushing forward with the 
notion of coherence of EU law with the EC and EU law covered.66 De Búrca has 
considered that the CJEU has expressed especially in Kadi the approach of 
judicial pluralism.67  
 
                                                 
61 Piris, p. 188. 
62 Steiner Henry J., Alston Philip and Goodman Ryan: International Human Rights in the Context. 
Law, Politics, Morals. Third Edition. Oxford University Press. Oxford 2008, p. 670. 
63 The increase of competence of the CJEU has occurred particularly in the domain of AFSJ. As 
Hinarejos has shown, the common foreign and security policy, that previously formed the second pillar 
of the EU, has also gone through a significant change, with its own special features, in terms of the 
competence of the CJEU. See Hinarejos Alicia: Judicial Control in the European Union: Reforming 
Jurisdiction in the Intergovernmental pillar. Oxford University Press. Oxford 2009 , see pp. 122-182. 
64 Hinarejos, p. 17. 
65 See C-105/03 Criminal proceedings against Maria Pupino and C-402/05 Kadi. 
66 For a concise outline and analysis of the case Kadi from the angle of constitutional pluralism see 
Anthony Gordon: EU Law’s Fundamental Rights Regime and Post-National Constitutionalism. In 
Birkinshaw Patrick and Varney Mike (eds.): The European Union Legal Order after Lisbon. Kluwer Law 
International. Alphen aan de Rijn 2010, pp. 188-196.  
67 De Búrca Gráinne: The CJEU and the international legal order: a re-evaluation. In De Búrca 
Gráinne and Weiler J.H.H. (Eds.): The Worlds of European Constitutionalism. Cambridge University 
Press. Cambridge 2012, p. 148. 
 41 
The Lisbon Treaty means above all a drastic change in the nature of former 
third pillar law extension of judicial control into this sphere.68 There has long 
been resistance towards increased powers of the CJEU in the previous third 
pillar of the EU, which was very much due to strong positions of some Member 
States, most notably the UK. This underscores the importance of the 
intergovernmental nature of this pillar.69 The changes brought to the core of 
EU primary law, especially regarding the AFSJ, is likely to bring clarity to the 
nature of law that comprised the former third pillar, and in terms of judicial 
control. According to some estimations, it may also remove the need for 
judicial activism.70 Further to this, the change in the constitutional framework 
will also most likely lead to further empowerment of operational support 
Agencies, such as Europol and Eurojust, that are functioning in the former 
third pillar. The role of the national Parliaments has strengthened in many 
ways as a consequence of the Lisbon Treaty. The most significant change has 
obviously been the national Parliaments reinforced position in reviewing the 
principle of subsidiarity, but there are also interesting amendments that go 
directly to the AFSJ, too.71 National parliaments can have their voice heard in 
the EU decision-making process. There are, however, a couple of limitations 
to this. First of all, the voice of the parliament is of indirect nature because it 
will be exercised through the national government. Second, it may be the case 
that not all national parliaments pursue to exercise this.72  
 
As the AFSJ was established in the context of the Lisbon Treaty, most of 
the upcoming legislation in this field was transferred to the framework of 
ordinary legislative procedure.73 The emergence of the EP as a co-legislator 
will probably have a very profound effect on fundamental rights at the EU level 
and hence on the whole constitutional framework governing this very sensitive 
sphere.74 Legal instruments of the former third pillar of the EU – for example 
Council Framework Decisions – which were previously used in this field, can 
now be replaced with Directives and other legal instruments. 
 
Jean-Claude Piris, a merited scholar and a long-serving Director General 
of the Legal Service of the Council and thus the man behind the practical 
execution of many Treaty changes, has commented the Lisbon Treaty from the 
point of view of AFSJ as follows: He considers that the communitarization of 
measures affecting every citizen has been brought under full parliamentary 
                                                 
68 For analysis on impacts on such basic premises as direct effect and primacy see Hinarejos, p. 49 
69 See i.a. Denza Eileen: The Intergovernmental Pillars of the European Union. Oxford University 
Press. Oxford 2002, pp. 314-315. 
70 Hinarejos, p. 189. 
71 Pursuant to Article 12 c) of TEU ”National Parliaments contribute actively to the good functioning 
of the Union…by taking part, within the framework of the area of freedom, security and justice, in the 
evaluation mechanisms for the implementation of the Union policies in that area....”. 
72 Norton Philip: National Parliaments and the European Union: where to from here? In Craig Paul 
and Harlow Carol (Eds.): Lawmaking in the European Union. Kluwer Law International. Dordrecht 
1998, p. 211. 
73 Pursuant to Article 67 paragraph 1 of the TFEU: “The Union shall constitute an area of freedom, 
security and justice with respect for fundamental rights and the different legal systems and traditions of 
the Member States”. 
74 The sensitivity of the area of fundamental rights can be expected to be even more visible as further 
co-operation and integration is needed in matters related to internal and external security. See Piris 
Jean-Claude: The Constitution of Europe. A legal Analysis. Cambridge University Press. Cambridge 
2006,  p. 195. 
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control both at the European and national levels. Together with the extension 
of powers of the EP, the national parliaments now also have a greater role and 
the so-called citizens’ initiative has been introduced.75 As a solution to the 
democracy deficit problem, Piris sees the stronger involvement and greater 
powers of national parliaments in the EU decision-making process. Steps in 
this direction have been taken in the Lisbon Treaty, but Member States have 
still organized the involvement of their parliaments in quite different ways.76 
The significance and visibility of this policy area has obviously increased 
remarkably, especially due to the war against terrorism that was launched by 
the United States and its allies as a response to large-scale terrorist attacks 
against civilian targets. In addition to terrorism, other types of organized 
international crime have also enhanced the importance of the former third 
pillar of the EU. This makes the AFSJ an area in which the EU can also show 
its citizens the added value that the Union can bring into this field with 
enhanced co-operation between the Member States. This not only addresses 
the need for confidence building and increasing credibility, but a real necessity 
to work closely in the international field to fight such phenomena as 
international crime. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
75 Piris Jean-Claude: Where will the Lisbon Treaty lead us? In Arnull Anthony, Barnard Catherine, 
Dougan Michael, Spaventa Eleanor (Eds.): A Constitutional Order of States? Essays in EU Law in 
Honour of Alan Dashwood. Hart Publishing. Oxford and Portland, Oregon 2011, pp. 60-61. Later, Piris 
concludes that “the irruption of national parliaments into the EU legislative process is especially 
important, at a time when the European Parliament has failed once again, in the June 2009 elections, to 
attract more voters and, therefore, more legitimacy". Ibid., p. 65. 
76 Piris, p. 70-71. Piris considers that how national parliaments organize their scrutiny of their 
governments in the EU decision-making process can be arranged in a flexible manner using for instance 
the following options: a provision in the national constitution, a law adopted at the time of ratification 
of a new EU Treaty, a judgment of the constitutional court, a formal agreement between the parliament 
and the government and practices accepted explicitly or implicitly by the government. 
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III Fundamental rights impact 
assessment in various phases of EU 
legislative procedures 
 
The must first be a policy objective. If the intention within the 
Commission is to refine it into a legislative proposal, an impact assessment 
will be carried out. At this point it is the Commission that executes impact 
assessment using its existing machinery, such as the Impact Assessment 
Board (IAB). Then comes the Commission proposal and, once in the 
pipeline, other institutions enter the picture. If an AFSJ legislative initiative 
is initiated by Member States that submit the proposal it is most likely 
lacking an extensive impact assessment. It would therefore be preferable 
that in the AFSJ, the initiative would be left more and more in the hands of 
the Commission.  
 
After the legislative proposal has been presented, it enters the 
proceedings of the co-legislators, the Council and the Parliament. The two 
institutions respectively deal with the proposal and form their positions. In 
the end, the positions of the institutions will be merged in inter-
institutional negotiations and this will most probably sooner or later lead 
to the adoption of the EU legal instrument. I have placed a procedural 
phase which I call ‘consultation phase’ after the initiation phase and before 
the handling of the co-legislators. For ‘consultation phase’ I am referring to 
consultation of expert bodies, most notably FRA but also EDPS, which are 
active in legislative processes. It should not be mixed generally with 
‘consultation’, which takes place at various phases of the legislative 
process.77 
 
In the following I have illustrated ex ante review in the context of the 
EU ordinary legislative procedure - the law-making process which 
nowadays covers most of the fundamental right sensitive AFSJ legal 
initiatives. I have described the ordinary legislative procedure and set the 
ex ante review of fundamental rights into this framework by illustrating 
when and how this a priori assessment is carried out. I have divided the 
key phases for ex ante review of fundamental rights in five main stages: 
 
1) Initiation phase 
2) Consultation phase 
3) Council proceedings 
4) EP proceedings 
5) Trialogue 
 
All the phases except for the trialogue phase contain two main elements. 
First, I will set the scene for each phase by providing the background for 
                                                 
77 Especially in the initiation phase a wide-ranging consultation process is carried out. For example 
the Commission organizes public consultations with the aim of gathering opinions and positions from 
stakeholders on policy and legislative initiatives under consideration and preparation. 
 44 
the ex ante review. The key issue is to clarify how the framework for ex ante 
review has developed and what are the main actors conducting the review. 
The focus has been set on the legal-political framework, which is the basis 
for ex ante review. The second element consists of practical tools in 
executing the ex ante review. I will shed light on how fundamental rights 
are assessed in practical terms during the course of the ordinary legislative 
process. It therefore makes real the objectives and aspirations, which have 
been described in the introductory part setting the scene for ex ante review 
in each phase of the legislative process. Trialogue is such an important 
phase of the legislative process due to its decisive role in finding consensus 
on a legislative text that it deserves a section of its own. The court phase 
falls outside the scope of the presentation because it mainly belongs to the 
ex post phase.78 The following graph puts the above-mentioned five phases 
in the right order and illuminates what happens in the consecutive phases 
and how ex ante review at the EU level proceeds. 
 
Figure 1. Ex ante review of fundamental rights in key phases of the ordinary 
legislative process 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The picture above illustrates the key five stages of ex ante review in the 
EU legislative process. In addition to presenting the stages, Graph 1 also 
demonstrates the inter-relationships between the different stages and 
roughly sets the order of the process. One should, however, acknowledge 
that the phases are partly overlapping - for example the consultation phase 
can feed in to the legislative process for instance during the initiation phase 
or the EP and Council proceedings. Moreover, it is not totally excluded that 
the consultation phase could take place during the trialogue.  
 
The rules governing ordinary legislative procedure are set out in Article 294 
of TFEU. This law-making procedure of the EU, known previously as co-
decision, has become the general rule for the adoption of EU acts. There are 
few exceptions to using ordinary legislative procedure.79  Ordinary legislative 
procedure can well be characterized by equal competence of co-legislators, i.e. 
                                                 
78 CJEU case law is important also for the EU legislator in the ex ante review because it can function 
as a basic point  as an aid to interpretation also for the key institutions involved in the legislative process 
in analyzing if the draft EU legislation concerned is in line with EU fundamental rights.   
79 Good examples of such exceptions are, for instance, issues related to taxation and Euratom. 
Consultation phase 
Initiation phase 
EP proceedings 
Council proceedings 
Trialogue 
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the Council and the EP.80 The Council, the EP and the Commission deal with 
legislative proposals usually originating from the Commission in different 
phases of ordinary legislative procedure. Legislative work will initially be 
performed predominantly internally within each institution, but the central 
feature of the later stages of the process are inter-institutional negotiations 
which aim at reaching a compromise between different views of the 
institutions. 
 
For the ordinary legislative process, I will initially present the first 
reading.81 Approximately ¾ of all EU legal instruments are adopted during 
the first reading, which highlights its importance and makes it the most 
commonplace method of agreeing upon EU legislation. The first phase in 
drafting EU legislation is, however, the preparatory stage, which I call the 
‘initiation phase’.  
 
 
1. Initiation phase 
 
The first line of defence of fundamental rights in the EU legislative process 
can be found in the initiation phase of legislation. The Commission has a key 
role to play in the ex ante review of fundamental rights in the initiation 
phase.82 It has been said that the EU is a complex network lacking single 
authority clearly responsible for the policy outcomes. The EU does not have a 
clear government, nor an opposition that could provide an alternative to the 
government in a democratic system.83 In the EU, most of the duties of nation-
states’ governments have at the EU level been given to the Commission. It is 
                                                 
80For a well-illustrating chart see 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/aboutparliament/en/0081f4b3c7/Law-making-procedures-in-
detail.htm Visited on 10 February 2014. 
81Pursuant to Article 294: 1. Where reference is made in the Treaties to the ordinary legislative 
procedure for the adoption of an act, the following procedure shall apply. 
2. The Commission shall submit a proposal to the European Parliament and the Council. 
3. The European Parliament shall adopt its position at first reading and communicate it to the 
Council. 
4. If the Council approves the European Parliament's position, the act concerned shall be adopted 
in the wording which corresponds to the position of the European Parliament. 
5. If the Council does not approve the European Parliament's position, it shall adopt its position at 
first reading and communicate it to the European Parliament. 
6. The Council shall inform the European Parliament fully of the reasons which led it to adopt its 
position at first reading. The Commission shall inform the European Parliament fully of its position. 
82 In the Barroso II Commission fundamental rights had a greater visibility due to appointment of 
Viviane Reding, then Vice-President of the Commission, as Commissioner responsible for fundamental 
rights among other duties. The Commission adopted zero tolerance policy towards breaches of 
fundamental rights and undertaken new responsibilities related to reporting. Furthermore, the 
Commission also confirmed its commitment as regards fundamental rights standards, also in the context 
of the legislative process, vis-à-vis other EU institutions. Fundamental rights: challenges and 
achievements in 2010, Annual report of the FRA, p. 7. 
On the political agenda of Juncker Commission fundamental rights and the Charter have been raised 
even higher. The First Vice President of the Commission Frans Timmermans is in charge of better 
regulation, inter-institutional relations, the rule of law and the Charter of fundamental rights. The key 
task of the new Vice President is to ensure that every Commission proposal or initiative complies with 
the EUCFR. See Mission letter by President of the European Commission Jean-Claude Juncker 
addressed to First Vice President Frans Timmermans. Available at http://ec.europa.eu/about/juncker-
commission/commissioners-designate/index_en.htm. Visited on 8 October 2014. 
83 Van Ham Peter: European integration and the post-modern Condition. Governance, Democracy, 
Identity. Routledge. New York 2001, p. 160. 
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obvious that despite similarities, considerable differences also exist between 
Member States' governments and the Commission. The Commission is also 
the “Guardian of the Treaties” as it shall ensure the compliance with the 
provisions of the Treaties and hence controls the other institutions’, mainly 
the Council’s and the EP’s, compliance with EU law.84  Furthermore, the 
Commission exercises its right of initiative and therefore crucially contributes 
to the policy and law-making processes of the EU. Inactivity of the 
Commission would mean a paralysis of the EU. Regarding the right of 
initiative, we should bear in mind that although the Council and the European 
Parliament have a right to request the Commission to deliver a legislative 
initiative, the Commission cannot be compelled to do so.85 Thus there must be 
a policy objective and things get under way when the Commission makes a 
proposal for the EU legislate on.86 The life-cycle of a EU legislative proposal 
within the Commission can be encapsulated into the following subsequent 
phases: the policy initiation phase; the drafting phase; inter-service 
coordination; agreement between specialized members of the cabinets, by the 
chefs of the cabinets and eventually the college itself.87 In the preparation 
process of legislation, the Commission uses a lot of outside resources but is at 
the same time subject to considerable outside pressures from various 
stakeholders.88 After the policy initiation phase within the Commission, a draft 
is drawn up by a middle-ranking official of the Directorate General (DG) who 
takes the text forward in his hierarchy all the way to the Director General. Then 
the draft will be passed through the cabinet to the chefs de cabinet.89 The 
remaining phase within the Commission is the college of Commissioners. The 
college can do practically anything it likes with the draft. The most 
commonplace options are to accept it, reject it or return it back to preparation 
of the DG.90 In the decision-making, the position of the President of the 
Commission is extremely important.91 Within the Commission, the 
                                                 
84 Lenaerts Koen and Van Nuffel Piet: Europees recht in Hoofdlijnen. Vierde, herziene uitgave. 
Maklu uitgevers NV. Antwerpen 2008, p. 275. 
85 Verhoeven Amaryllis: The European Union in Search of a Democratic and Constitutional Theory. 
Kluwer Law International. Dordrecht 2002, p. 232. 
86 As will be shown later also Member States still have the right of initiative in some very restricted 
policy areas. In practical terms, however, the Commission has a monopoly of the right of initiative. 
87 Spence David: The Directorates General and the services: structures, functions and procedures. 
In Spence David (Ed.): The European Commission. Third Edition. John Harper Publishing. London 
2006, p. 146. 
88 Nugent Neill: The Government and Politics of the European Union. Sixth Edition. Palgrave 
MacMillan. Basingstoke, p. 169. Whether this can be regarded as a pro or con is a matter of the case 
concerned. Anyway, the Commission is under a great deal of lobbying from industry, NGOs and other 
stakeholders. Furthermore, when suggesting different policy proposals the Commission often uses 
studies of different institutes not under the Commission umbrella. 
89 On the role of cabinets see Nugent, pp. 158-159. A great deal of political power within the 
Commission can be found in the cabinets of the Commissioners. If you have political power in the EU 
you also have legislative power. This is why the role of cabinets in the legislative process should not be 
underestimated. 
90 Ibid., p. 163. 
91 Each and every EU file has a lead department but in order to ensure effective coordination 
informal contacts with other Directorates is needed. Similarly, a more formal procedure may take place 
with establishment and functioning of inter-service groups that work on dossiers having effects to several 
DGs. Here again, the coordination role has been vested in the Secretariat General. We should remember 
that although significant differences between different Commissioners and DGs may exist, deadlock 
within the Commission would also mean a no-go for the Union decision-making. See Christiansen 
Thomas: A Maturing Bureaucracy? The Role of the Commission in the Policy Process. In Richardson 
Jeremy (Ed.): European Union: Power and Policy-Making. Routledge. London 1996, p. 85. 
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coordination role is under the responsibility of the Secretariat General, which 
aims to ensure coherence of the Commission sectorial policies. Additionally, 
the Secretariat General is in a key position regarding the Commission’s 
relations to other institutions, most notably towards the Council and the EP. 
This is also the case with complex, sensitive and controversial policy 
dossiers.92  
 
Each Article of the Treaty setting out the legal basis for legal instruments 
in each policy area has its own specificities and the limits of competence vary.93 
Regarding the drafting of EU legislative proposals, the Commission may 
manoeuvre widely in deciding the legal basis of the legal instrument. This 
choice has a big impact on both substantive and procedural aspects of the 
legislative proposal. Given this importance, the legal basis can very often be a 
source of institutional conflict, including arguments whether to go for 
supranational or intergovernmental solutions.94 The EU legislator deals with 
the issue of competence in the course of the legal proceedings. At the starting 
phase, discussion within the Council and the EP is usually concentrated mainly 
on the legal basis and it is the Commission who has to justify choices made in 
the selection of legal basis.95  
 
 
We must now identify the legal-political recent developments in the 
initiation phase, which have paved the way for a strengthened ex ante review. 
Following this, I will illustrate and analyse the practical tools of ex ante review 
in the initiation phase. As the EU environment has become increasingly 
regulated by EU legislation, it has also become evident that when adopting new 
EU legislation the principle of better regulation needs to be taken into account. 
In order to make better regulation, a leading principle throughout the EU 
                                                 
92 Kassim Hussein: The Secretariat General of the European Commission. In Spence David (Ed.): 
The European Commission. Third Edition. John Harper Publishing. London 2006, p. 75. From all this 
it becomes clear that the Secretariat General is of utmost importance in drawing the often differing 
positions of the Commission services together. With horizontal issues, such as fundamental rights and 
the objective of better regulation, the role of the Secretariat General is even more pivotal. 
93 This is also reflected with regard to international agreements and the issue of competence, see 
especially case C-22/70 ERTA, but also ruling 1/78, which dealt with the draft Convention of the 
International Atomic Energy Agency on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials, Facilities and 
Transports. In paragraph 35 of the ruling the Court found that “…it is not necessary to set out and 
determine, as regards other Parties to the Convention, the division of powers in this respect between the 
Community and the Member States, particularly as it may change in the course of time”. The issue of 
competence can be extremely problematic especially in the so-called mixed agreements. After the 
acquisition of more powers in the matters that are currently covered by the AFSJ the Union dimension 
has been empowered also in the sense of international agreements, including the so-called mixed 
agreements, that very often include important issues related to competence between the institutions. On 
international agreements in the field of judicial co-operation in civil matters see for example Hix Jan-
Peter: Mixed Agreements in the field of judicial co-operation in Civil Matters: Treaty-Making and Legal 
Effects. In Martenczuk Bernd and van Servaas Thiel (Eds.): Justice, Liberty, Security: New Challenges 
for EU external Relations. VUB PRESS Brussels University Press. Brussels 2008, pp. 254-255. 
94 See for example Usher John A.: The Commission and the Law. In Spence David (Ed.): The 
European Commission. Third Edition. John Harper Publishing. London 2006, p. 105. 
95 Especially interesting Treaty provision in the context of competence is the catch-all Article 352 of 
TFEU that enables EU action for achieving one of the objectives of the Treaty in the absence of necessary 
powers provided by the Treaty.  In this case the Council adopts necessary measures by acting 
unanimously on a proposal from the Commission and after obtaining the consent of the EP. In Paragraph 
2 of the Article the role of the national parliaments in monitoring subsidiarity has been highlighted in 
the spirit of Lisbon. 
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legislative process, the Commission has progressively launched impact 
assessments and considered whether new draft legislation, if adopted, would 
improve regulation in the particular subject area and bring added value to the 
existing regulatory framework under the auspices of the EU. A practical step 
towards this direction has been the Commission’s initiative to withdraw a 
great number of its proposals for EU legislation that have become obsolete.96 
The main objective behind the principle of better regulation in the framework 
of the EU is to improve the quality of new EU legislation and to simplify 
already existing EU legislation. The seed for this process can be found in the 
Commission’s White Paper on European Governance that called for reforms 
and improvements in the EU regulatory practices in order to attract more trust 
from the part of EU citizens.97 According to the Commission, the EU should 
especially strive for better involvement and more openness, better policies, 
regulation and delivery, global governance as well as refocused institutions. 
With a view to a practical implementation of these objectives, the Commission 
introduced an Action Plan in 2002 on simplifying and improving the 
regulatory environment. In the plan, possible actions and their indicative 
timetables were sketched out.98 What is noteworthy in this document is the 
expressed need for minimum standards in the consultation process and a 
consolidated impact assessment on the new policy and legislative initiatives. 
The aims envisaged in the White Paper and the action plan were further 
implemented and enhanced in 2003 in an Inter-institutional Agreement (IIA) 
on better law-making by EP, Council and the Commission.99 Consequently, 
many EU legal instruments in several policy areas particularly refer to this IIA  
when highlighting basic principles of better regulation.100 
 
The Commission also reports on an annual basis on the recent 
developments in the application of the principles of subsidiarity and 
proportionality.101 These matters also cover the sector of better regulation. A 
positive result to be found in the reports is that consultation of interested 
parties has increased steadily during the last decade. In spite of this, the 
                                                 
96 Although the Commission has its mechanisms to withdraw its proposals it has not been usually 
the case that the Commission draws back its newer proposals for EU legal instruments. In my opinion 
the Commission’s initiative can be welcomed as a good sign. With these plans the Commission will 
evidently bring more transparency and reactiveness to its practices as a primus motor in the EU 
legislative process. 
97 See White Paper on European Governance. COM(2001) 428 Final. 
98 Communication from the Commission. Action plan “Simplifying and improving the regulatory 
environment”. COM(2002) 278 final. 
99 European Parliament; Council; Commission: Inter-institutional Agreement on better law-making. 
OJ C 321/1, 31.12.2003. IIAs have been used in many policy sectors to formalize political agreement of 
the EU institutions on some important issue. IIAs are interesting instruments because they do not have 
a legal basis in the primary EU law which makes them different from the “official” EU legal instruments. 
It is clear that IIAs are legally binding but even today the level of their binding nature is a much debated 
topic. In the sources of this study IIAs have been placed under the heading “Legally binding EU 
instruments”, even though there are similarly good reasons not to do this. 
100 It is worth noting that in spring 2015, in the context of the proposed EU better regulation agenda, 
the Commission issued a proposal for an inter-institutional Agreement on Better Regulation envisaged 
to replace the existing IIA. This proposal puts more emphasis on subsidiarity, proportionality and 
fundamental rights considerations than the previous IIA. See Communication from the Commission to 
the European Parliament and the Council. Proposal for an Interinstitutional Agreement on Better 
Regulation COM(2015)216 final, 19.5.2015 and particularly paragraph 20 thereof. 
101 Report from the Commission ”Better Lawmaking 2006” pursuant to Article 9 of the Protocol on 
the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality. COM(2007)286 final. 
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number of the Commission’s legislative proposals has been basically at the 
same level during the same time span. In light of these statistics, it is at least 
possible to identify a positive development in the way that the vast array of 
stakeholders has been integrated into the consultation process. A wide-
ranging consultation process on draft EU legislation is an essential part in the 
preparation of new legislation. Particularly in the field of fundamental rights, 
several non-governmental organizations (NGOs), which focus on human 
rights issues, can be in a position to make a positive contribution to the 
preparation of new legislation.102  
 
Better regulation can be seen as an emerging objective shared by all the 
institutions involved in the EU legislative process. One could even say that 
better regulation has broken through to the EU legislative process at the level 
of principle during the recent years. Nevertheless, more concrete actions 
aiming at making better regulation function in practical work would be 
welcome. Even though we should not underestimate that this principle has 
become an important objective in EU law-making, one should not ignore the 
reality in this process. As mentioned before, brokering political compromise 
may lead to poor quality legal texts. Sometimes EU legislators must phrase 
legal instruments ambiguously rendering them open to various interpretations 
in order, for example, to achieve a qualified majority and to get things moving. 
Nonetheless, recent developments in improving EU legislation seem to be very 
positive. Especially the Commission’s concrete actions in putting more efforts 
on the preparatory phase of EU legislation are a good signal towards other 
institutions. Having been accused of lack of transparency and inadequate 
preparation of EU legislation, the Commission without a doubt improves its 
image in this regard. The Commission also has put increasing efforts into 
mainstreaming fundamental rights in activities in different policy sectors. 
Various decisions and initiatives have been taken in this regard over the years. 
The Commission as the guardian of the Treaties and initiator of EU legislation 
is perhaps in the most important position to make a significant contribution 
into this area.103  
 
If we think about the recent trends in the Commission’s work on better 
regulation, we should for example note the Commission’s communication on 
                                                 
102 The expertise and experience of these NGOs can bring added value to the preparation process 
even though NGOs, like any other stakeholders, have their own particular interests and stakes in the EU 
legislative process. 
103 The Commission has also undertaken to seek advice on issues in the field of better regulation 
from a Group of High-level National Regulatory Experts that was established in early 2006. 
Pursuant to the Article 2 of the Commission’s Decision main tasks of the high-level group consist of 
assisting the Commission in improving the regulatory environment for key policy areas, contributing 
to the spread of best practices, strengthening the co-operation between the Commission and 
Member States particularly in transposition phase of EU law and monitoring as well as advisory 
functions. The strength in these kinds of high level groups puzzling with difficult issues is that 
usually their participants are highest level officials in national organizations in charge of the policy 
area concerned. On the other hand, advisory groups should be equipped with a great deal of 
independence in carrying out their work. This may not necessarily be the case with this High-level 
Group. However, this group can function as a think-tank and the Commission is entitled to take 
advantage of ideas presented during the meetings and possibly start making them real by proposing 
new EU legislation. Commission Decision of 28 February 2006 setting up a group of high-level 
national experts (2006/210/EC). OJ L 76/3, 15.3.2006. 
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smart regulation in the EU which was published in autumn 2010.104 The 
Commission first considers that better regulation must become smart 
regulation and be strengthened in the Commission’s working culture.105 This 
has to do with aspects of better regulation internally, within the Commission. 
Nevertheless, the Commission also rightly points out that smart regulation is 
a shared responsibility of all the EU institutions and that all institutions must 
strive for this objective in all policy areas.106 Ex post evaluation of legislation 
remains a key tool for achieving this goal.107 In spite of this, we can detect an 
even a stronger focus in the paper, which has not been set on the existing 
legislation, but the legislation that is being prepared. The approach in this kind 
of method springs from evaluation that is of ex ante nature. This system 
culminates mainly in the impact assessments and the novelty in the 
Communication is one focus area that is wrapped up in reflecting the new legal 
status of the EUCFR.108 In the impact assessment phase, significant attention 
has given to IAB.109 We can clearly see that these aspects mainly concern the 
internal aspects of the better regulation that is carried out within the 
Commission. If we then turn to the Commission’s views on how better or smart 
regulation should take place in inter-institutional terms, we can above all 
identify the utmost importance that the Commission has set on the need to 
integrate all the EU institutions in this work. The Commission reminds that 
although the other key players in the EU legislative process, namely the 
Council and the EP, have agreed to carry out impact assessments on the 
amendments that they make to the Commission’s original proposal, this has 
indeed only rarely been the case. The Commission further encourages other 
institutions to make progress in this important area and offers possibilities for 
co-operation in this field.110 The Commission finds that the EP and the Council 
should include impact assessments to a greater extent to their proceedings on 
EU dossiers.111 What is interesting and generally well-founded in the 
Commission’s Communication is the call for impact assessments for Member 
States’ possible initiatives in the field of AFSJ.112  
 
The Commission has traditionally possessed a heavy constitutional arsenal 
to launch ex post procedures in judicial control in the EU.113 Verhoeven 
reminds that the Commission has an important but controversial role in the 
                                                 
104 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European 
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions. Smart Regulation in the European 
Union. COM(2010) 543 final, 8.10.2010. 
105 Ibid., p. 2.  
106 Ibid., p. 3. 
107 Ibid., p. 4. 
108 Ibid., p. 7. According to the Communication “the Commission will reinforce the assessment of 
impacts on fundamental rights, and will develop specific guidance for this”. 
109 Ibid., p. 6. 
110 Ibid., p. 8. 
111 According to the Commission also other EU bodies, such as European Economic and Social 
Committee and the Committee of the Regions should be involved more directly in the preparation of 
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112 Ibid. 
113 For the Commission’s role in infringement procedures and actions for annulments see Arnull 
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field of law enforcement, particularly because of its discretion whether or not 
to open infringement proceedings.114 Quite recently, the Commission has 
intentionally tried to reinforce different internal ex ante control mechanisms. 
It is a general rule that the Commission will conduct impact assessments of 
legislation that is included in its annual legislative and work programme.115 
More exact steps in carrying out the impact assessments have been described 
in the Impact Assessment Communication of 2002, in the Commission 
Services Working Document dating back to 2004 and the Commission’s 
internal impact assessment guidelines.116 The Commission has increasingly 
launched impact assessments on its legislative proposals to be presented. The 
rationale of impact assessments is to analyse the probable effect that an EU 
instrument may have on a given policy area. In this assessment, attention will 
be paid to all relevant economic, social, political and juridical consequences 
that probably emerge after the adoption of the proposed piece of legislation. 
Impact assessment can thus be conceived as a useful tool at the disposal of EU 
institutions in their policy-making. With regard to the Commission and impact 
assessments, Rick Haythornthwaite reminds that during the last years the 
Commission has screened all its proposals that have been pending for a 
significant amount of time. Moreover, one third of these proposals have been 
withdrawn or returned for further impact assessments.117 In fact, this 
represents quite a significant change in the Commission’s attitude towards 
pending legislation.118 
 
 
We now have the IAB in place and its role can be found in the quality 
assurance of impact assessments prepared by the Commission. Further to this, 
IAB ensures that a variety of policy options and their feasibility during the 
whole legislative process will be taken into consideration. The ultimate aim of 
the Commission is to turn IAB into a centre of excellence in this particular 
field.119 During its years of operation, the IAB turned out to be quite a strict 
body in the evaluation of impact assessments of draft legislation. For example, 
in 2010 the resubmission rate of draft impact assessment reports was 42%. 
The IAB can request resubmission of draft IA when it has serious quality 
concerns that should be dealt with.120 In this context, however, we should note 
that the quality standards applied by the IAB were strengthened in the 
previous years. The IAB seems to have adopted a more stringent approach 
towards the quality of draft impact assessment reports. In practical terms, the 
IAB has attained a powerful position within the Commission, thus the position 
of the IAB matters.  
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115 Inter-Institutional Common Approach to Impact Assessment. November 2005. 
116 Ibid. See COM (2002) 276 Final and SEC (2004) 1377 as well as SEC (2005) 791. 
117 Haythornthwaite Rick: Better Regulation in Europe. In Weatherill Stephen (ed.): Better 
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119 Ibid., p. 8. 
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A negative opinion by the IAB can be related to the core parts of the report 
that is usually linked to the problem definition, options and impacts, adequacy 
of consultation, subsidiarity and proportionality.121 If an IA report receives a 
negative opinion from the IAB, the report has to be updated and the 
shortcomings revealed by the Board have to be worked on and corrected. The 
report can then be submitted for a second opinion. If the report receives a 
positive opinion, the service in charge of the report within the Commission 
does its utmost to integrate the comments and the necessary elements of the 
IAB to the report and then launches the inter-service consultation in order to 
obtain a green light for the impact assessment.122 In this phase of the process, 
other services still need to be heard, but this will bring the quality check to an 
end. The next step then is the legislative procedure itself. From all this we can 
take it for granted that the Commission takes impact assessment and quality 
control of its legislative proposals very seriously. As former President Barroso 
has stressed: “in principle a positive opinion from the IAB is needed before a 
proposal can be put forward for Commission decision.”123 Despite criticism 
expressed sometimes by the Member States’ legal experts towards impact 
assessments, one can well note that this criticism is often ungrounded. The 
Commission has moved from quite light impact assessment procedures to a 
systematic and more extensive one involving strict quality control and more 
transparency. This is not always the case at the national level in EU Member 
States when assessing impacts of national law.124 In spring 2015, the 
Commission has introduced even higher level of ambition with regard to better 
regulation and impact assessments in the context of the EU better regulation 
agenda. This agenda entails a stronger and more independent role for the IAB, 
to be called ‘Regulatory Scrutiny Board’ in the future.125 
 
What is the general scope of impact assessments? The Commission 
produces an unbelievable amount of legal proposals and all kinds of 
communicative papers every year. Nevertheless, not all categories of the 
Commission’s preparatory papers require a formal impact assessment. A 
formal impact assessment is necessary for all items on the Commission’s Work 
Programme. This includes all regulatory proposals, White Papers, expenditure 
programmes and negotiating guidelines for international agreements. Green 
papers and consultation with social partners are, however, excluded from 
impact assessments due to their consultative quality.126 These general rules do 
not hinder the Commission to carry out an impact assessment on a dossier that 
is not included in its Work Programme. Concerning impact assessments, we 
can note that they will be carried out by each service of the Commission 
                                                 
121 Ibid. 
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123 According to Ibid., p. 9.  See also COM(2010) 1100 ”The Working Methods of the Commission 
2010-2014”, http://ec.europa.eu/commission _2010-
2014/president/news/documents/pdf/c2010_1100_en.pdf. 
124 The Commission also has the challenging duty of trying to find one size fits for all solutions that 
is not always easy taking into account the plethora of legal orders and legal traditions of Member States. 
125 See Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the 
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126 See Impact Assessment Guidelines. Document of the European Commission SEC(2005) 791, p. 
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responsible for the proposal. The weak point in this is that until recent times 
there has not been an expert body that could have had a deeper and longer-
term expertise and understanding in the field of fundamental rights.127 
 
Impact assessments will, without doubt, also increase the position of 
fundamental rights in the analysis. This is also due to the stronger status of the 
EUCFR in the EU law and hence in the legislative process. It can be expected 
that in the coming years the Commission analysis will draw inspiration to a 
greater extent also from the provisions of the EUCFR. Contents of the impact 
assessment reports and the outputs thereof, the contents of the provisions of 
draft EU legal instruments, will be more extensively reflected against the 
EUCFR and fundamental rights generally. Impact assessments should also 
aim at drawing the attention of those people in charge of preparatory phases 
of EU legislation to fundamental rights aspects of legislation under drafting.128 
My experience is that experts on some specific – usually quite narrow – policy 
area are not always sufficiently acquainted with certain constitutional law 
elements of the texts they are dealing with. Legal cross-checking may not 
always put the text on the right track afterwards.129 
 
Some scholars have drawn the conclusion that the Commission mainly 
carries out the EU-wide impact assessment without engaging with IA 
processes at the national level, unless Member States actively draw the 
attention of the Commission to the diverging impacts at national level.130 The 
Commission’s impact assessment procedure consists of a series of analyses 
conducted at the administrative level. These include problem identification, 
definition of objectives, development of main policy options, impact analysis, 
comparison of the options in light of their impact and an outline for policy 
monitoring and evaluation.131 
 
The fact that there is no single EU legislator, but different co-legislating 
institutions, can also be considered a problem from the point of view of impact 
assessments. This is especially the case when it comes to impact assessments 
as information tools meant for the legislator.132 Some academics have made 
the observation that the EP has usually approached the issue of regulatory 
reform from the angle of its legislative powers. In spite of this, the idea that 
democratic accountability is possible only if the EP is sufficiently informed of 
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the impacts of draft legislation has gained more ground within the EP.133 The 
problem with impact assessments is that proposals may significantly change 
during discussions in the Council framework and within the EP. This is 
obviously a price that has to be paid. In terms of co-operation between the 
institutions, the Commission has lent a helping hand towards the EP and the 
Council by expressing its preparedness to share methodology used in the 
impact assessments.134 Sometimes it may also be the case that the Council and 
the EP have identified constitutional problems in legal texts that have been 
amended in a positive way from the point of view of fundamental rights. Paul 
Craig has also raised some concerns about the legal effects of the impact 
assessment reports and the extent to which they are subject to the EU courts. 
The problem is that the impact assessment is only a preliminary step in the 
decision-making process and the impact assessment will not become a part of 
the EU instrument itself and will thus not be subject to judicial review. A good 
example of this kind of important part of the impact assessment is linked with 
the analysis on subsidiarity that may become enforceable.135 Here, the status 
of the impact assessment seems somewhat cumbersome. 
 
It is possible to make the distinction between the two phases of securing 
compliance with fundamental rights in the preparatory phase of the legislation 
within the Commission. The first part of the process takes place in the context 
of the impact assessment of the legislative proposal. We should note that this 
stage is predominantly of preparatory quality as various policy options and 
their impacts are being analysed. The draft proposal does not yet exist. This 
work serves the purpose of the preparation of the draft legislative proposal and 
paves the way for the fundamental rights control phase that follows after the 
draft text comes into being. Both these stages can be seen to fall under the 
smart regulation umbrella. The Commission has provided with guidance for 
the practical examination of fundamental rights aspects of policy options.136 
The document from the Commission giving guidance to the assessment of 
fundamental rights aspects of policy options springs from the smart regulation 
initiative and the Strategy for the effective implementation of EUCFR. Its aim 
is to function as a guideline for the Commission’s internal legal analysis on 
fundamental rights implications of EU legal and policy instruments under 
preparation. The key objective is to make sure that EU instruments take into 
account fundamental rights as set out in the Charter. It is the Charter that sets 
the preconditions for the legislative process in terms of observance of 
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fundamental rights.137 Furthermore, also the CJEU has in its case law 
confirmed that the EU institutions have to examine different policy options in 
light of fundamental rights as set out in the Charter.138 
 
Consequently, the Commission strives to identify fundamental rights 
issues when planning and analysing policy options aiming at particular policy 
goals. In short, the idea is to pinpoint fundamental rights issues and thus to 
help the preparation process to exclude possible problems. The assessments 
may also bring options of including positive issues related to the topic. It 
furthermore helps to identify interrelations of various fundamental rights 
included in the policy instruments under consideration. The practical 
approach of the guidance paper is to reinforce the analysis on the impact on 
fundamental rights in its impact assessments. Similarly, it foresees to make 
fundamental rights aspects more prominent in the explanatory memoranda 
accompanying those legislative proposals with a significant link to 
fundamental rights. Most concretely, perhaps, the Commission commits itself 
to include in the legislative proposals recitals which refer to compliance with 
the Charter and identify the fundamental rights on which the proposal has 
repercussions.139 Recitals will become a part of the final legal instrument. 
Recitals very often proffer background of the article text itself and provide 
guidance for the interpretation the article text that is of a different nature than 
the preamble.140 
 
The operational guidance document also elaborates the fundamental rights 
check-list, which was introduced in the Charter Strategy.141 The basic point of 
departure is an in-depth understanding of the meaning of the provisions of the 
Charter. In this interpretation exercise, the guidance document takes up the 
“explanations relating to the Charter of Fundamental Rights”.142 The next 
phase is to reflect the contents of the Charter on the policy options and later 
on substantive contents of the proposed piece of legislation. In this analysis 
phase, the interface of the Charter with the ECHR and international human 
rights conventions should be clear in the minds of those preparing the impact 
assessment. The same applies to the nature of rights and the possible 
conditions for their limitation, if we are not talking about absolute 
fundamental rights.143 The operational guidance document does not merely 
aim to provide standard clauses that would on a business-as-usual basis be 
introduced in the legal texts. If anything, the approach of the Commission is 
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holistic and the objective is an in-depth analysis of fundamental rights aspects. 
What the Commission is striving for is the promotion of a fundamental rights 
culture at all phases of preparation of EU law.144 The operational guidance 
document is not the only exercise of its kind. The Commission has, for 
example, prepared a guidance document for assessing social impacts within 
the Commission impact assessment system.145  
 
In the operational guidelines document the Commission subscribes to 
early-phase identification of fundamental rights in the consultations 
documents, such as green papers, communications and internet 
consultations.146 As an example of this we can name the Communication on 
the Use of Security Scanners at EU Airports, in which such aspects have been 
addressed.147 Additionally, the Commission seeks to expand the integration of 
various stakeholder groups in the field of fundamental rights into the 
consultations process.148 The Commission has also intensively considered the 
need to address thematic fundamental rights issues. An example of this new 
thematic approach is the EU Agenda for the rights of the Child.149 Despite the 
general amelioration of ex ante review within the Commission, the 
development has not happened without institutional hiccups.150 It is often the 
case that the real problems emerge in the phase where the Council and the EP 
start to make amendments to the Commission’s original proposals and the 
impacts of these changes will not be properly analysed and followed-up.   
 
The Commission has also decided to contribute to the field of fundamental 
rights by financial means. One major part of this practical work is focused on 
promotion of fundamental rights culture.151 In this context we should also 
make the distinction not only between horizontal and vertical EU issues (EU 
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legislation), but also with internal and external EU affairs (international 
agreements that may have strong effects on fundamental rights).152 This brings 
into play the impact assessments on the negotiating mandates that the 
Commission seeks from the Council and subsequent Council and EP decisions 
on the approval of the negotiated texts. With the negotiating mandates, some 
practical problems in the impact assessment may emerge. Probably the biggest 
issue relate to the restricted nature of negotiating mandates. These mandates 
that the Commission seeks from the Council will, if approved, serve as the 
basis for the Commission’s negotiations with third parties. The planned or 
adopted EU positions thus include several confidential elements. 
 
With reference to practice, the Commission Legal Service is extremely 
important in securing compliance with fundamental rights in the Commission 
internal preparatory processes. The core task of the Legal Service is to ensure 
conformity with the Treaties and coherence with existing EU legislation.153 The 
Commission’s Legal Service is thus involved in the preparatory phase of the 
Commission’s legislative proposal. The important point is that the 
Commission’s legislative proposal has to pass the scrutiny of the Legal Service, 
which can be considered as a “stress test” and quality check of the proposal.154 
The strengthened ex ante review of fundamental rights can also create added 
value as a confidence and credibility building exercise addressed to ordinary 
citizens. This would make clear that the Commission does not make 
contradictory legislative proposals and hence does not carry out the 
preparatory phase of legislation in an ivory tower.155 
 
 
2. Consultation phase 
 
The concept of consultation phase is applied here to define the next stage 
of the ex ante review of fundamental rights in the ordinary legislative process. 
The consultation phase cannot be strictly placed in this stage, as it is a 
continuous process and it can and should take place at various phases of the 
process. When executed ideally, consultation should and often is carried out 
by the Commission already at the early phases of its preparatory work. I have, 
however, positioned consultation phase after the Commission has presented 
its proposal for a legislation and consultation of most notably the FRA and the 
EDPS gets underway.156 At this stage, and for the purposes of this study, FRA 
and EDPS are the most important bodies, but I should also mention in this 
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context the ground-breaking work of the EU Network of independent experts 
in the field of ex ante review of fundamental rights. 
 
The issue of establishing an EU agency dealing with fundamental rights 
issues was taken up at the highest political level in the Cologne European 
Council in 1999.157 The idea of an agency was further processed in a report 
prepared by Philip Alston and J.H.H. Weiler for the Comité des Sages 
responsible for drafting leading by example: A Human rights agenda for 
the year 2000. The main argument regarding the necessity of the FRA was 
that the EU should adopt a preventive approach towards fundamental 
rights, thus paving the way for a more pro-active role in this field in 
addition to the traditional judicial review remedy.158 In the European 
Council meeting in Brussels on 13 December 2005, the Heads of States and 
Governments of the EU Member States decided that FRA should be 
established.159 The Council adopted the Council Regulation establishing the 
FRA on February 15, 2007 on the basis of a compromise proposal put 
forward already during the Finnish Presidency of the Council.160 The EU 
can take advantage of the Agency’s expertise in different phases of its 
legislative process. It is quite evident that FRA can contribute to the 
preparatory stages in the EU legislative process and not the back end of it. 
Nevertheless, the Agency may also have a significant role in analysing the 
effects of EU legislation from the fundamental rights’ point of view. As 
such, it is important to bear in mind that a prerequisite has been stipulated 
in Article 3 of the Council Regulation setting up the FRA, according to 
which “the Agency shall deal with fundamental rights issues in the 
European Union and in its Member States when implementing Community 
law”. In the explanatory memorandum of the proposal for a Council 
Regulation establishing the Agency it was stated that “the objective of the 
proposal is to extend the mandate of the EUMC and to establish a European 
Union Agency for Fundamental Rights. It will establish a centre of expertise 
on fundamental rights issues at the EU level”.161  
                                                 
157 In paragraph 46 of the Presidency Conclusions of the Cologne European Council held on 3 and 4 
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The widely shared point of departure among the various institutions and 
stakeholders involved in the process was that FRA should have a pivotal role 
to play in monitoring and securing the realization of rights provided in the EU 
Charter of Fundamental Rights. The legal basis of the instrument establishing 
the FRA was Article 308 of TEC (currently Article 352 of TFEU). Although this 
catch-all Article was eventually selected as the foundation whence the creation 
of the Agency would derive there was also discussion on the possible inclusion 
of Articles 6 and 7 of TEU in the legal basis. This idea was, however, rejected. 
According to Gráinne de Búrca, these two Articles have proved a significant 
trigger for human rights activity, in particular, at the EU level. A good example 
is the establishment of the EU network of independent experts.162 In the times 
before the Lisbon Treaty the legal basis used for the Agency Regulation 
restricted the scope of the Agency merely to the former Community pillar thus 
excluding the former third pillar of the EU from FRA competence.163 The issue 
of possibly extending the coverage to this fundamental rights sensitive third 
pillar was simply left to Council Declaration that is only aspirational. Later, as 
a consequence of the Lisbon Treaty and the important Council Decision on 
multiannual framework for the FRA, this problem has been removed.164 This 
has significantly increased the operational room for manoeuvre of the FRA. 
 
It is relatively easy to conclude that the elevation of the Charter to the legal 
status of primary EU law has also strengthened the role of the FRA. The entry 
into force of the Lisbon Treaty and the subsequent change in the status of the 
EUCFR in practice means that the Charter is one of the starting points for the 
CJEU in fundamental rights cases.165 The FRA and Charter could be 
considered to live in a symbiotic relationship – the reinforcement of either one 
ends up being a reinforcement of the other. As the FRA itself states “the Agency 
situates its work in the wider context of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of 
the European Union”.166 The Charter is hence at the very heart of Agency 
activities.167 Very soon after its adoption in a legally non-binding form, the 
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Framework for the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights for 2013-2017, COM (2011) 880 
final. The proposal whose spearhead clearly was the inclusion of police co-operation and judicial co-
operation in criminal matters into FRA tasks and functions, however, was faced with some resistance 
from the part of the Council. After quite lengthy negotiations the Council Decision was finally adopted 
in March 2013, see Council Decision establishing a multiannual Framework for 2013-2017 for the 
European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights. OJ L 79/1, 21.3.2013. 
165 Senden Hanneke: Interpretation of Fundamental Rights in a Multilevel context. An analysis of 
the European Court of Human Rights and the Court of Justice of the European Union. Intersentia. 
Cambridge 2011, p. 31. 
166 Draft Annual Work Programme of the FRA 2014, April 2013.  Available at 
http://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/annual_work_programme_2014_english.pdf. Visited on 20 
August 2013. 
167 This becomes absolutely clear also in the Agency Regulation itself. In its recital 9 it is stipulated 
that “The Agency should refer in its work to fundamental rights within the meaning of Article 6(2) of the 
Treaty on European Union, including the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental 
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Charter triggered wide-ranging Commission-led exercises dealing with 
compliance of legislative proposals with the Charter. The Charter was also 
reflected to a great extent in the activities of the European ombudsman.168 
More importantly, the CJEU took a positive stand already in European 
Parliament v. Council in 2006 on the Charter by re-stating its importance in 
the context of constitutional traditions and international obligations common 
to Member States.169 In this case it is worth noting that the EP launched this 
process.  
 
The powers of the EU Agencies are generally relatively circumscribed.170 
For the analysis of tasks and competence of EU Agencies, a key CJEU case is 
always the landmark ruling Meroni.171 In this case, the court especially 
emphasized the importance of preserving institutional balance and the need 
to delegate competences only under clearly defined and limited circumstances. 
Whenever setting up new Agencies in the EU, the relation of the founding act 
of the Agency concerned with Meroni always comes into discussion sooner or 
later in the context of competences and tasks of the Agency. The common 
feature of the Agencies, despite the wide variety of their activities, are legal 
personality, certain degree of organizational and financial autonomy and 
regulations that set them up to perform specific tasks.172 
 
Another important consultative EU body is the EDPS, which was 
established by the entry into force of the Regulation 45/2001 on the protection 
of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data.173 The primary 
task of this independent supervisory authority is to ensure that fundamental 
rights and freedoms are respected by Community institutions and bodies. This 
applies especially to the right to privacy. The EDPS is also responsible for 
monitoring the provisions of this regulation and any other Community Act 
relating to the protection of fundamental rights with regard to the processing 
of personal data.174 Furthermore, the EDPS obtains in this regulation various 
advisory functions.175 In order to ensure the effective functioning of the EDPS, 
it has been provided with significant powers related to its field of work. 
Therefore, we can see that institutionally the EDPS is a major player in issues 
related to especially the right to privacy and the right to protection of personal 
data – two significant fundamental rights. 
 
                                                 
Freedoms, and as reflected in particular in the Charter of Fundamental Rights, bearing in mind its status 
and the accompanying explanations. The close connection to the Charter should be reflected in the name 
of the Agency”. 
168 Craig and de Búrca, p. 417. 
169 C-540/03 European Parliament v. Council. 
170 See e.g. Craig and de Búrca, p. 79. 
171 C-9/56 Meroni v High Authority, Judgment of the Court of 13 June 1958. 
172 Hartley T.C. The Foundations of European Union Law. Seventh Edition. Oxford University Press. 
Oxford 2010, p. 36. 
173 Regulation (EC) No 45/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 December 2000 
on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data by the Community 
institutions and bodies and on the free movement of such data. OJ L 8/1. 12.1.2001. Chapter V of the 
Regulation deals with EDPS. 
174 Ibid., see Article 41 and particularly paragraph 2 thereof. 
175 For an exhaustive list of EDPS duties see Article 46 of the Regulation. 
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The new methods of constitutional control, i.e. ex ante review, are often 
non-binding and softer. The same goes for other tools aiming at a high level of 
fundamental rights protection and deeper co-operation in this field. During 
the last decade or so, new soft law-oriented mechanisms have emerged at the 
EU level. 176 Against this background, the EU Network of Independent Experts 
on Fundamental Rights should be noted, having been created in 2002 by the 
Commission in response to a recommendation in the EP's report on the state 
of fundamental rights in the European Union.177 The network came into 
existence largely due to the inadequate time and resources of the LIBE 
Committee of the EP to carry out monitoring functions at that time.178 The 
Network's main tasks were as follows: first, it was mandated to draft an annual 
report of the state of fundamental rights in the European Union and its 
Member States, assessing the application of each of the rights set out in the 
EUCFR. Second, it was given the task to provide the Commission with specific 
information and opinions on fundamental rights issues when requested to do 
so. Third, the Network was mandated to assist the Commission and the EP in 
developing EU policy on fundamental rights. Its objective was further to 
ensure a high degree of expertise in relation to each of the Member States and 
the EU as a whole. Martin Scheinin has argued that the mandate of the 
Network is typical for a human rights monitoring body, adjusted to the role of 
the EUCFR as the applicable set of standards. Furthermore, the Network has 
issued recommendations and identified best practices and taken forward their 
benchmarking.179 Each year the Network produced a report on how 
fundamental rights are safeguarded in practice. It also published opinions on 
specific questions upon the request of the Commission. European citizens 
were also allowed to send information on safeguarding fundamental rights in 
the Union to the Network or the Commission. The Network attached in several 
reports particular importance to developing ex ante review mechanisms of 
compliance with fundamental rights at the level of the EU. The introduction in 
the Network’s report for the year 2003 covers the essential issues in taking up 
“the need to integrate the concern for fundamental rights from the early stages 
of the elaboration of European law, according to an approach to fundamental 
                                                 
176 One example of this group is the open method of co-ordination. It has aimed at bridging the social 
deficit gap by using increasingly non-coercive soft law instruments and other ways of increased co-
ordination in such sensitive policy fields as social protection where more legally binding solutions would 
not probably have proved useful. The method of open co-ordination has also left quite a lot of say at the 
Member State level due to its resort to soft law instruments and cautious approach towards far-reaching 
harmonization. On the method of co-ordination see Christodoulidis Emilios: A default 
Constitutionalism? A Disquieting Note on Europe’s Many Constitutions. In Tuori Kaarlo and Sankari 
Suvi (eds.): The Many Constitutions of Europe. Ashgate Publishing Limited. Farnham 2010, pp. 38-39. 
177 See European Parliament resolution on the situation as regards fundamental rights in the 
European Union (2000) (2000/2231(INI). In the Resolution’s paragraph 9 the EP recommended that 
“a network be set up consisting of legal experts who are authorities on human rights and jurists from 
each of the Member States, to ensure a high level of expertise and enable Parliament to receive an 
assessment of the implementation of each of the rights laid down notably in the Charter, taking account 
of developments in national laws, the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Communities and 
the European Court of Human Rights and any notable case law of the Member States' national and 
constitutional courts”. 
178 See De Schutter 2010, pp. 5-6. 
179 Scheinin Martin: Relationship between Agency and the Network of Independent Experts. In 
Alston Philip and de Schutter Olivier: Monitoring Fundamental Rights in the EU. The Contribution of 
the Fundamental Rights Agency. Oxford and Portland, Oregon 2005, p. 84. 
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rights which must be more preventive, and not simply remedial”.180 The 
experts have further found that preventive control can offer better guarantees 
for legal certainty.181 A certain type of preventive character has been high on 
the agenda since the beginning of the Network’s work.182 In addition to this, 
the Network has also approached these questions from the angle of 
comparison between different systems of EU Member States.183 Later, the FRA 
overtook the place of the Network, as the Network’s mandate expired in 2006.  
 
According to Craig and de Búrca the mandate of the Agency was restricted 
to cover merely the collection of opinions, formulating opinions, highlighting 
good practices and publishing thematic reports.184 This implies a rather 
pessimistic notion of the potential that FRA activity might offer, which may be 
applicable when relating to the monitoring of Article 7 of TEU. Nevertheless, 
this view overlooks the effect that FRA has already had on various 
fundamental right sensitive EU legal dossiers. The impact has often been of 
indirect nature, but clearly evident when reviewing final versions of EU legal 
acts. Taking into account the ubiquitous questions of division of competence 
at different levels in the domain of fundamental rights the most practical 
solution was to restrict the FRA’s activities in matters in which EU Member 
States are, inter alia, implementing EU law. This seems to be the case, since 
any attempts to shift the balance between the tri-polar system of the EU, the 
EU Member States and ECHR-centric system have been likely to cause a 
counter-reaction from the party under pressure to cede some of its 
competence. In fact, this direction is most likely and the division of 
competence in this field will be maintained as it is.  
 
The impact of the Charter on realization of fundamental rights in particular 
legislative dossiers has not always been positive. This was true, for example, in 
the case of the European Arrest Warrant. In this legal act, the legislator raised 
fundamental rights and the principles enshrined in the Charter as the leading 
principle of this legal instrument, while elsewhere in the text endangered the 
right to freedom from arbitrary arrest and the right to a fair trial.185  
 
Some scholars find that legislative references to the Charter are 
predominantly pro forma statements that the piece of legislation is in line with 
                                                 
180 EU Network of Independent Experts on Fundamental Rights: Report on the situation of 
fundamental rights in the European Union in 2003, p. 9. 
181 Ibid., p. 32. 
182 EU Network of Independent Experts on Fundamental Rights: Report on the situation of 
fundamental Rights in the European Union and its Member States in 2002, p. 25. 
183 See for example Opinion of the EU Network of independent experts in fundamental rights 
regarding the role of national institutions for the protection of human rights in the Member States of the 
European Union. March 2004. 
184 Craig Paul and de Búrca Gráinne: EU law. Text, Cases, and Materials. Fourth Edition. Oxford 
University Press. Oxford 2008, p. 404. 
185 De Búrca Gráinne and Aschenbrenner Jo Beatrix: European Constitutionalism and the Charter. 
In Peers Steve and Ward Angela (eds.): The European Union Charter of Fundamental Rights. Hart 
Publishing. Oxford and Portland, Oregon 2004, p. 33. In some legal documents that have been adopted 
also after the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty one can see similar trend that fundamental rights and 
the Charter are being promoted for example in the recitals but the hard core of the text, the Articles, does 
not take into account fundamental rights in a sufficient manner. The promotional aspects of recitals are 
in fact hollowed or in practice removed by substantive operational provisions of the text. 
 63 
the Charter.186 Some danger is also evident, but sectorial legislation should be 
considered in order to see that the cloud of references to the Charter has a 
silver lining: bringing the EUCFR into play, especially in the negotiations on 
issues other than those falling under the AFSJ, has clearly strengthened the 
presence of fundamental rights in the discussion and has helped to reveal 
possible fundamental right problems that may not have been detected if 
formal references to the Charter did not exist. In spite of the fact the Charter 
does not create new competences or alter them, for example Paolo Carrozza 
has in the same line with Alston and Weiler highlighted the eventuality that 
legislative action could increasingly be justified by fundamental rights, as 
recognized especially in the Charter.187 This finding is particularly important. 
It is possible to see that fundamental rights are creeping into policy areas 
previously considered as somehow fundamental rights neutral despite the fact 
that nothing really is. Furthermore, Carrozza links to this discussion the ECHR 
and the jurisprudence of the ECtHR in terms of affirmative or positive 
obligations.188  This positive obligation that derives from the idea of taking 
positive action in order to guarantee for the individuals an effective enjoyment 
of certain right may have an indirect but important effect on fundamental 
rights in EU legislation, despite the current division of competence. 
 
One could approach the role of the Agency through the overarching 
institution-specific questions of this study that deal with, on the one hand, the 
promotion of fundamental rights in draft legal texts and, on the other hand, 
the restriction of fundamental rights in the law-making process. These positive 
and negative obligations are essential for tackling the issue of ex ante review 
of fundamental rights in the EU law-making process. The Agency clearly has 
much to offer for discussion on both of these aspects. In light of the evidence 
of this study, it seems that FRA has taken on a particularly high profile, 
especially in the promotion of fundamental rights in the various opinions on 
draft legal instruments. In several EU legislative dossiers, the Agency has 
brought into the discussion important elements that very often spring from 
the Charter and the CJEU interpretation practice. In practical terms, the FRA 
seeks more references to the Charter and aims at a higher level of alignment 
of secondary EU law under preparation with the phrasing and the spirit of the 
Charter. Legislative dossiers that have been analysed in this study suggest that 
most often it has been the EP that has taken FRA opinions into its positions 
on draft EU legislation.189 The FRA has also been instrumental in intensifying 
the discussion on the limitation of fundamental rights when new EU 
legislation is being drafted. Very often the FRA has turned against the 
Commission in stating that the Commission goes too far in limiting 
fundamental rights and stretches the limits of the allowed restriction 
                                                 
186 See for example Carrozza Paolo: The Member States. In Peers Steve and Ward Angela (eds.): The 
European Union Charter of Fundamental Rights. Hart Publishing. Oxford and Portland, Oregon 2004, 
p. 47. 
187 Ibid., p. 48. 
188 Ibid., p. 49. 
189 See draft legal instruments on Passenger Name Record and in the margins of the security scanner 
file. 
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criteria.190 Political back-up for FRA views has also often emerged in these 
cases from the EP. 
 
Who triggers the interventions of the FRA in certain draft legal instruments 
is interesting to observe. This can happen either at the Agency’s initiative or at 
the request of one of the institutions.191 In the initiating phase, it seems to be 
the EP that has taken most of the advantage of FRA expertise in launching the 
scrutiny of the Agency. Own-initiative opinions form another important 
category of FRA opinions. 
 
According to Article 4 paragraph 2 of the Agency Regulation “The 
conclusions, opinions and reports referred to in paragraph 1 may concern 
proposals from the Commission under Article 250 of the Treaty or positions 
taken by the institutions in the course of legislative procedures only where a 
request by the respective institution has been made in accordance with 
paragraph 1(d). They shall not deal with the legality of acts within the meaning 
of Article 230 of the Treaty or with the question of whether a Member State 
has failed to fulfil an obligation under the Treaty within the meaning of Article 
226 of the Treaty”. This provision was without a doubt designed to preserve 
the delicate institutional balance and to keep the Agency away from the core 
area falling within the competence of the CJEU, namely interpretation of the 
EU law.192 The legal basis for the Agency's work can be found in the Agency 
Regulation, but there are good reasons to claim that during its years of 
operation the FRA has been able to hold a more important role than could be 
expected on the basis of the regulation. The FRA has also carried out some self-
evaluation by analysing impacts of its opinions on some legislative dossiers in 
its annual reports.193 As always with the EU agencies, the tasks and 
competence of the FRA tend to increase. Relatively heavy political pressures 
already encourage the revision of the remit of the FRA in the course of the 
strengthening of particularly the fundamental rights aspects of the AFSJ. 
Although reverse pressures exist, too, one can foresee reinforcement of the 
Agency during the next few years, even though FRA regulation is still quite 
fresh. From an institutional angle we can note that of all the EU institutions, 
the EP has probably been the strongest supporter of a powerful Agency. The 
                                                 
190 See proceedings on EU data protection package and the European Investigation Order. 
191 Pursuant to Article 4 paragraph 1 d to meet the objectives of the Regulation and within the 
competences laid down in the Regulation it shall “formulate and publish conclusions and opinions on 
specific thematic topics, for the Union institutions and the Member States when implementing 
Community law, either on its own initiative or at the request of the European Parliament, the Council or 
the Commission”. The content of this provision has been further elaborated in Recital 13 stating that 
“The Agency should have the right to formulate opinions to the Union institutions and to the Member 
States when implementing Community law, either on its own initiative or at the request of the European 
Parliament, the Council or the Commission, without interference with the legislative and judicial 
procedures established in the Treaty. Nevertheless, the institutions should be able to request opinions 
on their legislative proposals or positions taken in the course of legislative procedures as far as their 
compatibility with fundamental rights are concerned”. 
192 The role of the FRA is actually wider than being an actor in the ex ante review of fundamental 
rights in the legislative process. In addition to submitting opinions on draft legislation, the FRA also 
conducts studies on thematic fundamental rights issues, liaises with EU institutions and relevant 
national authorities and acts as an interlocutor in fora dealing with fundamental rights. 
193 See e.g. brief evaluation of impacts of the FRA opinion on EU data protection reform package, 
FRA Annual Activity Report 2012, p. 10. Available at http://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/annual-
activity-report-2012_en_0.pdf. Visited on 20.8.2013. 
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EP has always called for the need to take advantage of the expertise of the 
Agency and to extend its practical work also to fundamental right-sensitive 
policy areas.194 
 
In its opinions, the FRA has repeatedly made concrete drafting proposals 
to legal texts under preparation, stressing the content of the EUCFR. Various 
FRA text proposals emphasizing the role of the Charter suggest that the FRA 
has placed the Charter at the apex of its opinions. How FRA positions have 
found their way into final legal acts is a different story. In light of concrete EU 
legal dossiers, it seems that the FRA has most often gained support, 
particularly from the EP, while Member States, i.e. the Council, has had a more 
reserved position on FRA opinions. The FRA opinions have been reflected 
particularly in the position of the EP, while the Council have a rather different 
line.  
 
The research material used for this study indicates that there has been quite 
a lot of tension between the FRA and the Commission in the restriction of 
fundamental rights. In many EU legal dossiers the Commission has 
approached the restriction of fundamental rights from a rather flexible point 
of departure, underscoring the nature of fundamental rights being subject to 
limitations. Nonetheless, we can note that point of departure of the FRA has 
often been quite the opposite – a lot of emphasis has been placed on the need 
to fulfil the criteria for limiting fundamental rights. This has led to occasional 
criticism of the Agency towards Commission legislative proposals. In the 
centre of these arguments has often been Article 52 of the EUCFR setting out 
the allowed grounds for limitations to fundamental rights.195  
 
Clear developmental focal points are evident when summarizing the impact 
of the FRA. The FRA has paid a lot of attention to both promotion of 
fundamental rights and the limitation of fundamental rights. The FRA has 
been very keen to push for texts in the legislative phase that bolster 
fundamental rights aspects of the legal texts. In these views, the FRA has 
received a lot of political support from the EP. Similarly, the FRA has also 
taken a high profile as a loud critic of the Commission, especially in relation to 
too far-reaching limitations of fundamental rights. Also in this case, FRA 
opinions have been backed by the EP. On various occasions both the 
Commission and the Council have been forced to back down with their 
positions. The FRA can be considered to be a very special Agency among other 
EU Agencies that have executing functions. One could see that the FRA could 
even evolve into a primus inter pares. This is mainly due to the position of the 
FRA in the supervision of fundamental rights in the EU legislative process. 
Before an EU act is formally adopted, the FRA may intervene and try to remedy 
the flaws identified in the piece of draft EU legislation concerned. This kind of 
                                                 
194 See for example Report of 12 February 2007 on compliance with the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights in the Commission’s legislative proposals: methodology for systematic and rigorous monitoring. 
2005/2169(INI), A6-0034/2007, “The Voggenhuber Report”. Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and 
Home Affairs. See particularly paragraphs 14, 17 and 18. 
195 For the background of the Article 52 see Liisberg Jonas Behring: Does the EU Charter of 
Fundamental Rights threaten the Supremacy of Community Law? 38 CML Rev 1171, 2001. This analysis 
is still to a great extent valid despite changes in the legal status of the Charter.  
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weak form control, in this case preview, can be regarded as significant 
although the impact of the FRA materializes in the law-making process mainly 
indirectly through positions of EU institutions. What makes FRA 
interventions remarkable is their inextricable link with fundamental rights – 
the hard core of European constitutional law. Unfortunately, the FRA has thus 
far not been utilized as much as would have been beneficial for the overall good 
of EU fundamental rights. 
 
 
3. Council proceedings 
 
The Council is above all the institution of the EU in which the Member 
States are represented. After consecutive enlargements of the EU, the number 
of Member States now counts altogether 28 EU countries.196 The Council, 
being a playground of the Member States, is thus the forum where diverging 
positions of the Member States clash and where national interests most visibly 
find their way to the EU debate. Although the Council is one institutional 
entity, its work is organized hierarchically between different levels. The first 
level is the Council Working Group level that is usually characterized as 
technical. Sectorial Council Working Parties deal with legislative and policy 
initiatives falling within their remit under the Council structure. Most of the 
preparation of legislative work takes place in these groups. 
 
The discussion in the working group often ends in a deadlock. In this 
situation, the dossier under discussion will be taken to the Coreper level. This 
Committee of Permanent Representatives of Member States, the committee 
consisting either of Permanent Representatives (Coreper II) of Member States 
or their Deputies (Coreper I), is a kind of compromise factory of the EU. The 
outstanding and often more political issues of political and legislative files will 
be handled in Coreper in order to find a compromise between various 
positions. With the constitutional tendency to make decisions in accordance 
with the ordinary legislative procedure, the role of the Coreper is paramount 
especially in preparing negotiating mandates for the rotating Presidency of the 
Council for trialogue meetings with the EP.197 Very often, the Coreper may find 
a way out, but sometimes this attempt may be in vain and in this case the 
problem needs to be taken to a higher political level. The Coreper also has an 
important role to play in ensuring the consistency of EU policies and actions 
and overseeing that the principles of legality, subsidiarity and proportionality 
are observed.198 
                                                 
196 This is bound to change due to the Brexit. The impact of the UK leaving the EU has been excluded 
from the scope of this dissertation. 
197 What remains intact after the entry into force of Lisbon Treaty is the rotating Presidency of 
Council. In the new constitutional framework the European Council, which is now a formal institution 
chaired by the permanent President of the European Council, has diminished the role of the Member 
State holding the Presidency of the Council. The main tasks of the Presidency have been summarized as 
follows: previously, the Presidency used to function as a business manager, manager of foreign policy, 
promoter of initiatives, package broker, liaison point and collective representative. See Hayes-Renshaw 
Fiona and Wallace Helen: The Council of Ministers. Second edition. Palgrave MacMillan. Basingstoke  
2006, pp. 140-154. 
198 Article 19 of the Rules of Procedure of the Council. Council decision of 1 December 2009 adopting 
the Council’s Rules of Procedure (2009/937/EU). OJL L 325/35, 11.12.2009. 
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Sectorial Councils organized at the ministerial level are the highest point of 
the Council architecture. Ministers of EU Member States discuss unresolved 
issues trying to find solutions acceptable to everyone around the Council table. 
It should be noted, nevertheless, that usually the way has been paved for the 
decisions at a lower level with involved political guidance all the way 
throughout the process. In addition to solving the most important political 
problems, the essential role of the ministers is to provide input to political 
discussion relating to dossiers under discussion and also to give the 
Commission guidance on how to proceed with future legislative work. This can 
take place, for example, in the form of Council Conclusions. The last instance 
and institutionally separate institution is the European Council that steers the 
work of the different Councils and may decide on policy issues that have not 
been solved by the ministers.199 At all the levels described above, the 
Commission is also represented. The aim of this chapter is to perform a legal 
analysis on different forms of ex ante control of fundamental rights in the 
context of different legislative proposals in the Council structure. The objective 
is to answer the question of how the Council, at its different levels, seeks to 
ensure the compliance of the legislation with EU fundamental rights?  
 
Ex ante control can be considered to take place at all levels of the Council 
preparation. We should however distinguish different types of control 
according to different actors involved in the legislative work. It is possible to 
identify the essential role of the Council Legal Service which is organizationally 
a part of the Council Secretariat. The Council Legal Service is the body that 
supervises the legality of legislative texts under preparation. It is present at all 
levels, from the working group to the ministerial level. It presents comments 
and views on the discussed texts and their conformity with the acquis 
communautaire. In addition to its spontaneous role during Council meetings 
at different levels, it may also present written opinions on legal problems. 
Usually the demandeur of these written contributions is the Presidency.200 The 
first stage initiative frequently comes from the interested delegations, the 
Member States. In addition to the task of helping the Council to respect the 
rule of law, it defends it in cases before the CJEU.201 It is therefore very neutral 
in the legislative process but has representative functions on behalf of the 
Council (which is not always unanimous) in court proceedings. The Council 
Legal Service therefore offers a counterweight to Legal Services of other EU 
institutions. 
 
The Council Legal Service is in a key position to react to the Commission’s 
original proposal and to propose amendments made to it by the delegations 
                                                 
199 For the reasons of work economy and the relatively general level guidance that the European 
Council provides, I have decided not to deal with the European Council exhaustively in this thesis. 
Despite its growing role and formally institutionalized character the European Council is unlikely to go 
in-depth with ex ante review should the file concerned not become a large political issue. 
200 The usual practice at the working party level or in the Coreper is that one of the delegations in 
the Council seeks legal advice on some particular issue. In the negotiations this request is channeled to 
the Council Legal Service by the Presidency. Some “critical mass” is therefore needed to back up these 
individual requests by delegations. 
201 Bishop Michael: The Council’s Legal Service. In Westlake Martin and Galloway David (eds.): The 
Council of the European Union. Third edition. John Harper Publishing. London 2006, p. 357. 
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within the Council. This is important because preceding matters such as legal 
basis, general principles of law and statement of reasons, all constitute 
grounds for the annulment of a Court act by the CJEU. As Bishop observes, 
this is why the advice of the Legal Service must be professional and 
independent.202 As for the possible grounds for annulment by the CJEU, 
attention should be drawn to general principles of law, which according to the 
interpretation practice of the CJEU also include fundamental rights. The Legal 
Service therefore has a significant task of also ensuring compliance with 
fundamental rights in the legislative phase. In very practical terms, the Council 
Legal Service can make a positive contribution to this work by pushing forward 
better quality in drafting.203  
 
Most of the first-stage preparatory work of legislation is carried out in 
various working parties of the Council. The most important for Council 
Working regarding fundamental rights is the Working Party on Fundamental 
Rights and Citizenship (FREMP). It has a significant role above all in the work 
on fundamental rights scrutiny. Another key working group of the Council is 
the Human Rights Working Group (COHOM), but the work of the COHOM is 
mainly focused on the external dimension of EU fundamental rights policy. All 
other Council sectorial working groups deal with fundamental rights issues, 
but it is fair to say that very often the fundamental right focus is not that 
remarkable in everyday work. Sectorial working groups handle legal dossiers 
from their angle of expertise and probably the most extensive expertise can be 
found in working groups dealing with AFSJ, because mostly fundamental 
rights issues are probably most common in these dossiers. Another channel of 
ex ante control in the Council is offered by the Member States. All the Member 
States have in place their national preparation mechanisms of EU affairs at the 
national level. These systems are very different from each other. Some national 
systems empower national parliament with a strong say on EU affairs while 
the others maintain most of the control functions at the governmental level. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
202 Ibid., p. 358. 
203 Pursuant to Article 22 of the Council’s Rules of Procedure “the Legal Service shall be responsible 
for checking the drafting quality of proposals and draft acts at the appropriate stage, as well as for 
bringing drafting suggestions to the attention of the Council and its bodies.” Council decision of 1 
December 2009 adopting the Council’s Rules of Procedure (2009/937/EU). OJ L 325/35, 11.12.2009. 
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Graph 2. Physical assessment of fundamental rights within the Council 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Despite these possibilities to control conformity of legislation with 
fundamental rights we can see that the real Achilles’ heel in the legislative 
process is the non-existence of formal impact assessments. This relates to the 
common practice during the legislative process where the original proposals 
of the Commission will be significantly changed. As considerable changes to 
the Council texts will be introduced, no impact assessments will be carried out. 
The Commission and the legal services of both the Commission and the 
Council are at the disposal in securing that draft legal texts are in line with the 
EU law but this fails to satisfactorily compensate for the lack of impact 
assessments because changes may often have strong implications on 
fundamental rights as well. The jurist-linguist phase at the very end of the 
legislative process is rather technical, but in this phase terminological 
problems may still emerge. In this connection we should note that if a group 
of Member States takes the legal initiative in the AFSJ there is no obligation to 
carry out impact assessment.  
 
One practical problem related to the Council proceedings is the limited 
access to travaux préparatoires of the Council that are usually not public. This 
is especially true with regard to first reading legislative files. These are hard to 
follow because no “official” Council positions are available as is the case with 
second reading files. This creates a practical problem in reflecting the final 
outcome of the legislative process, the legal act, against the Council positions 
and thus determining what the real impact of the Council was in the legislative 
Legislative process within the Council 
Council 
Secretariat 
Council Legal 
Service Member 
States 
Government 
(experts) 
Parliament 
(experts) 
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process. Today, a first reading agreement takes place in about ¾ of EU 
legislative dossiers.204  The Council begins its proceedings at the working party 
level on the legal text and usually after rounds of negotiations the EU dossier 
in question is ripe for Coreper to decide. The Council Presidency aims to take 
the text forward and the crucial issue is to avoid the blocking minority in the 
Council that can block the decision-making altogether.  
 
Here the Council conclusions on the role of the Council in ensuring the 
effective implementation of the EUCFR should be discussed more closely.205 
In the conclusion the Council recalled the need set out in the Stockholm 
programme that EU institutions and Member States should ensure that 
legislative initiatives are and remain consistent with fundamental rights in the 
course of the legislative process.206 The Stockholm programme emphasized 
the need for a systematic and rigorous monitoring and hence the Council 
invited the FREMP to elaborate in cooperation with the Council Legal Service 
methodological guidelines dealing with the main aspects of fundamental 
rights scrutiny.207 The Council considered that these guidelines should be 
above all short and pragmatic and should address how to identify and solve 
problems of their own proposals for amendments in relation to their 
compatibility with fundamental rights.208 This goal was deemed necessary to 
be shared by all the preparatory bodies of the Council. In the conclusions, the 
idea was apparently to promote having a fundamental rights label for Council 
legislative acts. It seems that this was closely linked with an objective to 
endorse a fundamental rights culture at all levels of the Council when drafting 
legislation. This kind of promotion would certainly be important especially for 
awareness-raising among the drafters of sectorial EU legislation. 
 
When considering the Council as the co-legislator we should keep in mind 
that in the AFSJ a group of Member States is still entitled to put forward 
legislative proposals. Although we seem to have moved towards Commission 
right of initiative also in this domain, it is extremely important to carry out 
evaluation of impacts of proposals by a group of Member States. The Council 
conclusions also attach great importance to proposals originating in this way. 
The same is true with amendments made to the legislative texts during the 
legislative proceedings.209 These are obviously the biggest gaps in the ex ante 
review within the Council. An interesting feature in the Council Conclusions is 
the reiterated call for using the FRA and reinforcing co-operation with it.210 
Although the pivotal role of the Council Legal Service has been underscored 
on many occasions and the importance of national legal experts as the first line 
of defence against insufficient sensitiveness towards fundamental rights in the 
                                                 
204 In the EP this has given rise to discussion on the possible democracy gap with a dominating role 
of rapporteurs in first reading files. 
205 See Draft Council Conclusions on the role of the Council of the European Union in ensuring the 
effective implementation of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, 6387/11, 
Brussels 11 February 2011. The Justice and Home Affairs Council adopted the Council Conclusions on 
24-25 February 2011. 
206 Ibid., paragraph 1. 
207 Ibid., paragraph 16. 
208 Ibid., paragraph 15. 
209 Ibid., paragraph 4. 
210 Ibid., see paragraphs 18-20. 
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legislative process, it is important that also the Council seems to be willing to 
provide a strong role to the FRA in the ex ante review of fundamental rights. 
 
As mandated in the Council Conclusions, the FREMP prepared guidelines 
document for carrying out the fundamental rights identification and ensuring 
that legal texts are in line with the Charter.211 The guidelines approved by the 
Council are legally non-binding and can be used for several purposes. For 
instance, guidelines often aim at helping in the very practical and technical 
application of legal instruments. They can also be adopted when there is a need 
to establish a code of conduct for procedural reasons. The purpose of the 
guidelines can be summarized very briefly. It has to do with identifying and 
dealing with fundamental rights issues that are arising during the discussions 
on legislative proposals in the Council.212 It becomes quite evident in the 
guidelines that the EUCFR functions as a yardstick in the assessment of 
fundamental rights, with particular attention being given naturally to the 
CJEU as the interpreter of the EU primary law.213 For the expert bodies to be 
consulted, the guidelines emphasize notably the Council Legal Service, the 
national legal experts in the capitals as well as the FREMP.214 Additionally, the 
expertise of the FRA has been underscored.215 What is likely to be important 
for the practical work on the basis of the guidelines is related to limitation of 
fundamental rights. The guidelines offer guidance on what basis fundamental 
rights can be restricted. The annex of the guidelines aims at shedding some 
light on the questions related to the requirement to be provided by law and the 
necessity and proportionality.216  
 
For many years there has been discussion under the auspices of the Council 
on the need to enhance better regulation, or smart regulation as this initiative 
is currently called. Unfortunately, there has not been that much action and 
practical measures in this field. The development with impact assessments 
that can be regarded as a practical tool to strive for better regulation has been 
modest.217 Efforts in this area have mainly concentrated on political messages 
on the importance of impact assessments, such as with various Council 
conclusions on the topic. In December 2011, the Competitiveness Council 
adopted Council Conclusions on impact assessment. With these Council 
Conclusions, the Council tried to tackle the issue of impact assessments within 
the Council. After acknowledging and taking into account of the Commission’s 
key role in the field of impact assessments and the recent developments within 
the EP the Council turned its attention to the Council’s tasks.218 First, the 
Council committed itself to improving the practice of discussing the 
                                                 
211 Guidelines on methodological steps to be taken to check fundamental rights compatibility at the 
Council’s preparatory bodies. 10140/11, Brussels 18 May 2011. 
212 See Guidelines, preamble. 
213 Guidelines, p. 5. 
214 Ibid., p. 4. 
215 Ibid., p. 4. 
216 Ibid., see p. 6 and Annex IV, pp. 16-18. 
217 A proof of this can be found for example in the case C-236/09 Test Achats, in which the CJEU 
found that Council Directive 2004/113/EC is in violation with Articles 21 and 23 of the EUCFR.  
218 On the work in this area see Council Conclusions on impact assessment, 3133rd Council meeting, 
competitiveness (internal market, industry, research and space), Brussels 5 and 6 December 2011, 
paragraphs 5 and 6. 
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Commission impact assessments during the legislative process. Also the need 
to strengthen the cooperation with the Commission was underlined.219 
Furthermore, the relevant information prepared by the Member States was 
reflected.220 Much of the responsibility for managing and providing 
opportunities for discussion on such data was addressed to the Presidencies 
and consequently in practical terms also to the Council Secretariat. Moreover, 
the Working Party level of the Council was encouraged to make use of the 
possibility to invite the Commission to complement its original impact 
assessments.221 What is probably the most important issue in these quite 
routine-like Council Conclusions is paragraph 13 that underlines the 
importance of embedding effective use of impact assessments in the EU 
legislative process. It also recalls the commitment of the Council to prepare, if 
deemed necessary, impact assessments on its own substantive amendments. 
Here, the important role of the General Secretariat of the Council was 
underscored together with the co-operation between Member States’ and the 
Commission’s expertise.222  
 
With the extremely long processes in amending the Treaties over the last 
decade or so, engaging in such far-reaching changes may not be a very popular 
idea. However, if a reform of the Treaty will take place sometime in the future, 
it should be considered if Member States could be given a similar option of 
giving the Commission a “yellow card” for neglecting fundamental rights in the 
draft legal instruments. This would be a similar mechanism to that of the 
submission of objections, the reasoned opinions, in subsidiarity. This might 
lead to a closer involvement of the Member States already in the preparatory 
phase of legislation. In this kind of arrangement lies the danger of the 
mechanism being used for political purposes, like trying to block politically 
sensitive proposals of the Commission. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
219 Ibid., paragraph 9. 
220 Ibid., paragraph 10. 
221 Ibid., paragraph 12. 
222 Ibid., paragraph 13. Taking into account the rather restricted resources of the Council Secretariat 
this may in practice be easier said than done. Without sufficient resourcing the professional level 
carrying out ex ante control may become a mere Potemkin facade. 
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4. EP proceedings 
 
Draft legislation enters EP proceedings as Council proceedings are 
underway. The competence of the EP has significantly increased in the field of 
ex ante review of fundamental rights as a consequence of the institutional 
changes introduced in the Lisbon Treaty. The figure below illustrates this 
change. 
 
 
 
 
Graph 3. Institutional change and the EP 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In order to bring some clarity on the institutional position of fundamental 
rights within the EP, we should turn to the document establishing the rules of 
the game for the EP to internally handle fundamental rights issues, namely the 
rules of procedure. According to the rules of procedure, respect for 
fundamental rights is one of the key principles in the functioning of the EP. 
The Rules of Procedure (RoP) attach utmost importance especially to the 
EUCFR.223 Furthermore, the RoP foresees a process according to which a 
particular subject matter can be brought to the EP committee responsible for 
interpretation of the Charter by a political group or by a certain number of 
MEPs if a legislative proposal or parts of it do not comply with EUCFR. 
Fundamental rights are present also in other parts of the RoP and the need for 
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conformity has been re-iterated several times.224 The new legal framework 
established in this field by the Lisbon Treaty was highlighted on many 
occasions before the entry into force of the new Treaty.225 Claims from the EP 
have also often emerged on putting the EP and the Council on an equal footing 
in the law-making process.226 
 
The competence of the EP regarding provisions of Title V of TFEU is 
explicitly stated in various provisions of this Title. First, in accordance with 
nearly all the Articles falling under Title V of TFEU, the EP is guaranteed with 
the powers of co-legislator. With these Articles reaching from 67 to 89, the EP 
will be involved in ordinary legislative procedure in the fields of policies on 
border checks, asylum, immigration, judicial cooperation in civil matters, 
judicial cooperation in criminal matters as well as in police cooperation. 
Taking into account the very concrete link of these policy areas to the very 
heart of constitutional law, we can note that we are talking here about an 
extremely substantial change.227 
 
It seems that probably the most interesting position that the EP itself has 
taken on its role in the AFSJ is the resolution of 25 November 2009 on the 
Stockholm Programme.228 The Stockholm Programme has been the most 
important political guideline for the development of AFSJ. In the Stockholm 
program, adopted during the Swedish Presidency in 2009, political guidance 
is provided for the development of the former area of justice and home affairs, 
the European Council very clearly gives the EU institutions and the Member 
States the task of securing consistency of fundamental rights in the legislative 
process.229 The fact that this issue has been taken up at the highest political 
level hints at the growing importance of ex ante review.  
 
It should also be noted that the position of the EP is quite strong and 
ambitious when it comes to objectives of the Stockholm program. The new role 
of the EP in the new constitutional framework is highlighted to a great extent. 
In many respects, the need to set the bar higher as regards the level of ambition 
of this policy program has also been underscored. Once again, the EP in several 
                                                 
224 See for example rule 43 (paragraph 4), rule 103 (paragraph 1) and Annex XV (paragraph 2),  
225 See e.g. paragraph 2 of the Report on the draft Council Decision determining the list of third 
States and organizations with which Europol shall conclude agreements. A7-0069/2009. 16.11.2010. 
226 Paragraph 1 of Draft opinion of the Committee on Constitutional Affairs for the Committee on 
Legal Affairs on better lawmaking in 2007 and 2008 pursuant to Article 9 of the Protocol on the 
application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality. 2009/2142(INI). 25.2.2010. 
227 The Lisbon Treaty also contains provisions on the possibility of enhanced co-operation. 
Sometimes enhanced co-operation has been criticized because it can be understood as providing à la 
carte solutions to question related to European integration. In my opinion, enhanced co-operation can 
be a good instrument in the former third pillar of the EU because it can help to overcome deadlocks in 
negotiations on legal proposals. Member States’ absolute red lines and no go-zones can be taken into 
account by using the possibility of enhanced co-operation to move forward. 
228 European Parliament resolution of 25 November 2009 on the Communication from the 
Commission to the European Parliament and the Council – An area of freedom, security and justice 
serving the citizen – Stockholm Programme. 
229 The European Council invites the EU institutions and the Member States to ensure that legal 
initiatives are and remain consistent with fundamental rights throughout the legislative process by way 
of strengthening the application of the methodology for a systematic and rigorous monitoring of 
compliance with the Convention and the rights set out in the Charter of Fundamental Rights. The 
Stockholm Program – An open and secure Europe serving and protecting the citizens. 17024/09, p. 12. 
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paragraphs of the resolution takes up the need to strengthen parliamentary 
control in initiatives related to AFSJ.230 Furthermore, the EP finds, quite 
interestingly and also in many parts of the resolution, that another important 
feature of reinforcing parliamentary control is the involvement of national 
parliaments. Here, in paragraph 11, the EP calls for a more transparent law-
making process. Particularly the access to documents and information in cases 
with a link to the rights of the individual has been raised.231 What is even more 
significant is the idea of establishing “of a concrete monitoring and evaluation 
system, notably in the area of justice, which focuses on the quality, efficiency, 
and fairness of existing legal instruments, of the administration of justice and 
of the protection of fundamental rights, closely involving the European 
Parliament and the national parliaments”.232 What does this mean in practice? 
The EP indeed further refines the idea by condensing it to development of 
evaluation systems. First, the EP takes note of the existence of various 
evaluation systems in this policy field. What the EP is after, is a consolidated 
and coherent framework with better co-ordination for these activities. This 
should cover the wide range of phases of evaluation, including ex ante -
evaluation.233 It is evident that a stronger role is foreseen for the EP and also 
national parliaments. What might be interesting in the future is the possible 
partnership of the EP and national parliaments in this field and their 
contribution to better law-making.234 Nevertheless, the need to strengthen 
parliamentary scrutiny – both at national and supranational levels – can be 
identified as a general feature of the EP view.  
 
Ex ante review emerges again in the resolution, in paragraph 21. In this 
paragraph, the EP stresses that impact assessments are needed with regard to 
every new EU policy, legislative proposal and programme. Similarly, these 
impact assessments should identify fundamental rights that are affected by 
these new initiatives.235 The interesting thing in this statement is that the EP 
would very much like to see stronger involvement of the FRA throughout the 
policy cycle of each legislative proposal having fundamental rights 
implications. This is no wonder because the EP has always been a strong 
proponent of Union and supranational dimension of EU policies. Similarly, 
the EP has welcomed giving more tasks and competence to EU agencies. This 
can certainly take EU policies in an increasingly harmonized direction. The EP 
goes even further in its call for better legislation by requiring impact 
assessments in the field of justice and deploring that in the past no proper 
impact assessments were conducted in this field.236 This can be considered as 
a major criticism towards the practices of the Commission. The same trend 
continues later with a further request monitoring the quality of opinions 
delivered by the IAB. For the purpose of carrying out quality checks, the EP 
proposes a panel of independent experts. 
                                                 
230 See for example Resolution, paragraph 5, p. 3. 
231 Ibid., paragraph 11. 
232 Ibid., paragraph 13. 
233 Ibid. 
234 See Priestley Julian: Six Battles that shaped Europe’s Parliament. John Harper Publishing. 
London 2008, pp. 204-205. 
235 See Resolution, paragraph 21. 
236 Ibid., paragraph 102. 
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In the Resolution, the EP also touches upon the external dimension of 
fundamental rights.237 The promotion of fundamental rights, democracy and 
the rule of law has been one of the cornerstones of EU external relations and 
with the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the EP has a strengthened 
position vis-à-vis international agreements. As a consequence of the 
possibility to accept or reject texts of international agreements, the EP also has 
more say on the fundamental rights related matters included in these 
agreements. The increase in the powers of the EP after the entry into force of 
the Lisbon Treaty can also be seen in the back-end of the legislative cycle such 
as delegated acts.238 Similarly, as stated before, the EP now has more 
competence in international issues, such as when concluding international 
agreements.239 These are areas where the EP can also keep fundamental rights 
issues on the agenda. As a consequence of its increased competence, the 
necessity to obtain the EP’s consent will now reach also to the international 
agreements on police and judicial co-operation in criminal matters.240 
 
In its vote in November 2010, the EP LIBE committee adopted a report on 
the situation of fundamental rights in the European Union.241 This report can 
be considered as an EP response to the Commission Communication on the 
strategy for the effective implementation of the EUCFR by the EU. The EP 
report very much follows the same line with the views expressed in its report 
concerning the Stockholm program. In many parts of the text, the EP calls for 
a stronger fundamental rights policy, both internal and external, for the EU. 
In addition to general messages on reinforcing the fundamental rights 
dimension, the EP also pays attention to ex ante review of EU legislation. First, 
the EP reminds the Commission to monitor all new legislative proposals for 
compliance with the EUCFR and also to check existing instruments in this 
respect. Furthermore, the EP underlines the need to include impact 
assessments that would ensure the compliance of the proposal with the 
Charter.242 Here the EP also attaches importance to the work conducted by the 
IAB under the Commission.243  The EP also sends a similar message to the 
Council.244 What is even more interesting in terms of ex ante review is the 
commitment of the EP to strengthen its own ex ante review in the legislative 
process.245 It seems that the EP is really taking fundamental rights seriously in 
                                                 
237 The EP stresses in paragraph 151 that “contrary to what was stated in the Presidency’s draft 
Stockholm Programme, when fundamental rights are at stake EU external policy should comply with the 
EU’s internal legal framework and not the reverse”. 
238 Pursuant to Article 290 (2 b) of the TFEU “The European Parliament or the Council may decide 
to revoke the delegation”. In terms of institutional balance of power this is a major difference to the 
implementing acts, the so-called comitology, under Article 291 of the TFEU. 
239 Lenaerts Koen and Cambien Nathan: The Democratic Legitimacy of the EU after the Treaty of 
Lisbon. In Wouters Jan, Verhey Luc and Kiiver Philipp (Eds.): European Constitutionalism beyond 
Lisbon. Intersentia. Antwerpen 2009, p. 187. 
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241 Report on the situation of fundamental rights in the European Union (2009) – effective 
implementation after the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon (2009/2161 (INI)). A7-0344/2010. 
242 Ibid., paragraph 18. 
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244 Ibid., paragraph 27. 
245 See ibid., paragraph 26. Accordingly, the EP ”highlights that also the European Parliament should 
strengthen its autonomous impact assessment on fundamental rights in relation to legislative proposals 
and amendments under examination in the legislative process to make it more systematic, notably by 
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its law-making and is ready to take into account the comprehensive need to 
reinforce ex ante review. The EP also considers that the FRA should be 
strengthened in providing expertise and inputs to the decision-making 
process. According to the EP, this includes reviewing the mandate of the 
Agency.246 Finally, the EP also calls for the institutions involved in the EU 
decision-making process to use the data provided by the FRA in the 
preparatory stage of legislative activity.247 This is a clear signal that the EP 
wishes to give a strong status to the Agency in law-making, which includes a 
fundamental rights dimension. The involvement of the FRA is in the 
preparatory phase of legislation. 
 
In the Stockholm Program, the European Council invites the EU 
institutions to make full use of the expertise of FRA in the legislative work.248 
A strengthened role for the FRA could contribute to pulling the institutional 
threads of ex ante review together and ensuring sufficient neutrality in the 
preview.  The only thing that might be somewhat problematic is that the 
empowerment of the Agency may strengthen the position of the Commission 
and, as a consequence, shift the institutional balance of power.  
 
The EP also has a key role to play with regard to the positive obligation to 
promote fundamental rights, both in legislation and policy documents. Let us 
take the report on the fundamental rights situation in the EU as an example. 
It is of particular interest that in November 2012, the LIBE Committee 
produced a report on the fundamental rights situation in the EU. This report 
contained a great number of interesting insights and calls for EU actions in the 
field of fundamental rights. The findings of this report are important for this 
study, chiefly for two reasons. The first important point highlighted in the 
report is about securing compliance of draft legislation with fundamental 
rights. The report approaches this issue from an institutional angle. Regarding 
the role of the Commission in this screening process, the EP welcomes the 
actions taken by the Commission to ensure that draft legislation is in 
conformity with the EUCFR but also considers that there is still a lot of room 
for improvement: The EP finds that there are still legal proposals that do not 
take into account effects on fundamental rights.249 When it comes to practical 
measures, the EP urges the Commission to make sure that the effect of 
legislation on fundamental rights and its implementation by the Member 
States will be a part of the Commission’s evaluation reports on the 
implementation and application of EU law.250 More concretely the EP requests 
the Commission to revise the impact assessment guidelines. What is 
noteworthy is the request to widen the guidelines to include UN and CoE 
                                                 
enlarging the possibilities currently foreseen by Rule 36 of the Parliament’s Rules of procedure on the 
respect for the Charter and to ask to the Legal service opinions on legal issues in relation to fundamental 
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246 Ibid., paragraphs 32 and 33. 
247 Ibid., paragraph 34. 
248 See p. 12 of the Stockholm Programme. 
249 Report on the situation of fundamental rights in the European Union (2010-2011), Committee 
on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs, Rapporteur: Monika Flasiková Benová. A7-0383/2012, 
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250 Ibid., paragraph 3. 
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human rights standards.251 This constitutes an interesting change towards a 
wider framework for ex ante review of fundamental rights. 
 
The EP then turns its attention to the Council. The spearhead of the EP 
position is the need of “the Council to ensure effective implementation of its 
commitment to check both its proposed amendments to Commission 
proposals and proposals put forward on its own initiative with the Charter”.252 
In this case the EP obviously focuses on legal initiatives initiated by a group of 
Member States and also policy initiatives encapsulated in policy documents, 
such as Council conclusions. The EP does not spare itself from criticism either, 
so the EP statement is not about bashing the other institutions. The EP 
considers it necessary to strengthen its impact assessment on fundamental 
rights in relation to legislative proposals and proposed amendments made 
during the law-making process.253 The EP therefore seems to be ready to take 
the hit for not having yet reacted adequately to the necessity of reinforcing ex 
ante review. The EP also very much underscores its role as the bastion of 
democratic and parliamentary oversight and in the text refers especially to the 
case of ACTA.254 In terms of delving into the deeper substance of fundamental 
rights, the EP finds that tensions between economic freedoms and 
fundamental rights should be handled already at the legislative phase.255 The 
second important reason has to do with the role of the FRA. Again, in its report 
the EP calls other institutions to make use in a systematic manner of the 
independent expertise of the FRA.256 Later on in the report, in the context of 
PNR proposal, the EP once again reiterated the need to take account of 
concerns expressed by the FRA.257 We can, with good reason, conclude that 
the EP considers it extremely important to involve the FRA in the legislative 
process, especially when fundamental rights issues are concerned.258  
 
Finally, let us put forward the decisive question concerning the realism of 
all this: How to merge a high level of ambition with the notion of realism and 
how to integrate the outcome with a high quality of legal texts? This is a 
challenge that the EU has to face in the field of fundamental rights. One 
obvious conclusion is that ex ante review must be an extensive and a 
continuous process and has to involve all the institutions. Consequently, the 
EP has to contribute as well and without a doubt it will do. In order to 
guarantee that it can act responsibly within its new competence, the EP will 
obviously take its new role very seriously and put a great deal of effort on 
ensuring that files have a link to constitutional issues.259 In order to conclude 
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from an institutional point of view, we should try to answer the following 
question: Can the EP be seen as an institutional gambler longing for more 
competence in the AFSJ or as a responsible co-legislator par excellence. In 
light of recent evidence, we can conclude that the EP has opted in for the latter 
option. This conclusion can be drawn from preparation of legislation, which 
also includes analysis of fundamental rights. This is the case in spite of the 
relatively strong rhetoric that the EP used after the entry into force of the 
Lisbon Treaty. Practice can at first glance appear to be quite different from the 
rhetoric. It seems nonetheless that the EP is taking the ex ante review of 
fundamental rights seriously at the level of political aspiration and 
commitment, as well as at the level of legal-technical preview.  The hybrid 
model of constitutional preview involving extensively the EP can function as 
significant boost for taking fundamental rights more seriously in the EU 
legislative process. We should note that the EP has on various occasions 
pushed very hard for a robust ex ante review of fundamental rights at the EU 
level. The EP has, in particular, seen the EUCFR as the vital basis for this ex 
ante review and the calls for strengthening the system of preview have been 
addressed to all the EU institutions.260  
 
All the practical work on EU legislation within the EP is carried out in 
specialized parliamentary committees. The handling of the dossier starts in 
the EP when the responsible Committee begins the discussion on the topic. 
Rapporteur and shadow-rapporteurs will be nominated for the file and the 
report of the rapporteur will be voted in the Committee and later in the 
plenary.261 This represents the EP position.   The amendments that are 
presented later on to the plenary are discussed and dealt with in these 
committees.262 In this work, a considerable political power is attached to the 
rapporteur of the respective legal file. According to Voerman, the EP tries to 
enter into a dialogue with electorate through its contribution to legislative 
process. Practically, this happens with the means of the amendments.263 As 
stated previously, the rapporteur of the file has a central role to play. He or she 
can introduce amendments when the piece of draft legislation is being dealt 
with in the parliamentary committee. In the committee phase ,also individual 
MEPs can table amendments. It is clear, however, that already at this stage 
there is a need to broker a political package of the amendments that the 
majority can accept. The next stage after the committee phase is the plenary. 
If the handling of the EP text has already progressed all the way to this phase, 
it is much harder to enter new amendments into the EP text. At least a much 
larger political mass, such as a political group, is needed to make an 
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amendment to pass on to the text in the plenary. Furthermore, the role of the 
President of the EP is very strong in deciding which amendments tabled in the 
plenary will be given the green light. 
 
Probably the most important parliamentary committee exclusively dealing 
with human rights issues is the Sub-Committee on Human Rights (DROI).  
This sub-committee structurally functions under the Committee on Foreign 
Affairs (AFET). Hence, the focus of the sub-committee has been mainly on the 
external dimension of fundamental rights, i.e. relations with third countries. 
We are obviously now witnessing, however, a change in the role of the DROI 
as the EP is taking a much stronger role in fundamental rights issues than 
previously. Nevertheless, it becomes quite obvious later in this presentation 
that the dichotomy between internal and external fundamental rights policies 
still exists. This is not to say that the EP has lacked political will to be more 
active in internal fundamental rights issues. Quite the contrary, the EP has 
consistently showed great interest in the internal fundamental rights policies, 
but it has simply been short of legislative competence and hence of practical 
means to carry out more wide-ranging policies and initiatives in this field. 
When issues are dealt with by the EP they are usually first debated in the 
committees and the reports of the committees will form the basis for plenary 
discussion.264 Only time will tell to what extent issues related to ex ante review 
will be handled in the committees of the EP and in the plenary. Nevertheless, 
it seems quite difficult to integrate ex ante review elements to plenary 
discussions. Other committees than the DROI could however hold an 
important role also in issues related to fundamental rights, although the 
primary responsibility clearly lies within the competence of the DROI, 
especially regarding the external dimension of fundamental rights. 
 
In relation to internal fundamental rights legislation, one should be aware 
of the importance of especially the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and 
Home Affairs (LIBE).265 Now, as the LIBE Committee is responsible for “the 
protection within the territory of the Union of citizens’ rights, human rights 
and the fundamental rights, including the protection of minorities, as laid 
down in the Treaties and in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the 
European Union” it is crystal clear that LIBE is the major interlocutor in 
fundamental rights issues.266 This applies particularly to the internal 
dimension of fundamental rights in the Union, i.e. preparation of EU 
fundamental rights legislation, which is the more important part of 
fundamental rights work from the angle of this study. The LIBE is also in 
charge of the establishment and the development of the AFSJ, which will serve 
as a springboard and not a gravedigger of various legal and political initiatives 
that will become increasingly important. Similarly, the overall link to 
fundamental rights related topics as well to institutional bodies, such as FRA 
and Eurojust, highlights the LIBE in the spectrum of fundamental rights. It 
                                                 
264 See Hartley T.C.: The Foundations of European Community Law. An Introduction to the 
Constitutional and Administrative Law of the European Community. Sixth Edition. Oxford University 
Press. Oxford 2007, p. 30. 
265 The LIBE committee has also been identified as a key parliamentary committee in monitoring 
fundamental rights implications of legislative proposals, see “The Voggenhuber Report”, paragraph 15. 
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should also be noted that LIBE annually undertakes the report on the situation 
of fundamental rights in the European Union as set out in the Annex 1 of the 
RoP. 
 
In practical terms the role of LIBE becomes very concrete when one asks 
who is the pen in the EP. The MEPs of LIBE will manage the drafting of the 
reports on fundamental rights issues within the EP.267 Moreover, it will be a 
team of members of LIBE who will conduct the practical negotiations on 
fundamental rights legislation in the trialogues with the Council and the 
Commission.  We should bear in mind that the EP is organized internally in a 
consensus-oriented way, with a considerable role being given to the 
rapporteur, who seeks broad support from political groups to his proposals in 
order to secure smooth handling in the plenary.268 The rapporteur of the 
respective legislative file is also in a central position in the phase of trialogues, 
in which the positions of the institutions will be merged, usually in a series of 
inter-institutional negotiations.269 Some scholars have identified a problem in 
this process in terms of transparency and democratic accountability due to fact 
that in trialogues very important dossiers will be negotiated “behind closed 
doors”.270  
 
A very important Committee in the EP that has very close links to 
fundamental rights issues is the Committee on Constitutional Affairs (AFCO). 
The last years have borne the testimony of a large number of the previously 
known third pillar initiatives touching directly upon the very constitutional 
core of the EU and consequently that of the Member States. A good example 
of this is the European Arrest Warrant, which in its implementation phase 
raised considerably constitutional concerns and even resistance from the part 
of Member States.271 One could even talk about a new wave of constitutional 
patriotism.272  
 
With the empowerment of the EP in the former third pillar of the EU, the 
EP will also become an increasingly attractive target for lobbyists and all kinds 
of interest groups to present their stake on issues, which the EP will handle.273 
                                                 
267 For a deeper analysis of LIBE it would have been interesting to study the composition of the 
Committee, e.g. which parties do the members of the LIBE come from, which social backgrounds are 
they from and which nationalities do they represent. Similarly, it would have been intriguing to further 
tackle the variety of the committee statements by asking which topics have these statements or positions 
dealt with: division of competence, fundamental rights, and which substantial fundamental rights and 
so forth.  
268 Priestley, p. 125. 
269 We should note, however, that each legislative dossier has so called “shadow rapporteurs” who 
are nominated by the political groups in order to ensure that political views of the given political group 
will be taken sufficiently into account when preparing the EP position on the file concerned and when 
conducting practical negotiations thereon. Hence, the idea of seeking compromise between political 
views becomes reality already in this phase.   
270 See Héritier Adrienne: Explaining Institutional Change in Europe. Oxford University Press. 
Oxford 2007, p. 99-100.  
271 For a wide-ranging discussion on this topic see Guild Elspeth: Constitutional Challenge to 
European Arrest Warrant. Wolf Legal Publishers. Nijmegen 2006. 
272 On the concept of ”Verfassungspatriotismus” see Habermas Jürgen: Faktizität und Geltung. 
Beiträge zur Diskurstheorie des Rechts und des demokratischen Rechtsstaats. Suhrkamp. Frankfurt am 
Main 1992, pp. 632-660. 
273 Banchoff Thomas and Smith Mitchell P.: Legitimacy and the European Union. The Contested 
Polity. Routledge. London 1999, p. 147. 
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This trend should not be seen as some kind of a bogey-man lurking in the 
legislative process, but rather as a process promoting transparency with the 
active involvement of various stakeholders. Having these actors more deeply 
involved in the legislative phase could have the merit of more forceful 
attention to fundamental rights already in the early phase of drafting 
legislation. Without undermining the possible problems of lobbying an added 
value to fundamental rights legislation may spring from NGOs in this field.  
 
The Legal Service of the EP is the major player in ensuring consistency of 
legal drafts for fundamental rights. In organizational terms, the Legal Service 
belongs to the Secretariat. It consists of high-level legal professionals that 
participate in the legislative process throughout the EP legislative work. The 
importance of the Legal Service grows as we are moving towards the core 
legislative process of the EP, namely the ordinary legislative procedure. 
Especially in the phase of trialogues, the legal assistance of the Legal Service 
proves its mettle.274 Moreover, the presence of the Legal Service of the EP 
institutionally balances the involvement of the respective Legal Services of the 
Council and the Commission.  
 
 
5. Trialogue 
 
The next phase is the stage of the ordinary legislative procedure of utmost 
importance but rather unknown to many despite its impact on the final text. It 
is called trialogue, which consists usually of rounds of negotiations between 
the Commission, the Council and the EP. Trialogue is all about trying to strike 
a balance between different views of the institutions and to provide a text that 
can be accepted by the qualified majority of the Council and a majority of the 
EP votes. In the trialogue key players on the Council side are the Presidency 
and on the Commission side the rapporteur and the shadows.275 Coreper has 
a key role to play in the preparation of the Council positions at this stage 
because the Presidency seeks negotiation mandates for the negotiations in the 
Coreper.276 High level Commission officials represent the Commission in the 
trialogue negotiations and the Commission defends the spirit of its initial 
proposal.277 Each institution ought to make compromises and concessions 
during the negotiations.  
 
 
                                                 
274 See Annex XX Code of conduct for negotiating in the context of the ordinary legislative 
procedures, in particular paragraph 7, of the RoP of the EP.  
275 The Council delegation in the negotiations is usually led by the Permanent Representative (in 
Coreper II matters) or the Deputy Permanent Representative (in Coreper I matters).  
276 In bigger legislative initiatives, the Presidency usually divides the piece of legislation into 
thematic negotiation blocks that will be tackled one by one. The key task of the Presidency is to try to 
achieve a qualified majority to back up the Council position and to avoid the blocking of a minority of 
votes, currently 93, out of 352. This means that in order to achieve a qualified majority there has to be 
260 votes cast in favour of the proposal out of total of 352 votes. As of 1 November 2014, the Council has 
applied double majority voting rules. 
277 The Commission negotiation team is usually headed by the Director General of the Directorate 
General responsible for the file. It should be noted that there are no strict rules on the level of participants 
in informal trialogues, which are the most common method of carrying out the negotiations. Conversely, 
formal trialogues require, for example, ministerial representation on the Council side. 
 83 
 
 
 
 
 
Graph 4. Ex ante control in trialogue phase of ordinary legislative 
procedure 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The figure above illustrates the inter-institutional negotiation in the 
ordinary legislative procedure that covers most of the AFSJ. From this picture 
it becomes clear that in the trialogue a large responsibility has been given the 
legal services of the institutions in checking the compliance of compromise 
texts. This is yet another weak-form layer in the ex ante control of fundamental 
rights complex in the EU. As a consequence of the negotiations, a final 
compromise text will be submitted for the approval of the institutions, which 
is more or less a “take it or leave it” situation. This is the case especially with 
first reading agreements that are nowadays increasingly important due to the 
fact that about three quarters of all legislation under the ordinary legislative 
procedure becomes adopted in the first reading. At this stage, the co-
legislators will consider the compromise package as a whole and fundamental 
rights aspects are clearly one part of the consideration. If the text is green 
lighted and will be adopted, possible problems appear in the context of the 
implementation as happened with the European Arrest Warrant. It is quite 
often the case that political pressure to reach a compromise between the 
institutions is overwhelming. In this case, the practical possibilities of legal 
services to have an effect on minor issues relating to the quality of the legal 
text are scarce. Only bigger legal conundrums can be raised at this stage. 
 
Should the institutions fail to find an acceptable compromise that can be 
supported by all the institutions, the legislative file goes to the second 
reading.278 This is where deadlines come in. Whereas the first reading 
                                                 
278 Second reading 
7. If, within three months of such communication, the European Parliament: 
(a) approves the Council's position at first reading or has not taken a decision, the act concerned 
shall be deemed to have been adopted in the wording which corresponds to the position of the Council; 
(b) rejects, by a majority of its component members, the Council's position at first reading, the 
proposed act shall be deemed not to have been adopted; 
Compromise (fait accompli, 
”take it or leave it”) 
LS LS LS 
Council Cion EP 
Coreper 
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procedure is not restricted by any mandatory time frames, the deadline for the 
second reading is three months, which can be extended by one month. In this 
case the Council will adopt its formal position and the Presidency will then 
negotiate with the EP on the basis of this position. Once again, the Coreper will 
prepare negotiating mandates for the Presidency, which normally has a much 
more restricted room for manoeuvre in the negotiations due to the Council 
position. The role of the Commission is somewhat different in this second 
reading phase. It will be more like a facilitator striving for a compromise 
between the Council and the EP. If the proposed instrument is not adopted in 
the second reading, it goes to the third reading, generally known as the 
conciliation committee, although these are formally separate procedures.279   
 
It is rare that a legislative proposal ends up in conciliation committee. All 
the 28 Member States are represented in the Conciliation Committee. If the 
legal instrument will not be adopted in the third reading it means the end of 
the instrument. In these cases there is insufficient political will to adopt the 
EU legislative act in question. If the legal instrument fails, the Commission has 
at its disposal a certain mechanism for withdrawing the legislative proposal 
but in case the proposal has been a priority of the Commission, this is unlikely. 
In these cases, the proposal will simply fade away but the Commission may 
return to the issue, for example in the form of revised proposal if the political 
tide changes in the future. 
 
This shift in the institutional balance of power will probably not take place 
without practical problems. EU Member States that are accustomed to 
regulating fundamental rights issues mainly by themselves will obviously face 
                                                 
(c) proposes, by a majority of its component members, amendments to the Council's position at first 
reading, the text thus amended shall be forwarded to the Council and to the Commission, which shall 
deliver an opinion on those amendments. 
8. If, within three months of receiving the European Parliament's amendments, the Council, acting 
by a qualified majority: 
(a) approves all those amendments, the act in question shall be deemed to have been adopted; 
(b) does not approve all the amendments, the President of the Council, in agreement with the 
President of the European Parliament, shall within six weeks convene a meeting of the Conciliation 
Committee. 
9. The Council shall act unanimously on the amendments on which the Commission has delivered a 
negative opinion. 
279 Conciliation 
10. The Conciliation Committee, which shall be composed of the members of the Council or their 
representatives and an equal number of members representing the European Parliament, shall have the 
task of reaching agreement on a joint text, by a qualified majority of the members of the Council or their 
representatives and by a majority of the members representing the European Parliament within six 
weeks of its being convened, on the basis of the positions of the European Parliament and the Council at 
second reading. 
11. The Commission shall take part in the Conciliation Committee's proceedings and shall take all 
necessary initiatives with a view to reconciling the positions of the European Parliament and the Council. 
12. If, within six weeks of its being convened, the Conciliation Committee does not approve the joint 
text, the proposed act shall be deemed not to have been adopted. 
Third reading 
13. If, within that period, the Conciliation Committee approves a joint text, the European 
Parliament, acting by a majority of the votes cast, and the Council, acting by a qualified majority, shall 
each have a period of six weeks from that approval in which to adopt the act in question in accordance 
with the joint text. If they fail to do so, the proposed act shall be deemed not to have been adopted. 
14. The periods of three months and six weeks referred to in this Article shall be extended by a 
maximum of one month and two weeks respectively at the initiative of the European Parliament or the 
Council. 
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difficulties with the EP, the institution that usually strives in other policy 
sectors for extended Union competence and more ambitious targets. These 
clashes very often occur in the context of inter-institutional negotiations on 
legislative files, i.e. the trialogues. Fundamental rights will not make an 
exception to this rule.280 In spite of this, a paralysis of decision-making in this 
field cannot be expected.281 In very similar situations, with a considerable 
change in the constitutional setting of the decision-making, the interaction 
between the institutions has not proved too rigid. The Commission, as the 
guardian of Treaty, usually defends the Union approach and wider 
competence and tasks for the Commission. Therefore it can be estimated that 
EP is likely to find an ally in the Berlaymont building. The Commission and 
the EP can together form a strong counter-pole for Member States’ driven 
Council also in the field of fundamental rights.  
 
Taking into account the development that has led to a shift towards the EP 
as regards competence in the field of fundamental rights, it is easy to draw the 
following conclusions: First, Member States will have to adjust themselves to 
the fact that the EP now has a significantly greater say on fundamental rights 
issues. In the decision-making four-column documents indicating also EP 
position will now form a basis for taking the decision also in this very sensitive 
sphere. The shift to ordinary legislative procedure and thus towards the EP 
that the limited right of initiative for legislation that is reserved for a group of 
at least seven Member States, does not preserve the balance of power from the 
point of view of Member States. The right of initiative of a certain amount of 
Member States probably offers an interesting flavour to the trialogues, as it is 
likely to provide tension, especially in the axis Council – the EP will increase 
and make the striving for the compromise in the ordinary legislative procedure 
difficult for the Presidency. The role of the Commission in this case will 
obviously be somewhat of the nature of a mediator like in the second reading 
of the previously known co-decision procedure. 
 
In practical terms the trialogue concludes the legislative process, with only 
formalities remaining. In the trialogue phase, the EU institutions are at the 
final stage in the ex ante review. At this phase, however, political issues are 
predominant. In other words, ex ante review does not have a very natural role 
in this phase because most often game-changers and show-stoppers are 
political issues and not legal ones. After the formal adoption of the EU legal 
act, we are approaching the application and with regard to certain EU 
instruments the implementation phase. This is when ex post review as 
presented in the figure below comes in and simultaneously ex ante review 
comes to an end.282 One can squeeze the ex ante review of fundamental rights 
into the figure below (Graph 5). 
                                                 
280 See Priestley, p. 204. “The area of greatest conflict will inevitably be Justice and Home Affairs, 
where Parliament has already demonstrated that on the liberty/security spectrum it has tended towards 
a greater sensitivity towards the concerns of the civil libertarians than either the Council or the 
Commission”. 
281 See Banchoff and Smith, p. 141.  
282 Nevertheless, when transposing for example an EU Directive into national law ex ante review of 
fundamental rights occurs at least in some Member States. Therefore, the point where the ex ante review 
stops in the EU legislative process is not absolutely determined. 
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Graph 5. Ex ante review of fundamental rights in the ordinary legislative 
procedure covering most of the AFSJ 
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Graph 6 below connects the hands-on ex ante review with the legislative work 
of the institutions and other actors. I have illustrated the typology of review by 
dividing the review in two main categories. The first type of review consists of 
technocratic review, which is conducted for example in the legal services of the 
institutions, IAB and impact assessment unit — both located in the Secretariat 
General of the Commission, working groups of the Council, FRA and the 
EDPS. With technocratic, I refer to scrutiny, which requires deep legal 
technical and substantial expertise. Another class of review is mainly political-
oriented and it is carried out for instance in the EP parliamentary committees, 
notably LIBE. The same applies to review at Coreper level and ministerial level 
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of the Council. An effective rights-based review at these levels, however, 
represents a daunting challenge, even though legal services of the institutions 
are involved in the decision-making process. 
 
 
Graph 6. Execution, positioning and nature of ex ante review within the 
frame of EU law-making 
 
 
 
 
 
Technocratic 
 
 
 
     Commission      Council            EP 
 
 
Political 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
IAB                Working parties    LIBE Secretariat 
IA unit        Legal service       Legal Service 
Legal Service 
Cabinet         Coreper                  LIBE 
College         Ministerial level    Plenary 
FRA 
EDPS 
National 
Parliaments 
 88 
IV Ex ante review of proposals for EU 
legislative measures in light of the 
Charter: the constitutional and 
institutional framework 
 
 
1. General remarks on ex ante review as a 
mechanism of constitutional review: 
mainstreaming intermediary models 
 
Two categories of constitutional review can be discerned. The first category 
is ‘preventive control’ that can also be called ‘ex ante review’; the second is 
‘repressive control’ which is a synonym for ‘ex post review’. Preventive norm 
control is review executed in abstracto and the objective is to hinder the 
adoption and the entry into force of legislation that is in breach with the 
constitution. Repressive norm control for its part aims at revocation of 
legislation that infringes the constitution or legal implications stipulated 
pursuant to lower level norms in breach with the constitution.283 Repressive 
control can therefore take place in abstracto or in concreto. With the notion 
of ex ante review I refer to conformity control exercised in the preparatory 
phase of legislation i.e. before the legal act concerned is formally adopted. This 
kind of control is of ex ante nature and it differs significantly from the legal 
review of the courts. If we take the idea to the sphere of fundamental rights, 
which very often has a clearly visible link to constitutional issues, at national 
level we can identify at least semi-judicial bodies vested with powers to analyze 
in advance if a proposed legal act conforms to constitutional provisions. 
Probably the purest example of this is the Conseil Constitutionnel of France, 
which does not exercise judicial review, but previews the constitutional 
compliance before the act concerned has been formally adopted. This is the 
case although there are some signs that the French system is taking steps 
towards increased ex post review.284 
 
One can also distinguish between positive and negative control. Positive 
control means that what has been provided to happen, happens. Negative 
control on the other hand means that what has been provided not to happen, 
does not happen.285 This dichotomy is also present in this study when it comes 
to two forms of ex ante control, which are related to promotion of fundamental 
rights and limitation of fundamental rights. With regard to limitations, it is of 
utmost importance to define permissible limitations to fundamental rights. 
                                                 
283 See Riepula Esko: Eduskunnnan perustuslakivaliokunta perustuslakien tulkitsijana: 
Valtiosääntötutkimus eduskunnan perustuslakivaliokunnasta perustuslakikontrollia ja perustuslakien 
tulkintaa harjoittavana toimielimenä vv:n 1907-1972 valtiopäiviltä. Suomalainen lakimiesyhdistys. 
Helsinki 1973, pp. 4-6. 
284 This is the case although there are some signs about the French system taking steps towards 
increased ex post review. With the Constitutional law of 23 July 2008 the ex ante review system of France 
was complemented by reinforcing also the a posteriori review elements of the French system. 
285 Hidén Mikael: Säädösvalvonta Suomessa. I eduskuntalait. Suomalainen lakimiesyhdistys. 
Helsinki 1974, p. 6. 
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With permissible limitations, I simply refer to the set of criteria which have to 
be met in order to be able to limit fundamental rights stipulated in 
constitutional law or constructed by the case-law of the (constitutional) courts. 
 
It is possible to divide countries roughly into two categories according to 
the form of constitutional review that they exercise. First, we have the control 
system of judicial review, in which the task of controlling the constitutionality 
of legal acts has been vested into the judiciary.286 In this system, the key player 
is the court, with a minor role being given to the legislator in the constitutional 
review. Control of the courts is naturally of ex post nature, i.e. the conflict of a 
legal act only becomes evident after the legal act has been enacted and it 
scrutinized by the court either in concreto as a part of a court case or under 
some circumstances in abstracto.287 On the other hand, we have the system 
that springs from the doctrine of the sovereignty of Parliament. This form of 
control stresses the strong role of the legislator in securing compliance with 
constitutional rights. In this system, very much attention has been given to the 
parliamentary assembly as an incarnation of volonté générale to put the issue 
in words of Rousseau. The legislator can pass legislation and the courts’ room 
for manoeuvre in interpreting the constitutionality of legislation is very limited 
or even non-existent. The Parliament is expected to carry out this kind of 
constitutional review already in the phase of preparing legislation and the 
position of the Parliament is crucial in determining what the spirit of the 
constitution is. With respect to timing, this can take place also ex ante, before 
the act has been approved. 
 
The situation is, however, not black and white and systems that can be 
positioned somewhere between the two extremes do exist. In between these 
two counter-poles, often characterized by the sovereignty of the parliament 
doctrine and judicial review we can also identify hybrid models that have 
features of the both main systems of constitutional control.288 Some ten years 
ago Stephen Gardbaum raised the issue of the Commonwealth Model of 
Constitutionalism that highlighted the shift of some British Commonwealth 
countries, most notably the UK,  towards a stronger role of the courts in 
constitutional review, although these countries still very much can be 
characterized with strong features of sovereignty of Parliament. This new third 
model of constitutionalism stands between the two polar models of 
constitutionalism and aims to create a middle ground between them rather 
than adopting a wholesale transfer from one pole to the other.289 Gardbaum’s 
point was to flag up the emergence of hybrid systems of constitutional control 
                                                 
286 This form of constitutional control originated in the United States as result of the landmark ruling 
Marbury v Madison. The US Supreme Court has the task of reviewing the conformity of laws with the US 
constitution and the court can strike down the contradicting legislation by declaring the acts in breach 
with the Constitution as null and void. 
287 See Gardbaum, p. 717. 
288 One interesting discussion in this regard on changes at the national level see Young Alison L.: 
Parliamentary Sovereignty and the Human Rights Act. Hart Publishing. Oxford and Portland, Oregon 
2009, pp. 174-175. This study deals with the UK Human Rights Act and the discussion on continuing 
parliamentary legislative supremacy vs. the courts’ power to override legislation where this contravenes 
human rights. In this research, Young presents a strong case in favour of continuing parliamentary 
legislative sovereignty. In this context the Human Rights Act has also been defended as a compromise 
facilitating dialogue between the legislature and the judiciary. 
289 Gardbaum, p. 709.  
 90 
with elements stemming from both traditional systems of constitutional 
review.290 In fundamental rights issues we can detect a possible source of 
conflict between two poles, on the one hand that of integrationist and on the 
other hand that of sovereigntist. The points of departure of these two camps 
are biased at the outset and Walker felicitously describes this as constitutional 
myopia. 291 Indeed, the key measure of Union competence is legislative and the 
whole ideological debate between intergovernmental and supranational 
positions is centered namely on the legislative act.292 This is why the legislative 
process of the constitutionally-sensitive AFSJ is of paramount importance for 
whole European projects and the division of competence therein. With a 
partial depletion of grand ideas of times prior to the European integration 
process, the AFSJ can even be considered to be one by some EU policy 
circles.293 
 
The constitutional legislators also act in a judicial way in many respects, for 
example when deliberating and passing judgments on the constitutionality of 
legislation.294 As Stone puts it “the spectre of constitutional censure hovers 
over the legislative process”.295 This means in practice the awareness of the 
legislator that the legal instrument concerned is subject to a judicial review 
and if found unconstitutional it can be invalidated by the constitutional court. 
The logic also works in reverse: the legislator also fixes, in constitutional 
decision-making process the parameters of the court’s exercise of 
constitutional review.296 The legislator thus keeps molding the environment 
for the court’s functioning. Keeping in mind the focus on fundamental rights, 
it is beneficial to analyze the effect of these constitutional rights in the 
functioning of the legislature. This has a clear impact on the output of the 
legislator. The impact of this form of review is mainly different from that 
deriving from the courts. In the following we need to address both strong and 
weak forms of judicial review with a focus on the importance of weak form 
patterns of review. The weak form review often contains varying constellations 
of review of fundamental rights emanating from both the legislator and the 
courts. 
 
One way of approaching the position of an international legislator is that of 
the classic dichotomy of monism and dualism. This conceptual toolbox has 
traditionally been used to illustrate the interface of national and international 
law. In short, those national legal systems that have chosen to transpose with 
separate acts international obligations arising mainly from international 
agreements have opted for dualism. Monism, on the other hand, considers that 
                                                 
290 According to Gardbaum ”the Commonwealth model suggests the novel possibility of a continuum 
stretching from absolute legislative supremacy to the American model of a fully constitutionalized bill of 
rights with various intermediate positions in between that achieve something of both”. Ibid. p. 710. 
291 See Walker Neil: In Search of the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice: A Constitutional 
Odyssey. In Walker Neil (Ed.): Europe’s Area of Freedom, Security and Justice. Oxford University Press. 
Oxford 2004, p. 29. 
292 Ibid., p. 21. 
293 See for example ibid., p. 13-14. 
294 Stone Sweet Alec: Constitutional Politics: the reciprocal Impact of Lawmaking and constitutional 
Adjudication. In Craig Paul and Harlow Carol (Eds.): Lawmaking in the European Union. Kluwer Law 
International. Dordrecht 1998, p. 111. 
295 Ibid., p. 113. 
296 Ibid., p. 131. 
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international obligations, that the country has signed up to, are automatically 
a part of the country’s legal system. For a monist country, separate 
implementing action is thus not necessary. In the context of the EU, we should 
first note that some Member States have a dualist legal system while others 
have monist tradition of perceiving the interrelationship between national and 
international law. Here again, we must be aware that the EU legal system has 
blurred this classic dichotomy somewhat with such fundamental notions of EU 
law, such as the direct effect and supremacy of the EU law.297 The trend has 
been pointing towards increased monism with all the levels and instruments 
of regulation, be they national, international or European. The impact of this 
change has probably been stronger on the dualist systems and the reason for 
this has been the mixing of borderlines between various interacting legal 
systems. One could thus argue that we have moved far away from the national 
norm-centric legal system whose main feature was the architecture of 
hierarchy of norms (the so-called Stufenbau): the old system that can be 
categorized as Kelsenian in a traditional sense.298 The new situation can rather 
be characterized as legal pluralism, which contains political elements.299 The 
experience so far from the activities of an international or supranational 
legislator is quite scarce. We can however tackle the topic by reflecting the 
functioning of a national legislator to this particular situation. In the legislative 
process the legislator is bound by fundamental rights and the essence of these 
rights steers the functioning of the legislative body. Fundamental rights can 
function as a restriction to the actions of the legislator but they can also 
reinforce positive obligations of the legislator in the legislative process.  
 
Martin Scheinin presents an interesting pattern for the impact of 
international human rights norms on the national legislative process in his 
study concerning the status of human rights in the Finnish law.300 First 
Scheinin divides international instruments according to their legal status, to 
internationally legally non-binding instruments on one hand and to 
internationally legally binding instruments on the other. International non-
binding instruments can be either irrelevant for the legislative dossier or they 
may have a certain standard effect. In the latter case, the international 
instrument, which is not binding on a country concerned, can be used as an 
external yardstick when drafting a national law.301 This means that a given 
non-binding instrument penetrates into the sphere of standards, although the 
                                                 
297 Case C-26/62 Van Gend en Loos and Case C- 6/64 Costa v ENEL. Regarding the doctrine 
concerning supremacy of EU law over national law, Ola Wiklund argues that this principle should not be 
regarded as an absolute rule according to which EU law always prevails over national law. Instead of 
this, the principle should be formulated so that every legal norm, in this case norm of the EU law, is 
supreme in relation to a norm of the national legal order within its scope of application or its sphere of 
competence, Wiklund Ola: EG-Domstolens tolkningsutrymme. Om förhållandet mellan normstruktur, 
kompetensfördelning och tolkningsutrymme I EG-rätten. Juristförlaget. Stockholm 1997, p. 173 and 221. 
298 For Kelsen’s theory of hierarchy of norms in which a lower status norm derived its validity from 
a higher status norm see Kelsen Hans: Reine Rechtslehre. Zweite Auflage. Wien 1960. p. 196.  
299 As Anderson puts it ”Legal pluralism reveals the political character of our prevailing definitions 
of constitutionalism and demonstrates how state-centred accounts prevent us from asking questions of 
accountability with regard to all forms of political power. Legal pluralism accordingly shows the 
importance of effecting a paradigm shift in the field of constitutional law”. Anderson Gavin W. 
Constitutional Rights after Globalization. Hart Publishing. Oxford and Portland, Oregon 2005, p. 4. 
300 Scheinin Martin: Ihmisoikeudet Suomen oikeudessa. Suomalainen lakimiesyhdistys. Jyväskylä 
1991, p. 331. 
301 Ibid., p. 315. 
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fact that the instrument is non-binding leaves quite a lot of leeway to the 
legislator.  According to Scheinin, an international legally-binding instrument 
can have either an effect of principles or that of rules on the legislative solution 
to be adopted. The former case is usually related to situations of collision 
between two human rights norms.302 In this situation, the legislator weigh and 
balance between the two norms in order to find out which norm prevails in the 
legislative deliberation. The second form of hard impact on the legislative 
process is focused on legally binding international norms, which exist as rules. 
In this case, the rule effect may appear when national law is in breach with an 
international legal instrument, which is binding on the country.303  Scheinin’s 
theoretical approach can also be useful when dealing with the EP as a 
European co-legislator. Making a distinction between the effect on Alexyan 
terms to those concerning dichotomic either/or-situations with rules and 
more flexible situations involving Abwägung between principles is worth 
considering.304  
 
If we think about the case law of the CJEU concerning limits of the 
competence of the EU legislator, we can easily pinpoint the significance of the 
case Mulder.305 Wyatt concludes that this case was important especially 
because it highlighted that a democratic political process is not always 
sufficient and the Commission and the Member States have to bear in mind 
the rule of law.306 At the time, with the EP excluded from legislative powers in 
the field of agricultural policy, like in this milk quota related Mulder, it is 
obvious that the Commission and the Council were in the line of fire. However, 
the present important co-legislator EP is bound by the same case law. When it 
comes to the principle of subsidiarity we can see that EU legislation has been 
challenged in the CJEU by some Member States due to claimed disregard of 
the legislative act of subsidiarity issues. Member States in turn have not 
necessarily been very coherent and consistent on these issues when proposals 
for EU legislation are voted in the Council.307  
 
Anderson very correctly points out that the constitutional ideas have been 
transferred to post-national bodies, such as the EU, and that economic 
globalization has had significant effect on the erosion of the interstate system 
and the consequent strengthening of transnational regimes.308 With this 
change, the traditional liberal legalism has lost much of its ability to explain 
the constitutionalism that we are now facing. Instead of this, legal pluralism 
has proved to be an advantageous approach in illustrating the nature of the 
                                                 
302 Ibid., p. 316. 
303 Ibid., p. 305. 
304 For probably the most concise legal theoretical study on rules and principles see Alexy Robert: 
Theorie der Grundrechte. Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft. Baden Baden 1985. 
305 C-104/89 Mulder. 
306 Wyatt Derrick: Is the European Union an Organisation of Limited Powers? In Arnull Anthony, 
Barnard Catherine, Dougan Michael, Spaventa Eleanor (Eds.): A Constitutional Order of States? Essays 
in EU Law in Honour of Alan Dashwood. Hart Publishing. Oxford and Portland, Oregon 2011, p. 11. 
307 See Wyatt Derrick: Is the European Union an Organisation of Limited Powers? In Arnull 
Anthony, Barnard Catherine, Dougan Michael, Spaventa Eleanor (Eds.): A Constitutional Order of 
States? Essays in EU Law in Honour of Alan Dashwood. Hart Publishing. Oxford and Portland, Oregon 
2011, p. 17. 
308 Anderson, p. 7. 
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current paradigmatic transition in constitutionalism.309 This approach takes 
more consistently into account the fact that today’s law-making process is 
shaped increasingly by international elements, interacting legal systems and a 
greater number of progressively powerful players, such as multinational 
corporations, NGOs and other relevant stakeholders. The greatest merit in 
legal pluralism is probably the revealing of power relations in the 
constitutionalism. The power relations can be found everywhere within the 
sphere of law, although the way that power relations may appear can vary.310 
It seems to be a good way of tackling the shrinking state-centric constitutional 
issues.311 One should, however, be aware that the state, and hence the 
constitutional law of the state, are likely to maintain their key positions in the 
world system.312  
 
It has been argued that judicial review has been an option for political elites 
losing their grip of the power to maintain the status quo.313 In this case, it is 
the losers of the political and thus of legal power who want to transfer power 
to the courts from the legislature. Anderson considers “constitutionalism is 
best understood as an artefact in the struggle between hegemonic and 
counterhegemonic forces”.314 This argument can be tested also in the context 
of the legislative process of the EU. We only need to identify hegemonic and 
counterhegemonic forces. This is where EU institutions come into play. It 
should be borne in mind that political actors are likely to favour the 
establishment of institutional structures most beneficial to them.315 Within the 
EU, the struggle for power and competence is fierce between the institutions, 
particularly in the aftermath of Treaty amendments. Each and every EU 
institution fights tooth and nail to maximise its competence and the best way 
of tackling this topic would be to use rational choice and game theories that 
are usually used in social and political science.316 Our analysis is not limited to 
dealing with the question of who gets the most, but to provide an explanation 
to the emerging ex ante review mechanism at the EU level. Nevertheless, this 
analysis cannot be carried without due attention being given to the pursuit of 
institutions to fashion the constitutional and institutional framework in a way 
that would be beneficial to them. From all this we can see that the introduction 
of an ex ante review mechanism is highly political, although it has to do with 
                                                 
309 See ibid., p. 145. 
310 Ibid., p. 107. 
311 On the issue of the features of legal liberalism see ibid. pp, 40-44. For legal pluralism see pp. 44-
49. 
312 Ibid., p. 100. 
313 See Hirschl Ran: Towards Juristocracy. The Origins and Consequences of New Constitutionalism. 
Harvard University Press. Cambridge, Massachusetts, 2004, p. 49 and pp. 213-214. In light of concrete 
examples from Canada, Israel, New Zealand and South Africa Hirschl very well illustrates that the 
introduction and strengthening of judicial review at the expense of certain extent of the sovereignty of 
Parliament has not been carried out in isolation of the surrounding social and political change.  
314 Anderson, p. 119. 
315 Hirschl, p. 39. 
316 Much has been written about game theory and the role of ”the rational economic man” in politics. 
Most often references are made to the works of Howard Raiffa and Martin Shubik.  Game theory has 
been applied also on EU decision-making procedure by several scholars. For a concise study on game 
theory see Binmore Ken: Fun and Games. A Text on Game Theory. Lexington 1992. For a good example 
of applying rational choice theory on EU decision-making see Laruelle Annick and Widgrén Mika: The 
Development of the Division of Power among the European Commission, the Council and the European 
Parliament, CEPR Discussion Papers 1600, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers 1997. 
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the very core of legal functioning of the EU. The current trend points towards 
greater legislative activism, especially by the EP.317 The discussion about 
judicial activism may soon be replaced by the discussion about legislative 
activism. As for judicial activism, judicial self-restraint or judicial deference 
and possible arguments in favor of resorting to judicial deference in the face 
of democratic institutions making sounder or fairer decisions, one can only 
draw attention to constitutionalism.318  
 
From the definitions of the two main mechanisms of constitutional control 
we can detect the clearly visible link between democracy and fundamental 
rights. It is evident that the sovereignty of Parliament model takes as its point 
of departure the paradigm of an elected assembly expressing the will of the 
demos. The Parliament has been elected by the people and it can thus depart 
from the will of its predecessor parliaments and have a deep impact also in the 
sphere of constitutional control. The judicial review for its part transfers the 
role of the ultimate umpire in constitutional matters beyond the legislator, 
namely to the courts. As has become evident, systems trying to integrate these 
elements are also in place in some countries. However, the balance in some 
countries tends to change; lately this development has been in favour of the 
judicial review. 
 
The interaction and the constitutional dialogue at the national level is 
already a multi-layered phenomenon but we can add another layer to this 
complexity by putting the EP at the centre of our analysis. Can the EP be 
considered as an expression of the volonté générale of the European demos? 
In terms of democracy, the EP is without a doubt the only directly-elected 
political body although we should not forget that the Council also consists of 
Member States whose governments have been democratically elected. This is 
nevertheless of a more indirect nature in the context of the EU. In spite of the 
democratic nature of the EP, I carry doubts on the representativeness of the 
EP as the will of the European people, because the European demos hardly 
exists.319 We should nonetheless not undermine the role of the EP as it can 
offer democratic control to the preparation of legislation.320 The EP is 
currently the best possible way of involving democratic control at the 
European level and there is simply no way of denying it. The greater 
                                                 
317 On the judicial activism exercised by the CJEU see Rasmussen Hjalte: On Law and Policy in the 
European Court of Justice. A Comparative Study in judicial Policymaking. Nijhoff. Dordrecht 1986. 
According to Rasmussen judicial policy-making is all about to “to designate courts’ contribution to 
creating, conserving or changing public policies, or existing priorities among them, in areas of public 
policy which are subject to some sort of governmental regulation by binding rules of law”. Ibid., p. 4. The 
same study also illustrates cases too hot to handle by the Court. A recent interesting example of this case 
C-573/12 Ålands vindkraft, in which the Court ruled the case against the opinion of AG Bot thus avoiding 
the revolution of renewable energy subsidy schemes in the EU.  
318 On the related discussion in a different context see Dworkin Ronald: Taking Rights Seriously. 
Gerald Duckworth Co. Ltd. London 1978,  pp. 140-142. 
319 On the related discussion see for instance Weiler Joseph: The Constitution of Europe. “Do the 
new Clothes have an Emperor?” and other essays on European Integration. Cambridge University Press. 
Cambridge 1999. 
320 For example Lavapuro considers in his remarks concerning the Constitutional Law Committee 
of the Finnish Parliament that “as a democratic organ it (the Constitutional Law Committee, KF) creates 
for the legitimacy of whole system an essential counterweight to the case-by-case review exercised by the 
courts”. Lavapuro Juha: Uusi perustuslakikontrolli. Suomalainen lakimiesyhdistys. Helsinki 2010, p. 
238. 
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involvement of the EP in the legislative control of fundamental rights can be 
seen by using Gardbaum’s model as a way to achieve institutional balance, 
joint responsibility and deliberative dialogue in fundamental rights issues.321 
Furthermore, the penetration of this new model of constitutionalism into the 
European sphere of fundamental rights protection can be regarded to provide 
a solution to the old dilemma of democracy and fundamental rights.322 This 
may happen by giving a stronger say in deciding on fundamental rights to 
democratically elected bodies rather than the courts carrying out judicial 
review. As regards the position of FRA as an actor in the EU ex ante review, 
one should tackle especially the issue of democratic legitimacy. The starting 
point is the fact that FRA is an EU Agency whose officials are basically civil 
servants who have been hired because of their expertise and professionalism. 
For the high-level positions in the hierarchy of the Agency, political lobbying 
from the part of Member States can be hard but generally FRA is an expert 
body whose political linkages should not be overdone. Therefore, from an 
institutional point of view, FRA does not have similar democratic legitimacy 
as elected EU institutions that have to go through on varying intervals a public 
scrutiny.323  
 
Juha Lavapuro has in his dissertation in a distinguished manner elaborated 
the forms of constitutional review.324 Lavapuro focuses in his thesis especially 
on change in constitutional control practices in Finland. He identifies certain 
advantages that the intermediary constitutional control system can provide. 
One of these is the involvement of democratic control in the interpretation of 
fundamental rights. This interaction is lacking to a great extent in the systems 
whose main feature is a strong position of e.g. constitutional courts. Tension 
between fundamental rights principles and democracy principles may emerge 
in concrete legal practice. According to Lavapuro, this is the case typically 
when the outcome of democratic procedures, the legal act, can in a given court 
case be considered to lead to a conflict with those substantial requirements 
that are set by the fundamental rights to democratic procedures.325  
 
From this complexity we can draw the practical conclusion that the 
judicial review by the CJEU is of utmost importance. It is the ultimate 
authority in interpretation of EU primary law and because of the multi-
layered legislative process, we need this kind of coherent force that enforces 
the uniform application of EU law. The problems related to democratic 
control can in this sense be largely overcome by judicial self-restraint that 
the CJEU often must also resort to. In this context we should also note that 
the position of the ECHR and the ECtHR is strong in the EU legal order and 
particularly in fundamental rights issues. We can conclude by stating that 
there probably is no exhaustive explanation that can be provided to the on-
                                                 
321 See Gardbaum, p. 710. 
322 Ibid., p. 748.  
323 FRA is nonetheless obviously better placed as an expert body exercising quite neutral ex ante 
review of draft EU legislation. In this connection we can rather observe that the democratic legitimacy 
comes into play indirectly when EU institutions take into their positions FRA views on draft EU 
legislation. Political institutions of the legislative process filtrate legal expert opinions at the political 
level. 
324 See Lavapuro. 
325 Ibid., p. 86. 
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going tug-of-war between the school emphasizing the supremacy of the 
parliament and the school stressing the supremacy of the courts. 
Intermediary theories that underscore the importance of constitutional 
dialogue can offer the best ways forward. 
 
The next step is to focus at the Member States level, with a view to 
examining how selected Member States undertake to ensure compliance 
with fundamental rights of EU legislative proposals at the national level. 
This takes place, for example, in Member States' Parliaments.326 In 
Finland, Parliament has a relatively strong role in national preparation of 
EU affairs. Pursuant to the Finnish Constitution, the involvement of the 
Parliament in the national preparation of EU affairs will be secured in 
several ways. The level of involvement of the Finnish Parliament in EU 
affairs has been stipulated in Sections 96 and 97 of the Constitution. The 
raison d’être of these provisions is to enshrine the adequate involvement of 
the Parliament in EU affairs.327 The Grand Committee of the Finnish 
Parliament has a pivotal role in dealing with EU affairs. Furthermore, the 
Speaker of the Parliament or the Grand Committee, depending on the 
nature of a given file, forwards EU dossiers sent by the Government further 
to Parliament’s special committees for a detailed discussion. In 
fundamental rights related proposals for EU legislation, the CLC of the 
Finnish Parliament is extremely important. 
 
Finland has a peculiar system of ex ante control of compliance of draft 
legislation with fundamental rights that dates back to the era of autonomy 
under the Russian regime in the 19th and early 20th century. The CLC has 
always occupied a central role in the constitutional review of Finland.328 In this 
system, the preview of compliance with fundamental rights of bills, usually 
originating from the Government, has been vested in one Parliamentary 
Committee, namely the CLC. At this point it is necessary to clarify that Finland 
has no Constitutional Court nor has broadly taken a judicial review system that 
exists in several other countries and is responsible for ex post evaluation of 
compliance of already passed legislation with fundamental rights.329 As Antero 
Jyränki very well summarizes, the Finnish control mechanism of acts is as 
regards laws at least in principle and formally purely legislator’s self-control, 
                                                 
326 For a snapshot of the differing positions of Member States’ parliaments in handling EU affairs, 
see Grabenwarter Christoph: National Constitutional Law relating to the European Union. In Von 
Bogdandy Armin and Bast Jürgen (eds.): Principles of European Constitutional law. Second revised 
edition. Hart Publishing. Oxford 2010, pp. 83-131. 
327 For comments on participation of the Finnish Parliament on the basis of Sections 93 (2), 96 and 
97 see Ojanen Tuomas: The Impact of EU Membership on Finnish Constitutional Law, pp. 554-557. 
Article in European Public Law. Vol. 10, Issue 3, Sept. 2004. See also Boedeker Mika and Uusikylä Petri: 
Interaction between the Government and Parliament in Scrutiny of EU Decision-Making. Finnish 
Experiences and General Problems. In National Parliaments and the EU – Stock-taking for the Post-
Amsterdam Era. Eduskunnan kanslian julkaisu 1/2000. 
328 For the position and the development of the CLC at the apex of constitutional review in Finland 
see particularly Riepula, pp. 49-53. Although Riepula’s dissertation dates back early 1970s it is still the 
most comprehensive presentation of CLC ever made.  
329 It should be noted that the European integration process and Finnish Accession to the EU in 1995 
has in many respects increased awareness of judicial review as a result of interpretation practice of CJEU. 
The same applies to some extent to ECtHR, too. 
 97 
which means ex ante control of procedural order of legislation process of legal 
acts.330 
 
The CLC’s main task in the Finnish constitutional system is to deal with 
constitutionally-significant legislative issues. This also includes mutatis 
mutandis EU affairs. Submitting a legislative issue to the examination of the 
Committee can be decided upon in the Parliament. The CLC is also entitled to 
do this independently at its own request. As to the composition of the 
Committee it should be noted that Members of the Committee are Members 
of the Finnish Parliament. Legal experts, mainly distinguished legal scholars 
such as university professors, also have a crucial role in the work of the 
Committee. In the CLC, the institution of expert hearings holds an esteemed 
role and the recommendations of the most often heard constitutional legal 
professionals have usually been followed.331 Although these experts’ opinions 
do not formally bind the Committee in its decisions, the Committee usually 
follows the main lines of these views.332 On the possible negative aspects of ex 
ante review carried out by the parliamentary organs, when analyzing the CLC 
in the 1970s Hidén already observed that such a system may also be 
susceptible to political pressures.333 The statements and views presented by 
the Committee have a great impact on draft legislation concerned. As for the 
case of national legislation, the Committee also deals with draft EU legislation 
on the basis U and E letters submitted by the Government. This brings into 
play the question of whether EU legislation is in accordance with fundamental 
rights guaranteed by the Finnish Constitution. A similar discussion is 
apparently underway in all EU Member States. However, according to Ojanen, 
EU law has not seriously challenged constitutional rights provided in the 
Finnish Constitution until quite recent times.334 
 
The Committee has emphasized in its statements that the reinforcement 
of the fundamental rights dimension of the EU does not change the role of 
the Committee as an organ practising control and interpretation of 
fundamental rights, both in the national legislative process and national 
                                                 
330 Jyränki Antero: Valta ja Vapaus. Lakimiesliiton kustannus. Helsinki 1994, p. 213. This 
observation is closely linked to another peculiarity of the Finnish system, exceptive enactments. This 
means that it is possible to adopt legislation that is not in harmony with provisions of the Constitution. 
A prerequisite for this procedure is that such acts are approved in the order of amending the 
Constitution. These acts, however, have a status similar to ordinary acts of Parliament. After the entry 
into force of the new Constitution in 2000 the number of exceptive enactments has significantly 
decreased due to a very clear target of reducing the number of those enactments. 
331 See Riepula, p. 319. 
332 It should be noted that ”in practice, review by the Constitutional Law Committee takes place 
during the progress of the bill through Parliament, and the findings of the Committee are statements on 
the constitutionality of the bills and other matters submitted to it, as well as on their relation to the 
international human rights treaties (Section 74 of the Constitution of Finland of 2000)”. Ojanen Tuomas: 
From Constitutional Periphery toward the Center. Transformations of Judicial Review in Finland. 
Nordic Journal of Human Rights. Nr. 2 2009., p. 195. 
333 Hidén, p. 335. For Hidén this was not only because the members of the CLC are MPs and therefore 
directly within the sphere of political effects but because it is in practical terms difficult to isolate the 
interpretation on the constitutionality of interpretations concerning desirability of the act becoming 
approved. In this context we must, however, bear in mind that this notion was mainly linked to the 
procedures of adopting the law (as an ordinary parliamentary act or in the order of a constitutional 
amendment) in Finland.  
334 Ojanen 2004, p. 544. Ojanen goes on stating that until 2003 in practically all cases it has been 
possible to implement EU law without having to limit the reasonable observance of constitutional rights. 
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handling of EU affairs.335 In the latter statement the Committee further 
held that it is a task of the Committee to assess from the angle of 
fundamental and human rights provisions also bills aiming at national 
implementation of EU law.336 It can thus be concluded that Finland is no 
exception among those EU Member States which find that the ultimate 
authority in the field of fundamental rights should continue to rest within 
the competence of the Member States. 
 
We should note that in Finland the courts can, on a limited basis, control 
the constitutionality of the laws pursuant to Section 106 of the Finnish 
Constitution.337 In practice, this means that in Finland there is a certain 
kind of hybrid system of constitutional review, which links together ex ante 
review by the CLC and the ex post review by courts with all the different 
actors.338 As Ojanen highlights, the role of judiciary is now stronger in the 
Finnish system than some decades ago, but in spite of this development 
judicial self-restraint still takes place and the ex ante review of the CLC 
remains the primary mechanism of reviewing the constitutionality of 
legislation.339 This change can thus be characterized rather as an evolution 
and by no means a revolution. 
 
Lavapuro has argued that the constitutional review model adopted in 
Finland is an expression of a kind of an intermediary theory. Instead of 
institutional authority that can be returned  to the hierarchy, the constitutional 
control has been reformed in Finland by developing side by side with the 
earlier parliamentary control, different models of constitutional control that 
are in interaction with each other.340 Lavapuro’s new constitutional review 
thus derives from a multiplicity of actors that exercise the constitutional 
review and thus contribute to the realization of fundamental and human 
rights.341 Finland can hence be regarded as an example of pluralistic 
intermediary model of rights-based ex ante review falling somewhere between 
two extreme poles of review: 
 
1) Model of centralized review with a great deal of powers vested in a 
constitutional court (Germany)  
                                                 
335 This interpretation was raised as a reaction to the Government’s report on the results of the 
Convention and preparation for the IGC in 2003 and it was re-stated when dealing with the 
Government’s bill concerning ratification of the Constitutional Treaty. See PeVL 7/2003 and PeVL 
36/2006. In the following a reference to statements by the Constitutional Law Committee will be made 
by using abbreviation PeVL. All the statements can be found on Parliament’s web-pages at 
www.eduskunta.fi  
336 PeVL 36/2006. For a concrete example of this see e.g. PeVL 15/2003 which concerned 
Government’s bill on amending nature conservation act. It can thus be concluded that Finland is no 
exception among those EU Member States which find that the ultimate authority in the field of 
fundamental rights should continue to rest within the competence of the Member States. 
337 See Ojanen 2009, pp. 205-206. 
338 See Tuori Kaarlo: Kombination aus theoretischer ex ante- und konkreter ex post-Prüfung: Das 
finnische Modell. In Haller Gret, Günther Klaus, Neumann Ulfrid (Hg.): Menschenrechte und 
Volkssouveränität in Europa. Gerichte als Vormunde der Demokratie? Campus Verlag GmbH, Frankfurt 
am Main 2011, pp. 284. 
339 Ojanen 2009, p. 207. 
340 Lavapuro, p. 28. 
341 Ibid., p. 285. 
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2) Model of sovereignty of Parliament with significant parliamentary 
powers in the review (the UK, or rather the UK before the Human Rights Act) 
 
The government’s EU policy, as any other policy area, is subject to 
parliamentary control. In other words, the Government’s conduct of EU 
policy may in extreme cases lead to testing whether the Government enjoys 
the political trust of the majority of the Parliament, according to the 
principle of parliamentarism. In this way, the Finnish Parliament enjoys 
quite a unique position within EU architecture, if one were to compares its 
role with that of its counterparts, the Parliaments of other EU Member 
States. This is the case especially with EU affairs under the AFSJ. Having a 
quasi-judicial control mechanism in place that reviews the constitutionality 
of EU legislation already at the preparatory phase can be considered a great 
advantage for the Finnish system. This is by no means to say that Finland’s 
EU partners would be ignorant towards the constitutional aspects of draft 
EU legislation. It is simply the status of the CLC that makes the 
difference.342 
 
For some time there has been vivid discussion in Finland on the need to 
establish a Constitutional Court.343 This debate springs mainly from the role 
of the CLC and the claim of it being and becoming politicized. This idea has 
gathered momentum during the last few years and it remains to be seen how 
the future political masters react to this discussion in concrete ways. This 
discussion will not be pursued in depth, it is noted that the Constitutional 
Court could bring added value to the current Finnish regime of protection of 
fundamental rights. A strong ex ante review does not exclude a stronger review 
of a posteriori nature. 
 
It is possible to claim that EU level ex ante review cannot be juxtaposed 
with the ex ante review at the national level. However, in the absence of any 
comparable supranational fundamental rights-based ex ante review 
mechanism, a researcher who wants to draw inspiration for the analysis has 
no other choice but look at developed ex ante review mechanisms in some 
Member States. The EU is a unique legal order, sui generis, in the true 
meaning of the expression, and undoubtedly it is impossible to disengage a 
national ex ante review mechanism from its legal, political and cultural setting 
and to perfectly fit it to the EU level. Nevertheless, this should not prevent us 
from identifying common features across different levels despite differences. 
After all, national ex ante review mechanisms do deal with many similar issues 
                                                 
342 As this kind of ex ante review mechanism exists we can realize that with this arrangement Finland 
is more likely to avoid problems regarding compatibility of already adopted EU legal instruments with 
the national Constitution. 
343 For Kelsen, for example, the solution was that of control exercised by a constitutional court, an 
independent judicial organ reviewing legality of acts. In his critique towards Carl Schmitt’s position on 
the crucial role of the sovereign, Reichspräsident, Kelsen characterized the features and the tasks of the 
constitutional court by separating it sharply from the influence of the legislator and the executive. Kelsen 
found that “Nur ein vom Gesetzgeber verschiedenes, von diesem und daher auch von jeder staatlichen 
Autorität unabhängiges Organ muss berufen werden, die verfassungswidrigen Akte des Gesetzgebers zu 
vernichten. Das ist die Institution eines Verfassungsgerichtes“. Kelsen Hans: Wer soll der Hüter der 
Verfassung sein? Mohr Siebeck. Tübingen 2008, pp. 23-24. For further elaboration of the role and the 
functioning of the constitutional court see ibid., pp. 23-27. 
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which are present in EU review. These include, for example, involvement of 
parliamentary institutions, expert bodies and the role of the courts in the 
constitutional review just to mention a few institutional aspects. It would be 
too easy to simply state that EU ex ante review is one of its kind and to treat it 
in isolation of international and national developments in the fundamental 
rights protection. Similarly, it would be too easy to simply forget about 
national ex ante review mechanisms, not least because of the importance of 
constitutional traditions of Member States for European fundamental rights 
as recognized by the CJEU.  In addition to the fact that national level systems 
of ex ante review provide interesting food for thought for the analysis of EU 
level developments, it would not be sustainable to omit one of the key pillars 
of the EU fundamental rights doctrine.344 
 
The Finnish experience from ex ante review is important because Finland 
has a long tradition in the ex ante review of fundamental rights in the 
Parliament. Over two decades of Finnish membership to the EU, the CLC, in 
particular, has in a flexible manner also taken on the review of EU legislative 
proposals entailing interference with fundamental rights. The choice for the 
basis for comparisons and lessons learned could have also been some other EU 
Member State, which has a system of relatively strong ex ante review of 
legislation.  
 
 
1.1. Democracy and legitimacy of rights-based review 
 
The relationship between fundamental rights and democracy can either be 
described as instrumental or intrinsic depending on whether democracy is 
instrumental for the protection of human rights. It is intrinsic if human rights 
and democracy are closely inter-dependent. In fact both options are 
possible.345 Democracy is the rule of the people without doubt. What form 
democracy may take in particular time and space is another issue. The most 
fundamental feature of democracy is the access of an individual to a decision-
making process at different levels of society. In liberal democracies, the most 
important aspect of individual access is the right to cast a ballot in elections. 
Further, the right for political activity and the right to run for political position 
are significant in this respect. These rights are secured by legal rules. These 
legal rules on governance form a considerable part of the legal notion of 
democracy. As is the case concerning government, broadly taken, at a state 
level these legal provisions can be found at the highest level of legal norms – 
usually at the constitutional level. We should, however, see that democracy is 
an ambiguous and essentially controversial concept. Furthermore, the 
conceptions of democracy in the political theory are different from democracy 
standards intrinsic to positive law.346 We should not restrict ourselves to 
                                                 
344 I do not see a reason for limiting the Court’s interpretation to substantive fundamental rights and 
not to understand constitutional traditions in a wider sense. 
345 Besson Samantha: Das Menschenrecht auf Demokratie - Eine moralische Verteidigung mit einer 
rechtlichen Nuance. In Haller Gret, Günther Klaus, Neumann Ulfrid (Hg.): Menschenrechte und 
Volkssouveränität in Europa. Gerichte als Vormunde der Demokratie? Campus Verlag GmbH. Frankfurt 
am Main 2011, p. 73. 
346 Jääskinen Niilo: Eurooppalaistuvan oikeuden oikeusteoreettisia ongelmia. Helsinki 2008, p. 133. 
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analysing the concept of democracy purely through the prism of the formalistic 
theory of law. Democracy also includes the realization of the rule of law and 
respect for fundamental rights, and it cannot function without the rule of law 
which aims at safeguarding that preconditions for democratic government are 
fulfilled. Additionally, fundamental rights can well be considered to fall within 
the essence of democracy. 
 
If we further think about democracy within the EU framework, we may 
discuss the very foundations of the division of competence between the Union 
and the Member States. It is not necessary to deal with such questions as 
Kompetenz-Kompetenz, but only to refer to one particular case of the German 
Constitutional Court, namely the so-called Maastricht Urteil.347 In this case, 
the Constitutional Court ruled that it was within its jurisdiction to review the 
actions of the EU institutions in order to ensure that they remain within the 
limits of their competence. According to the Karlsruhe Court, it was required 
to guarantee the protection of fundamental rights of the German citizens. The 
question of who is the ultimate authority, the final enforcer of law in Europe, 
remains unsettled, as does the question of democracy.  
 
The Anglo-American concept the rule of ‘law’ has often been used as a 
synonymy of the continental concept of ‘Rechtsstaat’. Both these concepts 
express the idea of justness in a modern state.348 Although these concepts may 
have different emphases for constitutional and historical reasons, they 
basically mean the same thing. The notion of the rule of law includes the 
principles of justness, legality, legal certainty, respect for fundamental rights 
and even democracy. The rule of law should thus be construed in a broad 
sense. 349  
 
As Ely puts it “Thus the central function, and it is at the same time the 
central problem, of judicial review: a body that is not elected or otherwise 
politically responsible in any significant way is telling the people’s elected 
representatives that they cannot govern as they’d like.”350 In the same vein, Ely 
also discusses the issue that in practice a lot of power in the legislature has 
been vested on unelected administrators.351 Ely finds that in a representative 
democracy, value determinations are to be made by elected representativeness 
and if the people disapprove them they can be voted out of office. For Ely, 
appointed judges are comparative outsiders in the governmental system and 
need to worry about continuance in office only very obliquely. This does not 
necessarily put them in a special position with regard to value determinations, 
                                                 
347 Brunner v. Maastricht Vertrag, BVerfGE 89 (1993). On the issue of competence-competence see 
also the so-called cases Solange I 37 BVerfGE 271 (1974) and Solange II 73 BVerfGE 339 (1986). 
348 Hallberg Pekka: The Rule of Law. Edita. Helsinki 2004. p. 13. I believe that probably the biggest 
difference between for example the British and German understanding of the two concepts is the 
stronger attachment of the German perception to the Constitution, die Verfassung. 
349 The rule of law hence touches upon some very comprehensive legal principles. According to 
Hallberg there are fundamental elements of the rule of law which are legality, separation of powers, the 
protection of fundamental rights and the rule of law as a functional entity. Ibid., pp. 70-90. 
350 Ely John Hart: Democracy and Distrust. A Theory of Judicial Review. Harvard University Press. 
Cambridge, Massachusetts 1980. pp, 4.-5. 
351 Ibid., p. 131. For Ely the crucial issue is that these administrators are neither elected or re-elected 
and are controlled only spasmodically by officials who are. 
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but rather puts them in a position to objectively assess claims “that either by 
clogging the channels of change or by acting as accessories to majority tyranny, 
our elected representatives in fact are not representing the interests of those 
whom the system presupposes they are”.352 
 
If we place the EU institutions against a backdrop of representative 
democracy, it is quite obvious that the democratic legitimacy is somewhat 
hollow in one sense or another. This goes back to the system of checks and 
balances that is different from national level constitutional arrangements. This 
is also because of the lack of a truly European demos to which the democratic 
legitimacy of the institutions could be returned to. The most visible feature of 
representative democracy is anchored to the system of democratic elections 
through which the will of the people will be expressed. In the context of the 
EU, we can identify two kinds of representative democracy that can be 
considered either as direct or indirect when seen from the EU angle. Both of 
these models have their pros and cons in terms of democratic involvement. 
The EP, despite its apparently feeble link to the local level, is a representative 
body whose democratic legitimacy at the EU level springs from direct elections 
although different election systems are applied depending on the political 
system of the Member State. Thus, emphasis should be placed on the words at 
the EU level. 
 
EU Member States’ governments can be regarded at the EU level as 
indirect, although they are directly elected. The Member States’ governments 
carry out their political tasks and functions under the supervision of national 
parliaments in the spirit of parliamentarism, but the will of the people comes 
to the EU level only indirectly, through the Council. In spite of this, the 
government of a given Member State is more closely tied to the will of the local 
people than the EP for many obvious reasons. Nonetheless, this does not erase 
the fact that the most advanced attempt at the EU level to incorporate the 
direct will of the people to the decision-making process is the EP. This raises 
the topic of the role of national parliaments.353 The Lisbon Treaty introduced 
elements to the primary EU law that clearly reinforce the possibilities of 
national parliaments to obtain information on topical EU issues, if this does 
not already happen through the Member States governments. The Treaty also 
strengthens the possibilities of national parliaments to have their voice to be 
heard directly.354 This is a remarkable improvement in linking national 
parliaments, the true local level element engaging the people, with the EU 
policy and legislative processes. Nonetheless, the shortcoming here is the 
                                                 
352 Ibid., p. 103. 
353 Traditionally, national parliaments have often been described as the loser of the European 
integration process as a consequence of transfer of legislative power from the national to the EU level 
and simultaneously from parliaments to the Member State governments. Auel Katrin: The 
Europeanisation Parliamentary democracy. In Auel Katrin and Benz Arthur (Eds.): The Europeanisation 
of Parliamentary Democracy. Routledge. New York 2006, p. 5. 
354 For recent high-quality discussion on the role of national parliaments in the EU policy-making 
see a joint paper by leading think-tanks on EU policy: Legitimising EU Policymaking. What role for 
national parliaments? Prepared by Stratulat Corina, Emmanouilidis Janis A, European Policy Centre 
(EPC), Fischer Thomas, Bertelsmann Stiftung and Piedrafita Sonia, Centre for European Policy Studies 
(CEPS). 2014. Available at 
http://www.epc.eu/documents/uploads/pub_4101_legitimising_eu_policymaking.pdf. Visited on 
20.2.2014. 
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rather scarce powers of national parliaments to provide effective inputs to the 
legislative process, although advancements are being made in a positive 
direction. Finally, let us turn to the Commission that, of all the EU institutions 
involved in the legislative process, has the weakest tie-in to the democracy. 
This is not, however, non-existent and during the last decades also democratic 
elements of the Commission have been strengthened, particularly due to the 
fact that it is politically responsible to the EP. The Commission can thus be 
considered to have a double legitimacy.355  
 
Graph 7. Institutions and bodies involved in the ex ante review of 
fundamental rights in the EU legislative process. Interface of objectivity and 
democratic legitimacy. 
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Graph 7 illustrates the interrelationship between neutrality and objectivity, 
vis-à-vis democratic legitimacy when it comes to different actors involved in 
control of fundamental rights. All these bodies, except the CJEU, are involved 
in the legislative process and the related ex ante review. As can be seen in the 
figure in the case of the EP, it may be that a high democratic legitimacy may 
not be a silver bullet in securing compliance with fundamental rights in the 
legislative process.  
 
                                                 
355 Firstly, there is the responsibility to the EP that finds its concrete form when nominating the new 
Commission. On the other hand, the EP can force the Commission to resign. Secondly, the 
Commissioners are nominated by the Member States governments and therefore the political situation 
of the particular EU Member State is reflected in this selection process. The link to democracy is, 
however, extremely thin and in practice Member State governments have free hands to propose the 
candidate for the position “of the Member State’s” commissioner. 
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It is also important to introduce a certain kind of system of judicial checks 
and balances with the development of ex ante review in all the key institutions, 
namely the Commission, the Council and the EP. Eventually, improving the 
quality of legal texts and contributing to the fulfillment of this objective already 
in the preparatory phase, is in the interests of legal certainty and thus the 
interest of an individual. The current situation in which the EP is involved in 
the ordinary legislative process and the CJEU in enforcement enhances the 
system of checks and balances in the EU.356 Furthermore, according to van 
Gerven each of these institutions monitors the others to ensure that they do 
not impinge on its powers and may bring the respective case to the CJEU.357 
This is increasingly the normal way of doing business, also within the sphere 
of AFSJ. If we consider the internal dynamism of the EP in fundamental rights 
issues, we can note that there seems to be an internal shift in interest from 
external or international fundamental rights issues to internal fundamental 
rights issues that form the hard core of EU legislation. This trend is probably 
unavoidable and it also greatly contributes to the EU competence in external 
fundamental rights issues.358  
 
A certain kind of logic of complementarity justifies the legitimacy of the EU 
by pointing to the systematic differences between European and national 
institutions arguing that their specific capacities supplement each other in an 
effective way. For example, the Commission, which is independent from 
electoral pressures, can act in general interest.359 In the EU, there is in fact no 
way of throwing the government out. Dismissing the Commission by the 
Parliament cannot be considered as its equivalent.360 This is a clear gap, 
because citizens should always have the possibility to “throw the scoundrels 
out”. It has been a clear objective to link the Commission’s appointment to 
more democratic and open procedures. This has found its expression 
especially in terms of the role of the EP. The Santer Commission had to resign 
in 1999 due to withdrawal of the EP’s support from the Commission. 
Furthermore, the EP has exercised democratic control when appointing the 
Commission. This has happened, for example, in the form of hearings in the 
EP and in some cases the Commissioner-to-be has been forced to change the 
foreseen portfolios or even to withdraw.361 
 
                                                 
356 See Lenaerts Koen and Cambien Nathan: The Democratic Legitimacy of the EU after the Treaty 
of Lisbon. In Wouters Jan, Verhey Luc and Kiiver Philipp (Eds.): European Constitutionalism beyond 
Lisbon. Intersentia. Antwerpen 2009, p. 199. 
357 Van Gerven Walther: Wanted: More Democratic Legitimacy for the European Union. Some 
Suppositions, Propositions, Tests and observations in light of the Fate of the European Constitution. In 
Wouters Jan, Verhey Luc and Kiiver Philipp (Eds.): European Constitutionalism beyond Lisbon. 
Intersentia. Antwerpen 2009, p. 156. 
358 See case C-22/70 Commission v Council (ERTA). 
359 Hurrelmann Achim: Multilevel Legitimacy: Conceptualizing Legitimacy Relationships between 
the EU and National Democracies. In Democratic Dilemmas of Multilevel Governance. Legitimacy, 
Representation and Accountability in the European Union. DeBardeleben Joan and Hurrelmann Achim 
(Eds.): Democratic Dilemmas of Multilevel Governance. Legitimacy, Representation and Accountability 
in the European Union. Palgrave MacMillan. Basingstoke 2007, p. 24. 
360 Weiler J.H.H.: Why should Europe be a Democracy: The Corruption of Political Culture and the 
Principle of Toleration. In Snyder Francis: The Europeanisation of Law. Hart Publishing. Oxford 2000, 
p. 215. 
361 With these examples I refer particularly to cases of László Kovács, Rocco Buttiglione and most 
recently Alenka Bratusek. 
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Verhoeven takes up the interrelationship between the Commission and the 
EP as the one ensuring the accountability and political responsibility of the 
Commission. Furthermore, she sees the national parliaments’ role mainly in 
the democratic control of the Council.362 This is in many respects true, just to 
start with the nomination of the Commission and the key position of the EP in 
this process. We should not however forget that the Lisbon Treaty has moved 
the accountability of the Commission also towards the scrutiny of national 
parliaments. If one important goal with the Treaty amendment is to reinforce 
the role of the national parliaments, generally one concrete example of the 
increased role of national parliaments in controlling the Commission is the 
possibility to “show the Commission a yellow card” for not complying with 
subsidiarity principle in draft legislative acts.363  Already in the context of the 
wrecked Constitutional Treaty Walker drew attention to the fuller 
operationalization of subsidiarity through the early involvement and the 
monitoring function of national parliaments in the law-making process and 
the effect of the EUCFR in this.364 The focus on controlling the Commission 
through the EP has likely been focused on for too long. Even though examples 
exist of the control exercised by the EP, such as demission of the Santer 
Commission, the real added value in providing democratic down-to-earth 
control could be found in national parliaments that clearly are placed both 
physically and mentally closer to ordinary citizens. This new control function 
of the national parliaments is interesting and important, and this kind of 
approach could provide a partial remedy to the democracy deficit.365 
 
For the use of this new yellow card procedure, for the reasons of 
subsidiarity for example, Wyatt has argued that a sufficient amount of yellow 
cards by national Parliaments – if neglected by the Commission – could 
initiate a process of the CJEU to request the Commission to demonstrate that 
the national Parliaments had made an error of appraisal in objecting the draft 
act on subsidiarity grounds.366 In this case, yellow cards meeting the threshold 
would function as procedural requirement to review the validity of act. For the 
role of national parliaments in the control of subsidiarity in the legislative 
process we can at least say that it has brought transparency to the legislative 
process. Discussions on subsidiarity often take place in very early phases of the 
legislative process and opinions of legal services of EU institutions have been 
                                                 
362 Verhoeven, p. 238. 
363 See Protocol No 2 of the TFEU on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and 
proportionality. Pursuant to Article 6 of the protocol “any national Parliament or any chamber of a 
national Parliament may, within eight weeks from the date of transmission of a draft legislative act, in 
the official languages of the Union, send to the Presidents of the European parliament, the Council and 
the Commission a reasoned opinion stating why it considers that the draft in question does not comply 
with the principle of subsidiarity. It will be for each national parliament or each chamber of a national 
Parliament to consult, where appropriate, regional parliaments with legislative powers”. 
364 See Walker Neil: The Migration of Constitutional Ideas and the Migration of the Constitutional 
Idea: The Case of the EU. EUI Working Paper LAW, No 2005/04. Department of Law. European 
University Institute. Florence 2005, p. 14. 
365 It is interesting to note that nowadays the EP has often called for a pragmatic strategy in 
functional co-operation with national parliaments. Neunreither Karl-Heinz: The European Parliament 
and National Parliaments: Conflict or co-operation? In Auel Katrin and Benz Arthur (Eds.): The 
Europeanisation of Parliamentary Democracy. Routledge. New York 2006, p. 165. 
366 Wyatt Derrick: Is the European Union an Organisation of Limited Powers? In Arnull Anthony, 
Barnard Catherine, Dougan Michael, Spaventa Eleanor (Eds.): A Constitutional Order of States? Essays 
in EU Law in Honour of Alan Dashwood. Hart Publishing. Oxford and Portland, Oregon 2011, p. 22. 
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criticized for limited access of the public and for being dealt with behind the 
closed doors. Opening control of subsidiarity to the national parliaments 
means also opening the processes and contents to a greater extent to the 
public. The crucial issue to be solved is the question of subsidiarity as the law-
making process raises the issue of democratic accountability and regulation at 
different levels of the EU.367 A good step forward was taken in the Lisbon 
Treaty with the introduction of the above-mentioned yellow card procedure 
that strengthens the democratic surveillance in the legislative phase at exactly 
the right level, the national Parliaments to which EU citizens feel most 
attached and find the expression of their will more closely than the distant EP. 
The Lisbon Treaty enables the EU legislator, the Council and the EP, to use the 
so-called ‘orange card’ procedure if the Commission maintains its proposal 
after the yellow card. Orange card means that the legislator will not give any 
further consideration to the legislative proposal if it considers that the 
proposal is incompatible with the principle of subsidiarity. However, even if 
the orange card procedure did not exist, Member States can form blocking 
minorities for whatever reasons and the threshold for a blocking minority is 
even lower than that required for “showing the orange card”.368 
 
According to von Bogdandy, the basic building blocks of democracy in the 
in the primary EU law springs from two sources, which are: the peoples of the 
Member States and the Union’s citizens.369 This leads us to the notion of the 
EU resting on double legitimacy and we can also identify EU institutions 
representing the peoples of Member States, the Council and Union’s citizens, 
the EP.370 
 
At the current stage of European integration, there is no real European 
demos. Member States are still the Masters of the Treaties and therefore the 
pouvoir constituant can be found at the Member State level.371 As the figure 
below suggest the involvement of Member States’ demoi is of indirect nature 
although direct involvement has played a significant role especially in the 
referenda organized by some Member Stets when ratifying Treaty 
                                                 
367 Waldron considers that the rationale of a legislative assembly is to represent the main factions in 
the society and to make laws that takes their differences seriously rather than ignores or altogether omits 
them. Waldron Jeremy: Law and Disagreement. Clarendon Press. Oxford 1999, p. 27. 
368 Another feature that is interesting when looking the Commission through the prism of democracy 
is the lobbying. As all the other EU institutions the Commission also is subject to heavy lobbying by the 
plethora of stakeholders and interested parties. Van Schendelen considers that one issue of key 
importance in terms of democracy is the openness of the decision-making system, see  Van Schendelen 
Rinus: Macchiavelli in Brussels. The Art of Lobbying the EU. Second fully updated Edition. Amsterdam 
University Press. Amsterdam 2005, pp. 314-315. 
369 Von Bogdandy Armin: Founding Principles. In Principles of European Constitutional law. Second 
revised edition. Von Bogdandy Armin and Bast Jürgen (eds.). Hart Publishing. Oxford 2010, p. 49. 
370 On the one hand citizens of the EU are represented directly through the EU. As we can recall the 
citizenship of the EU was one of the novelties of Maastricht Treaty. In the beginning it was supposed not 
to replace national citizenship and this principle is still going strong in Article 9 of the TEU. On the other 
hand, the representation of Member States has been underscored when referring to the European 
Council, the Council and the role of national parliaments. 
371 We can also identify basically classical ideas in the times of erosion of the sovereign states 
emphasizing that it is the people who are the ultimate lawmaking authority in a democratic community 
– hence its pouvoir constituant. On the other hand we can regard the legislative, the executive and the 
judiciary as pouvoirs constitués – receiving powers from the people. Lindahl Hans: Sovereignty and 
Representation in the European Union. In Walker Neil (ed.): Sovereignty in Transition. Hart Publishing. 
Oxford and Portland, Oregon 2003, p. 91. 
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amendments. The positive issue with the legitimacy springing from EU 
citizens is its direct nature that is clearly visible especially in the EP elections. 
Nonetheless, turnouts in the EP elections are still too low and for example the 
lack of sufficient level of media interest and coverage as well as the basically 
negative attitude towards the EP are still practical problems do not bring the 
EP closer to a citizen. We should however give this part of democratic 
legitimacy of the EU more time to develop.372 
 
The CJEU has also taken a stand in the case International Fund for Ireland 
in favour of double democratic legitimacy.373 At stake in this case was the legal 
basis chosen for the financial contributions of the Community to the 
international fund for Ireland. The CJEU in its ruling found in favour of the 
EP that co-decision was required and that a mere consultation of the EP was 
not sufficient.374 
 
In this context we also need address democracy deficit in the Council 
legislative proceedings. The Member States’ governments represented in the 
Council are elected democratically and the Governments’ behavior also draws 
further legitimacy in terms of democracy due to involvement of national 
parliaments.375 The role of national parliaments in EU affairs may differ 
significantly from one country to another but the Lisbon Treaty provisions aim 
at the strengthening the role of national parliaments by and large in EU issues. 
One key task of national parliaments in the more direct democratic control is 
bridging the democracy gap but is not always problem-free in terms of 
efficiency of negotiations bearing in mind especially the always present time 
limits.376 
 
However, the Council has often been accused of insufficient transparency 
and of making decisions behind closed doors without adequate democratic 
control or disclosure of the preparatory work for discussion in the media. This 
is the case although the legal framework governing decision-making has 
evolved into a more transparent and open direction as a consequence of 
subsequent Treaty amendments and the introduction of related secondary EU 
legislation.377 Another source of criticism arises from pre-negotiations 
conducted at the level of Government and institution officials not elected for 
their posts and thus escaping sufficient democratic control.378 Stefan Oeter, 
                                                 
372 Even if a Volksgeist in a Hegelian sense hardly ever develops within the EU, more interest in EU 
affairs and an increased legitimacy could for example be expected as a consequence of the overall 
negative experience of the crisis of the euro. 
373 See Sharpston Eleanor and De Baere Geert: The Court of Justice as a Constitutional Adjudicator. 
In Arnull Anthony, Barnard Catherine, Dougan Michael, Spaventa Eleanor (Eds.): A Constitutional 
Order of States? Essays in EU Law in Honour of Alan Dashwood. Hart Publishing. Oxford and Portland, 
Oregon 2011, pp. 140-141. 
374 See CJEU case International Fund for Ireland C-166/07. 
375 In this connection we should note diverging impacts of the European integration on the status of 
national Parliaments in the course of time. See Kassim Hussein: The Europeanization of Member State 
Institutions. In Bulmer Simon and Lequesne Christian (eds.): The Member States of the European 
Union. Oxford University Press. Oxford 2005, p. 298. 
376 Hayes-Renshaw, p. 241. 
377 See Bauer Martin Transparency in the Council. In Westlake Martin and Galloway David (eds.): 
The Council of the European Union. Third edition. John Harper Publishing. London 2006, pp. 367-372. 
378 Hayes-Renshaw and Wallace, p. 68. 
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basing his arguments on traditional Weberian notions of bureaucracy, 
highlights that bureaucracies at the European level are not under same kind of 
parliamentary control as at the national level. Political responsibility therefore 
becomes diluted or vanishes altogether.379 The vision of technocrats running 
the Union is still going strong in the EU folklore. 
 
Against this background we should define the role of the Council within the 
EU structure. The most important thing to remember is that the Council is 
above all a legislator representing the political will of the Member States. 
Nowadays, the Council must increasingly function more in tandem with the 
EP in the legislative work. Even though we have witnessed the extension of the 
EP competence to policy areas traditionally under the control of the Member 
States, such as justice and home affairs and agriculture, the Council still 
occupies a pivotal role in the preparation of EU legislation. Even today, some 
political questions have been left for the Council to decide with a mere 
consultative role reserved for the EP.380 This does not undermine the fact that 
the Commission is also in a strong position in the legislative process of the EU. 
The Council also carries out some executive functions. In one sense, this is 
closely related to providing political leadership and serving the purposes of 
policy-shaping, policy-initiation, as well as crisis management.381 These 
powers are clearly shared with other EU institutions, which underlies the big 
picture of the EU lacking general separation of powers in a classic state-centric 
sense. Furthermore, the EU legislation has to be implemented by the Member 
States that constitute the Council.382 
 
These far-reaching changes in the legislative environment, with a much 
stronger involvement of the EP, certainly increases the democratic nature of 
the EU.383 As the EP has now gained a very strong role in the field of 
fundamental rights It is useful to link this development with increased 
democratic control. This is even truer when we look at the past of the EP as 
strong supporter of human rights especially in relations with third 
countries.384 Furthermore, the empowerment of the EP can be seen as a viable 
option to strengthen democracy in the complex system of EU policy-
making.385 This is correct, but one could offer counter-arguments regarding 
                                                 
379 See Oeter Stefan: Federalism and Democracy. In Von Bogdandy Armin and Bast Jürgen (eds.): 
Principles of European Constitutional law. Second revised edition. Hart Publishing, Oxford 2010. p. 73. 
380 An example of this is the legislation based on the Euratom Treaty. 
381 Westlake et al, p. 10. 
382 For implementation of EU policies at the level of Member States see Wallace Helen: Exercising 
Power and Influence in the European Union: The Roles of Member States. In Bulmer Simon and 
Lequesne Christian (eds.): The Member States of the European Union. Oxford University press. Oxford 
2005, pp, 34-36. 
383 Douglas-Scott Sionaidh: Constitutional Law of the European Union. Pearson Education Limited. 
Harlow 2002, pp. 134-135.  
384 For example Banchoff and Smith remind that the EP has during recent years used its right to 
block financial protocols with Turkey, Israel, Morocco and Syria for human rights reasons, Banchoff and 
Smith, p. 142. 
385 For instance Bellamy and Castiglione argue that ”the democratic deficit can only be addressed in 
ways that will resolve the EU’s current crisis of political legitimacy, therefore, if the proposed democratic 
regime matches the mixed character of the European polity”. See Bellamy Richard and Castiglione Dario: 
The Uses of Democracy: Reflections on the European Democratic Deficit. In Eriksen Erik Oddvar and 
Fossum John Erik: Democracy in the European Union. Integration through Deliberation. Routledge. 
London 2000, p. 83. 
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aristocratic nature and the relative lack of transparency and the direct control 
by the media, to mention a few examples.386 The system of producing EP 
positions on legislative proposals and policy issues, which is centered on 
individual MEPs –  the rapporteurs – can also be contested from the point of 
view of democracy. MacCormick has correctly commented on the nature of the 
EP by highlighting that it is not a state Parliament, nor a legislature of a federal 
state, but a Parliament of a new kind of commonwealth. This commonwealth 
is a non-sovereign confederal commonwealth constituted of post-sovereign 
Member States.387 At the state level, parliaments can be conceived as supreme 
legislative authorities with their legislative – in other words, rule-making 
power. These legislative authorities are able to make general rules of universal 
and uniform application in the state’s territory and therefore they have a 
central place in the institutional normative order.388 We can easily see that 
compared with national parliaments at the state level, the EP has a kind of 
shared responsibility with other EU institutions, most importantly with the 
Council.389 
 
An example of critique presented on criticism on review exercised by the 
courts has been raised for instance by Juha Lavapuro. It has been mainly 
addressed at Jeremy Waldron’s approach that attaches democratic procedures 
in the context of representative institutions, thus omitting, for example, public 
discourses in connection with court rulings that involve fundamental rights.390 
I try to transfer this idea to the EU level. The legal system of the EU includes 
several important actors and a multitude of legitimation bases. Therefore the 
critique presented by Lavapuro proves very useful. 
 
It is absolutely impossible to return the legislative organs exhaustively and 
sustainably to democratic foundations. The democratic deficit is always 
present in the EU legislative process. Compared with national legal systems, 
the democratic gap exists in various phases of the EU legislative process, 
depending on the angle of the observer. For this reason, it is crucial that the 
definite legal control in the EU legal system is anchored into the judicial review 
carried out by the CJEU. Nonetheless, as out of vogue as it may seem, it would 
also be important to tie the legislative institutions of the EU more closely to 
the analysis of contents of fundamental rights present in the pieces of 
legislation being drafted. As a consequence of widening of the competence to 
the AFSJ of the EP, the ex ante review of legislative institutions needs to be 
strengthened. The same goes for empowerment of national Parliaments in the 
                                                 
386 See Cuyvers Armin: The Aristocratic Surplus. In Kinneging Andreas (ed.): Rethinking Europe’s 
Constitution. Wolf Legal Publishers. Nijmegen 2007, p. 127. 
387 See MacCormick Neil: Questiong Sovereignty. Law, State and Nation in the European 
Commonwealth. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1999. p, 156. Although MacCormick does not seem to 
belong to the advocates of EP providing a clear-cut answer to issues around EU democracy deficit he is 
in favour of giving more legislative powers to the EP. Meanwhile, the EU has undergone constitutional 
reforms taking it to a more federal direction with increased legislative competence of the EP but still, 
MacCormick’s concerns seem to be valid even in today’s situation.  
388 MacCormick Neil: Institutions of Law. Oxford University Press. Oxford 2007, p. 50. 
389 In addition to the previously mentioned aspects especially direct democracy has been attempted 
to be strengthened by the so-called citizens’ initiative as set out in Article 11 paragraph 4 of the TEU. So 
far experiences of these initiatives launched by at least one million citizens from a significant number of 
Member States are scarce. 
390 See Lavapuro, p. 111. 
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context of the Lisbon Treaty. After all, the EP is the only elected institution at 
the EU level.391 Furthermore, national parliaments draw their legitimacy 
directly from the people of the Member States thus represent the closer link to 
national level legitimacy. In this situation of empowerment of parliaments and 
their involvement in the key value choices of the Union, it is important to have 
a strengthened preview of fundamental rights carried out by these institutions. 
Parliaments need to go to the mainstream of fundamental rights control in the 
preparatory phase. 
 
 
2. Parameters of rights-based review 
 
For a deeper analysis needed for dealing with fundamental rights in 
different legislative dossiers, some key parameters must be employed. In this 
research, these key parameters consist of a test of permissible limitations to 
fundamental rights and the different effects of fundamental rights. Therefore, 
the approach is two-fold. 
 
The first set of parameters can be divided into a permissible limitation test, 
drawing inspiration above all from the test of permissible limitations derived 
from the limitation provision of the Charter, namely Article 52(1). I would 
deem the Charter provision - with the key dimensions like the essence of 
fundamental rights - more interesting for concrete cases but the Finnish case 
- that will be discussed briefly - is also intriguing as an example of limitation 
practices of an intermediary model of rights-based review. Permissible 
limitation tests form an important operational framework for the analysis. 
This is because many fundamental rights are subject to limitations under the 
Charter. 
 
The second bulk of parameters include the functions of fundamental rights 
and here we must make a distinction between positive and negative 
obligations. In the framework of parameters, the key issues of proportionality 
and balancing will be discussed. 
 
 
2.1. The permissible limitations test as a general framework of 
review 
 
It is stipulated in Article 52 (1) of the EUCHR  
Any limitation on the exercise of the rights and freedoms recognised by this 
Charter must be provided for by law and respect the essence of those rights 
and freedoms. Subject to the principle of proportionality, limitations may be 
made only if they are necessary and genuinely meet objectives of general 
                                                 
391 Some observers have also paid attention to the reluctance of some constitutional courts, most 
notably the German Constitutional Court to consider the EP as a source of adequate democratic 
legitimacy of EU legislation. The legitimisation provided by the EP has rather been considered as a 
complementary one by the Constitutional Court. See Pernice Ingolf: Does Europe need a Constitution? 
Achievements and Challenges after Lisbon. In Arnull Anthony, Barnard Catherine, Dougan Michael, 
Spaventa Eleanor (Eds.): A Constitutional Order of States? Essays in EU Law in Honour of Alan 
Dashwood. Hart Publishing. Oxford and Portland, Oregon 2011, p. 95. 
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interest recognised by the Union or the need to protect the rights and freedoms 
of others. 
 
Article 52 (1) can be regarded as an extremely progressive limitation 
provision in many respects. It is a general limitation provision, which in an 
explicit manner sets out the preconditions for limiting fundamental rights. 
With its current strong status, the Charter including this provision reflecting 
clear and modern legal thinking on limiting fundamental rights functions as a 
useful tool for the CJEU in its interpretation practice. The provision is indeed 
beneficial for fundamental rights protection and it should not only be the 
Court, but also the EU legislature, to take it duly into account when 
introducing new EU legislation. 
 
The permissible limitations to fundamental rights enshrined in the Charter 
can be summarized in the following catalogue392: 
1) provided for by law 
2) legitimate aim 
3) inviolable essence 
4) necessity 
5) proportionality  
 
In this context it is also important to notice that Article 52 (2) links the 
criteria for limitation assessment enshrined in Article 52 (1) with the rights in 
the Treaties.393 Furthermore, due attention must also be paid to the level of 
protection as set out in Article 53 of the Charter. When we are discussing the 
level of protection and particularly the scope of this EUCFR provision, we 
come across recent case law of the CJEU and most notably cases Åkerberg394 
and Melloni395, which very much highlight the supremacy of EU law. This does 
not mean that the relation of the Charter rights with fundamental rights of the 
Member States is irrelevant. Also Member States' fundamental rights as an 
expression of "constitutional traditions" can be conceived as having a value in 
the EU legislative process. As such, it must be recognized that permissible 
limitations and position of ECHR rights as minimum standards are 
inextricably linked under Article 52(3).396 In practice, this means that the 
ECHR rights function as a minimum level of protection and that EU law can 
go beyond this level.  Having regard to the position of the CJEU and the ECtHR 
praxis on fundamental rights as the backbone of the EU fundamental rights 
regime, we should have a close look at the case law of the courts particularly 
on limiting fundamental rights. From the point of view of legislative cases 
                                                 
392 This builds on the categorization presented by Ojanen in Ojanen Tuomas: Making the Essence of 
Fundamental Rights Real: The Court of Justice of the European Union Clarifies the Structure of 
Fundamental Rights under the Charter. European Constitutional Law Review 2, 2016. 
393 It is set out in Article 52 (2) of the Charter that “Rights recognized by this Charter for which 
provision is made in the Treaties shall be exercised under the conditions and within the limits defined 
by those Treaties”. 
394 C-617/10 Åklagaren v Hans Åkerberg Fransson.  
395 C-399/11 Stefano Melloni v Ministerio Fiscal. 
396 It is set out in Article 52 (3) that "In so far as this Charter contains rights which correspond to 
rights guaranteed by the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 
the meaning and scope of those rights shall be the same as those laid down by the said Convention. This 
provision shall not prevent Union law providing more extensive protection." 
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chosen for this study, the limiting of fundamental rights is the crucial question. 
We should therefore ask how the courts have considered the criteria for 
limiting fundamental rights in practice. The basic status of case law of the 
courts has already been discussed in the previous chapters of this study. For 
example in the ECtHR case S. and Marper v. the United Kingdom the court 
ruled the case in favour of applicants  stating that in this case in which 
retention of DNA of persons suspected but not convicted of offences 
constituted a disproportionate interference with the applicants’ right to 
respect of private life. Consequently, the ECtHR found that this interference 
was not necessary in a democratic society and therefore concluded that there 
was a violation of Article 8 of the ECHR.397 When discussing the issue of 
limiting fundamental rights, we should bear in mind that some of the 
fundamental rights are absolute. These fundamental rights are not subject to 
limitations under any conditions. This has been reaffirmed in concrete court 
cases by the ECtHR.398 In Finland, based on the Finnish practice, a test of 
permissible limitations to fundamental rights has been applied. It has been 
developed by the interpretation practice of the CLC, which is in a highly 
authoritative position in ex ante review of compliance with the Constitution of 
the Finnish law.399  
 
As for the provided for by law requirement, we can first identify some 
problems in the EU, especially in the case of comitology and delegated acts. 
We cannot deny that legal acts passed through the comitology procedure or 
delegated acts are legitimate EU acts. I find it, however, problematic to restrict 
fundamental rights with such acts because in these cases the EU legislator has 
delegated the act promulgating competence to a lower level. For example, 
when it comes to delegated acts we should note that according to the Treaty 
delegated acts can only be utilized to amend non-essential elements of the 
basic act.400 This rules out the possibility that delegated acts could be used for 
the purpose of limiting fundamental rights. Nor do delegated acts, for the same 
reason, qualify in accordance with law criterion, even though delegated acts 
are legally binding EU instruments. The same also goes for the implementing 
acts.401 Should the EU legislator leave some issues in the context of the basic 
act to be decided upon in the comitology, or as a delegated act it cannot be the 
will of the legislator to enable the restriction of fundamental rights with such 
acts. In this sense, comitology acts and delegated acts should be considered in 
                                                 
397 Paragraph 125 of ECtHR case of S. and Marper v. the United Kingdom, Applications nos. 
30562/04 and 30566/04, 4.12.2008. 
398 See e.g. ECtHR case of Saadi v. Italy, Application no. 37201/06, 28 February 2008, paragraph 
149. 
399 The background of this test can be found in the fundamental rights reform of the Finnish 
Constitution in mid-1990s and in the overall reform of the Finnish Constitution at the turn of the 
Millennium. Although this list of criteria for permissible limitations includes the most common ground 
for restrictions it should be noted that the CLC has stated that this list is not an exhaustive list. Veli-
Pekka Viljanen has on the basis of the practice of the CLC analysed the test, which consists of seven 
restriction criteria. The prerequisites for restriction of fundamental rights are requirement of 
parliamentary legislation, requirement of precision and definition, requirement of legitimacy, 
requirement of proportionality, requirement of non-violation of the core of a basic right, requirement of 
due protection under the law and the requirement of compliance with human rights obligations. 
Viljanen, pp. 37-38 
400 Article 290 of TFEU. 
401 Article 291 of TFEU. 
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the case of restriction of fundamental rights as lower level secondary EU law, 
although such strict hierarchy does not exist. 
 
The requirement of legitimate aim at the EU level is difficult to tackle. It is 
hard to grasp what could constitute such a social need that might justify 
limitations. We do have at our disposal the interpretation practice of the 
ECtHR on the “pressing social need” that, nevertheless, corresponds more to 
the requirement of necessity of the limitation than to finding out whether there 
is a legitimate reason for limitation.402 Having such a great variety of social 
interests and values in Europe, the margin of appreciation doctrine of the 
ECtHR has proved highly useful. Given the above-mentioned differences in 
Member States, the question of legitimacy can indeed be the hardest to 
answer. 
 
The inviolable essence of fundamental rights has also been increasingly 
emphasized in very recent case law of the CJEU. In the major data protection 
ruling in case Schrems, the court expressed serious concerns about right to 
private life as guaranteed in Article 7 of the Charter. The same conclusion was 
drawn in relation to the right to effective remedy, as set out in Article 47 of 
EUCFR.403 Basing its arguments on fundamental right concerns, the Court 
annulled the Commission's US Safe Harbour Decision 2000/520/EC. This 
requirement of non-violation of the core of a fundamental right means that the 
core of a fundamental right cannot be interfered with by legislation that would 
in practice make empty the core elements of the fundamental right.404 Already 
within the framework of other requirements for limiting fundamental rights, 
we have encountered problems in defining what is meant by such 
precondition. Likewise, it can sometimes be difficult to identify what is the 
core. Some help in this difficult task can be found in the international human 
rights agreements that define minimum levels of protection.405 We can also 
conclude that it would be problematic to limit the core of those fundamental 
rights that have been formulated in the form of an absolute prohibition.  
 
In relation to necessity, Rivers distinguishes between different types of 
discretion. He introduces policy-choice discretion and considers that 
proportionate decisions have to pass the test of legitimate aim, capable or 
suitable means, least necessary limitation of rights and fair balance.406 
According to Rivers, the necessity test requires that there are no avoidable 
fundamental rights sacrifices. If a particular aim can be accomplished by less 
interfering means, the decision-maker must go for this option.407 This is 
especially important when tackling the issue of limiting rights in the legislative 
process. Policy-choice discretion comes into play when there is a policy that 
                                                 
402 Viljanen, p. 184. 
403 See in particular paragraphs 94 and 95 of C-362/14 Schrems v Data Protection Commissioner. 
404 For example in the German tradition both in statutory as well as judicial terms the essence of 
fundamental right has a significant impact. See Rytter Jens Elo: Domstolenes fortolkning og kontrol med 
lovgivningsmagten. Forlaget Thomson. København 2000, pp. 258-261. 
405 See Viljanen, p. 244. 
406 Ibid., p. 114. 
407 Ibid., p. 114. 
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satisfies both of these tests.408 It is, above all, a power of choice of the 
legislature or the executive between two or more policy-options which are all 
necessary and balanced. It is then up to the courts to determine at which points 
necessary policies become unbalanced.409 Rivers concludes by stating that 
traditionally “the job of the legislature is to be the gatekeeper to collective 
limitations on rights, and only sporadically intervene in the private and 
criminal law of relations between individuals. Surely a legislature is less likely 
to ‘get it right’ when seeking to uphold collective interests than when adjusting 
the balance between individual interests. It is precisely in the former case that 
the courts need to protect the individual and in the latter in which the courts 
can accept the legislature as the mouthpiece of a new social consensus around 
a rebalancing of interests.”410 
 
Article 52 (1) is particularly important because it highlights 
proportionality. In many fundamental right related cases, the CJEU has been 
pushed to take a strong stand against disproportionate political aspirations of 
the EU legislature entailing breaches of fundamental rights. This provision is 
also important due to its emphasis on necessity requirement. Proportionality 
is an important principle in the criminal law. It is essential also with regard to 
fundamental rights and especially when considering limitations to such rights. 
The CJEU has in many rulings taken a stand on the issue of proportionality. 
One of the first cases, where the Court positioned itself with regard to 
proportionality was case Fedechar.411 Later on in case Fedesa it held: "The 
Court has consistently held that the principle of proportionality is one of the 
general principles of Community law. By virtue of that principle, the 
lawfulness of the prohibition of an economic activity is subject to the condition 
that the prohibitory measures are appropriate and necessary in order to 
achieve the objectives legitimately pursued by the legislation in question".412 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
408 Ibid., p. 115. For Rivers, in addition to the policy-choice discretion, the other types of discretion 
include cultural discretion and empirical discretion.  
409 Ibid., p. 129. 
410 Ibid., p. 131. 
411 C-8/55 Fedechar. 
412 C-331/88 Fedesa, paragraph 13. The court further specified: "When there is a choice between 
several appropriate measures recourse must be had to the least onerous, and the disadvantages caused 
must not be disproportionate to the aims pursued". 
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Graph 8. Limiting fundamental rights in the legislative process 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In Graph 8, an attempt has been made to illustrate the process of limiting 
fundamental rights in the EU legislative process. As we can see, 
proportionality is the key aspect when curtailing fundamental rights and it has 
to be taken into account throughout the limiting exercise.413 In the law-making 
process, it is the primary EU law, especially the EUCFR, which sets out 
requirements for the limitation. Furthermore, limitations are based on ECHR, 
which has an important position in the legal environment of the EU. It is clear 
that the courts, namely the CJEU and the ECtHR, mold their interpretation 
practice with the setting against which the limitation under the European law 
should be considered.  
 
According to Sheldon Leader one can identify three requirements for 
proportionality. These are the conditions under which a state is entitled to 
override the exercise of fundamental rights: 
"(a) that the means chosen are suitable for achieving an objective which 
competes with the requirement that one respect the fundamental right in 
question; 
(b) that the object be a legitimate one; and 
(c) if (a) and (b) are satisfied, that the means chosen, and/or the objective 
as interpreted, impinge on the exercise of a fundamental right no more than is 
necessary.414 These three elements can be found in the CJEU case law Bilka-
Kaufhaus GmBH v Weber von Hartz.”415 
 
                                                 
413 For useful discussion on proportionality in Europe see Ellis Evelyn (ed.): The Principle of 
Proportionality in the Laws of Europe. Hart Publishing. Oxford 1999. 
414 Leader Sheldon: Proportionality and the justification of discrimination. In Dine Janet and Watt 
Bob: Discrimination law: Concepts, Limitations and Justifications. Longman. New York 1996, p. 111. 
415 C-170/84 Bilka-Kaufhaus. This case was about indirect discrimination. In this context see also C-
149/77 Defrenne v Sabena. 
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Sadurski considers that proportionality assessment focusing on the 
relationship between the means and ends seems to be paradigmatically a 
legislative function, as the aim of the legislation is a legislative task. This is also 
the case with the limitation of rights when analyzing proportionality – in 
Sadurski’s terms reasonableness – of those limitations. For him, the legislators 
have the democratic legitimacy to carry out weighing and balancing and 
making compromises about competing values, interests and preferences.416 
Julian Rivers has, although mainly concentrating on the review of the courts, 
found that proportionality should deliver the correct answer for primary 
decision-makers but should also admit a range of answers to the court.417 Even 
though both the legislature and the judiciary use proportionality as a standard, 
there is nevertheless a slight difference in its usage. The doctrine of 
proportionality is closely linked to fundamental rights. However, the question 
is: which limitations of fundamental rights may be considered legally 
acceptable? As differentiated by Rivers “such limitations must pursue a 
legitimate aim, the means adopted must be capable of achieving that aim, they 
must be the least intrusive means (they must be ‘necessary’), and there must 
be a fair and acceptable relationship between the aim pursued and the cost to 
rights (‘balancing’ or ‘proportionality in the narrow sense’)”.418 In other words, 
we could ask if the measure is suitable to achieve a legitimate aim. We could 
also ask if the measure is necessary to achieve the aim or are there less 
restrictive measures available for achieving the same aim?419 In spite of this, 
we should not forget, when talking about balancing, that each right has a core 
and essence that should never be infringed.420 If we take the ECtHR case law 
as our point of departure we can see that its problematic feature is the 
tendency of the court to put necessity and balancing into a single test even if 
academic society discerns them.421   
 
International human right obligations are also important in this respect. 
Regarding the requirement of compliance with human rights obligations, we 
only need to refer to the quintessential role of the ECHR and case law of the 
ECtHR in the EU law. This has been highlighted both in the Treaties as well as 
by the CJEU. The same goes for international human right obligations that 
form a part of the general principles of EU law as fundamental rights. In this 
connection, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) 
and the Human Right Committee's interpretation thereon is very important. 
When commenting on Article 52 of the EUCFR in relation to the permissible 
limitations emanating from the ECHR, the EU Network of Independent 
Experts refers to the explanations of the Presidency of the European 
Constitutional Convention. In this, the equivalence between the two systems 
                                                 
416 Sadurski Wojciech: ”Reasonableness” and Value Pluralism in Law and Politics. EUI Working 
Papers. LAW 2008/13. Department of Law 2008, p. 10. 
417 Rivers Julian: Proportionality and discretion in international and European law. In Tsagourias 
Nicholas (ed.): Transnational Constitutionalism. International and European Perspectives. Cambridge 
University Press. Cambridge 2007, p. 108. 
418 Ibid., p. 110. 
419 Eleftheriadis Pavlos: The Standing of states in the European Union. In Tsagourias Nicholas (ed.): 
Transnational Constitutionalism. International and European Perspectives. Cambridge University 
Press. Cambridge 2007, p. 60. 
420 Rivers, p. 111. 
421 Ibid., p. 111. 
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is highlighted.422 With regard to the drafting history of Article 52 (1), 
limitations to fundamental rights were only seldom a topics for discussions in 
the European Convention.423 Anderson and Murphy remind that the ECHR 
and the EUCFR texts have a technically different approach to dealing with 
limitations of fundamental rights. In the ECHR, the acceptable grounds for 
interference have been set out in individual Articles of the Convention, while 
the EUCFR contains a general provision for limitation, namely Article 52. The 
authors, however, deny the simplicity of a general derogation clause as “the 
effect of Article 52 (3) is to prohibit derogations on grounds other than those 
sanctioned in the ECHR”.424 In fact, Article 52 (1) of the Charter defining the 
permissible limitations to fundamental rights can be considered to be state-of-
the-art compared with the criteria stipulated in the ECHR. Paragraph 1 of the 
Article of the Charter is a well-developed provision because it sets out, in a very 
clear fashion, that any limitation of the rights of the Charter shall respect the 
essence of these rights. In its interpretation practice, the CJEU has further 
developed the core of this provision. 
 
As Scheinin notes, and basing his argument on General Comment 27, the law 
itself has to establish the conditions under which the rights may be limited. 
Moreover, the Human Rights Committee sets certain qualifications before a 
law becomes a proper instrument for the purpose of limiting a human right. 
Restrictions must not impair the essence of the right and furthermore, the 
relation between right and restriction, between norm and exception, must not 
be reversed.425 The ECtHR has established a step-wise test to review the 
requirement of "in accordance with law". First, the interference should 
obviously have some basis in domestic law. Second, these legal rules should be 
accessible and foreseeable. Finally, they should be in conformity with the 
Convention, including the general principles expressed or implied therein.426 
The general paradigms on permissible limitations to fundamental rights have 
also been developed in the general comments on the ICCPR. These dogmatic 
interpretations have been prepared by the Human Rights Committee of the 
                                                 
422 See Commentary of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. Article 52 by 
Olivier de Schutter. EU Network of Independent Experts, p.  398. In this commentary a reference has 
been made to the very illustrative statement of the Presidency of the Convention: “Le paragraphe 3 vise 
à assurer la cohérence nécessaire entre la Charte et la C.E.D.H. en posant la règle que, dans la mesure où 
les droits de la présente Charte correspondent également à des droits garantis par la C.E.D.H., leur sens 
et leur portée, y compris les limitations admises, sont les mêmes que ceux que prévoit la C.E.D.H. Il en 
résulte en particulier que le législateur, en fixant des limitations à ces droits, doit respecter les mêmes 
normes que celles fixées par le régime détaillé des limitations prévu dans la C.E.D.H., qui sont donc 
rendues applicables aux droits couverts par ce paragraphe, (Italics, KF) sans que cela porte atteinte à 
l’autonomie du droit de l’Union et de la Cour de justice de l’Union européenne”.  
423 Borowsky Martin: Kapitel VII Allgemeine Bestimmungen. In Meyer Jürgen (Hrsg.): Kommentar 
zur Charta der Grundrechte der Europäischen Union. Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft. Baden-Baden 2003, 
p. 578. 
424 According to Anderson and Murphy this leads to the practical need to have the ECHR text at 
hand when assessing the scope of the power to derogate from the rights that the EUCFR guarantees. See 
Anderson David and Murphy Cian: The Charter of Fundamental Rights: History and Prospects in Post-
Lisbon Europe. EUI Working Papers. LAW 2011/08.  Department of Law. European University Institute. 
Florence 2011, p. 7. 
425 Scheinin Martin: The Work of the Human Rights Committee under the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights and its Optional Protocol. In Hanski Raija and Scheinin Martin (compiled) 
second revised edition. Institute for Human Rights. Åbo 2007, p. 4. 
426 Lawson R.A. and Schermers H.G. (Compiled, edited and annotated): Leading cases of the European 
Court of Human Rights. Ars Aequi Libri. Nijmegen 1997. Comment on case Kruslin v France, p. 373. 
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UN, which is in an authoritative position to do so and hence illuminate the 
raison d'être of the ICCPR provisions.427 Especially interesting documents 
with regard to permissible limitations are related to the nature of the general 
legal obligation imposed on State Parties to the Covenant and general 
comment on the states of emergency provision of the Covenant. The first 
document on the legal obligations begins with the concept that obligations of 
the Covenant are binding on every State Party as a whole. According to the 
general comment "all branches of government (executive, legislative and 
judicial), and other public or governmental authorities, at whatever level - 
national, regional or local - are in a position to engage the responsibility of the 
State Party".428 This notion is generally very important and it clarifies the 
scope of the Covenant, whose binding nature does not only apply to the 
executive, but importantly from the perspective of this study to the legislative. 
 
Further to this, the general comment on Article 2 of the Covenant is 
especially interesting. Pursuant to the interpretation of the Human Rights 
Committee, the legal obligation under this provision is both negative and 
positive. Accordingly, States Parties must refrain from violations of the rights 
enshrined in the ICCPR and any restrictions of any of those rights must be 
permissible under the relevant provisions of the Covenant. The argumentation 
continues: "where such restrictions are made, States must demonstrate their 
necessity and only take such measures as are proportionate to the pursuance 
of legitimate aims in order to ensure continuous and effective protection of 
Covenant rights. In no case may the restrictions be applied or invoked in a 
manner that would impair the essence of a Covenant rights".429 This clearly 
raises the principles of proportionality and necessity to the very heart of 
limitation considerations. The Committee takes an even stricter line with 
regard to the essence of ICCPR rights and their restrictions. This is particularly 
noteworthy. Another important strand of interpretations on limitations can be 
found in the General comment No. 29 on the States of Emergency Article 4.430 
The Committee starts its deliberations by highlighting the importance of this 
provision for the whole system of protection for human rights as it lays down 
the option for unilateral derogation while placing the derogation and its 
consequences under a specific regime of safeguards.431 Secondly, the 
Committee underscores the exceptional and temporary nature of measures 
derogating from the provisions. In fact, there are two preconditions for 
                                                 
427 Human Rights Committee is composed of independent experts. The focus in its work is monitoring 
the implementation of ICCPR, examining the reports of the State Parties, presenting 
recommendations, considering inter-state complaints and according to the First optional protocol of 
the ICCPR to examine individual complaints. The preparation of general comments is also an 
important duty of the Committee. The Committee should not be confused with the UN Human Rights 
Council (until 2006 UN Human Rights Commission), which is based on the Charter of the United 
Nations. The Human Rights Committee is not a UN organ stricto sensu but a Treaty monitoring body, 
which is established by a Treaty in order to monitor the compliance of States Parties' obligations under 
this Treaty. Nowak Manfred: The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. In Hanski Raija 
and Suksi Markku: An Introduction to the International Protection of Human Rights. A Textbook. 
Second revised edition. Institute for Human Rights. Åbo 1999, p. 91. 
428 General comment No. 31. The Nature of the General Legal Obligation Imposed on the States 
Parties to the Covenant. Adopted on 29 March 2004, CCPR/C/21/Rev. 1/Add. 13, paragraph 4, p. 2. 
429 Ibid., paragraph 6, p. 3. 
430 General comment No. 29. States of Emergency (Article 4). Adopted on 31 August 2001. 
CCPR/C/21/Rev. 1/Add. 11. 
431 Ibid., paragraph 2, p. 2. 
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invoking Article 4, namely a public emergency which threatens the life of a 
nation and state of emergency must be officially proclaimed by the State Party. 
The Committee continues its stringent interpretation of Article 4 by stating 
that derogating from the Covenant is only allowed in case of an armed conflict 
if it constitutes a threat to the life of nation. The Committee has, on various 
occasions, expressed its concerns about derogations executed by State Parties 
in situations not falling within the scope of Article 4.432 
 
Yet another important issue is the fundamental requirement for any measures 
derogating from the Covenant that such measures are limited to the extent 
strictly required by the exigencies of the situation. According to the 
Committee, the obligation to limit any derogation to those strictly required by 
the exigencies of the situation reflects the principle of proportionality which is 
common to derogation.433 There is therefore a certain burden of proof laid on 
State Parties' derogating from Covenant obligations to demonstrate that their 
derogative measures are strictly required by the exigencies of the situation. It 
should be noted that proportionality has been an issue of major concern for 
the Committee when dealing with State Parties' reports. There are also 
elements for example in the right for non-discrimination that cannot be 
derogated from in any circumstances.434 Given this and other above-
mentioned interpretations, it is possible to conclude that also the ICCPR sets 
out a comprehensive legal framework for legitimate derogations that has to be 
taken duly into account by EU and national legislatures when dealing with 
permissible limitations to fundamental rights. 
 
Constitutional pluralism also derives from the EU, ECHR and international 
human rights systems in connection with limitation criteria. Generally, new 
constitutionalism can be characterized with independent and partly 
overlapping mandates of national and supranational institutions in individual 
right protection.435 In addition to relations between domestic institutions 
involved in rights protection, this also highlights the nexus between domestic 
and international institutions. Furthermore, it brings into play human rights 
as an international bill of rights and European constitutional pluralism in light 
of the current discussion about weak-form constitutionalism.436 The notion of 
such multilevel constitutionalism is nothing new in the field of constitutional 
law, but transferred to the context of the EU it refers to wide legal co-operative 
arrangements between different levels. Furthermore, it aims to reconcile 
between claims of the unity of EU's legal order and the existence of several 
political and legal authorities.437 According to Tuori "legal pluralism enters 
                                                 
432 Ibid., paragraph 3, p. 2. 
433 Ibid., paragraph 4, pp. 2-3. 
434 See ibid., paragraph 8, p. 4. 
435 Lavapuro Juha, Ojanen Tuomas and Scheinin Martin: Rights-based constitutionalism in Finland 
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437 Mutanen Anu:Towards a Pluralistic Constitutional Understanding of State Sovereignty in the 
European Union? The Concept, Regulation and Constitutional Practice of Sovereignty in Finland and 
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European legal space together with transnational law. Diversity turns into 
pluralism when state law's exclusive jurisdiction is challenged".438 This is 
exactly what has happened in the field of fundamental rights. In relation to 
constitutionalism and constitutional pluralism, it is very often the case that the 
focus has been set on the functioning of courts carrying out constitutional 
review and their interrelationships. Ex ante review of fundamental rights, 
however, should have its place in this discussion. Ex ante review is associated 
with constitutionalism and constitutional pluralism because it aims at 
reviewing the conformity of legislation with norms and case law of 
constitutional order and it involves several different actors carrying out this 
review. The importance of legislatures operating at different levels of the 
European constitutional review system should not be omitted as they have a 
lot to offer to the current debate on rights-based review taking place in the EU.  
 
 
2.1.2. Balancing fundamental rights in the legislative process? 
 
The criterion of proportionality can be regarded as a normative idea 
controlling all of the balancing steps in order to ensure the coherence, 
objectivity and certainty of the resulting judgments and decisions. The 
interconnection of balancing and proportionality is hence tight.439 The 
essential element in deliberations on proportionality has been reserved for 
balancing. When fundamental rights collide, balancing is a very useful tool. In 
this research, we analyze the ex ante review of fundamental rights and thus 
certain theories and practices used for examining the ex post review are poorly 
applicable to the preview phase of fundamental rights. This can be attributed 
to the fact that ex ante review is predominantly of an in abstracto nature and 
not in concreto. In this sense, especially the weighing and balancing doctrine 
that is used in ex post review entails some problems when used in the ex ante 
review.  
 
On the basis of international human rights conventions and the practice of 
their interpretation, Scheinin and Vermeulen have concluded that the 
essential content of any human right must always be respected within its scope 
of application.440 This brings us back to the previously discussed core of 
fundamental rights. In some cases there is simply no room for limitations or 
balancing. This is the case if it is possible to identify a non-derogable core of a 
fundamental right that makes balancing impossible. Balancing should not be 
seen as an all-encompassing approach but for it too there is a scope of 
application. The right to privacy is not a non-derogable right and hence subject 
to permissible limitations but according to Scheinin and Vermeulen the 
essential question is whether the right to privacy or human rights generally is 
                                                 
438 Tuori Kaarlo: European Constitutionalism. Cambridge University Press. Cambridge 2015, p. 88. 
See also interrelated discussion on European fundamental right pluralism and European security 
constitution by the same author. 
439 Valentini Chiara: The Reasonable Adjustment of Basic Liberties. Liberalism and Judicial 
Balancing. EUI Working Papers. Max Weber Programme. MWP 2009/36. European University 
Institute, p. 4. 
440 Scheinin Martin and Vermeulen Mathias: Unilateral exceptions to international law: Systematic 
legal analysis and critique of doctrines that seek to deny or reduce the applicability of human rights 
norms in the fight against terrorism. EUI Working Papers. Law 2010/08. Department of Law, p. 27. 
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just one factor in weighing and balancing or whether human rights law should 
be the framework for balancing through applying the test of permissible 
limitations and the requirement of proportionality in that process.441 
Similarly, certain dimensions of non-discrimination derive from Article 15 of 
the ECHR and Article 4 of ICCPR non-derogable human rights that shall be 
honoured also in the state of emergency, such as the state of war. In 
international law, the International Court of Justice has confirmed in some 
occasions the applicability of human rights law. This principle has been 
affirmed by the UN Human Rights Committee.442 Scheinin and Vermeulen 
have also raised the EP to the status of international actors, which emphasizes 
the positive relationship between human rights and security. In practical 
terms, this means that in addition to stressing the importance of the principle 
of freedom in the EU, the EP has underscored that security must be promoted 
in line with the rule of law and fundamental rights obligations.443 
 
Martin Scheinin has approached the issue of balancing in counter-
terrorism measures by building his arguments on theories of Ronald Dworkin 
and especially Robert Alexy whose distinction of legal norms between rules 
and principles can provide an angle to this question. Scheinin admits that 
treating fundamental rights as principles is well-founded mainly because of 
their close connection to morality and the often occurring need for weighing 
and balancing.444 Nevertheless, he considers that many constitutional and 
international norms concerning fundamental rights must be characterized as 
rules. In these cases involving rules with properly defined scopes of 
application, no balancing is needed nor allowed, and the rule applies in an all-
or-nothing fashion.445 
 
The critique of Scheinin on Alexy can be found in Alexy’s notion of 
fundamental rights operation as principles only. This approach adopted by 
Alexy derives from the practice of the German Constitutional Court and 
considers the weighing and balancing probably in overly optimistic terms.446 
Even human rights that are subject to permissible limitation “should be 
understood to include one or more ‘core’ elements within which a broader 
principle is crystallized as a rule that allows no limitations or ‘balancing’”.447 
For example, Tzanou has, in her study on the right of data protection in EU 
law enforcement, come to a conclusion in data protection that the ‘essential 
core’ of data protection can be identified and more importantly this ‘essential 
                                                 
441 Ibid. They also conclude that in this context ”a specific mistake in the use of balancing metaphor 
as a justification for states departing from their human rights obligations in the name of security relates 
to the extension of ’balancing’ to those human rights that do not allow for restrictions, or that are non-
derogable even in times of emergency”. 
442 Ibid., pp. 10-11. 
443 Ibid., p. 26. 
444 Scheinin Martin: Terrorism and the Pull of ‘Balancing’ in the Name of Security. In Scheinin 
Martin et al.: Law and Security. Facing the Dilemmas. EUI Working Papers. Law 2009/11. Department 
of Law of the European University Institute, p. 56. 
445 Ibid. 
446 Ibid., pp. 56-57. 
447 Ibid., p. 63. 
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core’ cannot be overridden.448 This is particularly important to comprehend in 
order to be able to identify core elements of fundamental rights in the selected 
EU legal initiatives. For this reason, the arguments in favour of weighing and 
balancing may not always be valid. This is true, also because we are not 
discussing in this study the ex post review exercised by the courts but ex ante 
review carried out by legislative and other organs. Similarly, many of the 
selected files are related somehow to anti-terrorism. In this way, the ideas of 
striking a new balance between security and rights become highly relevant.449 
As Scheinin puts it, in the era of global terrorism there is a risk of accepting 
too many compromises in the name of balancing.450 What is also important for 
this study is that the Commission has been active towards the ECtHR on 
balancing between the protection of needs of the individual and the security 
interests of the state.451 
 
 
2.2. Effects of fundamental rights 
 
The respect for human rights and some particular substantial fundamental 
rights have been highlighted as important values of the Union in Article 2 of 
the TEU.452 Article 6 of TEU is even more important and in this provision the 
key role of the EUCFR has been recognized. One should note, however, that in 
Article 6 it is also clearly provided that “the provisions of the Charter shall not 
extend in any way the competences of the Union as defined in the Treaties”.453 
Article 7 of TFEU sets out the important consistency requirement for EU 
policies. Moreover, provisions having general application also contain Articles 
directly linked with specific fundamental rights.454 If we take a very practical 
approach to the law-making process we can see that fundamental rights have 
always been present when discussing legislative dossiers. I believe that the 
EUCFR has had the value of popularizing and mainstreaming fundamental 
                                                 
448 See Tzanou, p. 362. According to Tzanou there is a core of data protection principles that must 
be ensured under all circumstances so that data protection can guarantee the dignity and autonomy of 
our personality when our personal data are processed. 
449 Scheinin 2009, p. 58. 
450 Ibid., p. 57. 
451 Ibid., p. 61. Scheinin refers to the Commission working document: The relationship between 
safeguarding internal security and complying with international protection obligations and instruments, 
5 December 2001. COM(2001) 743 final.  
452 According to Article 2 of the TEU: "The Union is founded on the values of respect for human 
dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights 
of persons belonging to minorities. These values are common to the Member States in a society in which 
pluralism, non-discrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity and equality between women and men 
prevail”. 
453 Article 6 of TEU. This means that competence has to be conferred by Treaty Articles and the 
Charter does not alter this situation i.e. it does not create new competences for the Union. This issue was 
a source of some legal arm-wrestling when the Treaty amendment was prepared but this was the 
outcome probably because the drafters of this provision considered it problematic to have an open-ended 
provision which may have led to unintended consequences for the Union competence. This kind of 
limitation of competence with regard to the scope of the Charter has been attributed to the Member 
States' reluctance. See Schneider Catherine: Menschenrechte und Übertragung der Souveränität auf die 
Europäische Union: Folgen für die Definition und Entwicklung der Menschenrechte. In Haller Gret, 
Günther Klaus, Neumann Ulfrid (Hg.): Menschenrechte und Volkssouveränität in Europa. Gerichte als 
Vormunde der Demokratie? Campus Verlag GmbH. Frankfurt am Main 2011, p. 218. 
454 Especially combating different forms of discrimination should be mentioned in this conjunction. 
Article 10 of TFEU hence highlights the prohibition of discrimination provided more extensively in 
Article 21 of the EUCFR. 
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rights among the drafters of especially sectorial EU legislation that at first 
glance does not seem to have direct connections to fundamental rights. That 
is, especially experts on other substantial issues than law. Around the 
negotiation tables of the EU, one can hear a growing number of references to 
fundamental rights, also in sectorial EU files and this is likely to be largely 
thanks to the Charter. 
 
The issue of competence is crucial when considering positive and negative 
aspects of fundamental rights in the EU context.455 Olivier de Schutter has 
meritoriously examined the EU fundamental rights vis-à-vis the issue of 
competence. As he correctly notes in the framework of the EU and the 
implementation of the EUCFR "fundamental rights appear not only as limits 
imposed from the outside to the exercise of powers which exist within this 
multilevel mode of governance, but they could also fulfill a positive role".456 
Hitherto, however, a defensive function of fundamental rights has been 
predominant, and the fear of transferring powers to the EU from Member 
States at the expense of protection of individuals in the national legal systems 
has been the key underlying factor. Therefore, fundamental rights have been 
utilized as checks on the exercise by the EU institutions of their powers.457 In 
brief, fundamental rights are regarded in the EU as limits, and not as a 
mandate to fulfil.458 In other words "fundamental rights are conceived of as 
external limits to the exercise of powers under EU law, rather than as 
objectives which the EU should seek to promote".459 This has resulted in the 
lack of incentives to develop fundamental rights beyond the minimal 
obligation to respect them.460 
 
The key in understanding the issue of competence is to comprehend Article 
51 of the Charter. The first point is that the Charter does not extend the scope 
of application of EU law beyond its current limits. Secondly, the adoption of 
the Charter should not be seen as issuing the EU with the new tasks of realizing 
the fundamental rights recognized in the Charter. The latter aspect suggests 
that the rights of the Charter have purely a defensive role to play.461 According 
to de Schutter, fundamental rights function as a shield: they rather restrict EU 
legislator than function as the objectives that the legislator should strive for.462 
The problem can also be deeper in the fundamental rights culture of the EU, 
                                                 
455 For the importance of competence in the EU fundamental rights policy see Weiler and Fries. The 
authors correctly question why the duty to observe fundamental rights fall on the CJEU and in some 
instances on the Member State courts but not on the political institutions of the Community of that time. 
For a good analysis on the division of competence and fundamental rights see also Eeckhout Piet: The 
EU Charter of Fundamental Rights and the Federal Question. 39 Common Market Law Review  945. 
2002. 
456 De Schutter Olivier: The Implementation of the EU Charter of Fundamental rights through the 
Open Method of Coordination. Jean Monnet Working Paper 07/04. NYU School of Law. New York 2004, 
p. 2. 
457 See ibid., p. 3. 
458 Ibid., p. 4. 
459 Ibid., p. 4. 
460 Ibid., p. 4. 
461 Ibid., p. 12. 
462 De Schutter Olivier: A New Direction for the Fundamental Rights Policy of the EU. REFGOV. 
Reflexive Governance in the Public Interest. Working paper series: REFGOV-FR-33. 2010, p. 10. 
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which despite positive developments, has focused more on limits to the EU 
action than promotion of fundamental rights.463 
 
On the other hand, deriving positive obligations from the Charter cannot 
be excluded. Promoting the application of rights enshrined in the Charter is of 
great importance in this respect.464 Indeed, this can be considered to be 
empowering phrasing, despite the clear limitations attached to it in terms of 
the limits of competences. In order to bridge the gap, de Schutter suggested 
some ten years ago the introduction of the open method of coordination in the 
realm of fundamental rights.465 This idea paving the way for a more 
comprehensive EU fundamental rights policy within the limits of competences 
is more than welcome.  
 
In the case of shared competence - i.e. where the Union does not possess 
exclusive competence - the Union may only act in conformity with the 
principles of subsidiarity and proportionality.466 Keeping in mind that most of 
the EU issues are matters of shared competence, especially the point about 
proportionality in the context of fundamental rights is paramount. There are 
historical reasons for considering fundamental rights as limits but despite this 
burden of the past, we should try to move beyond the limit-oriented perception 
of fundamental rights. Nothing in reality forbids the EU legislator to look at 
things from a pro fundamental rights point of view as long as it acts intra vires.  
 
 
2.2.1. Positive obligations 
 
As the ECtHR case Evans v the UK has shown, it is not easy to weigh and 
balance between positive and negative obligations.467 Let us now focus on the 
positive obligations under the European law, most notably the Charter. Article 
51 of the EUCFR sets important restrictions to the scope of application of the 
Charter. Above all, it contains the normative basis for the application of the 
Charter only when the addressees of the provision are implementing EU law. 
Moreover, this provision sets out that the Charter does not establish new 
powers or tasks for the Union nor extend the field of application beyond the 
powers of the EU. Article 51 therefore aims at consolidating the current 
                                                 
463 Ibid., p. 3.  
464 De Schutter 2004, p. 19. According to Article 51 (1) of the Charter "the provisions of this Charter 
are addressed to the institutions, bodies, offices and agencies of the Union with due regard for the 
principle of subsidiarity and to the Member States only when they are implementing Union law. They 
shall therefore respect the rights, observe the principles and promote the application thereof in 
accordance with their respective powers and respecting the limits of the powers of the Union as conferred 
on it in the Treaties". (italics, KF) 
465 De Schutter 2004, p. 39. According to him the spearhead of this initiative should be decreasing 
the tension between the "Economic Constitution" and the "Political Constitution" of Europe. James Tully 
presents interesting remarks on the systems of law beyond the state with a view to the preceding 
economically oriented  ius commercium and lex mercatoria regimes, which have had a significant 
impact on post-colonial world order.  See Tully James: Modern Constitutional Democracy and 
Imperialism. Osgoode Hall Law Journal 46, 3, 2008. 
466 De Schutter 2004, pp. 29-30. He furthermore considers that for example "the Schmidberger case 
exemplifies in that respect  that an examination of the proportionality of the restrictions imposed on the 
fundamental freedom of movement under the Treaty, where such restrictions are justified by the concern 
to protect fundamental rights, should not take the form of a strict examination of necessity", see p. 11. 
467 See ECtHR case Evans v the United Kingdom, application No. 6339/05, 10 April 2007. 
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division of competence and to hinder that any kind of new powers would be 
established for the Union. 
 
We should, however, analyze Article 51 paragraph 1 further: It is stated that 
“They (the addressees i.e. the institutions, bodies, offices and agencies as well 
as the Member States, KF) shall therefore respect the rights, observe the 
principles and promote the application thereof in accordance with their 
respective powers and respecting the limits of powers of the Union as 
conferred on it in the Treaties”.468  The most visible issue in this provision is 
the pursuit of preserving the division of competence that was already very high 
on the agenda of some Member States during the drafting phase of the Charter. 
 
Nevertheless, this provision can also be seen in light of establishing a 
positive obligation to the Union in terms of promoting fundamental rights.469 
This has to take place within the existing powers but it cannot be denied that 
such an obligation of positive nature exists. In practice, this positive obligation 
can be considered to also cover the legislative functions of the Union thus 
penetrating into the legislative process of the EU. This kind of wider 
interpretation of this provision is necessary in order to ensure a fuller 
realization of fundamental rights.  
 
EU institutions and bodies draw particular inspiration from the Charter 
also in relation to the promotion of fundamental rights. For example the 
Commission highlights its commitment to give a practical effect to the legally 
binding Charter and to foster a fundamental rights reflex in the preparatory 
phase of EU legislation. The role of other EU institutions, most notably the 
Council and the European Parliament, has also been underscored.470 Despite 
these intentions and objectives, we can still notice a certain fundamental rights 
deficit, especially in the Council proceeding when amendments are proposed 
to Commission legal initiatives. 
 
With regard to the pro-active approach to foster fundamental rights 
through the EU legislation, the Commission mentions some recent legislative 
proposals, including the EU data protection package, the Directive on 
improving the gender balance among non-executive directors of companies 
listed on stock-exchanges and related measures and the Directive on the right 
to information in criminal proceedings and the draft Anti-Counterfeiting 
Trade Agreement (ACTA).471 Interestingly, the role of the Commission in 
promoting fundamental rights in some of these legal dossiers is questionable. 
 
White and Ovey define the positive obligation in the context of the ECHR 
as follows: “Positive obligation is a label used to describe the circumstances in 
                                                 
468 Article 51 (1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. 
469 For the positive obligations in the Charter generally see Maduro Miguel Poiares: The Double 
Constitutional Life of the Charter of Fundamental Rights. In Eriksen Erik Oddvar, Fossum John Erik 
and Menéndez José Augustin (eds.): The Chartering of Europe. The European Charter of Fundamental 
Rights and its constitutional Implications. Nomos. Baden Baden 2003. 
470 See Report from the Commission to the European Parliament, the European Economic and Social 
Committee and the Committee of Regions. 2012 report on the application of the EU Charter of 
Fundamental Rights, COM (2013) 271 Final, 8.5.2013, p. 2. 
471Ibid., pp. 3-5. 
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which a Contracting Party is required to take action in order to secure to those 
within its jurisdiction the rights protected by the Convention”.472 The position 
of positive obligations in the ECHR human rights system is nowadays strong, 
even if the limits of such obligations can be quite obscure.473 White and Ovey 
take Article 2 of the Convention as an example. The right to life provision 
requires the Contracting Parties to take legal measures to put in place criminal 
sanctions for taking life but it is not clear at all if this provision extends to, say, 
health services and to what extent.474 
 
It was noted already before the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty and 
the subsequent change in the legal status of the Charter that it could impose a 
positive obligation on the EU institutions. The phrasing of the Charter 
suggests that the drafters wanted to keep this option open rather than restrict 
the institutions to purely act in the realm negative obligations of limiting 
fundamental rights.475 Indeed and especially in the post-Lisbon era of 
European constitutional law, this seems very logical and clear given the status 
of fundamental rights in the EU legal order. This is without prejudice to the 
extent of EU competence in the field of fundamental rights, which is a crucial 
question. 
 
We must nonetheless understand that there are certain restrictions for 
understanding the extent of positive obligation in a given file. To fully grasp 
the big picture, one would need to also follow up the legislation deriving from 
the basic act under scrutiny and ask how the positive obligation of the basic 
act has contributed to the realization of positive obligation in the secondary 
act. During the last few years this greater presence of the Charter has led 
particularly to empowerment of promotional aspects of fundamental rights in 
the EU legal texts. This has been concretized especially in the positions of the 
EP, the FRA and the EDPS. The EUCFR has also intensified discussion on the 
restriction of fundamental rights.  
 
 
2.2.2. Negative obligations 
 
When discussing the limitation of fundamental rights, Steve Peers makes a 
useful distinction between the ECHR approach and the EU approach. For the 
ECHR approach, he identifies three categories of limitations. The first 
limitation included rights, which are subject to express limitation on specific 
grounds and which are also necessary and proportionate. The second 
limitation contains the great variety of rights which are subject to limitations 
                                                 
472 White Robin C.A. and Ovey Clare: The European Convention on Human Rights. Fifth Edition. 
Oxford University Press. Oxford 2010, p. 100. 
473 Ibid. Perhaps the most exhaustive presentation on the positive obligation of the Contracting 
Parties to the Convention can be found in Mowbray A.: The Development of Positive Obligations under 
the European Convention on Human Rights by the European Court of Human Rights. Hart Publishing. 
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474 White and Ovey, p. 102. 
475 De Schutter Olivier: The Implementation of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights through the 
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in the state of war or other specified emergencies. The third limitation includes 
the non-derogable rights.476 The EU approach, then, has been according to 
Peers more open-ended as to limitations that have apparently been easier to 
pass. The CJEU has, however, taken a stricter line to limitations since the 
Schmidberger case. From this follows that the CJEU has been quite 
inconsistent regarding whether to use the ECHR standard or EU standard in 
the cases involving limitation.477 Some ten years ago, Peers found it necessary 
to go for a “higher standards” approach in the limitation of fundamental rights. 
He was clearly in favour of ensuring that the ECHR standard is being upheld 
when the ECHR rights are being applied. This opinion apparently advocates 
the ECHR standard.478 Nonetheless, the ECHR and the interpretation practice 
of the ECtHR are crucial for both dimensions of the analysis of the Charter, 
the promotion of fundamental rights and the limitation of fundamental 
rights.479  
 
Regarding permissible limitations to fundamental rights and the CJEU, 
some scholars argue that the court underscores that fundamental rights in 
conjunction with the EU are always relative and never absolute.480 Senden 
reminds us that the basic line of the CJEU can be seen especially in judgement 
in case Wachauf, in which restrictions are allowed if they meet certain 
limitation criteria and the core of the right is not affected.481 Already some ten 
years earlier in Hauer, the Luxembourg court chose a rather different track 
than its Strasbourg counterpart when it comes to limitations.482 
 
When assessing the limitation of fundamental rights, the issue of 
proportionality comes into play. The CJEU has to a great extent taken a stand 
on the proportionality in particular in Afton Chemical and Nelson and 
others.483 Another significant CJEU ruling came from the Sky Österreich 
                                                 
476 Peers Steve: Taking Rights Away? Limitations and Derogations. In Peers Steve and Ward Angela 
(eds.): The European Union Charter of Fundamental Rights. Hart Publishing. Oxford and Portland, 
Oregon 2004, p. 142. 
477 See Peers, p. 143 and p. 151. With inconsistency Peers means that the CJEU applies “Community 
limitation standards in some cases but the ECHR standard in others without any explanation offered”. 
478 Peers, pp. 178-179. Peers refers in particular to case Martinez and de Gaulle v. European 
Parliament, see T-222/99 R, 25.11.1999, Jean-Claude Martinez and Charles de Gaulle v. European 
Parliament. 
479 It is recalled that Article 52 (3) of EUCFR provides “In so far as this Charter contains rights which 
correspond to rights guaranteed by the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms, the meaning and scope of those rights shall be the same as those laid down by 
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rights of the ECHR to an important position when defining the rights and their scopes. 
480 Senden, p. 316. 
481 Ibid. and C-5/88 Wachauf. In ruling C-5/88 Wachauf the CJEU held that "the fundamental rights 
recognized by the court are not absolute, however, but must be considered in relation to their social 
function. Consequently, restrictions may be imposed on the exercise of those rights, in particular in the 
context of a common organization of a market, provided that those restrictions in fact correspond to 
objective of general interest pursued by the Community and do not constitute, with regard to the aim 
pursued, a disproportionate and intolerable interference, impairing the very substance of those rights". 
482 C-44-79 Hauer. 
483 C-343/09 Afton Chemical and Joined cases C-581/10 and 629/10 Nelson. In paragraph 71 of the 
latter case the CJEU held “The principle of proportionality, which is one of the general principles of EU 
law, requires that measures adopted by EU institutions do not exceed the limits of what is appropriate 
and necessary in order to attain the legitimate objectives pursued by the legislation in question; when 
there is a choice between several appropriate measures, recourse must be had to the least onerous, and 
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GmbH case. The issue for this case was balancing between the freedom to 
receive information and the freedom of the media against the freedom to 
conduct a business. In Sky Österreich GmbH, the CJEU ruled the case in 
favour public access to information.484 The freedom to conduct a business was 
hence limited and the CJEU found this limitation proportionate.485 On 
numerous other occasions, the CJEU has also taken a position on limitations 
under Article 52 (1) of the Charter.486  
 
When analyzing the Data Retention Directive, we must consider how the 
CJEU has conducted intrusion assessment. The CJEU judgment in case Digital 
Rights Ireland represents an example of fundamental rights review, which is 
based on a test of permissible limitations under Article 52 (1) of the Charter. It 
consists of three subsequent phases whereby the Court examined: 1) whether 
the directive falls within the scope of Articles 7, 8 and 11 of the Charter; 2) 
whether the directive constitutes an interference with the right to privacy and 
the right to protection of personal data; and 3) whether such interferences can 
be justified under Article 52 (1) of the Charter.487 To this effect, the CJEU 
confirmed that the scope of Articles covered the Directive. Furthermore, 
basing its arguments on case Österreichischer Rundfunk, the CJEU noted that 
retention of data derogates from the system of protection of the right to privacy 
as set out in Directives 95/46 and 2002/58. Moreover, the Court affirmed that 
interference with the right to privacy and the right data protection should be 
considered to be wide-ranging and particularly serious. The permissible 
limitation test was a key consideration of the Court when analyzing the 
interference with the rights to privacy and data protection. The spearhead in 
this assessment was proportionality, which was not respected by the EU 
legislator.488 
 
The SURVEILLE paper identifies five main issues, which lead to the CJEU 
conclusion that the EU legislator exceeded the limits of proportionality in the 
case of Data Retention Directive. First, the directive failed to set limits to the 
personal scope of application, i.e. it applies to persons with no proven links to 
serious crime. Second, the directive is too open for various interpretations 
regarding the legitimate objective of countering terrorism. Third, the directive 
failed to adequately limit the access of national authorities to the data retained 
                                                 
the disadvantages caused must not be disproportionate to the aims pursued (Joined Cases C-27/00 and 
C-122/00 Omega Air and Others [2002] ECR I-2569, paragraph 62, and Case C-504/04 
Agrarproduktion Staebelow [2006] ECR I-679, paragraph 35)”. 
484 C-283/11 Sky Österreich GmbH v Österreichischer Fundfunk, paragraphs 66-67. In practical 
terms the CJEU got involved of balancing situation between the rights guaranteed in Article 11 and 
Article 16 of the Charter.  
485 Ibid. See paragraph 67 in which it was stated that ”In those circumstances, the European Union 
legislature was lawfully entitled to impose the limitations on the freedom to conduct a business 
contained in  Article 15(6) of Directive 2010/13 in relation to holders of exclusive broadcasting rights 
and to consider that the disadvantages resulting from that provision are not disproportionate in light of 
the aims which it pursues and are such as to ensure a fair balance between the various rights and 
fundamental freedoms at issue in the case”. 
486 See C-129/14 Zoran Spasic, C-611/12 Giordano and C-314/12 UPC Telekabel Wien GmbH. 
487 SURVEILLE Paper Assessing Surveillance in the Context of Preventing a Terrorist Act, 
Surveillance: Ethical issues, legal limitations, and efficiency, FP7-SEC-2011-284725, Extract from 
SURVEILLE Deliverable D2.8: Update of 2.7. on the basis of input of other partners. Assessment of 
surveillance technologies and techniques applied in a terrorism prevention scenario, 29.5.2015, p. 38. 
488 See ibid., pp. 39-40. 
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by private companies. Fourth, the directive set the data retention period to 6 
months irrespectively of the nature of the data. Fifth, it lacked sufficient 
safeguards in relation to security and protection of data retained by private 
providers of electronic communications.489 Building on these shortcomings, 
the paper attaches importance to the conclusion of the Court on the lack of 
"clear and precise rules governing the extent of interference".490  
 
As for the limitation of fundamental rights under the ECHR, we should 
distinguish between Article 15 of the ECHR that provides on derogations to the 
ECHR in emergency situations and provision-specific limitations.491 Let us 
make a general observation: the ECHR does not contain a general approach to 
the limitation of rights it protects. Quite the contrary: it includes a number of 
techniques and in addition to restriction under Article 15 also other Provisions, 
most notably Articles 8-11, list limitations.492 
 
Limitations to the above-mentioned Articles contain one important general 
principle: only the limitations expressly authorized by the ECHR are 
allowed.493 What is significant in the activities of the ECtHR is how it deals 
with permissible limitations that Contracting Parties have put in place in 
relation to ECHR Articles. The Court will scrutinize if the limitation has been 
prescribed by law494 and whether the aim of the limitation is legitimate495. It 
also assesses if the limitation is necessary in a democratic society.496 In all this, 
proportionality has a key role to play.497 In the context of pluralism we also 
come across with the margin of appreciation doctrine. This is because 
proportionality has often been used as an indicator when analysing whether a 
Contracting Party has gone beyond its margin of appreciation. This doctrine 
has certainly fulfilled its task to protect value pluralism in the ECHR system of 
human rights protection.498  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
489 Ibid., p. 42. 
490 Ibid. 
491 See White and Ovey, pp. 112-126. For an overall presentation on the limitations to fundamental 
rights and the role of the ECtHR in this matter see, Viljanen Jukka: The European Court of Human 
Rights as a developer of the general doctrines of human rights law: a study of the limitation clauses of 
the European Convention on Human Rights. Tampere University Press, Tampere 2003. 
492 See White and Ovey, p. 308. 
493 Ibid., p. 310. 
494 See cases Sunday Times v United Kingdom 26.4.1979 (6538/74) 2 EHRR 245, Slivenko v Latvia 
9.10.2003 (48321/99) 39 EHRR 490 ECHR 2003-I, Leander v Sweden 26.3.1987 (9248/81) 9 EHRR 
433, Herczegfalvy v Austria 24.9.1992 (10553/83) and Ollila v Finland 30.6.1993 (18969/91). 
495 See case Nnyanzi v United Kingdom 8.4.2008 (21878/06) 47 EHHR 461. 
496 See cases Silver and others v United Kingdom 25.3.1983 (5947/72) 5 EHRR 347, Handyside v 
United Kingdom 7.12.1976 (5493/72) 1 EHRR 737 and Lingens v Austria 8.7.1986 (9815/82) 8 EHHR 
407. 
497 White and Ovey, p. 311. 
498 Ibid., p. 333. 
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PART TWO: EX ANTE REVIEW IN ACTION: 
SELECTED CASE STUDIES 
 
IV Case studies illustrating ex ante review in 
action     
 
1. The Method: Illuminating ex ante review of fundamental 
rights with legislative dossiers 
 
Ex ante review deals with how the pre-adoption phase control of 
fundamental rights functions in the EU legislative process. This is the applied 
and practical part of the study. In the selected, concrete legislative dossiers, I 
have applied the theory presented in Part I. A major part of the analysis has 
been devoted to concrete EU legal files entailing significant fundamental right 
elements and very often problems. Many of these legal dossiers fall within the 
AFSJ that quite often gives rise to sensitive issues from a fundamental rights 
point of view. There is also a cluster of EU legislative exercises related to the 
fundamental right of data protection. When analyzing concrete cases of EU 
law I have sought to reflect them against relevant legal research literature, 
which ranges from quite theoretically-oriented studies to practical legislative 
studies. The virtue in all of this can be found in facilitating the necessary 
dialogue between part I and part II of the dissertation. Without this necessary 
linkage, the study would run the risk of becoming an empty shell, thus isolating 
the theoretical and practical parts of the research. Clearly, an analytical-
descriptive research needs a theoretically focused background. My aim is to 
provide an insight into the assessment if ex ante review was executed in an 
optimal manner in each case. 
 
Conclusions will be drawn of ex ante review of fundamental rights at 
different levels. The experiences of this research journey have also inspired the 
presentation of some de lege ferenda conclusions and other operational 
findings and recommendations. I will outline some general conclusions on my 
notion of the impact of fundamental rights on the EU legislative process. I will 
ask whether the impact been merely cosmetic like, involving recitals that state 
that the legislative act is in line with fundamental rights, or has the impact 
been concrete, going all the way to the most important Articles in the 
legislation under preparation. I will also ask whether there have been some 
overwhelming legal conundrums with fundamental rights in the chosen 
legislative dossiers that have in the end remained unresolved. From an 
institutional angle I will present the question of how have opinions and 
statements of actors, such as FRA and the EDPS, led to changing texts in order 
to overcome serious fundamental right related problems? It is also important 
to ask if the EDPS and/or the FRA has pointed out that draft legal texts contain 
such severe fundamental right problems that these legal texts cannot be 
adopted at all or need at least far-reaching changes? We could moreover pose 
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the question of whether EU institutions have bona fide taken advantage of 
opinions of the FRA and the EDPS, or politically exploited them? 
 
A major part of this study consists of case analyses that aim to demonstrate 
how ex ante review at different levels functions in practice. The presentation 
focuses on both procedural and substantive analysis of the selected legal 
instruments. For the procedural aspects, it is interesting to note how 
legislative procedures have been carried out, what has been the role of 
different players in the law-making process and how much time these 
processes have consumed. As for Part I, the approach is process-oriented and 
all the cases will be dealt with in the chronological order of the EU legislative 
process. As for the more interesting dimension, namely the substantial one, it 
suffices to say here that a legal analysis will be provided when tackling the 
position of given fundamental rights in the relevant dossiers chosen for this 
study. Regarding violations of the constitution, Hans Kelsen distinguishes two 
categories of infringements. The first is related to the formal aspects of the 
legal instrument and the second to its contents.499 In these cases, the focus has 
been set on the latter aspect in the legislative process.  
 
The aim in the following presentation is thus to illustrate how different 
legal texts evolved and usually developed from a fundamental rights point of 
view. Furthermore, I will ask what was the role of different EU institutions in 
these processes. I will eventually draw some conclusions from an institutional 
angle and shed some light on the overall development of ex ante review in the 
EU legislative process. The following will be a three-tier analysis. It will first 
focus on the process. Secondly, it tackles the fundamental right relevant 
provisions. Proportionality and necessity play a central role. Thirdly, it 
identifies whether at issue is a negative obligation or a positive obligation of 
the legislator. Consequently, if limiting is at stake, then the test that seeks 
inspiration from the limitation Article 52 (1) of the Charter. The intention is to 
not delve too deeply into the hermeneutics of the texts but to offer a clear-cut 
analysis of lines taken by different stakeholders in these important 
fundamental right files. However, the objective of identifying the positions of 
institutions with regard to fundamental rights and possible changes in stances 
during the process requires quite detailed and descriptive presentation of each 
legislative file.  
 
 
2. Criteria for selecting the cases 
 
The following legislative initiatives share one common feature: a great 
majority of them fall within the scope of the former third pillar of the EU, now 
called the AFSJ.500 Furthermore, each of them contains an element of 
                                                 
499 Kelsen 2008, p. 8. Here Kelsen notes that ”Gesetze sollen nicht nur auf die vorgeschriebene Weise 
zustande kommen, sondern dürfen auch keinen Inhalt haben, welcher die Gleichheit, die Freiheit, das 
Eigentum usw. verletzt. Die Verfassung hat dann nicht nur den Charakter von Prozess- d.h. 
Verfahrensrecht, sondern auch den Charakter von materiellem Recht.“  
500 The Data Retention Directive is the most important exception as it was agreed before the Lisbon 
Treaty entered into force. What makes the Directive extremely significant is that it perfectly illustrates 
how ex ante review of fundamental rights can go wrong in the legislative phase. 
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particular fundamental rights sensitivity – in other words provisions that have 
caused concern from the point of view of one or more fundamental rights. With 
this, I refer especially to fundamental rights enshrined in the EUCFR and 
ECHR, but potential conflicts with fundamental rights set out in national 
constitutions of Member States are also of relevance in this context. Moreover, 
common characteristics of the cases of PNR, Security Scanners, ACTA and the 
Data Retention Directive also include the essential position of two 
fundamental rights, namely the right to data protection and the right to 
privacy. These cases will be analysed especially in relation to these substantive 
fundamental rights in light of the evolving legal texts and the interpretation 
practice of the CJEU and the ECtHR. As we can see later, these draft legal 
instruments constituted interference with these fundamental rights. 
 
The further this study progressed, the more I came to a conclusion that an 
especially important part of the analysis should focus on limiting fundamental 
rights. The key issue with the legislative dossiers has very often been a 
situation where certain fundamental rights are being limited, but there have 
been doubts whether these restrictions fulfil the basic requirements for 
limitations, i.e. to be provided with law, to be proportional and necessary in a 
democratic society, the respect for the essence of fundamental rights and so 
forth. I will also try to tackle this aspect relative to the legislative process and 
show how institutions involved in the ex ante review of EU legislation have 
executed it. These cases illustrate European constitutionalism in its pluralistic 
expression with the many actors carrying out ex ante review. 
 
Whether these interferences qualify as permissible limitations to 
fundamental rights as set out in the EUCFR, and as interpreted by the CJEU 
and the ECtHR, remains to be explored. I have therefore devoted a subchapter 
in the text to limiting fundamental rights under Article 52 of the EUCFR. Key 
questions that we must tackle are: Did interferences with fundamental rights 
occur in these legal files? How was this interference detected? How was the 
fulfilment of limitation criteria verified and what was the role of different 
institutions? Finally, we can ask what the impact of the eventual legal texts on 
fundamental rights was. Due to the emphasis set on ex ante review of 
fundamental rights in this study, I have closely followed the legislative process 
on these particular files and tried to identify how fundamental rights aspects 
have been dealt with by different institutions and stakeholders. I have tackled 
these dossiers in chronological order of the legislative process and analysed 
fundamental rights related positions and concerns of different institutions.  
 
Regarding the Commission, the main focus of the analysis has been quite 
naturally on its initial proposals for legislation. This is only one part of the 
Commission’s contribution in the law-making process, thus I have also studied 
impact assessments and explanatory memoranda that have accompanied the 
proposed legislative acts. I think that especially this phase is important 
because it is a way to look inside the Commission’s internal legislative and 
preparatory machinery. The status of fundamental rights considerations is 
central in the impact assessment. In spite of this glance inside the 
Commission, we should bear in mind that this is only the façade towards the 
outside world. It is impossible to illustrate the Commission’s internal decision-
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making process with all the changes made to the draft texts, in particular in 
the inter-service consultation phase and the level of chefs de cabinets and 
finally the college. This information is not publicly available. 
 
If we then turn to the Council, we must pay attention to the Council 
proceedings at the ministerial level. It would be useful to use to the full extent 
evolving drafts of the Council Working Groups and the Coreper, but 
unfortunately these texts are not always available. This being the case, we must 
mainly resort to public sources at our disposal that give hints and indications 
about how the Council as a whole dealt with – and to which directions it 
steered – the legislative proposals. In addition to only press releases, it is 
possible to follow the evolution of Council position and texts by analysing 
different Council documents that have been made publicly available. A 
practical problem for the researcher is the rather scarce availability of Council 
texts. Moreover, if texts are made available it is often the case that the most 
sensitive parts of the texts are deleted in order to preserve the confidential 
nature of Council proceedings with delicate topics.501 The council documents 
used in this study mainly consist of press releases, but most importantly of the 
different Council versions of legislative texts. By following the different 
Presidency compromise texts, it is possible to identify the changes made to the 
previous texts and hence pinpoint the way towards which the Council is 
heading in its position. 
 
In this context we should note the highly important EU discussion on public 
access to EU documents. The legal framework for public access has been set 
out in the EP and Council Regulation 1049/2001.502 The application of the 
Regulation by the Council has been inadequate, however, as public access has 
been quite restricted to, for example, details on the positions of delegations. 
To this effect, the CJEU took a historical position in its verdict in case Access 
Info Europe on 17 November 2013.503 This NGO had submitted a request for 
Council documents to the Council Secretariat, which provided the documents 
but did not disclose delegation details. The Council was against issuing the 
documents with all the relevant information and justified its stance with the 
derogation provision of the Regulation, namely Article 4(3). According to the 
Council, a detrimental effect to the decision-making process and sensitivity of 
the information were at issue. 
 
In the vivid discussion, the EP took a side with the NGO and positioned itself 
against the Council by interfering in the legal process. The General Court of 
the EU came out with a ruling on 22 March 2011 and ruled the case in favour 
of the Access Info Europe.504 The CJEU ruling C-280/11 in 2013 confirmed the 
interpretation of the General Court. This can be considered to be a real victory 
for transparency in the Council decision-making and the public access to 
                                                 
501 This inevitably leads to the situation where the somewhat sporadic selection of Council texts can 
only provide a partial picture of where the Council stood at a given time on a given outstanding issue. In 
this case, the researcher must do their best to try to collate the big picture from different sources. 
502 Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 2001 
regarding public access to European Parliament, Council and Commission documents. 
503 C-280/11 Council v Access Info Europe, 17 October 2013. 
504 T-233/09 Access Info Europe v Council, 22 March 2011. 
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information. In this case, an alliance between the EP and NGOs was formed 
that strove for greater transparency. Now the Council must open its processes 
to the public to a greater extent. Despite this, it remains somewhat unclear 
how the Council will in practical terms carry out the disclosure of the 
delegation information. Furthermore, this interesting strand of discussion has 
progressed as the handling of the recast of the Regulation on public access to 
information has continued since 2008 when the Commission presented its 
proposal for a recast in the context of the European Transparency Initiative.505 
In this discussion, a dividing line can also be seen between the EP and the 
EDPS on one hand, and the Council on the other hand. The Commission has 
also been criticized for a low level of ambition. 
 
I will base my arguments on EP resolutions and draft reports on draft legal 
instruments. I will argue that particularly the EP has raised significant 
fundamental rights concerns throughout legislative processes and sought to 
strengthen the ex ante review of EU legal acts. My further conclusion is as 
follows: I believe that especially the EP has extensively used expert opinions 
of the FRA and thus brought these views to the political discussion and hence 
all the way to the legislative process. It seems that EP was active in this field 
already before the change of the constitution framework, i.e. the Lisbon 
Treaty, and now with its role of the co-legislator also in the former third pillar 
matters it has taken an extremely high profile in fundamental rights 
protection. This has happened through the ex ante review of fundamental 
rights. From a general EU policy point of view, it is interesting that the EP 
position has often run counter to the Commission’s position. Therefore, there 
is no way of talking about the EP and the Commission “being in the same plot” 
seeking support from each other as is the case in many other policy areas. 
 
I also study the role of the FRA in the legislative process. It is somewhat 
early to analyse the impacts of the FRA on some key dossiers, but it seems that 
the FRA has taken a strong role, especially when it comes to exploring the 
impacts of draft legal texts on fundamental rights. The material used in this 
study suggests that the expert legal opinions of the FRA have often politically 
crystallized in the position of the EP in the legislative files. Therefore, one 
could say that the impact of the FRA has been both direct and indirect and we 
have a good reason to deal with the FRA as a key player occupying a rather 
neutral role in the EU legislative process. Finally, I should mention that yet 
another important stakeholder in legal cases associated with right to data 
protection and right to privacy is the EDPS. The scope of activity of the EDPS 
is more limited compared with the FRA, for example, but it has strong 
expertise in these special fields of European law and it also has clear authority 
even to impose its views also on the EU legislator in these special questions. 
The involvement of so many actors in this ex ante form of constitutional review 
                                                 
505 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council regarding public access 
to European Parliament, Council and Commission documents COM (2008) 229 final, 30 April 2008. 
After the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty the Commission presented a renewed proposal, see 
Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (EC) No 
1049/2001 regarding public access to European Parliament, Council and Commission documents 
COM(2011) 137 final 21 March 2011. 
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offers interesting practical insights into the development of European 
pluralistic constitutionalism.   
 
It would have been interesting to also study other topical fundamental right 
sensitive EU legislative cases, in particular the recent data protection reform 
package.506 This package was negotiated for quite some time and various 
issues with fundamental rights were debated at great length during the 
decision-making process.507 Tackling this set of new rules for data protection 
in the EU would require a dissertation focused entirely on this topic. Other 
topical cases of interest for the theme of this study falling under ordinary 
legislative procedure include directive on trafficking in human beings508 and 
the Eurodac regulation509, both important legislative files but beyond the 
practical reach of this dissertation.510 
 
It is essential to utilize mainly official documents of the EU and let them 
“speak with their own voice”. This illustrates, in its purest sense, the positions 
of the legislative institutions involved in the law-making process. The sources 
mainly consist of legislative proposals of the Commission and the related 
preparatory documents, such as impact assessments. When the Commission 
has presented its proposal, the legislative institutions, the Council and the EP 
for their positions on the initiatives and it is possible to follow-up how 
fundamental rights are treated in these positions. Furthermore, consultative 
bodies, FRA and EDPS, need to be heard during the process. All these 
documents can be characterized as EU preparatory documents, which do not 
have such legal status as preparatory works in some national legal systems. 
They are, however, important in terms of illuminating the positions of the 
institutions in relation to negative and positive obligations during different 
                                                 
506 For initial proposals see Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council 
on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement 
of such data (General Data Protection Regulation), COM(2012) 11 final, Brussels, 25.1.2012 and Proposal 
for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the protection of individuals with regard 
to the processing of personal data by competent authorities for the purposes of prevention, investigation, 
detection or prosecution of criminal offences or the execution of criminal penalties, and the free 
movement of such data, COM(2012), Brussels, 25.1.2012. 
507 It can be observed that especially the EP was a very active institution in promoting positive 
obligations in the texts during the negotiations. These positions often originated from the FRA.   
508 Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on preventing and 
combating trafficking in human beings and protecting victims, repealing Framework Decision 
2002/629/JHA. COM (2010) 95 final, 29 March 2010. For a concise overview of human trafficking set 
in the context of international human rights see Obokata Tom: Trafficking of Human Beings from a 
Human Rights Perspective. Towards a Holistic Approach. Martinus Nijhoff Publishers. Leiden 2006. 
509 Regulation (EU) NO 603/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 
on the establishment of Eurodac for the comparison of fingerprints for the effective application of 
Regulation (EU) No 604/2013 establishing the criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member 
State responsible for examining an application for international protection lodged in one of the Member 
States by a third-country national or a stateless person and on requests for the comparison with Eurodac 
data by Member States' law enforcement authorities and Europol for law enforcement purposes, and 
amending Regulation (EU) No 1077/2011 establishing a European Agency for the operational 
management of large-scale IT systems in the area of freedom, security and justice (recast), OJ L 180/1, 
29.6.2013. 
510 These three cases demonstrate the importance of ex ante review of fundamental rights in the EU. 
Also in these cases, the EP put a great deal of political pressure to the negotiations on taking a stronger 
view on fundamental rights in the dossiers concerned. FRA and EDPS positions were taken to the process 
mainly through the EP. 
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phases of law-making process. Research literature remains scarce on 
especially some of the files and, even if it exists, I have considered basing my 
findings on negative and positive obligations on the primary sources rather 
than second-hand sources important for the research theme.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 137 
V The case of Passenger Name Record 
 
From the angle of fundamental rights protection in the legislative phase, it 
is particularly interesting to shed some light on the case of Passenger Name 
Record (PNR). As a consequence of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the United States 
enacted stricter laws on data concerning airline passengers. In order to solve 
the contradiction between these requirements to access information and the 
EU data protection legislation, the Commission undertook negotiations with 
US authorities regarding the necessary requirements. This was followed by the 
Commission decision on the adequacy of data protection for such transfers.511 
The decision indicated that the Commission considered the level of US data 
protection to be sufficient.512 On the basis of this decision, the Council adopted 
the agreement of 17 May 2004 that enabled transfers of the data between the 
EC and the US.513 
 
The heart of the problem in this exercise seemed to be the adequacy criteria 
in the PNR agreements and the internal decision-making process of the EU. 
In the phase of concluding international PNR agreements, the EP was 
consulted but it did not issue an opinion within the required time limit. The 
EP, however, was dissatisfied with the content of the agreement and brought 
the case to the CJEU.514 The conclusion of the court was very clear: it held that 
adequate protection of the PNR data by the US was doubtful and considered 
that the legal basis of the instrument was incorrect because the essence fell 
under the then third pillar of the EU. The legal basis TEC 95 was not 
appropriate and the agreement furthermore was not within the scope of 
Directive 95/46/EC on data protection.515 Therefore, the CJEU held in its 
ruling of 2006 that the decision of the Council and the Commission had a third 
pillar dimension and could not have the Treaty Article on transport policy as 
the adequate legal basis. These decisions were thus declared null and void.516 
The judgment for its part contributed to the negotiation of a new agreement 
taking into account to a greater extent third pillar aspects of the issue.517 The 
guidance of the CJEU facilitated a later consensus on the need for interim PNR 
                                                 
511 Commission Decision 2004/535/EC of 14 May 2004 on the adequate protection of personal data 
contained in the passenger name record of air passengers transferred to the United States’ Bureau of 
Customs and Border protection, OJ L 235, 6.7.2004.  
512 De Hert Paul and de Schutter Bart: International Transfers of Data in the Field of JHA: The 
Lessons of Europol, PNR and Swift. See In Martenczuk Bernd and Van Servaas Thiel (eds.):  Justice, 
Liberty, Security: New challenges for EU external relations, VUB PRESS, Brussels University Press, 
Brussels 2008, pp. 326-327.De Hert and de Schutter offer a brisk outline of the earlier discussion and 
events in the margins of the PNR. 
513 See Council Decision 2004/496/EC on the Conclusion of an agreement between the European 
Community and the US on the processing and transfer of PNR (”Passenger Name Records”) data, OJL L 
183, 20.5.2004. 
514 Faull Jonathan: The Role of the European Commission in Tackling Terrorism: the Example of 
Passenger Name Records. In Arnull Anthony, Barnard Catherine, Dougan Michael, Spaventa Eleanor 
(Eds.): A Constitutional Order of States? Essays in EU Law in Honour of Alan Dashwood. Hart 
Publishing. Oxford and Portland, Oregon 2011, pp. 614-615. 
515 See Joined Cases C-317/04 and C-318/04 Parliament v Council. 
516 De Hert and de Schutter, p. 328. For CJEU judgment see Joined Cases C-317/04 and C-318/04 
European Parliament v Council and the Commission. 
517 The view of the EP on the new agreement was also predominantly negative, see Resolution P6-
_TA(2007)0347, 12.7.2007. 
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agreement that provided a way out of this problem.518 After this, the upcoming 
Treaty changes were to mould the external aspects and required new 
agreements of the PNR significantly. The case of the PNR can hence be 
regarded as falling within the category of cases that in the pre-Lisbon era had 
a close connection to both the Community pillar and the third pillar. These 
files were extremely complex because they were usually problematic in terms 
of legal basis. Consequently, problems directly linked with competence 
loomed large and this gave rise to inter-institutional tugs-of-war. It certainly 
made a difference if a given file was deemed to be derived from the Community 
pillar or the third pillar. Nowadays, when the pillar division no longer exists, 
the Commission and above all the EP can be identified as the winners. This is 
also the case in such sensitive areas as personal data having a policy goal of a 
sectorial policy area on the one hand, but having implications on the matters 
covered by the current AFSJ on the other hand. It is also clear that the CJEU 
now has competence to interpret issues covered by the former third pillar. 
 
The interesting common feature in both data protection and privacy is that 
these rights are not absolute and are subject to restrictions under certain 
conditions. Firstly, restrictions must be provided by law. Secondly, restrictions 
must pursue a legitimate aim. Thirdly, restrictions must be necessary in a 
democratic society. Fourthly, restrictions must conform to the principle of 
proportionality. Fifthly and finally, restrictions must respect the essence of the 
right to data protection.519 This list can be derived from Article 52 of the 
EUCFR and the general principles behind limiting fundamental rights. As will 
become evident later, this list will be important for analyzing the impact of 
provisions of the proposed PNR instruments on the core fundamental rights 
enshrined in the EUCFR. 
 
For the 2007 PNR agreement, the compliance with “provided by law”-
requirement is very questionable. This is because the agreement consists of 
three documents, which are the agreement itself, a letter by US authorities 
(Department of Homeland Security, DHS) and the EU response letter to the 
DHS letter. These letters contain interpretation and assurances on the use of 
PNR and cannot be considered to fulfill requirements of Article 52 (1), nor to 
be in line with interpretation practice of the ECtHR. This is also because of the 
lack of foreseeability and accessibility of individuals to the legal basis. 
Moreover, legal certainty can hardly be provided by issuing such letters on the 
interpretation of the agreement.520 
 
In the case of PNR, it is possible to identify various misgivings presented 
by different institutions and stakeholders when it comes to the necessity of the 
PNR. This applies to the EDPS, the EP and Article 29 Working Party that 
voiced doubts about the necessity of the PNR system in the EU.521 
Effectiveness of the system is of key importance when evaluating the necessity 
of the PNR. Then another issue to be considered is whether there are other less 
                                                 
518 For the legislative solutions adopted in 2006 see De Hert and de Schutter, p. 330. 
519 Tzanou, p. 67. 
520 Ibid., p. 297. 
521 Ibid., p. 298. 
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extensive alternatives available.522 In relation to profiling, we can hardly 
justify it from the perspective of necessity.523 This is the case even if generally 
the wide margin of appreciation-doctrine of the ECtHR in national security 
and counter-terrorism issues is a well-established fact. According to Lohse, 
terrorist profiling that builds on the criteria of ethnic or national origin, or 
equally on religion, is not only problematic in relation to the right to private 
life, right to data protection, equal treatment and non-discrimination, but also 
because it is inefficient.524 It is obvious that evaluating the necessity of a given 
legal measure in the democratic society is a primary task of the courts. 
Nevertheless, I think that it is important to assess the fulfillment of this 
requirement also in the legislative process. The European legislator should 
bear this issue in mind especially when “making holes to the fundamental 
rights” in the course of law-making process. That is why I believe that it is 
particularly important for parliamentary bodies to have a say ex ante in the 
legislative process. Restrictions to fundamental rights do not come into 
existence ex nihilo – there is always a political purpose behind it and it is 
necessary that the legislator takes a stronger role in this ex ante review of 
fundamental rights. 
 
At this stage, a distinction between external and internal dimensions of the 
PNR should be made, although these are interlinked. The external part has to 
do with PNR agreements with third countries, most notably the US and the EU 
decisions on their approval. Internal dimensions on the other hand deal with 
internal EU legislation on PNR. Meanwhile, the relative position of Member 
States has been weakened. In this context, we should keep in mind that there 
is a strong interface with third countries also in the internal EU legislation in 
this particular file. 
 
1. Internal aspects of the PNR: PNR proposal of 2007 
 
A good example of ex ante review in action in the EU legislative process is 
the passenger name record. This controversial legislative dossier consisted of 
the proposal for a Council Framework Decision on the use of Passenger Name 
Record (PNR) data for law enforcement purposes.525 The aim of the 
Commission was to enable the use of commercial passenger data for counter-
terrorism purposes. Because only a limited number of Member States had 
taken into use the mechanism to oblige air carriers to provide relevant PNR 
data and to have it analysed for anti-crime and anti-terrorist purposes, the 
Commission found it useful to have a common EU approach in this area. The 
proposal also had a strong external dimension because of its links to the 
exchange of information with third countries. The proposal of the Commission 
                                                 
522 Ibid., p. 299. 
523 Profiling generally refers to a systematic association of sets of physical, behavioral or 
psychological characteristics with their use as a basis for making law-enforcement decisions. For 
discussion on profiling see Tzanou, p. 310 and Lohse Mikael: Terrorismirikoksen valmistelu ja 
edistäminen. Suomalainen lakimiesyhdistys. Helsinki 2012, pp. 221-224. 
524 Lohse, p. 222. 
525 Proposal for a Council Framework Decision on the use of Passenger Name Record (PNR) for law 
enforcement purposes. COM (2007) 654 final, 6.11.2007. 
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passed the scrutiny of the IAB with some requests for changes and was 
published on 6 November 2007.526  
 
The most important argument behind the PNR proposal was the added 
value of the use of PNR data in combating terrorism. For authorities, PNR data 
was considered essential because it offered a good way to identify risky persons 
and to take appropriate measures. The Commission also justified the proposal 
with the fact that only a limited number of Member States at the time had put 
in place PNR mechanisms.527 It is therefore clear that the Commission wanted 
to avoid the situation where Member States would choose different 
approaches to PNR which would lead to unpredictable and scattered legal 
framework within the Union. The Commission hence saw harmonization as 
the way forward. The political push was also evident in the background. Most 
importantly, the European Council had in its conclusions of March 2004 called 
for the Commission to make a proposal for a common approach to the use of 
passengers’ data for law enforcement purposes.528 This invitation was 
reiterated twice at the highest political level in November 2004 in the Hague 
programme and the extraordinary Council meeting of 13 July 2005. Political 
soil was prepared already in the Commission’s Communication “Transfer of 
air passenger name record data: a global approach of 16 December 2003”.529 
 
In the explanatory memorandum accompanying the proposal, the 
Commission tried to reassure that the proposal is fully in line with the 
objective of creating a European AFSJ and that it complies with fundamental 
rights provisions. Furthermore, the fundamental rights ranging from 
protection of personal data to protection of privacy of persons were 
identified.530 The proposed legal instrument for PNR was a Council 
Framework Decision.531 We can see that in this initiative, the particularly 
alarming element from the point of view fundamental rights was its clear 
connection with the core of protection of personal data. This is safeguarded 
both in the ECHR and the EUCFR, as well as in differing ways in Member 
States’ constitutions. What was striking in the Commission’s proposal was 
almost total omission of fundamental rights aspects of the proposed piece of 
legislation. There was a real flaw, or even a black hole, in the analysis of 
fundamental rights in the impact assessment that accompanied the 
                                                 
526 See Avis du Comité des Evaluations d’Impact. Council Framework Decision on the use of 
Passenger name record (PNR) for law enforcement purposes. SEC(2007) 1457, In its opinion the IAB 
recommended however that “the IA report should be further improved by better illustrating the risk of 
no EU action, by explaining in more detail the choices made in shaping and selecting the preferred policy 
option, and by elaborating on the consequences for relations with third countries”. The responsible 
Directorate-General agreed to amend the IA report on these points. 
527 Explanatory memorandum, p. 12. 
528 Brussels European Council Conclusions of 25 and 26 March 2004. 9048/04. Brussels 19.5.2004. 
This request was made in the annexed Declaration on combating terrorism. 
529 See Communication from the Commission to the Council and the Parliament. Transfer of Air 
Passenger Name Record (PNR) data: A Global Approach. COM(2003) 826 final, Brussels 16.12.2003. 
530 See explanatory memorandum, p. 3. 
531 Council Framework Decision was very much a Directive-like instrument that was used in third 
pillar matters in the pre-Lisbon times. Similarly to Directives, Framework Decisions had to be 
implemented by the Member States within the provided timeframe and obligations were addressed to 
Member States. The legal basis of the proposal consisted of Article 29, Article 30 (1) (b) and Article 34 
(2) (b) of TEU. 
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proposal.532 As requested by the IAB, the Commission introduced some 
changes to the final impact assessment on the basis of recommendations but 
these were not considerably relevant from the point of view of fundamental 
rights.533 The Commission did emphasize in the impact assessment, and also 
in the argumentation of the explanatory memorandum, that terrorism is one 
of the greatest threats to security, peace, stability democracy and fundamental 
rights – the basic values of the European Union.534 Despite this general 
approach, safeguards for fundamental rights were not in place when 
substantial provisions of the legal text were outlined. This can be detected, for 
example, in the chapter of the impact assessment concerning respect for 
fundamental rights that did screen the affected fundamental rights set out in 
the ECHR and the EUCFR, but very strongly emphasized the limitation aspect 
of these rights on national security and public safety grounds. The Commission 
nevertheless underscored the need of these limitations to be proportionate, 
necessary in a democratic society and in accordance with law. The Commission 
finally considered that the proposed actions aim to combat terrorism and 
organized crime, and they hence come under the umbrella of these 
exceptions.535 In the explanatory memorandum of the proposal, fundamental 
rights were addressed simply by stating that “it (the proposal, KF) also 
complies with fundamental rights provisions, particularly with respect to the 
protection of personal data and the privacy of the persons concerned”.536 One 
could well say that counter-terrorism endeavours prevailed over fundamental 
rights in this proposal.  
 
The PNR proposal was accompanied with an impact assessment. The 
assessment had undergone the scrutiny of the IAB on 5 September 2007 and 
consequently an opinion of the IAB was issued on the first draft of the IA. The 
IAB found the IA insufficient due to inadequate handling of the preferred 
policy option, explaining the limitation to of the scope to extra-EU flights, 
elaborating the impacts on relations with third countries and eventually 
illustrating the risk of divergent national measures.537 As a result of the 
opinion, a re-drafted impact assessment came out on 6 November – so it took 
the Commission two months to provide an IA, taking into account the remarks 
of the IAB. 
 
In the IA, the Commission explained the method of consultation of 
stakeholders and the results. The key issue in IAs is the choice of policy option. 
The big decision to be made is always whether to go down the legislative road 
or not. In the IA, the Commission stated that most of the Member States were 
clearly in favour of a legislative instrument. What is striking here is the fact 
                                                 
532 Commission staff working document. Accompanying document to the proposal for a Council 
Framework Decision on the use of Passenger Name Record (PNR) for law enforcement purposes. Impact 
assessment. SEC(2007) 1453, Brussels 6.11.2007. 
533 See impact assessment 2007, p. 3. 
534 Ibid., p. 7. 
535 Ibid., p. 14. 
536 See explanatory memorandum of the above mentioned proposal, p. 3. 
537 Commission Staff working document accompanying document to the Proposal for a Council 
Framework Decision on the use of Passenger Name Record (PNR) for law enforcement purposes. Impact 
assessment. SEC(2007) 1453, Brussels 6.11.2007. p. 3. 
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that the Article 29 Working Party was against the proposal.538 From this, one 
can sense the upcoming sensitivity and difficulties related to the Framework 
Decision. Regarding the problem definition, the Commission considered that 
the terrorism and organized crime constitute one of the greatest threats to 
security, peace, stability, democracy and fundamental rights. PNR data was 
regarded as a useful tool to fight terrorism and organized crime and therefore 
the objective of the IA was to assess whether there is a need for a legislative 
proposal setting the framework for the use of PNR data.539 In the background, 
the question was always about harmonization at the EU level. This is because 
the Commission found in the IA that the most problematic issues with the 
current situation was the insufficient access of law enforcement authorities to 
passenger information, the diverging legal requirements for PNR in different 
Member States that put at risk legal certainty, the risk of being unable to 
manage the growing number of travellers and the lack of EU position that may 
be useful with regard to international dimensions of the PNR. Most 
interestingly, the Commission held that the prevailing situation was also a risk 
to the protection of citizens’ fundamental rights, in particular to privacy, if the 
exchange of PNR takes place on the basis of incompatible systems.540 This was 
yet another argument in favour of a harmonized approach. 
 
The IA included a separate sub-chapter focusing on the respect of 
fundamental rights. In this part of the text it was stated that the purpose of the 
measure was to ensure the right of European citizens to enjoy all their 
fundamental rights. The right to life and physical integrity were particularly 
mentioned.541 The Commission concluded that the proposed actions involved 
the collection, processing, exchange and the use of personal data of travelling 
citizens. The Commission found that they might as such interfere with the 
right to the protection of family life and the protection of personal data. Hence, 
Articles 7 and 8 of the EUCFR and Article 8 of the ECHR were concerned.542  
 
The Commission very much underlined in the IA that these fundamental 
rights are subject to limitations,  in accordance with Article 52 of the EUCFR. 
The Commission drew the attention to the possibility of limiting these 
fundamental rights, which are not of absolute nature. More specifically, the 
necessity for these exceptions was justified with “the interest of national 
security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the 
protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms 
of others”.543 These grounds are subject to be in accordance with law and 
necessary in a democratic society. The Commission went on trying to vindicate 
that fighting terrorism and organized crime would count as justified 
exceptions, but interference with fundamental rights would need to be 
considered against the principle of proportionality.544 Eventually, the 
Commission introduced a list of the minimum PNR data elements to be used 
                                                 
538 Ibid., p. 5. 
539 Ibid., p. 7. 
540 Ibid., pp. 11-12. 
541 Ibid., p. 13. 
542 Ibid., p. 14. 
543 Ibid. 
544 Ibid. 
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by competent authorities. Probably the biggest shortcoming in the 
Commission’s IA was the fact that it lacked analysis on substantial 
fundamental rights of the PNR proposal vis-à-vis relevant provisions of the 
EUCFR and ECHR. Nor did the Commission analyse the substance of the 
proposal in depth from the perspective of necessity. No proportionality test 
was carried out either. This sub-chapter contained only some slight weighing 
and balancing between various fundamental rights. This weighing and 
balancing was not properly done. Taking all of this into account, one may think 
that for the Commission, the fight against terrorism and organized crime was 
some kind of super-reason to limit fundamental rights that would an sich 
justify restriction to these constitutional rights. 
 
The IA also contained a chapter on the objectives of the proposal. Here the 
Commission named the right to privacy and the protection of fundamental 
rights as one of the objectives.545 In defining more accurate policy objectives, 
the Commission mitigated this basic principle considerably. This was achieved 
by speaking about “protecting citizens’ fundamental rights, in particular right 
to privacy, while recognizing the need for a wider sharing of relevant personal 
data for law enforcement purposes”.546 The latter change in the Commission’s 
emphasis constituted a visible departure from the outset of protecting 
fundamental rights, notably right to privacy. As we can see later in the analysis 
of the legal text, sharing of personal data for law enforcement purposes 
prevailed. As always for impact assessments, the Commission presented an 
analysis of the policy options under consideration. In the case of PNR, two 
alternative approaches were tackled. Firstly, there is always a business-as-
usual scenario. This means that no action will be taken and that one sticks to 
the existing legislative framework. In this case, the only relevant piece of EU 
legislation would have been Council Directive 2204/8/EC on the obligation to 
carriers to communicate passenger data for the purposes of border control.547 
At the outset, the Commission found that this scenario would not entail solving 
the issue of exchange of PNR information for combating terrorism and 
organized crime. According to the Commission, this might lead to different 
Member States enacting different PNR data rules. Similarly, Member States 
might agree with third countries to exchange such data.548 First and foremost, 
the deepest fear of the Commission was probably that this development would 
result in fragmentation of the European PNR regime. It is often the case that 
in similar circumstances the Commission proposes harmonization as the 
remedy. Minimum standards are often utilized for the containment of 
fragmentation and to hinder the fall of the dominoes in the face of Member 
States introducing national systems of their own. 
 
For the “no action” policy, the Commission pinpointed that it has a 
detrimental impact on the ability of the EU to fight terrorism and organized 
crime and therefore affect European citizens’ security.549 Already in the impact 
assessment phase, it was the security and vulnerability of the citizens’ that was 
                                                 
545 Ibid., p. 15. 
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547 Data are commonly known as Advance Passenger Information (API) data. 
548 Ibid., p. 16. 
549 Ibid., p. 18. 
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to a great extent underscored in the face of no action and diverging national 
PNR systems that might lead to “lowest standard shopping” by the criminals. 
The Commission very rightly stated in the IA that “no action” policy would 
mean that the right of privacy would not be interfered with at the EU level. 
Member States would continue to use and develop systems of their own. 
Finally the Commission drew the attention to Article 29 Working Party on 
Data Protection reply according to which in case Member States start 
implementing national measures, then it would be necessary to have a 
harmonized action. The Commission argued that the impact of no action on 
protection of data was zero. What is quite astonishing is that the impact of a 
legislative proposal covering air travel with a decentralized collection of data 
was estimated to provide in this scale twice a higher level of protection of 
privacy.550 
 
Let us then go into the second policy option that was eventually chosen: the 
introduction of a legislative proposal covering air travel with decentralized 
collection of data. This option was all about establishing a passenger 
information unit to which air carriers would be obliged to transmit PNR data. 
These data then filtered out of sensitive and non-required PNR elements. The 
unit would then after processing and filtering of the data transmit it to relevant 
law enforcement authorities of its own Member State and to the corresponding 
units of other Member States.551 The Commission was convinced that this 
would enhance significantly the security in the EU and deliver the aimed 
objectives. For the above-mentioned protection of privacy aspects, the 
Commission found that decentralized collection of data inherent in the 
legislative proposal and therefore the majority of remaining of data in one 
Member State would mean less interference with the right of privacy, while 
only the PNR data of identified high-risk passengers would be transmitted to 
other Member States. This would also serve the purpose of ensuring 
proportionality in interferences with fundamental rights. The Commission 
also reassured that safeguard clauses would be inserted in the legal text as for 
the rights of access and correction, limited periods of retention, measures to 
safeguard data security and clear purpose limitations.552 
 
A third option was also present in the Commission’s IA. It was the 
alternative of introducing a legislative proposal covering air travel with a 
centralized collection of data. The biggest difference compared with the 
previous option was the novelty of obliging air carriers to submit PNR data to 
a centralized unit at the EU level.553 According to the Commission, it would 
not be necessary to establish a new body to perform these functions as for 
example Europol could carry out these tasks. This policy option was 
considered useful from the point of view of increasing security and especially 
the centralized aspect of collection of data was deemed to be positive because 
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551 Ibid., p. 20. 
552 Ibid., p. 21. 
553 Ibid., p. 23. 
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of ensuring application of common criteria. The protection of privacy was 
considered to be at a very high level in this option.554  
 
When comparing the options in the IA, it became evident for the 
Commission that a business-as-usual scenario was out of the question. The 
Commission estimated that going for this option would entail a risk of 
diverging national systems, the increased costs of compliance and also risking 
the protection of privacy.555 Hence, the Commission found that a legislative 
proposal was the preferred option. Of the two remaining alternative legislative 
approaches, the Commission preferred the decentralized one. The 
Commission obviously had underlying misgivings about very practical issues 
of the centralized system, i.e. how to ensure co-operation between Member 
States and would the system be manageable and operable?556 Now, when we 
concentrate on the proposed PNR framework decision, we can see that the 
PNR data that was suggested to be transmitted was almost identical with the 
categories listed in the EU-US agreement.557 One can therefore see the 
inextricable link of the external dimension of the PNR to the internal 
dimension. The underlying reason for striving towards such an internal 
arrangement was probably the need to be the moral leader in the anti-terrorist 
measures with a high respect to human rights standards, but we should not 
omit the need for reciprocity in internal considerations.558 
 
Article 8 of the proposed Framework Decision dealt with the transfer of 
data to third countries. In its paragraph 1, it was stated that PNR data may be 
provided by a Member State to law enforcement authorities of third countries 
only if the Member State is satisfied that two conditions are met. The first 
precondition was that the authorities of third countries shall only use the data 
for the purpose of fighting terrorism and organized crime. The second 
prerequisite was about the prohibition of a third country to transfer the data 
to another third country without the express consent of the Member State.559 
These are good preconditions for fundamental rights, but it raises especially 
one major doubt in the practical sense of the implementation of this provision. 
One can well ask how to ensure that the third country concerned complies with 
these requirements when using the data and considering their transfer. There 
is simply no way of ensuring that this happens and unfortunately this makes 
the whole provision very questionable from the fundamental rights point of 
view. The whole chapter III of the proposal concerned the protection of 
personal data. Paragraph 1 of Article 11 established a link to Council 
Framework Decision on the Protection of Personal Data within the frame of 
police and judicial co-operation. Pursuant to this provision, Member States 
were obliged to ensure that this legal instrument, that was still under 
negotiation, also applied to PNR Framework Decision thus making the general 
Framework Decision lex generalis and the PNR Framework Decision lex 
specialis. 
                                                 
554 Ibid., pp. 23-24. 
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557 Tzanou, p. 277. For further similarities of the internal and external systems, see ibid., p. 279. 
558 Ibid., p. 278 and 281. 
559 See Article 8 (1) of the draft PNR Framework Decision. 
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Paragraph 2 aimed at limiting the scope of the use of data by setting out 
that the data was to be exclusively processed for the purposes of the 
prevention, detection, investigation and prosecution of terrorist offences and 
organized crime. What is interesting, is paragraph 3 of this draft legal 
instrument. This provision enshrined the prohibition addressed to Passenger 
Information Units and the competent authorities of the Member States to take 
enforcement action only by a reason of the automated processing of PNR data 
or by a reason of a person’s race or ethnic origin, religious or philosophical 
belief, political opinion or sexual orientation. With this provision, the 
Commission obviously tried to put the text in line with Article 21 of the 
EUCFR. This provision did not change the situation in practice, however, 
because the problematic annex related to Article was present in the text. This 
annex contained exactly these elements. 
 
In the proposed legal act itself, fundamental rights were touched directly 
upon by the drafters in the following way. Firstly, in the proposed recital 18 
the Commission stated that contents of lists of required PNR data should 
reflect an appropriate balance between the legitimate requirements of public 
authorities to prevent terrorist offences and organized crime and the 
protection of fundamental rights of citizens, in particular privacy. The text of 
the recital went on by stating that the “list should not contain any personal 
data that could reveal racial or ethnic origin, political opinions, religious or 
philosophical beliefs, trade-union membership or data concerning health or 
sex life of the individual concerned”.560 The purpose of the recitals in the EU 
legal instruments is that of providing help to interpretation of the related 
Article of the text and explaining the rationale of these provisions. As for their 
legal force, they are more or less aspirational but can function as an aid to 
interpretation when considering what the draftsmen meant. In this recital the 
objective was apparently to exclude the possibility of the lists being in breach 
with fundamental rights. The idea was obviously to especially address Articles 
7 – respect for private life – and Article 21 – the prohibition of discrimination 
– of the EUCFR.  
 
Similarly, recital 20 raised to consciousness the principle of data protection 
and the need to avoid enforcement actions on the basis of automated 
processing PNR data or by reason of a person’s race or ethnic origin, religious 
or philosophical belief, political opinion or sexual orientation.561 Again, by 
means of trying to convince that one can rest assured that the provisions of the 
Framework Decision are not incompatible with Article 21, the Commission 
sought to eliminate collisions with fundamental rights in the text. Lastly, in 
recital 24 it was stated that the Framework Decision “respects the fundamental 
rights and observes the principles recognized, in particular by the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union”.562 This can be considered to be 
a standard clause in the preamble. This recital does not make it unnecessary 
to analyse the contents of substantial provisions of the text from a 
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fundamental rights perspective which in fact reveal several conflicts of the text 
with fundamental rights. 
 
On 5 December 2007, the Article 29 Data Protection Working Party 
adopted an opinion on the proposal. The main criticism in this opinion was 
addressed to the disproportionate nature of the proposal and possible breach 
of right to data protection.563 In its opinion, the Article 29 Working Party and 
the Working Party on Police and Justice quite frankly found that “if the current 
version of the draft Framework Decision is implemented, Europe would take 
a great leap towards a complete surveillance society making all travellers 
suspects.”564 This is serious language from an expert group. In the same vein, 
the EDPS in its opinion on the proposal raised serious doubts especially 
concerning necessity and the proportionality of the proposed instrument.565  
 
 
2. Possibility to ask for the opinion of the FRA as a way 
out?  
 
In this situation the FRA stepped onto the scene. The legislative episode 
related to the handling of this file offers a good platform to look at the role 
played by the FRA that probably had its finest hour since its establishment in 
terms of real impact on one particular legal text. In autumn 2008, the French 
Presidency of the Council requested an opinion of the FRA on the proposed 
Council Framework Decision on the use of Passenger Name Record. In its 
opinion of 28 October 2008 the FRA raised several concerns deemed 
problematic in terms of fundamental rights.566 In the course of the 
negotiations the FRA opinion contributed positively to the final outcome. The 
FRA focused in its opinion on three fundamental rights, namely respect for 
private life (Article 7 of EUCFR), the right to data protection (Article 8 of 
EUCFR) and the prohibition of discrimination (Article 21 of the EUCFR). The 
substance of the proposed Framework Decision also touched upon the scope 
of ECHR, which all the EU Member States are Contracting Parties to. This said, 
it is clear that in the analysis on the PNR proposal also praxis of the ECtHR 
was necessary to be included as a core element. In its opinion, the Agency gives 
a very prominent position to the ECHR system of protection of fundamental 
rights and consequently also to the ECtHR. 
 
The FRA drew attention to the use of open-ended and imprecise phrasing 
in the PNR proposal.567 It is clear that with such a legal text touching upon the 
                                                 
563 Opinion number 145 of 5 December 2007. In fact, Article 29 Working Party adopted a joint 
opinion with the Working Party on Police and Justice. 
564 Joint opinion, p. 13. 
565 Opinion of the European Data Protection Supervisor on the draft Proposal for a Council 
Framework Decision on the use of Passenger Name Record (PNR) data for law enforcement purposes, 
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566 The FRA opinion is available on web-pages of the Agency at 
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567 Opinion, paragraph 47. 
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very substance of data protection, the need to be precise in defining concepts 
is fundamental. Otherwise, the risk of putting this fundamental right at risk 
looms large. The Agency also called for more evidence to demonstrate that the 
use of such data was necessary to achieve the objectives of the Framework 
Decision.568 This was all about the questionable proportionality and added 
value of the legal proposal that the FRA challenged in this way. Moreover, the 
Agency called for a review of the already-existing measures with a view to 
analysing their adequacy and the need to include sufficient procedural 
safeguards.569 All these points are pertinent. Finally, the FRA attached the 
utmost importance to the need to ensure that data transfers to third countries 
are only possible if an adequate level of protection of PNR data is safeguarded 
and monitored in the recipient country.570 Similarly, the eventuality of 
profiling was considered to be problematic.571 On the issue of ethnic profiling, 
Tuomas Ojanen reminds of its close link to the principle of non-discrimination 
safeguarded for instance by the ICCPR and the EUCFR. According to him, the 
prohibition of discrimination on the grounds of race and religion is a non-
derogable right in international human rights law and deviating from this 
principle is not allowed even in the situation of public emergency.572 In the 
very recent PNR proposals by the Commission, the concerns expressed by the 
FRA seem to have been taken more exhaustively into account, although we can 
expect that discussion on fundamental rights will continue, not least under the 
auspices of the EP.573 
 
 
3. EP intervention into the legislative process; bringing in 
the FRA position 
 
The EP adopted a resolution on 20 November 2008 on the proposed 
Framework Decision.574 The opinion of the EP, which was at the time still 
outside the legislative process, did not offer a deus ex machina solution to the 
fundamental rights related shortcomings of the proposal, but it did highlight 
these problems at the political level. The EP very much relied on the opinions 
of the FRA, the EDPS, the Article 29 Working Party and the Working Party on 
Police and Justice but after all the most significant impact that it had on the 
process, was political. In the resolution, democratic accountability has been 
mentioned and it seems obvious that the EP especially took a profile as the 
protector of a “small citizen” against the faceless and arbitrary enforcement 
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bureaucracy. It is also worth noting that the EP took a stand for involving 
national parliaments in the legislative process on the new proposal.575  
 
Through the EP, it is possible for the opinions of the FRA to become 
concretized at the political level. FRA draws up legal technical analysis on 
fundamental rights aspects of the proposals and the EP seems to be quite keen 
on taking them on board, especially if this adds to the fundamental rights 
protection of individuals and reinforces the democratic control. The basic 
argument inherent in the EP resolution is that the proposed measures in the 
PNR have significant impact on the personal life of the EU citizens and that 
the justification of these measures needs to be convincing when it comes to the 
necessity, proportionality and usefulness with a view to their objectives. 
Furthermore, safeguards to privacy and legal protection are underscored. 
Eventually, the EP considers that “this is a precondition for lending the 
necessary political legitimacy to a measure which citizens may view as an 
inappropriate intrusion into their privacy”.576 Interestingly, political 
legitimacy is once again stressed and it is also intriguing to see that the EP uses 
word “citizens” instead of “individuals”, a more often used legal term in 
fundamental rights discourse. This is apparently another hint of a more 
politicized side of this resolution. 
 
The EP goes on to criticize various legal uncertainties of the proposed text 
in their relation to the ECHR and the EUCFR and also finds the legal basis of 
the proposal problematic. For the problems concerning legal certainty, the EP 
associates itself with the opinions of FRA, EDPS, Article 29 Working Part and 
the Working Party on Police and Justice.577 The concern about legal basis was 
definitely connected to the role of the EP in the legislative process at the time. 
The EP also expressed concerns about the necessity of the proposal in the 
context of the Article 8 of the ECHR and called for justification on the pressing 
social need for it.578 By the same token, the EP doubted whether the proposed 
text would lead to harmonization of national systems – one of the main 
arguments of the Commission.579 Again, in paragraph 16 of the resolution the 
EP reminded about the necessity and also about requirements for limiting 
fundamental rights under Article 8 of the ECHR and Article 52 of the EUCFR, 
which is one of the most significant positions that the EP took in this 
resolution.580 This is not the end of the story because the EP also established a 
link to the ECHR interpretation practice in paragraph 19, where 
proportionality, preciseness and foreseeability are dealt with in the context of 
Article 8 of the ECHR.581 
 
Another key finding in the resolution was its criticism addressed to the 
possibility of profiling in the PNR proposal. The EP found it important to 
remind about the prohibition of discrimination enshrined in the primary law 
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of the EU as well as the ECHR.582 Finally, an important conclusion of the EP 
had to do with the principle of the adequate level of protection in the transfer 
of data to third countries.583  
 
 
4. A changing tide: Communication on the global 
approach to transfers of PNR data to third countries 
 
In autumn 2010, the Commission issued its Communication on the global 
approach to transfers of PNR data to third countries.584 The focus of this policy 
paper was mainly on external aspects of PNR, but as we have seen in the PNR 
the external dimension has always had an impact on the internal EU PNR 
system. The flow has been exactly from external to internal. While reminding 
in the communication about the recent agreements with third countries in this 
field the Commission found it important to reconsider its global approach 
bearing in mind strong data protection guarantees and full respect of 
fundamental rights.585 The Commission also stressed that the Member States, 
the EP, the EDPS and the Article 29 Working Party “are especially important 
in the development of the revised approach on PNR”.586 With these 
assurances, the Commission probably tried to make it up for these key 
stakeholders, whose reactions on the Commission’s earlier PNR initiatives 
were above all critical. 
 
For the considerations on the need to establish PNR system, the 
Commission raised the issue of diversity of approaches of Member States in 
the PNR. Reading between the lines one can identify the need for 
harmonization, and reading in the lines one can see the consideration about 
replacing the proposed PNR Framework Decision with a draft directive.587 As 
for the external dimension, the Commission also found that legal certainty for 
air carriers was of key importance.588 Protection of personal data and privacy 
were also mentioned as the significant motives for the proposal.589 These were 
actually not the only indications of the Commission having changed its 
approach. In the Communication, the Commission admitted that 
transmission, use and processing of PNR data affects fundamental rights, 
namely the right to protection of personal data. It also drew attention to the 
principle according to which an adequate level of protection of data would be 
required from third countries.590 To follow-up the data protection issue more 
closely, the Commission stated that the transfer of PNR data to third countries 
has an impact on a large number of individuals and their personal data and 
private life and as a consequence of this the Commission found it necessary to 
                                                 
582 Ibid., paragraph 23. 
583 Ibid., paragraph 30. 
584 Communication from the Commission on the global approach to transfers of Passenger Name 
Record Data to third countries. Brussels 21.9.2010, COM(2010) 492 final. 
585 Communication 2010, p. 3.  
586 Ibid. 
587 Ibid., p. 5. 
588 Ibid., p. 6. 
589 Ibid. 
590 Ibid., p. 7. 
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remind of the safeguards provided in the ECHR (Article 8) and EUCFR 
(Articles 7 and 8).591 Instead of only resorting to a normal liturgy of these 
fundamental rights being subject to limitation the Commission admitted the 
interference and considered that it has to be balanced.592 
 
The adequacy requirement was again reflected, especially when it comes to 
data protection regimes of third countries and their respective legal bases. 
Furthermore, the proportionality principle, the purpose limitation and data 
security together with the prohibition of using PNR data revealing racial or 
ethnic origins, political opinions or religious or philosophical beliefs, trade 
union membership, and health or sexual life “unless under exceptional 
circumstances where there is an imminent threat to loss of life and provided 
that the third country provides appropriate safeguards”.593 As a conclusion of 
the Communication, the Commission found that the EU should reflect the 
possibility of replacing bilateral PNR agreements with a multilateral 
agreement. The Communication contains general considerations which 
should guide the EU in negotiations with third countries.594 This 
Communication of the Commission can be seen as a turning point that implied 
more sensitivity from the part of the Commission towards fundamental rights 
aspects of the PNR. Nevertheless, we can see that these intentions did not yet 
materialize in a sufficient manner when drafting provisions of the PNR and 
analyzing their impact.  
 
 
5. PNR proposal of 2011 
 
On 1 December 2009 the TFEU entered into force and hence the 
controversial Council Framework Decision proposed by the Commission was 
replaced by the proposal for a Directive of the EP and the Council on PNR.595 
The change in the constitutional framework brought especially the EP to the 
core of the legislative proceedings and put it on an equal footing with the 
Council. This is a considerable change from the past. The change in the legal 
form of the instrument brings it into communitarized legislative framework in 
terms of the process. 
 
                                                 
591 Ibid. Additionally, the Commission also reminded of international law instruments in the field of 
protection of privacy and personal data, such as covenants, guidelines, recommendations and 
conventions under the auspices of the United Nations, the OECD and the Council of Europe. 
592 For the limitation of fundamental rights the Commission stated that ”Any limitation on the 
exercise of the rights and freedoms recognized by the Charter must be provided for by the law and respect 
the essence of these rights and freedoms. Subject to the principle of proportionality, limitations may be 
made only if they are necessary and meet objectives of general interest recognized by the Union or the 
need to protect the rights and freedoms of others”. As can be seen this text has been taken almost directly 
from the EUCFR. Ibid., p. 8. 
593 Ibid., p. 8. 
594 Ibid., p. 11. 
595 For discussion on features of EU Directives including that of the direct effect see Prechal Sacha: 
Directives in European Community Law. A Study of Directives and Their Enforcement in National 
Courts. Clarendon Press. Oxford 1995. 
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The Commission analyzed the impacts for the proposal for a PNR Directive 
that was published on 2 February 2011.596 The Commission highlighted the 
Stockholm Programme, which called for the Commission to present a proposal 
for the use of PNR data to prevent, detect, investigate and prosecute terrorism 
and other serious crime.597 Similarly, the Commission carried out an impact 
assessment and strove to tackle the issues of necessity and proportionality as 
requested by the other interlocutors of the process.598 The Commission also 
made it clear in the text that its aim in the new impact assessment is to answer 
criticism raised by the other institutions and the stakeholders.599 What is 
particularly important and interesting in the Commission’s impact assessment 
is a separate chapter devoted to respect for fundamental rights.600 This has 
clearly been carried out in accordance with the principles of the Commission’s 
strategy for the effective implementation of the Charter of Fundamental Rights 
by the European Union and in its fundamental rights “Check List”. The 
Commission’s elaboration on how it used this check list in the analysis, 
however, remains quite superficial and no in-depth explanation has been 
presented. 
 
In the fundamental rights part of the impact assessment, the Commission 
identified links of the proposal particularly to the protection of private life and 
the protection of personal data and referred to the relevant provisions in the 
ECHR, EUCFR as well as the TFEU. It however reminded of these rights being 
subject to limitations under Article 8 of the ECHR and Article 52 of the 
EUCFR. At the heart of these limitations lie the principles of proportionality, 
necessity in a democratic society and the limitations being in accordance with 
the law. As a conclusion, the Commission found in the impact assessment that 
“as the proposed actions would be for the purpose of combating terrorism and 
other serious crime, contained in legislative acts they would clearly comply 
with such requirements provided they are necessary in a democratic society 
and comply with the principle of proportionality”.601 The Commission still 
seemed to attach great importance to limitations of fundamental rights in 
order to pursue the objectives of the PNR.  
 
Other consultative bodies, the EDPS and the Article 29 Working Group, 
were not that convinced on the arguments behind the necessity and 
proportionality and how these issues found their expression in the draft legal 
text, although some improvements made to the text were welcomed. The EDPS 
strongly criticized the Commission’s proposal for not meeting the 
requirements of necessity and proportionality imposed by Article 8 of the 
EUCFR, Article 8 of the ECHR and Article 16 of the TFEU and expressed 
doubts about how the proposed text fulfills the conditions for limiting 
                                                 
596 See Commission Staff Working Paper Impact Assessment accompanying document to the 
Proposal for a European Parliament and Council Directive on the use of Passenger Name Record data 
for the prevention, detection, investigation and prosecution of terrorist offences and serious crime. 
SEC(2011) 132 final. 2.2.2011.  
597 Ibid., p. 18. 
598 Ibid., p. 6. 
599 Ibid., p. 7. 
600 Ibid., p. 19. 
601 Ibid. 
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fundamental rights.602 Some of these suggestions were already in place in the 
previous EDPS opinion, such as the need to delete the general requirements 
list, and were thus restated. At the end of his opinion the EDPS presented quite 
a few recommendations for the further drafting of the text.603 The Article 29 
Working Group in its opinion for example still considered that it was 
disproportionate and not in line with article 8 of the EUCFR to collect and 
retain all data on all travellers on all flights.604 The EP also used this possibility 
to be active on this fundamental rights sensitive file by using its right to request 
the opinion of the FRA on the new proposal for a Directive in April 2011 soon 
after the Commission had adopted its new legislative proposal. The FRA 
proceeded accordingly and issued its second opinion on the PNR on 14 June 
2011.605 
 
In this second opinion, the FRA identified links to several fundamental 
rights that are protected by both the EUCFR and the ECHR including non-
discrimination, respect for family and private life and protection of personal 
data.606 For the analysis of the fundamental rights implications of the 
proposal, the FRA very much based itself on preparatory documents of the 
Commission, namely the impact assessment and the explanatory 
memorandum.607 The FRA mainly concentrates in its opinion on non-
discrimination aspects and the requirements for limitations of fundamental 
rights and effective supervision. In its opinion on proposal for a Council 
Framework Decision the FRA paid attention to especially discriminatory 
profiling in the PNR. For the phrasing of the new proposal, the FRA considered 
that the text has improved thus reducing the risk of direct discrimination and 
discriminatory profiling.608 However, the FRA still found it necessary to 
strengthen the text somewhat by introducing an explicit prohibition on the 
transmission of sensitive data.609 Another concrete proposal of the FRA was to 
take the full advantage of using statistics for the assessment of the PNR system 
and in tackling the problem of indirect discrimination.610 Regarding the 
limitation of fundamental rights, the FRA draws particular attention to criteria 
concerning objectives of general interest recognized by the EU, the 
requirement to be provided for by law, and the necessity and proportionality. 
The FRA underscores that limitations are possible under the Charter, but such 
limitations must meet these conditions.611 The FRA held that the proposal for 
                                                 
602 Opinion of the European Data Protection Supervisor on the proposal for a Directive of the 
European Parliament and of the Council on the use of Passenger Name Record data for the prevention, 
detection, investigation and prosecution of terrorist offences and serious crime. Brussels, 25.3.2011, pp. 
3-4. 
603 Ibid., pp. 11-12. 
604 Opinion 10/2011 on the proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council 
on the use of passenger name record data for the prevention, detection, investigation and prosecution of 
terrorist offences and serious crime, WP 181, 5.4.2011, p. 4. 
605 Opinion of the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights on the Proposal for a Directive 
on the use of Passenger Name Record (PNR) data for the prevention, detection, investigation and 
prosecution of terrorist offences and serious crime (COM(2011) 32 final) 
606 Ibid., p. 5. 
607 Ibid., p. 6. 
608 Ibid., p. 7. 
609 Ibid., p. 8. 
610 Ibid., pp. 8-10. Additionally, the FRA proposed to add non-discrimination as an area of special 
attention for the review according to Article 17 (b) of the proposal. 
611 Ibid., p. 11. 
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PNR directive gave rise to some concerns in terms of the requirement to be 
provided for by the law because of the vague phrasing used in particular in 
annex 12 of the proposal.612 Furthermore, the definition of serious crime in 
Article 2 (h) was considered too open for various interpretations hence 
endangering legal certainty.613 Later in its opinion, The FRA made a 
constructive suggestion to limit the EU PNR system to serious transnational 
crime.614 Finally, foreseeability of Article 4 (2) (b) of the proposal was 
questioned in the opinion and the FRA in that sense associated itself very 
much with the EDPS and Article 29 Working Party.615 In its concluding 
remarks the FRA confirms that it has taken the opinions of the EDPS and 
Article 29 Working Group as a point of departure in its analysis. In addition to 
the points described previously it among other things suggested to create 
aggregate statistics based on PNR data to detect discriminatory patterns and 
trends in the application of PNR system. The use of statistics was also 
proposed to assess the efficiency of the PNR system.616 A big block of the 
conclusions of FRA dealt with the principle of proportionality, for example 
when limiting fundamental rights and in the treatment of innocent people.617 
Last but not least, the FRA considered it essential to ensure in Article 12 of the 
proposal the full independence of supervisory authorities.618 
 
 
The 2011 PNR Directive was accompanied with an impact assessment. In 
this new IA, the Commission argued in favour of presenting the new legislative 
proposal pursuant to the provisions and procedures of the Lisbon Treaty. The 
Commission also reminded of the request made in the Stockholm Programme 
of 2009 addressed to the Commission to present a proposal on PNR. Further 
to this, the Commission highlighted that a consultation process had taken 
place in the context of the 2007 PNR proposal and concluded that a consensus 
was reached in the Council working group regarding many provisions of the 
previous proposal. Most importantly, the Commission argued that the IA 
aimed at answering criticisms raised by the stakeholders and including all new 
facts and experience gained since 2007.619  The Commission proposed Articles 
82 and 87 of the Title V of Chapter V of the TFEU as legal basis and found that 
action at EU level in this field would ensure harmonized data protection. The 
                                                 
612 Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and the Council on the use of Passenger 
Name Record for the prevention, detection, investigation and prosecution of terrorist offences and 
serious crime. COM(2001) 32 final, 2.2.2011. The FRA took in its assessment into account especially item 
12 of the annex that lists information under title general remarks that include all available information 
on unaccompanied minors under 18 years, such as name and gender of the minor, age, language(s) 
spoken, name and contact details of guardian on departure and relationship to the minor, name and 
contact details guardian on arrival and relationship to the minor, departure and arrival agent. 
613 Ibid., pp. 13-14. 
614 Ibid., p. 22. 
615 Ibid., p. 14. 
616 Ibid., p. 21. 
617 Ibid., p. 22. 
618 Ibid., p. 23.  
619 Commission Staff Working Paper. Summary of the Impact Assessment accompanying document 
to the Proposal for a European Parliament and Council Directive on the use of Passenger name Record 
data for the prevention, detection, investigation and prosecution of terrorist offences and serious crime. 
p. 2. 
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Commission also considered that the proposal was in line with the subsidiarity 
principle.620  
 
In relation to the objectives of the proposal, the Commission pinpointed 
that it is essential to ensure that individuals’ right to the protection of personal 
data is respected when PNR data are collected and processed. It was also noted 
that access to PNR should be limited to what is necessary. This time the 
Commission also decided to include a separate chapter in the IA on 
fundamental rights considerations, mainly because these aspects in the 
previous proposal for a Council Framework Decision had attracted so much 
criticism. The new feature in impact assessment this time was using the 
Fundamental rights checklist, a new tool introduced in the strategy for the 
effective implementation of the EUCFR.621  
 
In this round, the Commission also admitted in the impact analysis that the 
use of PNR data would interfere with protection of private life and protection 
of personal data, key fundamental rights.622 It stressed that these rights are 
subject to limitation. Conditions and the prerequisite for the limitation would 
be “in accordance with law” and “necessary in a democratic society”. 
Proportionality would also need to be taken into account.623 Eventually 
regarding the much discussed feature of profiling in the previous Framework 
Decision, the Commission held that EU data protection legislation assured 
that automated processing of data intended to evaluate personal aspects of an 
individual should not produce legal effects. On the contrary, any automated 
decision should be controlled by a human being.624 Finally in the IA, the 
Commission concluded again that a legislative proposal containing a 
decentralized system of data collection was the best available option.625 The 
difference with the previous IA process was that this time fundamental rights 
aspects were examined in a more detailed and analytical way. When it comes 
to data protection and its added value, the case study of PNR, for example, 
seems to suggest that there is an added value. This was namely the case with 
regard to its practical significance in relation to the fair information principles 
that can provide guidance – both ex ante and ex post – on the problems of 
processing. One could even consider it as lex specialis of privacy. More to this, 
that is the case because of its normative importance in the context of law 
enforcement.626 
 
 
6. EP position on the new PNR proposal 
 
The position that the EP formed in its internal procedures on PNR can be 
characterized as very positive. If we take the rapporteur’s draft report as our 
point of departure, we can on several occasions identify the overarching 
                                                 
620 Ibid., p. 4. 
621 Ibid., p. 5. 
622 Ibid. 
623 Ibid. 
624 Ibid. 
625 Ibid., p. 6. 
626 Tzanou, p. 370. 
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contentment with the Commission’s proposal. In the explanatory statement of 
the LIBE, it was acknowledged that the EP recommendations dating back to 
2008 were taken into account. In the Opinion of LIBE, the same went for 
opinions of the EDPS, Article 29 Working Party and the FRA. Moreover, the 
impact assessment and consultation process were considered to be 
complete.627 The conclusion that the rapporteur drew is also important: he 
contented the necessity, proportionality and added value of the measures.628 
 
Similarly, amendments proposed by the LIBE Committee were scarce and 
mainly of a cosmetic nature. From the fundamental rights point of view, these 
amendments constituted some clarifications. The EP, for instance, proposed 
to add specific references to the Articles of the EUCFR.629 Compared to the 
Commission’s proposal for a Directive, the EP also sought to extend the list of 
grounds for prohibition of discrimination. The EP did not pursue to go beyond 
the EUCFR, but simply to put the text in line with the list of grounds for 
prohibition of discrimination set out in Article 21 of the EUCFR. These 
proposed amendments 3 and 14 helped to secure consistency of this legal 
instrument with the Charter and contributed to bridging possible gaps of the 
text proposed by the Commission.630 It remains a mystery why the 
Commission proposed an incomplete list with regard to Article 21 of the 
EUCFR in the first place, thus omitting the grounds related to an individual’s 
sex, colour, social origin, genetic features, language, membership of national 
minority, property, birth, disability, age and sexual orientation. Apparently, 
the Commission held that the grounds presented in its initial proposal were 
the most obvious possible reasons for discrimination, but it should have gone 
for an exhaustive list pursuant to the EUCFR. 
 
Furthermore, the EP sought to provide more ambitious safeguards for 
sharing information under Article 7 of the proposed Directive.631 In the same 
vein, it also stressed the need for an adequate level of data protection by 
possible third countries or international bodies that are involved.632 Another 
set of proposed changes were related to the protection of personal data in 
Amendment 24, which included more far-reaching suggestions on notifying 
affected individuals and necessary enforcement measures.633 Overall, the EP 
had a higher level of ambition with regard to the provisions of the PNR 
directive. One of the last proposed amendments of the EP was related to an 
independent review with a role to be given also to the EP.634 With this, the EP 
was also striving for a role in the evaluation of the directive, thus moving 
towards the implementation, which is usually in the hands of the Member 
States and under the control of the Commission.  
                                                 
627 Draft Report on the proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on 
the use of Passenger Name Record data for the prevention, detection, investigation and prosecution of 
terrorist offences and serious crime. Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs, 
Rapporteur: Timothy Kirkhope, 2011/0023(COD), 14.2.2012, pp. 30-31. 
628 Ibid., p. 32. 
629 See ibid. Amendment 3, p. 7 and Amendment 12, p. 11. 
630 Ibid., Amendment 3, p. 7 and Amendment 14, p. 12. 
631 See ibid., Amendment 18,  p. 14. 
632 See ibid., Amendment 21, paragraph 1 (ac), p. 16. 
633 See ibid., Amendment 24, p. 20. 
634 Ibid. Amendment 32, p. 26. 
 157 
 
On 25 March 2011, the EDPS issued its opinion on the draft criteria. Some 
of the previous basic criticism was still present in the new opinion. We should 
not, however, forget about the positive aspects of the EDPS opinion. The EDPS 
finds that especially data protection provisions have been ameliorated in the 
current text compared with the text that the EDPS commented on previously. 
Improvements can be found particularly in the new scope of the proposal, the 
roles of different stakeholders, the exclusion of the processing of sensitive 
data, the use of the PUSH system without a transitional period and the 
limitation of data retention.635 Furthermore, the EDPS hailed the development 
of the impact assessment on the reasons for an EU-PNR scheme.636 The EDPS 
opinion on the more recent PNR proposal suggests that the Commission had 
amended the text towards the line taken by the EDPS in the previous phase 
and this satisfied the EDPS to some extent. We can therefore also identify the 
importance of the EDPS in the process. 
 
 
7. Council proceedings and the flexible approach on intra-
EU flights 
 
During the Hungarian Presidency in spring 2011, the Justice and Home 
Affairs Council had its first policy debate on the proposed PNR directive. The 
main point of the discussion was the question of whether the collection of PNR 
data should be restricted to only flights from and to third countries or whether 
intra-EU flights should also be covered. Several options were possible 
regarding the question of scope. The Commission proposal limited the 
obligation to PNR data to extra-EU flights. On the other hand it would have 
been possible to go for the option, which would have enabled the Member 
States to designate those intra-EU routes starting from or landing on its 
territory for which PNR data should be transmitted to law enforcement 
authorities. Alternatively, one could have made the inclusion of all intra-EU 
flights mandatory.637 In the ensuing discussion, a majority of Member States 
found that Member States should have at least the option to include also intra-
EU flights in the PNR data collection.638 This would cater to some of the 
expressed concerns about the scope of the directive. 
 
In July 2011, the Polish Presidency issued a discussion paper on the way 
forward with the PNR file to Member States' delegations. The Council Working 
Party on General Matters including Evaluation (GENVAL) had tackled the 
outstanding issues, and on the basis of these discussions the Presidency came 
                                                 
635 Opinion of the European Data Protection Supervisor on the Proposal for a Directive of the 
European Parliament and of the Council on the use of Passenger name Record data for the prevention, 
detection, investigation and prosecution of terrorist offences and serious crime, 25.3.2011, paragraph 6, 
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636 Ibid., paragraph 7, p. 2. 
637 See Background note for Justice and Home Affairs Council in Luxembourg on 11 and 12 April 
2011, Issued on 8 April by the Press office of the General Secretariat of the Council of the European 
Union, p. 4. 
638 See Press release 3081st Council meeting of Justice and Home Affairs, Luxembourg 11-12 April 
2011, 8692/11 PRESSE 93, PR CO 21, p. 5. 
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to the conclusion that "proportionality and necessity - are perceived as the key 
to success in the co-decision process”.639 Interestingly enough, it is impossible 
to trace the key issues for further discussion in this document outlining the 
tests of proportionality and necessity as the texts have been deleted from the 
publicly available versions. The only thing that can be extrapolated from this 
is that necessity and proportionality issues played a central role in the Council 
discussions. The Presidency furthermore invited Member States to submit 
their written comments on the necessity and proportionality issues. 
 
In a Council document released in September 2011, the Presidency 
presented to the delegations its compromise text based on Member States' 
written contributions on proportionality and necessity.  In the annexed 
compromise text, it becomes clear that Council proposals in relation to 
proportionality and necessity are mainly covered in recitals.640 This is good for 
highlighting the proportionality but not good enough to function as a 
guarantee for proportionality. The same goes for the references to the EUCFR. 
The changes to key articles and annexes remain by and large cosmetic. 
Probably the biggest impact of amendments is on the scope in Article 1, which 
is more restricted in the Presidency text. In a Council document released in 
April 2012 the Danish Presidency found that a clear and strict purpose 
limitation is important in order to safeguard the proportionality of the 
Directive. The Presidency hence found it necessary to leave this part of the text 
untouched. Another important element of the text that was to be offered to the 
EP in inter-institutional negotiations was about the compromise of allowing 
Member States to apply the Directive to all or selected intra-EU flights.641 
 
 
During the Danish presidency, in April 2012 the Justice and Home Affairs 
Council debated the PNR Directive again. In the proceedings, a majority of 
Member States supported the inclusion of at least an option for each Member 
State to mandate the collection of such data also with regard to targeted intra-
EU flights. The main topic in the discussion was whether the PNR should be 
restricted to flights from and to third countries or should also apply to flights 
inside the EU. The compromise that was accomplished allowed, but did not 
oblige, Member States to collect PNR data also concerning the selected intra-
EU flights. The Council also agreed to maintain the overall data retention 
period of five years but decided to extend the first period, during which the 
data are fully accessible, to two years.642 On the basis of this general approach, 
the Danish presidency received the green light for starting inter-institutional 
negotiations with the EP. 
 
 
                                                 
639 See Council document 12373/11, 4 July 2011. 
640 See Council document 14233/11. For instance new recital 11 has been formulated as follows: "The 
processing of personal data must be proportionate to the specific security goals pursued by this 
Directive". 
641 See Council document 8916/12, 23 April 2012. 
642 Press release 3162 Council Meeting Justice and Home Affairs, Luxembourg 26 and 27 April 2012, 
9179/12, PRESSE 172, PR CO 24, p. 8. 
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In the case of PNR, an interesting contribution to the discussion on 
proportionality of the proposal was provided by the Dutch Senate. In its 
opinion, the Senate forcefully questioned the added value of the Commission 
proposal and expressed serious doubts as to whether the proposal complies 
with the requirements of proportionality.643 In its response the Commission 
defended its proposal and the added value of using PNR data. The purpose 
limitation was at the heart of the Commission's arguments explaining why the 
proposal was necessary and proportional. 644 The Commission, however, did 
not provide a clear answer to the concerns expressed by the Senate.  
 
 
8. Assessment of the case in relation to the ex ante 
review of fundamental rights 
 
The prohibition of discrimination has been enshrined in Article 21 of the 
EUCFR by stating in paragraph 1 that “any discrimination based on any 
ground such as sex, race, colour, ethnic or social origin, genetic features, 
language, religion or belief, political or any other opinion, membership of a 
national minority, property, birth, disability, age or sexual orientation shall be 
prohibited”. According to Timo Makkonen, this provision is innovative 
because its scope has apparently not been restricted and it can therefore be 
expected to also apply to relations between private parties. Furthermore, the 
list of prohibited grounds set out above is not a closed list and it is additionally 
unprecedented among international instruments.645 These aspects make 
Article 21 a very special provision. 
 
Similarly, paragraph 2 provides that “within the scope of application of the 
Treaties and without prejudice to any of their specific provisions, any 
discrimination on grounds of nationality shall be prohibited”. This provision 
has sometimes been criticized for being narrower than the preceding 
paragraph and for putting non-EU country nationals in a disadvantageous 
position vis-à-vis EU country nationals.646 
 
Maria Tzanou – basing her arguments on the provisions of the Data 
Protection Directive – finds that the principle of non-discrimination is of 
utmost importance proffering added value in data protection.647 The 
prohibition of unequal treatment can be highly relevant for some processes 
                                                 
643 See Opinion of the Senate of the Netherlands on the application of subsidiarity and 
proportionality. 15402/11, 13 October 2011. The Senate linked the proportionality concerns mainly to 
the retention of data of persons who are not guilty of committing a criminal offence and where the 
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644 See Letter of Commissioner Sefcovic of 11 October 2011 addressed to the Senate. Attached to the 
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645 Makkonen Timo: Equal in Law, Unequal in Fact: Racial and ethnic discrimination and the legal 
response thereto in Europe. University of Helsinki 2010, p. 157. 
646 Ibid., pp. 157-158.  
647 Tzanou Maria: The Added Value of Data Protection as a Fundamental Right in the EU Legal Order 
in the Context of Law Enforcement. European University Institute. Department of Law, p. 47. Tzanou 
attempts to examine what is the practical significance and normative importance of data protection in 
the field of counter-terrorism. 
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like profiling that can be discriminatory.648 In connection with the PNR case 
(vide infra), the risk of using this process implying the eventuality of illegal 
discrimination also became extremely intrinsic. Tzanou notes that Article 15 
of the EU data protection directive is aimed at protecting individuals against 
fully automated decision-making.649  
 
It is clear that the biggest concerns of the case of PNR were related to 
fundamental rights. The proposed air passenger screening practices 
constituted interference with right to privacy, right to data protection and 
prohibition of discrimination. Similarly, this case raised concerns about 
proportionality and the necessity of this exercise in relation to its security 
merits. As Tzanou sees it, the possibility of data protection to have a hard core 
was neglected in the PNR and there was in fact no need to fall back to the right 
to privacy.650  
 
The prohibition of discrimination contains both direct (open) and indirect 
(hidden) forms of discrimination.651 When we tackle the concept of non-
discrimination we can identify its close relationship to equality. Basically, 
these two concepts can be held to have semantically the same meaning: The 
term discrimination is focused on a specific action while equality describes an 
ideal.652 Hence, equality which is enshrined in Article 20 of the Charter, can 
be considered a more positive notion of non-discrimination. 
 
The case of the PNR illustrates that the FRA can make a valuable 
contribution to the ex ante control of fundamental rights in the EU legislative 
process. This happens with an in-depth legal analysis of the proposed legal 
instrument and contains various concrete suggestions for amendments. In this 
legal analysis, the particular yardstick against which the fundamental rights 
will be evaluated is the EUCFR, with emphasis also given to the ECHR. The 
FRA therefore draws inspiration from this legal basis and the interpretation 
practice of the CJEU and the ECtHR. Very much the same can be said about 
the significant role of other expert bodies, the EDPS and the Article 29 
Working Party, which were also capable of drawing the attention of policy-
makers to fundamental rights concerns of the PNR proposals. The most 
essential issue is, however, the utilization of the test of permissible limitations 
by the FRA. This had a great impact on the process and how the substance of 
the legal text evolved. 
 
In this legislative process, both the Council and the EP have taken 
advantage of its expertise by requesting its opinion on fundamental rights 
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aspects of the proposals in question. Furthermore, the Commission has also 
taken into account a great number of the proposals of the FRA in its proposal 
for a Directive after the FRA had drawn attention to fundamental rights 
problems in the original Council Framework Decision.653 The FRA can thus 
serve the purpose of a neutral body involved in the EU ex ante review. It is 
important that it can function somewhere outside the traditional fights over 
competence and the political power of the EU institutions. The importance of 
the EDPS can especially be found in its functioning as a sector-specific expert 
body whose views carry a considerable authoritative weight in the field of data 
protection and privacy. Is it possible to draw certain conclusions from the 
discussion on this file in the EU? The answer is yes and in this dossier we can 
probably learn some procedural lessons and identify a new law-making 
scheme for dealing with a fundamental-rights-sensitive EU dossier. First, in 
this case the constitutional ex ante review of a piece of draft EU legislation cut 
its teeth. The more important issue was the strong involvement of the FRA that 
can be considered a slight novelty. This has to do especially with the action of 
the Agency in bringing fundamental rights more deeply into the legislative 
considerations, which should potentially be followed by the upcoming draft 
legislation. In practice this would mean a much stronger role for the Agency in 
the analysis of fundamental rights aspects of a given file and consequently a 
stronger impact on the legal text under discussion. 
 
It would be important to involve the FRA more closely in the ex ante review 
of fundamental rights in the EU legislative process. The EU institutions, 
including the EP, should consider the Agency as a useful body in analysing 
fundamental rights aspects of EU legislation in preparation. It has been the EP 
that has repeatedly brought the FRA legal opinions into the political discussion 
and we can therefore claim that the EP has been the co-legislator that has used 
the FRA expertise most extensively. One more observation that can be made 
is that of the longue durée of the PNR in the legislative process. The reason for 
this is the sensitivity of this file from the point of view of fundamental rights. 
It is also obvious that ordinary legislative procedure with more legislative 
actors has been one reason for the relatively long-lasting law-making phase. 
In this case, I can fully associate myself to Gearty's notion of liberty being 
subjugated to security by the executive, in this case the Commission, at the 
expense of fundamental rights.654 PNR can be considered very much as a child 
of its time. 
 
If we assess the case against the criteria discussed previously we can see 
that the problems resulted mainly from disproportionality. If we use the 
criteria developed for the analysis we can see that in terms of substance, the 
PNR case failed the tests of proportionality, necessity and also the non-
                                                 
653 This was the general impression of the FRA on the Commission’s new proposal. According to the 
opinion, the Commission took account of the previous opinion of the FRA in its new proposal and 
referred also to the explanatory memorandum accompanying the proposal. See opinion of 14 June 2011, 
p. 5. 
654 Gearty Conor: Escaping Hobbes: Liberty and Security for Our Democratic (Not Anti-Terrorist) 
Age. LSE Law, Society and Economy Working Papers 3/2010. London School of Economics and Political 
Science. Law Department 2010, pp. 15-16 and p. 22. Gearty analyses the US and the UK policies with 
regard to human rights against the background of security and liberty in the aftermath of the "war against 
terrorism". 
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interference with the core of a fundamental right. Probably the grimmest 
interference happened with regard to the proportionality, where the 
Commission crossed the line and did not sufficiently take into account Article 
52 (1) of the Charter. Should the PNR have been adopted in its initial form it 
would most probably have been annulled by the CJEU at a later stage due to 
serious shortcomings with regard to proportionality. In this scenario, the court 
would have clearly sent a signal to the EU legislature on compliance with the 
requirements of this Charter provision.   
 
The focus in this file was mainly in limiting fundamental rights with only a 
minor role given to promoting fundamental rights. This is clearly a result of 
the overly far-reaching initial legal proposal which drew the attention mainly 
to the limitation aspects of the legal text. In this setting, the positive obligation 
had no possibility to be passed. 
 
We should nevertheless note that the text was improved in the course of 
the handling and this can be considered as proof of strength of ex ante review 
focused on the test of permissible limitations which takes place in the EU at 
different levels. Looking at the case from an institutional perspective, we can 
see that EU institutions supplemented with other stakeholders in the law-
making process can function as a system of checks and balances in 
fundamental rights issues. The legislative process on PNR witnessed 
institutional struggle as a consequence of the entry into force of the Lisbon 
Treaty and the altered competences of EU institutions. In spite of this, the EU 
was able to put this file on a more sustainable track in terms of fundamental 
rights protection. This demonstrates the usefulness of pluralism with multiple 
ex ante review actors.  
 
According to Blume, the fundamental principle in the rules on trans-border 
data transfer is simple: "transferring personal data to another country must 
presuppose that the protection level in the importing country corresponds to 
that of the exporting country since it assumed that the laws of each country 
aim at safeguarding integrity at a certain level".655 This was not the case in the 
PNR, and the level protection of data with regard to international transfers 
was a considerable problem, especially in the first Commission PNR 
proposals. We can see that even though the EU can be seen as a leader in data 
protection legislation in the world, at the same time it has its counter-
terrorism and law-enforcement measures that affect this right significantly.656 
In this case the text was significantly ameliorated in the course of the law-
making process and problems with proportionality were duly taken care of. 
 
Why did the Commission make such a disproportionate proposal in the 
first place? It seems that there was a good intention to combat terrorism. This 
together with the huge political pressure to do something about it led to the 
initial proposal. I do, however, believe that there was also a certain kind of 
aspiration to test some limits with regard to Commission powers and the 
proportionality in the proposal. If this far-reaching interpretation was 
                                                 
655 Blume Peter: Protection of informational Privacy. DJOF Publishing. Copenhagen 2002, p. 190. 
656 Tzanou, p. 358.  
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accepted by other institutions, it would have been an important precedent for 
the Commission to go on like this also in other files. It was important that this 
tendency was eventually stopped. 
 
The terrorist attacks in Paris during 2015 and in Brussels in March 2016 have 
put significantly more pressure on taking the PNR file further. Attempts have 
been made to persuade the EP, which for its part has been a loud critic of the 
Commission and the Council stances. The PNR file did not proceed in the EP 
for some years due to the resistance among mainly liberal democrat, socialist 
and green MEPs. In the face of a huge political pressure, the EP, however, 
adopted in the plenary the PNR Directive on 14 April 2016. The main elements 
of the compromise were related to setting up passenger information units, 
application to extra-EU flights with the Member States' option to apply it also 
to intra-EU flights and the review clause.657 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
657 In the practical EU law-making review clauses very often carry a significant political weight as it 
can be politically easier for different  actors involved in the decision-making to explain that the 
problematic issues can be opened within a certain timeframe. 
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VI The use of security scanners as a 
fundamental rights dilemma  
 
The significance and visibility of policy area covered nowadays by the AFSJ 
has obviously remarkably increased, especially due to the war against 
terrorism that was launched in 2001 by the United States and its allies as a 
response to large-scale terrorist attacks against civilian targets. In addition to 
terrorism, other types of organized international crime have enhanced the 
importance of the AFSJ. This makes the former third pillar an area in which 
the EU can also show its citizens the added value that the Union can bring into 
this field with enhanced co-operation between the Member States. It is not 
only the need for confidence building and adding credibility, but a real 
necessity to work closely in the international field to fight such phenomena as 
international crime. 
 
The terrorist attacks of 9/11 can be regarded as a watershed in many ways 
in the field of international security. Its aftermath, new international measures 
and initiatives were launched to contain terrorism, but these efforts were not 
always easy to put in line with fundamental rights. Fundamental rights proved 
important also in the context of the EU.658 One related EU file, in which the 
EP was involved with its ex ante review of fundamental rights is that of security 
scanners. The introduction and rolling out of security scanners at the airports 
became topical as a consequence of the attempted terrorist acts some years 
ago. The Commission reacted quickly to these attempts and proposed new 
measures to establish a common EU approach for taking into operation of 
body scanners at the EU airports. In practice the proposed EU instrument 
would have meant the rapid installation of such scanners at the airports. 
Similar to predominantly all the responses to possible terrorist threats, the 
proposed measures were prepared rapidly and understandably the related 
decisions had to be made quickly as well. In this rush, however, several 
concerns regarding the nature of fundamental rights remained unaddressed.  
 
What is a security scanner used at airports? It is a device that scans a 
human body and thus is used to detect possible materials and equipment that 
must not pass the security control of airports. This illicit equipment may, for 
example, include some types of weapons, such as knives and materials 
intended for explosions at the airports or detonating airplanes. The scanning 
exposes the human body, which is being scanned, to those who are carrying 
out the scanning. The exposure gives rise to problems related to fundamental 
rights. From the point of view of the EUCFR that can be used as a yardstick 
also in the case of security scanners, such fundamental rights may include 
human dignity (Article 1), respect for private and family life (Article 7), 
protection of personal data (Article 8), freedom of conscience and religion 
(Article 10), non-discrimination (Article 21), the rights of the child (Article 24) 
and ensuring a high level of human health protection in the implementation 
                                                 
658 See for example Ojanen Tuomas: Perus- ja ihmisoikeudet terrorismin vastatoimissa Euroopan 
unionissa. Lakimies 7-8 2007. 
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of EU’s policies and activities (Article 35).659 What is alarming is that this is 
not an exhaustive list of fundamental rights concerns related to the use of 
security scanners. 
 
When limiting an individual’s fundamental rights, the very basic point of 
departure is that the limitation concerned is clearly defined. Other 
requirements must also be set for such limitations, but the clear guidelines for 
waiving the fundamental rights related to using body scanners were simply not 
established. The EP thus started its proceedings on the dossier. The EP 
adopted on 23 October 2008, on its own initiative, a resolution on the impact 
of aviation security measures and body scanners on human rights, privacy, 
personal dignity and data protection.660 The EP held that the measures 
proposed by the Commission were far from being merely technical and it 
included a strong impact on the above-mentioned fundamental rights that 
should be provided with strong safeguards.661  
 
The EP challenged the Commission’s approach in many ways and required 
among other things that an impact assessment on fundamental rights should 
be carried out and that necessary consultation of the European Data 
Protection Supervisor, the Article 29 Working Party and the FRA should be 
executed.662 Furthermore, it stressed the importance of verifying the 
compatibility measures with human rights and fundamental freedoms. 
Similarly, follow-up actions were mentioned.663 From these statements we can 
notice the strong legal ethos highlighting the rule of law elements. What is 
interesting from the angle of fundamental rights is the role of the FRA that the 
EP points out. There is indeed some room for improvement in this regard. The 
FRA should be used to a larger extent as an expert body in analyzing the 
fundamental rights sensitive dossiers.664 Later on, and having been consulted, 
FRA found security scanners particularly problematic in terms of right to 
privacy. 
 
Eventually, this legislative circle was closed by the approval of the 
Commission Regulation 272/2009 supplementing the common basic 
standards on civil aviation security laid down in the annex to Regulation 
300/2008.665 The most controversial elements discussed above were left 
outside the scope of this regulation. The Commission reacted later to the EP’s 
requests by issuing a Communication on the use of security scanners at EU 
airports. In this Communication, the Commission elaborated the aspects that 
                                                 
659 See Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on the 
Use of Security Scanners at EU airports, COM(2010) 311 Final, 15.6.2010, p. 4. 
660 Aviation security measures and body scanners. European Parliament Resolution of 23 October 
2008 on the Impact of aviation security measures and body scanners on human rights, privacy, personal 
dignity and data protection. P6_TA(2008)0521. 
661 Ibid., recital D and paragraph 2. 
662 Ibid., paragraph 3. 
663 Ibid., paragraph 4. 
664 In July 2010 the FRA released its contribution on the issue of security scanners. See The use of 
body scanners: 10 questions and answers. Available at 
http://www.fra.europa.eu/fraWebsite/research/opinions/op-bodyscanner_en.htm. 
665 OJ L 91/7, 3.4.2009. The secondary law basis for this Regulation is Regulation (EC) No 300/2008 
of the European Parliament and of the Council of March 2008 on common rules in the field of civil 
aviation security and repealing Regulation (EC) No 2320/2002. OJ L 97/72, 9.4.2008. 
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the EP had taken up in its resolution and the intention to carry out, for 
example, an impact assessment was confirmed. Respect of fundamental rights 
and addressing health concerns were given a particular emphasis in the 
analysis. 
 
 
1. Inside the Commission’s impact assessment 
 
We can notice that the pressure exercised by other institutions made the 
Commission to address fundamental rights aspects of the security scanner 
dossier in a more elaborate manner. In March 2011, the Commission finally 
came out with an impact assessment on the topic.666 This impact assessment 
contained in-depth analysis of various impacts of the Commission’s legal 
instrument, but it is worth noting that one of the focus areas was fundamental 
rights. The formal introduction of the impact assessment was preceded by the 
IAB phase within the Commission that took place in January 2011. On the 
basis of the IAB evaluation and comments, the Commission decided to 
integrate the fundamental rights and health concerns in the problem 
definition and also included fundamental rights and health as a specific 
objective emphasizing the trade-offs between airport efficiency, security, 
minimization of risks and fundamental rights.667 This is yet another piece of 
evidence that the IAB phase can be useful in dealing with fundamental rights 
aspects of the Commission’s preparatory documents in the legislative process.  
 
In the impact assessment, the Commission devoted an introductory 
chapter of its own to legal basis, subsidiarity and fundamental rights. The main 
argument seemed to be that the lack of action and undertaking fragmented 
and uncoordinated action by individual Member States in this field would 
increase existing concerns about fundamental rights. The reason that was put 
forward was inequality of treatment of passengers and staff at different EU 
airports.668 Equal treatment is a basic fundamental right and it is safeguarded 
in international agreements in various ways, as well as in national and the EU 
law. Putting forward this kind of argument is doubtful, however, as it should 
be the individual EU Member States’ burden of proof that their legislation in 
the field of airport safety is in line with the EU acquis and complies with 
fundamental rights at different (international, national and EU) levels. Equal 
treatment appears to have mainly been used to justify policy action, not the 
protection of fundamental rights. 
 
The Commission went on to analyze impacts of the altogether seven policy 
options. When addressing each option, the Commission also tackled the pros 
and cons of each option in terms of protection of fundamental rights. When 
commenting on the baseline scenario, with no new EU regulatory action, the 
Commission mainly referred to the existing Treaty base of fundamental rights, 
                                                 
666 See Commission Staff Working Document. Impact assessment on the possible use of security 
scanners at EU airports. Brussels 23.3.2011. Also the Commission admits in the narrative on the policy 
background of the proposal that the Leitmotiv behind the Commission’s reappraisal and withdrawal of 
the security scanners was a result of the EP resolution on the matter in 2008, p. 4. 
667 Ibid., p. 8. 
668 Ibid., p. 18. 
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the TFEU and the Charter as well as to ECHR and its fundamental rights 
provisions relevant for this case. Furthermore, secondary EU legislation, such 
as the Directive on the use of personal data was mentioned. In this case, it 
would be up to the EU Member States to decide whether to adopt codes of 
practice in order to address fundamental rights concerns.669 In this case, the 
umbrella of protection would clearly be EU primary law and the ECHR. 
 
Option 2 presented by the Commission was also centered on no or 
discontinued EU action. The solution in this case would be the abolition of the 
exclusive nature of the list of allowed screening methods and technologies. In 
this case, the consideration of the Commission was similar to that under 
option 1, but additionally the Member States would decide whether or not to 
set operational conditions for other technologies to be possibly deployed in the 
future.670 
 
Option 3 would have added security scanners to the list of allowed 
screening methods for passengers. For this alternative, the same fundamental 
rights considerations are applicable as with the two previous options. The 
outcome would have been a situation in which Member States would decide 
whether or not to establish operational standards for the use of security 
scanners as a permanent screening method.671 
 
Option 4 foresaw that adding security scanners to the list allowed screening 
methods for passengers and fixing performance standards with the general 
possibility for passengers to opt out. The Commission highlighted that 
passengers would have the possibility of opting out. Therefore there would be 
no need to fix operational rules concerning fundamental rights. The EU 
legislation would impose the obligation that each person is fully informed of 
the implications of being screened by the security scanner. Those who would 
refuse to be screened for fundamental rights reasons would have to undergo 
an alternative method of detection.672 
 
Option 5 aimed at adding security scanners to the list of allowed screening 
methods and technologies for passengers and fixing the detection 
performance standards and the operational conditions under the 
implementing legislation without the general possibility for passengers to opt 
out. This option would impose a legal requirement for Member States/airports 
that decide to use security scanners to apply special hardware and software to 
ensure that certain fundamental rights relevant preconditions are fulfilled in 
the screening procedure. It was deemed necessary that the image is destroyed 
immediately after the passenger is cleared and it would not be stored, retained, 
copied or printed. Additionally, the necessity of the analysis being carried out 
by a person of the same gender was recalled. It was also considered necessary 
that the image could not be connected with the identity of the screened person 
and finally the Commission held that unauthorized access to the screening 
                                                 
669 Ibid., p. 20. 
670 Ibid., p. 22. 
671 Ibid., p. 23. 
672 Ibid., p. 24. 
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information is prevented and that passengers are fully informed of these 
procedures.673 What is significant with these operational conditions is that 
they resonated the opinions of the EDPS and the FRA. 
 
Option 6 was concerned about adding security scanners to the list of 
allowed screening methods. It also considered technologies for passengers, 
fixing the detection performance standards, the operational performance 
standards and the operational conditions under the implementing legislation 
with the general possibility for the passenger to opt-out. According to the 
Commission, this policy alternative shared the same fundamental rights 
considerations with option 5.674 In any case, those passengers who would 
refuse to be screened due to fundamental right considerations would be 
provided with the possibility of opting for an alternative screening method as 
set out under option 4. 
 
Finally, the last option 7 presented in the impact assessment aimed at 
making the use of security scanners mandatory at all airports, in combination 
with the operational conditions of option 5. This option would have the same 
basic fundamental right elements as option 5.675 We have now exhausted the 
list of policy options and their fundamental rights aspects identified by the 
Commission so let us move forward to drawing some conclusions. 
 
Firstly, we can note that the first 4 options contained no specific EU 
operational conditions for fundamental rights, while options 5, 6 and 7 did. 
We can also see that probably the most relevant fundamental rights involved 
were those related to the protection of human dignity and private life as well 
as the protection of personal data. Moreover, concerns on rights of the child 
and right to equality and the prohibition of discrimination were also present 
in the fundamental rights considerations.676 In the analysis on fundamental 
rights aspects of the different options, the Commission simply states that the 
European fundamental rights legislation is applicable. Those Member States 
and airports who already have codes of conduct established for the use of 
security scanners would continue to use them without the Commission 
systematic control. The Commission, however, notes that even though some 
Member States use codes of practice in order to comply with fundamental 
right, their content and practical application may vary.677 Under these options, 
if those Member States not using security scanners would go for this type of 
security check, they would according to the Commission most probably 
establish rules on fundamental rights. The underlying concern that the 
Commission seems to have is that these rules would be different in different 
Member States and consequently this assessment of fundamental rights 
aspects at the national level and obvious lack of co-ordination would lead to 
different treatment of passengers and staff in different Member States.678 The 
                                                 
673 Ibid., p. 25. 
674 Ibid., p. 26. 
675 Ibid. 
676 See ibid., p. 31. 
677 See ibid., p. 32. 
678 Ibid. 
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arguments in favor of a level playing field and certain level of harmonization 
seem to be coming out of the impact assessment across the board.  
 
The Commission also drew attention to its notion of options 2 and 3, which 
had higher inherent fundamental rights risks than the baseline. For option 2, 
this was due to the removal of the exclusive list of allowed screening methods 
and technologies. This being the case, the lack of European standards on 
fundamental rights would concern not only the security scanners but all new 
equipment and methods to be used in the future to come.679 For option 3, the 
Commission raised concerns about the restrictions on the deployment of 
security scanners and the subsequent result of more airports using them. This 
would, for its part, lead to fragmentation of fundamental rights.680 As regards 
option 4, the same fundamental rights considerations are valid and pertinent, 
but the Commission however raised the issue of the eventuality of passengers 
suffering from biased or incomplete information on the potential threats to 
their fundamental rights.681 If we then move on to options 5, 6 and 7 we can 
make the general observation that these alternatives would set detailed 
operational conditions for compliance with fundamental rights. What is in 
common in all these three options is their intention to get rid of differing codes 
of conduct in different Member States and to replace them with EU 
operational conditions for fundamental rights that would create a framework 
for the use of security scanners. This approach would also ensure uniform 
treatment of passengers and staff in compliance with the EUCFR. 
 
The Commission argues that “the necessity of the interference with 
fundamental rights is justified by the public interest of a better and more 
harmonized level of detection necessary for enhancing aviation security”.682 
The Commission is thus putting forward arguments on the restriction of 
fundamental rights. The Commission justifies this interference with data 
protection and other fundamental rights with necessity and proportionality of 
the operational guidelines.  
 
The Commission considers that the presented option 6 is the best 
alternative in terms of fundamental rights.683 This is most obviously because 
of the possibility given to individuals to opt-out, a possibility that does not 
exist under options 5 and 7. A positive element would probably be an increased 
social acceptance that springs from the opt-out.684 The Commission finds that 
a passenger choosing the opt-out would have to undergo an alternative 
method of detection that would be as effective as security scanners, but in the 
end this might undermine European airport security.685 We should note, 
                                                 
679 Ibid., p. 32 
680 Ibid. In this alternative the Commission identified the risk of more and more airports using 
restrictions that would at the end of the day lead to a scattered fundamental rights regime. 
681 Ibid. 
682 Ibid. 
683 Ibid., pp. 33 and 55. 
684 Ibid., p. 33. The Commission remarks that empirical evidence shows that there are in fact only 
few people who use this opt-out and due to the number of passengers undergoing an alternative method 
of detection, also the impact on social acceptance is limited. 
685 Ibid., pp. 33-34. The Commission argues that giving the passengers various options may allow 
them to test the weak points in the security systems. Furthermore, the Commission attached importance 
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however, that other EU bodies had intervened in the context of the previous 
Communication on the use of security scanners. The EDPS, for example, drew 
attention to its view that consent should not be used to legitimize a process of 
personal data if there is no legal basis for the processing. With this, the EDPS 
meant that the legal necessity to legitimize the use of scanners should not be 
transferred on the consumer through a choice option. In practice, this means 
that turning down the scanner search and opting for an alternative method 
would put the individual under suspicion.686 In this context, the need for legal 
obligation was brought up with a reference to Article 8 of the ECHR and 
Articles 7 and 8 of the EUCFR. 
 
The overall selection of instrument is balancing and trade-offs between 
different policy choices and their positive and negative sides. We must, 
however, keep in mind that fundamental rights include criteria that cannot be 
compromised. If limitations to them are to be made, strict limitation 
requirements need to be complied with. Even if an option was considered to 
provide the best level of fundamental rights protection, options 5 and 7 were 
raised as examples of ensuring compliance with fundamental rights and option 
5 was evaluated as the best alternative from the angle of airport security.687 
From this point of view, the protection of fundamental rights was considered 
to be the weakest in options 1 and 2. Taken together, we can see that especially 
in the case of security scanners, fundamental rights considerations were put 
on par with other underlying factors of this legal dossier, such as cost-
efficiency and security aspects. We have to be cautious, however, when 
drawing conclusions on the Commission’s role in this case, because further 
fundamental rights deliberations were mainly a result of another EU 
institution, in this case the EP.  
 
It is also worth noting that other stakeholders intervened during this rather 
heated policy-making process. For example, the Centre for Science, Society 
and Citizenship issued a very detailed study on the impacts of the use of 
security scanners.688 Already earlier in the process the Commission had aimed 
at having relevant stakeholders on board in the consultation process on the 
use of security scanners. The Commission set up a public-private dialogue by 
establishing a Body Scanners Task force that convened in December 2008.689 
The policy report of the Center above all set the EUCFR at the apex and 
considered that it should be the general framework for the introduction in the 
EU of new technologies for passenger screening and aviation security.690  
 
                                                 
to demanding training and supervision aspects of the alternative detection method, the full body hand 
search. 
686 See EDPS comments on the Communication COM (2010) 311 final from the Commission to the 
European Parliament and the Council on the Use of Security Scanners at EU airports, p. 2. 
687 Ibid., p. 55. 
688 See Whole Body imaging at airport checkpoints: the ethical and policy context. Centre for 
Science, Society and Citizenship. Policy Report No. 2010/01. February 2010. 
689 Ibid., p. 11. The setting up of this task force was accompanied with a public consultation on the 
impact of the use of body scanners in the field of aviation security on human rights, privacy, personal 
dignity, health and data protection. 
690 Ibid., p. 23. Against the legal and political background the report of the Centre especially focused 
on the need to take ethical aspects into consideration when dealing with security scanners given their 
sensitivity from the point of view of fundamental rights. See ibid., p. 44. 
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I will take the EUCFR as the basis of the analysis on the relevant 
fundamental rights involved in the legislative case on security scanners. We 
can easily identify the following provisions that need to be considered. Article 
1 deals with human dignity – from the use of security scanners concerns can 
be expressed if all the practical methods by using security scanners are fully in 
line with this provision. Another key provision that was raised during 
discussion on the legislative file on security scanners was Article 8, which deals 
with the protection of personal data. Also clear links with Article 21 (non-
discrimination) and in some senses also Articles 24 (the rights of the child) 
and Article 26 (integration of persons with disabilities). Pursuant to Article 52 
of the EUCFR limitations to these rights and freedoms can be made although 
to a clearly defined extent.691   
 
 
2. Closing the security scanner file: The Commission 
regulation of 2011 
 
In terms of legislation the next step taken by the Commission was the 
approval of the Commission Regulation 1141/2011 of 10 November 2011, 
amending Regulation 272/2009 supplementing the common basic standards 
on civil aviation security as regards the use of security scanners in the EU 
airports.692 It was also accepted by the Council and the European Parliament. 
This Commission Regulation amended the regulation in force on common 
basic standards by adding the possibility to use “security scanners which do 
not use ionising radiation”.693 This Regulation made the use of security 
scanners optional within the EU. So, it remains up to every Member State and 
their airports to decide whether to go for this security screening measure.  
 
In addition to allowing the use of security scanners the Regulation also 
provided some useful technical common standards for the performance of the 
scanners. More interestingly, it also included a separate recital on 
fundamental rights. In the preamble, the possibility to undergo alternative 
screening methods was confirmed. Moreover, in the same context, it was 
stated that the Regulation is in line with the EUCFR and that it respects 
fundamental rights. In particular, respect for human dignity and for private 
and family life, the right to protection of personal data, the rights of the child, 
the right to freedom of religion and the prohibition of discrimination were 
                                                 
691 Article 52 of the EUCFR on the scope and interpretation of rights and principles sets out in its 
paragraph 1 that ”any limitation on the exercise of the rights and freedoms recognized by this charter 
must be provided for by the law and respect the essence of those rights and freedoms. Subject to the 
principle of proportionality, limitations may be made only if they are necessary and genuinely meet 
objectives of general interest recognized by the Union or the need to protect the rights and freedoms of 
others”. 
692 Commission Regulation (EU) No 1141/2011 of 10 November 2011 amending (EC) Regulation No 
272/2009 supplementing the common basic standards on civil aviation security as regards the use of 
security scanners at the EU airports. OJL L 293/22, 11.11.2011. 
693 See Article 1 of the Commission Regulation and the Annex related to it. Legal technically the 
amendment was therefore executed with an annex solution that is a very common method in the EU law 
of introducing changes to legislation in force. At the heart of this method lies an operational Article that 
establishes a linkage to the annex that contains the real substance of the amendment. 
 172 
mentioned in the text.694 Eventually, the Regulation referred also to its 
application according to these rights and principles and also in the other parts 
of the text fundamental rights safeguards were introduced.695 
 
It is noteworthy that over the longer term, the fundamental rights 
considerations in the Commission changed substantially. This was due to 
pressure from the EP and other stakeholders involved in the case of security 
scanners but if we look at the political and legislative documents of the 
Commission we can see a change in the internal approach of the Commission 
as well. Another proof of this is the Commission Regulation on security 
scanners wherein fundamental rights aspects were anchored in a totally 
different way than in previous legislative documents. The Commission 
Regulation, also by definition, is Commission-driven legislation and without a 
considerable rethinking within the Commission such a different approach 
would not have been possible. We only need to see the legal form of this piece 
of legislation to understand this. 
 
This tendency can be further confirmed in the Commission implementing 
Regulation 1147/2011 adopted on 11 November 2011 amending Regulation 
185/2010 implementing the common basic standards on civil aviation security 
as regards the use of security scanners at EU airports.696 In addition to the 
similar recital on fundamental rights as in the previously presented 
Commission Regulation, the Commission implementing Regulation enshrined 
important requirements for the use of security scanners from a fundamental 
rights point of view. Again, security scanners have been presented only as an 
alternative and strict conditions have been set for their use.697 Passengers shall 
be entitled to opt out from a security scanner and in this case alternative 
screening method will be used. Furthermore, paragraph 3 of the annex 
included important supplementary requirement for the use of security 
scanners especially regarding data protection, human dignity and also for the 
prohibition of discrimination.698 From a practical viewpoint, all these 
requirements were relevant for securing compliance with fundamental rights. 
 
If we take into account the requirements set out in this implementing 
Regulation, we can see that there is a significant difference in this 
Implementing Regulation and the legal documents from which the 
Commission started the legislative saga of security scanners. It has been a long 
journey from nearly omitting fundamental rights in the early legal instruments 
of the Commission compared to the Commission Regulation and the 
                                                 
694 See recital 7 of the Commission Regulation. 
695 See recitals 7 and 6 of the Commission Regulation. 
696 Commission implementing Regulation (EU) No 1147/2011 of 11 November 2011 amending 
Regulation (EU)  No 185/2010 implementing the common basic safety standards on civil aviation 
security as regards the use of security scanners at EU airports. OJL L 294/7, 12.11.2011. 
697 Implementing Regulation, see paragraphs 2 and 3. 
698 Sub-paragraphs a-f included i.a. requirements related to storing, retaining, copying, printing, 
retrieving and deleting of images. Furthermore, they contained conditions for location of human 
reviewers and technical devices capable of storing, copying, photographing or recording images. 
Moreover, one can identify a block of requirements related to anonymity of screened persons vis-à-vis 
images and blurring and obscuring of images in order to prevent the identification of the face of the 
passenger. Lastly, requirements include the right of passenger to request his or her body to by analysed 
by a human reviewer of his or her choice.  
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implementing Regulation. In its annual report on the implementation of 
Regulation 300/2008, the Commission further underscored that it will pay 
particular attention to ensure that the rules, including those on fundamental 
rights, are fully respected by the Member States.699 
 
 
3. Assessment of the case in relation to the ex ante review 
of fundamental rights: EP as an initiator of the review of 
fundamental rights and the change of the position of the 
Commission 
 
On the right to privacy it is set out in the Charter: 
 
Article 7  
Respect for private and family life  
Everyone has the right to respect for his or her private and family life, home 
and communications. 
 
This classical human right can be seen to reflect the right to protection of 
this realm as stated in all constitutions of Member States and hence to belong 
to the basic rules of Union law.700 We should take note that privacy and the 
right to privacy do not mean the same. The right to privacy is instrumentally 
targeted on something while in privacy at issue is something, i.e. certain 
special interests that are targeted by the norms.701 Article 7 can also be 
considered to entail a positive obligation, which is stronger when the 
possibilities of an individual to take care of the protection by himself are 
weaker.702 
 
For a long time, the right to privacy was deemed to mean the right to be left 
alone.703 Nowadays, according to many commentators there is more to 
privacy. The respect for a private and family life is more than simply the right 
to be left alone.704 Underlying the discussion on privacy is the classical 
dichotomy between private and public realms discussed already in the works 
of Socrates and Aristotle.705 The CJEU has increasingly referred to Article 7 of 
the Charter in its recent interpretation practice.706 It is particularly noteworthy 
that in May 2014 the CJEU came out with an extremely important ruling in 
                                                 
699 See Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council. 2011 annual report 
on the implementation of regulation (EC) No 300/2008 on common rules in the field of civil aviation 
security. COM(2012) 412 final, Brussels 24.7.2012, p. 4. 
700 See Bernsdorff Norbert: Kapitel II, Freiheiten. In Meyer Jürgen (Hrsg.): Kommentar zur Charta 
der Grundrechte der Europäischen Union. Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft. Baden-Baden 2003, p. 146. This 
study is creditable due to thorough discussion on the preparation of the Charter in the European 
Convention. 
701 Mahkonen Sami: Oikeus yksityisyyteen. Werner Söderström Lakitieto Oy. Porvoo 1997, p. 14. 
702 Bernsdorff, p. 151. 
703 See Blume, pp. 13-14. 
704 See Bernsdorff, p. 152. 
705 Turkington Richard C., Trubow George B. and Allen Anita L.: Privacy. Cases and Materials. The 
John Marshall Publishing Company. Houston 1992, p. 1. 
706 See for instance C-212/13 Rynes. 
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the case Google Spain SL, Google Inc. v Agencia Española de Protección de 
Datos (AEPD), Mario Costeja González.707 The Court confirmed in this case 
"the right to be forgotten" of individuals. The verdict represents an important 
interpretation of Data Protection Directive and Articles 7 and 8 of the Charter 
and it will certainly change the whole setting of EU data protection regime in 
relation to the right to be forgotten. 
 
We can interestingly conclude that in the case of security scanners of all the 
EU institutions, it was the EP that most effectively fulfilled its role in the ex 
ante review of fundamental rights. The Commission probably acted somewhat 
hastily with certain kind of a tunnel view focused on security aspects. Because 
the Council was more or less unable to act and in this situation it was the EP 
that raised the fundamental right concerns and somehow got the discussion 
on the right track. The EP functioned as a primus motor in securing 
compliance ex ante with fundamental rights in the EU legislative process. The 
role of the EP as a protagonist in policy-making with regard to human rights 
has been obvious. Very often this has been seen in a conflicting relation to the 
Council.708  
 
It is interesting that the beginning of this legislative story happened already 
before the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty. In the current situation, there 
are even more constitutional powers for the EP to carry out its role. Another 
observation links the example with procedural handling of fundamental rights 
issues within the EP architecture. The problems that emerged were largely 
dealt with in the context of a sectorial EP Committee, namely the TRAN. This 
can be regarded as the most welcome sign since it indicates that the EP 
structure is prepared to detect and tackle horizontal fundamental rights issues 
in prima facie sector-specific legislative dossiers. 
 
Lessons learnt from the case of security scanners can be concluded by 
stating that in this legislative file, the EP exercised strong ex ante review of 
fundamental rights. The EP was able to take a leading role in highlighting the 
serious fundamental rights concerns, and also bringing a strong political 
impetus, to take into account fundamental rights dimension of the dossier. A 
good quality of legal technical analysis and argumentation was successfully 
combined with the necessary political thrust. The case of body scanners is a 
good example that ex ante review of the EP can have a positive effect on the 
EU legislative process. With this file, the EP put the whole process on the right 
track that would not have been the case otherwise. I find it quite obvious that 
if the initial security scanner legislation would have been adopted, it would 
eventually have ended in the docket of the CJEU. In this case, annulling this 
piece of legislation would have been at issue due to insufficient proportionality 
considerations. The focus in the assessment would then have been on whether 
the legislation is in line with Article 52 (1). 
                                                 
707 C-131/12 Google. Also this landmark ruling originated from a reference for a preliminary ruling 
under Article 267 of TFEU. 
708 See Schneider Catherine: Menschenrechte und Übertragung der Souveränität auf die 
Europäische Union: Folgen für die Definition und Entwicklung der Menschenrechte. In Haller Gret, 
Günther Klaus, Neumann Ulfrid (Hg.): Menschenrechte und Volkssouveränität in Europa. Gerichte als 
Vormunde der Demokratie? Campus Verlag GmbH. Frankfurt am Main 2011, pp. 205-206 
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What conclusions can we draw from the EP position presented above? It is 
obvious that the EP is keen on taking a significantly higher profile in the AFSJ 
and protection of fundamental rights. It is encouraging to note that at least in 
these statements, the EP pays a lot of attention to the preparatory phase of 
legislation that would have the merit of improving quality of legislative texts. 
It remains to be seen if the views presented in the resolution are more likely 
showing the new competence of the EP in the AFSJ or if these notions of taking 
fundamental rights more seriously, also in the preparatory phase of legislation, 
will lead to concrete actions from the part of the EP. In any case, we have a 
reason to believe that a new form of ex ante review of fundamental rights in 
the EP has emerged in addition to traditional methods of bringing 
fundamental rights into EU discussion, like the written questions of MEPs.709 
One could even say that the ex ante review of the EP is already in a 
consolidation phase. This is also a proof of the strength of European 
constitutionalism with one expression thereof being the pluralist ex ante 
review: After all, the EP was able to influence the Commission with 
fundamental right arguments in an effective manner, which was responsible 
for the preparation of this legislative file. Consequently, the Commission had 
to engage in a wide-ranging impact assessment focusing on the relation of the 
proposed legislative act to fundamental rights set out in the Charter. 
Substance-wise, the problem from the beginning was the inadequate handling 
of the Charter rights in the preparation of legislative proposal.  
 
As for the case of PNR, in the initial security scanner proposal the issue of 
limiting fundamental rights went too far. If we look at the substance, we can 
identify again the emerging concern on proportionality and we have a good 
reason to say that this test was failed in the initial proposal. The principal claim 
in this file can be found in non-discrimination, right to privacy and the right 
to data protection. In this case, ex ante review was also carried successfully in 
the law-making process, despite the failure of the Commission to take 
fundamental rights seriously in its initial proposal. Once more, the discussion 
was focused on the limitation dimension of the legislative proposal where the 
Commission tried to stretch the boundaries of limitation. It has been argued 
that counter-terrorism is a policy area labelled by externalization and 
Europeanisation and hence illustrative for the expanding powers of the 
executive branch.710 Only seldom were calls for positive obligations heard in 
this case.  
 
 
                                                 
709 The question for written answer is a procedure in accordance with rule 117 of the Rules of 
Procedure of the European Parliament whereby any Member may put questions for written answer to 
the President of the European Council, the Council, the Commission or the Vice-President of the 
Commission/High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. MEPs very often 
have used this method to take up issues related to fundamental and human rights. 
710 See Curtin Deirdre: Executive Power of the European Union: Law, Practices and Living 
Constitution. Oxford University Press. Oxford 2009, p. 195. 
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VII The Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 
(ACTA) 
 
Another interesting legislative file can be found in the field of intellectual 
property rights. The Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA) is an 
international trade agreement which aims at tackling intellectual property 
rights violations and ensuring that a high level of protection of these rights can 
be enforced globally. By enhanced international co-operation and IPR 
enforcement, the objective of the ACTA is to combat counterfeiting and piracy. 
On 14 April 2008, the Council authorized the Commission to negotiate this 
agreement on behalf of the EU and its Member States. The competence of the 
EU is indeed strong on topics touching upon common trade policy. The 
negotiations on the ACTA agreement were then followed, then concluded and 
the agreement was initialled on 25 November 2010.711 In the course of 
negotiations on ACTA, the EDPS submitted an opinion on the negotiations on 
ACTA on 22 February 2010 on its own initiative.712 The EDPS first considered 
that enforcement of IPR raised significant issues as to the impact of the 
measures taken to combat counterfeiting and piracy on individuals’ 
fundamental rights, and in particular their right to privacy and data 
protection.713 This being the case, the EDPS also found it regrettable that the 
Commission did not consult the EDPS in this file.714  
 
The Council adopted ACTA in December 2011 and it was signed by the 
Commission and altogether 22 Member States on 26 January 2012.715 In order 
to enter into force as a part of the EU legal framework, the ratification of 
Member States is required as well as the consent of the EP.716 Once the 
negotiations drew to a close, the ACTA agreement very soon found itself in 
difficulties in many EU Member States and large-scale movements and 
demonstrations against the ACTA took place. Serious concerns on the 
compatibility of ACTA with EU fundamental rights were raised across the 
board. This was also noted by the EU institutions. Another sign of sensitivity 
of this dossier was the hesitance of the Member States to ratify the agreement. 
In the academic circles, too, the agreement was faced with a lot of criticism, 
mainly due to serious fundamental right concerns. 717 
 
 
                                                 
711 See Council Decision on the Conclusion of the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement between the 
European union and its Member States, Australia, Canada, Japan, the Republic of Korea, the United 
Mexican States, the Kingdom of Morocco, New Zealand, the Republic of Singapore, the Swiss 
Confederation and the United States of America, 12195/11, Brussels 23 August 2011, recitals 1 and 2. 
712 Opinion of the European Data Protection Supervisor on the current negotiations by the European 
Union of an Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA): OJ C147/1, 5.6.2010.  
713 Ibid., paragraph 3. 
714 Ibid., paragraph 4. 
715 Ibid., paragraph 3. 
716 Pursuant to Article 40 of the ACTA agreement the ACTA would enter internationally into force 
when ratified by six signatory states. 
717 See e.g. opinion of European Academics on ACTA. Available at http://www.iri.uni-
hannover.de/tl_files.pdf/ACTA_opinion_20111_2.pdf. Visited on 25.10.2012. 
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1. EP takes a high profile in safeguarding fundamental 
rights 
 
The role of the EP regarding the draft Council decision is very simple under 
the TFEU. The EP consent for the adoption is needed and therefore the EP can 
either approve or reject the text. It is clear that the EP cannot directly change 
the content of the Council Decision, but  the necessity to have the EP consent 
provides the EP with some heavy arsenal in dealing with the Council 
Decision.718 In October 2012 the Chairman of the JURI committee requested 
the opinion of the EP Legal Service on question related to ACTA, including 
whether ACTA’s application can be considered compatible with the Treaties, 
the general principles of Union law and the Union acquis.719 The general 
principles of the Union law include fundamental rights and therefore the Legal 
Service also assessed the compliance of the ACTA with fundamental rights. As 
remarked by the Legal Service, the framework of the EUCFR and the ECHR 
must be taken into account in the analysis. The Legal Service found that ACTA 
belongs to the sensitive area of potentially conflicting fundamental rights, 
basically the IPRs on the one hand and the protection of personal data and the 
right to fair and due process on the other hand.720 
 
It is striking that the Legal Service considers that ACTA per se imposes no 
obligation on the EU that is incompatible with fundamental rights. The Legal 
Service rather suggests that ACTA allows the Contracting Parties to implement 
the agreement in a manner which balances the positions of the different right 
holders involved.721 In its conclusions, however, the Legal Service reminds that 
in the implementation and application of the ACTA, there is a need to strike a 
fair balance between the different and potentially conflicting fundamental 
rights. This is clearly up to the EU institutions and the Member States.722 
Reading the opinion between the lines, one could consider that the Legal 
Service aims to say that this is more like a political decision. At least the tone 
is very cautious and no infringements of fundamental rights have been 
identified by the Legal Service. Interestingly, later the EP Committees, most 
notably the LIBE, took a much stricter view on the ACTA than the Legal Service 
of the institution. The opinions of the technocratic and political bodies 
therefore differ considerably. In the face of the fundamental rights concerns, 
the Commission referred the ACTA to the CJEU. The question which was 
agreed upon unanimously within the Commission was: “Is the Anti-
Counterfeiting Agreement (ACTA) compatible with the European Treaties, in 
                                                 
718 As I see it, it would be possible for the EP to press indirectly for changes in the Council Decision. 
If the problematic provisions were identified the EP could in an informal way try to impact the 
Commission and the Council to introduce changes in the legislative process in a way that would make 
the text acceptable in the end also for the EP. The problem with this file is, however, not the Council 
decision itself that can be characterized as technical, but rather the underlying ACTA agreement. 
719 See Legal opinion of the EP Legal Service on Anti-Counterfeiting Agreement (ACTA) – 
Conformity with European Union law, paragraphs 1 and 2. Available at http://lists.act-on-
acta.eu/pipermail/hub/attachments/20111219/59f3ebe6/attachment-0010.pdf.  Visited on 24.10.2012. 
720 Ibid., paragraph 28. 
721 Ibid., paragraph 30. 
722 See ibid., paragraph 40 e). 
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particular with the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union?”723 
By doing so, the Commission rightly wanted to avoid situation where this legal 
text would run counter to the provisions of the EUCFR. Consequently, also the 
EP proceedings were postponed for the time being until the CJEU would give 
its view on whether the ACTA is in line with European fundamental rights. 
 
 
2. EDPS calls for taking the right to data protection and 
the right to privacy seriously 
 
Again, the EDPS intervened with a legal opinion, this time on the draft 
Council Decision.724 This second opinion comes mainly from the perspective 
of data protection and reflects the views presented in the first opinion. The 
EDPS throughout the opinion underscores that the enforcement of IPR should 
not happen at the expense of fundamental rights. In this case, these rights 
include right to privacy, data protection and freedom of expression, as well as 
presumption of innocence and effective judicial protection.725 The EDPS 
continued by stating that monitoring of users’ behavior in the internet may 
interfere with the above-mentioned rights and freedoms.726 The EDPS stressed 
that necessity and proportionality requirements of the proposed measures 
would be in breach with Article 8 of the ECHR, Articles 7 and 8 of the EUCFR 
and the most relevant piece of secondary EU legislation in this field, the Data 
Protection Directive.727 
 
Attention was finally drawn to Article 27 of the agreement by EDPS legal 
analysis, from the angle of EU legislation.728 The most important legal point 
was however made in the very final chapter of the analysis. Here, the EDPS 
considered that “the Agreement does not contain sufficient limitations and 
safeguards in respect of the implementation of measures that entail the 
monitoring of electronic communications networks on a large-scale. In 
particular, it does not lay out safeguards such as the respect of the rights to 
privacy and data protection, effective judicial protection, due process, and the 
respect of the principle of the presumption of innocence”.729 The EDPS 
presented an extremely critical attitude towards the ACTA. As we will see, a 
large part of this criticism was taken at the political level by the EP. We must 
now turn to the EP consideration of ACTA drawing inspiration from the legal 
opinions of its Legal Service. 
 
                                                 
723 See Press release of the European Commission Directorate-General for Trade: Update on ACTA’s 
referral to the European Court of Justice. 4 April 2012. 
724 See Opinion of the European Data Protection Supervisor on the proposal for a Council Decision 
on the Conclusion of the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement between the European Union and its 
Member States, Australia, Canada, Japan, the Republic of Korea, the United Mexican States, the 
Kingdom of Morocco, New Zealand, the Republic of Singapore, the Swiss Confederation and the United 
States of America., 24.4.2012.  
725 Ibid., p. 15. 
726 Ibid., pp. 15-16. 
727 Ibid., p. 16. 
728 Ibid. Concerns were raised particularly on the vague scope of enforcement measures, lack of 
definitions and the implementation of the so-called voluntary enforcement cooperation measures. 
729 Ibid. 
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3. EP rejects the ACTA - test of permissible limitations in 
action 
 
The EP finally rejected ACTA before the CJEU was able to provide a ruling 
on the compatibility of the ACTA with the EU law. This took place in the EP 
plenary on 4 July 2012 with an overwhelming majority of MEPs voting against 
the controversial ACTA.730 In fact, this was the first that the EP used its power 
to say no to an international trade agreement in the legislative framework of 
the Lisbon Treaty. 
 
To be able to explain this voting behavior, we must turn to the 
recommendation of the responsible Committee on International Trade that 
compiles of opinions of other relevant EP committees.731 It is interesting that 
in their separate opinions, the Committee on Development, Committee on 
Industry, Research and Energy and Committee on Legal Affairs, the 
Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs proposed that 
Parliament decline to give its consent. This means that all the involved 
Parliamentary Committees shared the same view. Of the contribution of all the 
Committees, the most significant was the opinion of the LIBE committee. The 
LIBE opinion was extremely detailed and precise in analysing fundamental 
rights aspects of ACTA and it well illustrates the importance that LIBE puts on 
ex ante review of fundamental rights. A wide variety of legal sources has been 
used for the LIBE opinion and it is actually far from being merely a political 
pursuit masqueraded as a legal opinion. Quite the contrary, the LIBE opinion 
analyses in an accurate and thorough manner especially the ACTA in relation 
to compliance with the EUCFR. 
 
It is worth noting that one of the major tasks of the LIBE Committee after 
the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty is to also assess the compatibility of 
EU legal instruments with the EUCFR. This was exactly the case with the 
ACTA. The LIBE itself considered that although the role of the CJEU 
enshrined in the Treaties should be respected, the LIBE assessment “must take 
into consideration Parliament’s role in the protection and promotion of 
fundamental rights in their letter as well as in their spirit, in the external and 
internal dimensions, from the perspective of the individual as well as from that 
of a community.”732 This reflects a commitment from the side of the EP and 
LIBE, particularly in the ex ante review of fundamental rights. The quality of 
the legal assessment of the LIBE with various sources and useful references to 
the case law of the European courts is also better than usually is the case with 
the EP anodyne legal analyses. In the opinion of the LIBE Committee attached 
                                                 
730 European Parliament rejects ACTA. Press release of the European Parliament. The outcome of 
the vote does not leave any room for speculation because altogether 478 MEPs voted against, 165 
abstained and only 39 voted in favour of the ACTA. 
731 Recommendation on the Draft Council Decision on the Conclusion of the Anti-Counterfeiting 
Trade Agreement between the European Union and its Member States, Australia, Canada, Japan, the 
Republic of Korea, the United Mexican States, the Kingdom of Morocco, New Zealand, the Republic of 
Singapore, the Swiss Confederation and the United States of America. Committee on International 
Trade, Rapporteur David Martin. A7-0204/2012, PE486.174v03-00, 22.6.2012. 
732 Draft recommendation, LIBE opinion paragraph 15, p. 18. 
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to the EP draft recommendation, the following points in particular were 
elaborated. After having acknowledged the importance of intellectual property 
rights in many respects, the LIBE turns to position itself on some key aspects 
of the ACTA. The LIBE criticises quite heavily the opaque nature of ACTA 
negotiations concluding that the EP has not been informed in the course of the 
negotiations and claiming that the process has lacked transparency.733  After 
these procedural remarks, the more interesting part of the LIBE opinion starts. 
 
LIBE finds that it is extremely important to strike a balance between IPRs 
and fundamental rights. In particular, freedom of expression, the right to 
privacy and protection of personal data are mentioned together with the 
confidentiality of communications and the right to due process. The LIBE 
reminds that this fair balance can be found in international law, European law 
and the case law of the CJEU.734 Later in the opinion, the LIBE goes even 
further by stating very rightly that the new Lisbon Treaty framework has 
fundamentally changed the landscape of the EU that now has a multi-level 
system of fundamental rights protection that emanates from multiple sources 
and is enforced through a variety of mechanisms. The EUCFR, the ECHR and 
constitutional traditions are mentioned, as well as the interpretation practice 
of the ECtHR and the CJEU. Furthermore, the exemplary role of the EU in 
fundamental rights has been taken up, also in relation to external policies.735 
 
The crucial issue for the EP seems to be the relation between the 
fundamental right of IPR under Article 17 (2) of the EUCFR and other 
fundamental rights.736 The other group of fundamental rights consists 
primarily of privacy, data protection and the freedom of expression. So, we are 
approaching a classical weighing and balancing situation. This is the case even 
though we are currently in the legislative phase. For the LIBE, too, the 
limitation of fundamental rights pursuant to Article 52 of the EUCFR plays a 
significant role. It stresses, according to the limitation requirements set out in 
the EUCFR, that the permissible restrictions must be provided for by law, 
necessary and proportionate to the legitimate aims pursued.737  
 
In the context of the ACTA, the LIBE also reminds – basing its arguments 
on case Kadi – of the CJEU according to which general principles of EU law, 
such as fundamental rights, cannot be prejudiced by international obligations 
stemming from international agreements.738 All the EU acts simply have to 
respect fundamental rights. If the LIBE pointed its finger on the Commission 
for the lack of transparency in the ACTA negotiations, the same is true with 
the impact assessments of the Commission. The LIBE finds it deeply 
regrettable that no fundamental rights specific impact assessment was carried 
out and considers that this runs counter to the views expressed in the 
Commission’s strategy for the effective implementation of the Charter.739 As 
                                                 
733 Ibid., LIBE opinion paragraph 3, p. 16. 
734 Ibid., paragraph 4, p. 16. 
735 Ibid., paragraph 8, p. 17. 
736 See ibid., paragraph 6, p. 16. 
737 See ibid., paragraph 11, p. 17. 
738 See ibid., paragraph 12, p. 18. 
739 Ibid., paragraph 13, p. 18. 
 181 
for the hard substance of the ACTA, the LIBE found that especially the 
provisions of the agreement on privacy and disclosure of information and 
general obligations with respect to enforcement were relevant from the 
fundamental rights point of view. Furthermore, provisions that aimed at 
preserving freedom of expression, fair process and privacy were considered as 
problematic. 740 Generally, the impact of the ACTA on legal certainty and the 
appropriate balance between fundamental rights were deemed doubtful by the 
LIBE. Furthermore, the LIBE expresses its concern about the implementation 
of the provisions of the ACTA. The committee brings up serious misgivings 
about the transposition as the rather vague provisions may lead to 
implementation that is illegal or contrary to fundamental rights.741 Moreover, 
regarding the vague provisions and allowed flexibility, the LIBE is concerned 
about legal uncertainty caused by the ACTA.742 This legal uncertainty is 
omnipresent, particularly in Article 11 (information related to infringements), 
Article 23 (criminal offences) and Article 27 (scope of the enforcement 
measures in the digital environment and particularly paragraph 3 thereof). 
These provisions were deemed especially problematic from the point of view 
of protection of personal data, the right to due process and the right to conduct 
business.743 The lack of precision of the ACTA provisions is one of the 
underlying reasons for these concerns.744 
 
By referring to Article 49 of the EUCFR, the LIBE also raises the discussion 
of the maxim nullum crimen, nulla poena sine lege. This is because section 4 
(criminal enforcement) of the ACTA is ambiguous.745 This is yet another 
example of the very fundamental issues inherent in the ACTA text, a serious 
source of problems that were taken up by the committee. The LIBE concludes 
its deliberations by stating that the proposed text “does not strike a fair balance 
between the IPRs and other fundamental rights and freedoms”.746 This goes 
especially to the right to protection of personal data, the freedom to receive or 
impart information and the freedom to conduct a business.747  Moreover the 
LIBE clearly finds that “ACTA does not provide guarantees on preserving the 
right to respect for private life, the right of defence (particularly the right to be 
heard) or the presumption of innocence.”748 The same applies to the right of 
respect for private life and communications.749 The LIBE comes to an end by 
stating that according to the jurisprudence of the ECtHR, any limitation on 
fundamental rights must be foreseeable in its effects, clear, precise and 
accessible, as well as necessary in a democratic society and proportionate to 
the aims pursued.750 Finally, the LIBE draws its conclusion to a close by noting 
                                                 
740 Ibid., paragraph 16, pp. 18-19. 
741 See ibid., paragraph 18, p. 19. 
742 Ibid., paragraph 19, p. 19. 
743 Ibid., paragraph 20, p. 19. 
744 In the context of the amorphis scope and vague phrasing the LIBE also refers to the opinion of 
the EDPS. 
745 Ibid., paragraph 22, p. 19. 
746 Ibid., paragraph 25, p. 20. 
747 Against this background the LIBE refers to the CJEU ruling in case C-70/10 Scarlett Extended 
SA v Société belge des auteurs, compositeurs et éditeurs SCRL (SABAM). 
748 Ibid., paragraph 26, p. 20. 
749 Ibid., paragraph 27, p. 20. 
750 Ibid., paragraph 32, p. 21. 
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that ACTA is incompatible with the EUCFR and recommends that the EP 
declines to consent to the conclusion of ACTA.751 
 
The ultimate deathblow to the ACTA became unavoidable when the 
rapporteur of the International Trade Committee concluded in the explanatory 
statement that “the intended benefits of this International agreement are far 
outweighed by the potential threats to civil liberties. Given the vagueness of 
certain aspects of the text and the uncertainty over its interpretation, the EP 
cannot guarantee adequate protection for citizens’ rights in the future under 
ACTA”.752 The rapporteur therefore recommended that the EP declines to give 
consent to the ACTA and consequently, a draft EP legislative resolution was 
drafted and annexed to the recommendation.753 In the resolution, the EP 
declined to consent to the conclusion of the ACTA and this was the end of the 
story for the EU participation in this agreement. 
 
 
4. Assessment of the case in relation to the ex ante review 
of fundamental rights 
 
From an institutional angle, too, the ACTA is a very interesting case. This 
is because traditionally common commercial policy has been the 
Commission’s playground belonging to the EU exclusive competence. In the 
new constitutional framework, however, the consent of the EP is required in 
the international agreements – this is a change introduced in the EU primary 
law mainly because of the need to increase democratic accountability. We can 
now see that the EP has also used this right and what makes this case 
extremely interesting is that in the case of ACTA it happened because of 
fundamental rights reasons. This can be seen as a challenge to the 
Commission’s role in this field but it is even more important to see in this case 
the strengthened role of the EP in ex ante review of fundamental rights and its 
readiness to use the all the necessary legal tools to ensure compliance with the 
EUCFR. This is a proof of the increasingly high profile of the EP in ex ante 
review. 
 
Another conclusion to be drawn from the role of the EP is the key 
importance of the LIBE committee. In handling of the ACTA, we can see seeds 
of LIBE turning into a real parliamentary ex ante review body of fundamental 
rights. We may well see even further development in this because it is the LIBE 
that very often deals with fundamental rights sensitive dossiers. The bold 
position of the LIBE in ACTA should also be seen as a commitment to 
effectively safeguarding the rights and freedoms enshrined in the EUCFR. 
 
In light of the ACTA it is justifiable to talk about the EP and particularly its 
LIBE committee as an emerging ex ante review institution that undertakes to 
assess the compliance of legal instruments with the EUCFR. The EP is clearly 
ready to use its new constitutional rights, also when it comes to fundamental 
                                                 
751 Ibid., paragraph 34, p. 21. 
752 Recommendation, p. 7. 
753 Ibid., p. 5. 
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rights in international agreements. Additionally, as we have seen in other case 
studies, the EP seems to be especially willing to take onboard fundamental 
rights considerations of other key players, such as the FRA and the EDPS. The 
same is true in this case with the EDPS, but in the handling of ACTA, the EP 
also functioned very much in an independent manner and came out with very 
bold and groundbreaking conclusions. Seen from an internal angle, the 
Committee structure of the EP actually took a much bolder position on ACTA 
than its Legal Service. 
 
Can the true colours of the EP be seen in this file with regard to the ex 
ante review? Critics of the EP approach might say that the EP position on 
ACTA was value-laden and political. One may also hear criticism towards 
the timing of the EP final position on ACTA. Why did the EP not wait for 
the CJEU view on this highly controversial agreement? I cannot subscribe 
to this point of view. First, the analysis of the EP was legally very sound and 
arguments put forward in it were solid. Second, with its new competence, 
the EP should be considered to be a major interlocutor in fundamental 
rights issues and an important actor exercising ex ante review of 
fundamental rights against the background of the EUCFR. The EP should 
not be seen as usurper of politico-legal power hi-jacking legislative dossiers 
with the means of fundamental rights.754 On the contrary, this should be 
seen positively as taking fundamental rights seriously in the preparatory 
phase in sector specific legal instruments. 
 
The way forward for Bellamy seems to be the system of procedural 
democratic checks and controls. These procedures underscore the importance 
of openness in decision-making and within such a system it is justice that 
designates a modus vivendi achieved through a balance of power between 
interlocking institutions, rather than an overlapping consensus on core 
constitutional values that may be upheld by a court of putative moral 
experts.755  Concerning the question of democracy, it is equally important to 
try to democratise EU legal and judicial discourses.756 The experience from 
ACTA can be seen as a sign of democratisation of the EU and its legislative 
processes, which in this case has taken place through the EP. 
 
In this case, "softer" fundamental rights prevailed over economically-
oriented fundamental rights — in this sense it can be seen as a continuum to 
Schmidberger. Proportionality was again clearly one of the key concerns. The 
limitation criteria were effectively applied by the EP, which took a strict and 
appropriate view with regard to fundamental rights and their relation to 
                                                 
754 Laurent Dutoit hits the bulls-eye when remarking about the EP that “en effet, la croissance, de 
manière coutumière, de ses pouvoirs est une caractèristique de son développement. D’un autre côté, on 
s’aperÇoit rapidement de la difficulté de sa position dans l’equilibre institutionnel”. Dutoit Laurent: 
Parlement Européen et société civile. Vers de nouveaux aménagements institutionnels. Bruylant-
Academia s.a. Louvain-la-Neuve 2009, p. 99. 
755 Bellamy Richard: The Constitution of Europe: Rights or Democracy? In Bellamy Richard, 
Bufacchi Victorio and Castiglione Dario (Eds.) Democracy and Constitutional Culture in the Union of 
Europe. Lothian Foundation Press. London 1995. p. 166. 
756 Maduro Miguel Poiares: Contrapunctual law: Europe’s Constitutional Pluralism in Action. In 
Walker Neil (ed.): Sovereignty in Transition. Hart Publishing. Oxford and Portland, Oregon 2003, p. 
518. 
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Article 52(1) of the Charter. One cannot overdo the importance of the EP 
applying the test of permissible limitations based mainly on the "limitation 
Article" of the Charter. This demonstrated sound legal argumentation in the 
background of political deliberations. There is no denying, either, that the 
political pressure to do this was high but the EP acted in conformity with 
fundamental rights and was able to bring proportionality sharply to the 
discussion. 
 
ACTA belongs to the series of cases which would have been considered in 
terms of substance to be in breach with the EUCFR by the CJEU if not rejected 
by the EP. This case also illustrates the holistic nature and power of ex ante 
review conducted by many EU actors with an impact also on international 
agreements and thus on external relations. Therefore, ACTA can be regarded 
as a proof of the strength of pluralist ex ante review in European 
constitutionalism. It is interesting that in this case it also has implications on 
the outside world and not only the EU. In this case, it goes hand in hand with 
the increased competence of the EP in external relations.    
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VIII European Investigation Order 
 
Yet another interesting file is the European investigation order (EIO) – a 
Member-States-driven proposal touching upon the area of criminal law.757 The 
domain of criminal law is interesting in the sense that it has traditionally 
belonged to the very essence of sovereignty of Member States’ legal systems. 
During the last decade, the integration of EU law and approximation of 
Member States’ laws have progressed also in the field of criminal law. The EIO 
is an initiative that was put forward by seven Member States under Article 82 
(1) (a) of the TFEU. This proposal for a Directive aims at creating a new 
framework for gathering evidence and reinforcing co-operation between 
Member States in this particular field. Considering the contents of the 
proposal, the underlying philosophy of the EIO was highlighted several times 
in the European Council's calls for the reinforcement of mutual recognition in 
the field of judicial co-operation. This issue was especially addressed in the 
Stockholm Programme. The main objective of the EIO was to establish a single 
European regime for obtaining evidence and mutual recognition was clearly a 
key principle in this initiative. The need for the proposal was apparently 
triggered by the need to create a comprehensive system for investigative 
measures in cases with a cross-border element.  
 
Such a system of mutual recognition prima facie interferes with fundamental 
rights of the individual. The biggest impact of this legislative proposal is 
probably on data protection. Due to the absence of an impact assessment in 
this Member States' initiative it is hard to analyze the background 
fundamental right parameters of this proposal, but , the answer can be found 
in the proposed legal text itself. In any case, this proposal was to receive quite 
a lot of criticism from stakeholders involved in the legislative process. 
 
Regarding the fundamental rights provisions of the proposed EIO 
directive, we can first notice that a standard provision-like recital has been 
introduced to the text. It contains assurance that the directive respects the 
fundamental rights and observes the principles of Article 6 of the Treaty and 
the EUCFR. In this recital, a reference has also been made indirectly to Article 
21 on non-discrimination of the EUCFR.758   
 
 
 
 
                                                 
757 Initiative of the Kingdom of Belgium, the Republic of Bulgaria, the Republic of Estonia, the 
Kingdom of Spain, the Republic of Austria, the Republic of Slovenia and the Kingdom of Sweden for a 
Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council regarding the European Investigation Order in 
criminal matters. OJ C 165/22, 24.6.2010. 
758 See ibid., recital 17. In terms of non-discrimination it is stated in this recital that “nothing in this 
Directive may be interpreted as prohibiting refusal to execute an EIO when there are reasons to believe, 
on the basis of objective elements, that the EIO has been issued for the purpose of prosecuting or 
punishing a person on account of his or her sex, racial or ethnic origin, religion, sexual orientation, 
nationality, language or political opinions, or that the person’s position may be prejudiced for any of 
these reasons”. 
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1. Lack of impact assessment as a shortcoming in 
Member States' legislative proposals 
 
Generally, the weak point of Member States’ initiatives is the lack of impact 
assessments. These initiatives do not go through the Commission’s procedures 
on examining and analyzing the impacts of the proposal. Another problematic 
issue about the Member States’ initiatives is the angle of their approach at the 
outset. They originate from a group of Member States with similar political 
aspirations and often with similar ideas how to tackle the problem that has 
been identified. The Commission for its part strives for a European approach 
and does its best to analyze impacts on EU as a whole, taking into account – 
and giving its best shot in this regard – diverging national circumstances of all 
Member States. That is, at least, the starting point. 
 
The Member States’ initiatives are biased, because the preparation is 
carried out within national administrations of the involved Member States. 
Inevitably, this brings into the process the need of the Member States to avoid 
certain problematic issues that do not fit into their legal and political 
circumstances and systems. In order to encourage the group of Member States 
to agree on a common proposal, the lowest common denominator must be 
found. This is exactly the difference of Member States initiatives compared 
with the Commission’s proposals. A legal initiative without a proper impact 
assessment can be considered to be a step into the darkness due to the 
unpredictable consequences that it may entail. This is particularly the case 
with Member States not co-sponsoring the legal initiative. It is possible to 
analyze the impacts in the course of negotiation when drafts change, but 
Council procedures in assessing the impacts of developing drafts are not very 
convincing.   
 
 
2. EDPS takes a stand on EIO; concerns about insufficient 
data protection 
 
Soon after the introduction of the EIO directive, the EDPS published its 
opinion on this legislative proposal.759 This was the first opinion of an expert 
body on this legislative dossier with no impact assessment but despite this 
implying major fundamental right effect. The EDPS submitted its joint opinion 
on EIO and EPO on 5 October 2010.760 This happened on its own initiative and 
throughout the opinion the EDPS regrets that it was not consulted by the 
initiators of the EIO and EPO in such important dossiers touching upon the 
very essence of the right to data protection.761 This is the reason why in its 
conclusion the EDPS recommends the Council to set up a consultation 
                                                 
759 Opinion of the European Data Protection Supervisor on the initiative of the Kingdom of Belgium, 
the Republic of Bulgaria, the Republic of Estonia, the Kingdom of Spain, the Republic of Austria, the 
Republic of Slovenia and the Kingdom of Sweden for a Directive of the European parliament and of the 
Council regarding the European Investigation Order in criminal matters, Brussels 5 October 2010. 
760 Ibid. 
761 See ibid. e.g. paragraph 6, p. 3. 
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procedure of the EDPS in the upcoming initiatives of Member States.762 If we 
consider that Member States’ initiatives have an obvious impact assessment 
deficit we should also see that a stronger involvement of the EDPS in files 
connected to the domains of the right to privacy and the right to data 
protection would deliver a significant added value. In the absence of proper 
impact assessments these bodies could bring the necessary expertise into the 
process.  
 
Setting the institutional framework aside, let us now turn to the substance 
of the EDPS opinion. First, the EDPS notes that the EIO and the EPO are both 
based on the principle of mutual recognition of judgments and judicial 
decisions. They also spring from the Stockholm Programme and set rules for 
exchange of personal data between the Member States.763 In the view of the 
EDPS, the EIO has a significant impact on the right to protection of personal 
data.764 The EDPS highlights that the objective of the EIO is to create an 
efficient instrument for obtaining information located in another Member 
State in the context of criminal proceedings. This is why, throughout the 
opinion, the EDPS consistently stresses the impact on the right to the 
protection of personal data due to evidence collecting that often contains 
personal data.765  
 
In addition to the lack of impact assessment, the EDPS also “wonders why 
the initiatives neither address the protection of personal data” nor explicitly 
refer to Framework Decision 2008/977/JHA.766 A link had already been 
established between the EPO directive and the above-mentioned Framework 
Decision and the EDPS suggested inserting text in the EIO in this regard.767 
The spirit in the EDPS opinion seems to be that fundamental rights aspects 
are left in the shadow of enhancing the effectiveness of judicial co-operation 
in the EIO and EPO as well. The EDPS even very frankly states that “both 
initiatives once again raise the fundamental issue of incomplete and 
inconsistent data protection principles in the field of judicial co-operation in 
criminal matters”.768 
 
In the same vein, the EDPS makes several proposals to overcome the 
unsatisfactory situation of data protection inadequately taken into 
consideration when drafting the EIO proposal. Most of the suggestions are 
related to security aspects of cross-border transmission of personal data, the 
roles of competent authorities, the accountability principle in the processing 
of personal data and admissibility of evidence. For the EIO, particularly the 
EDPS found it necessary to address the issue of evidence gathering by means 
of an exception.  A safeguard clause was proposed to cover the need to ensure 
                                                 
762 See ibid., paragraph 60, p. 13. 
763 Ibid., paragraph 7, p. 3. 
764 Ibid., paragraph 19, p. 5 
765 Ibid., paragraphs 17-19, p. 5. As regards evidence collecting and its impact on personal data we 
can identify as the most important Articles of the proposal Articles 21 and 22 (video or telephone 
conference), Article 23 (bank account information), Article 24 (banking transactions) and Article 25 
(monitoring of banking information). 
766 Ibid., paragraph 25, p. 6. 
767 Ibid., paragraph 26, p. 7. See also paragraph 35, p. 8. 
768 Ibid., see paragraphs 28-29, p. 7. 
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that the EIO may not be used for other purposes than the prevention, 
investigation, detection, or prosecution of crime or the enforcement of 
criminal sanctions and the exercise of defence.769 In more general terms, the 
EDPS called for a comprehensive data protection legal framework. The EDPS 
found it very important that it would also cover AFSJ and therefore police and 
justice affairs.770 
 
3. EP associates itself with the position of the FRA 
 
The EIO is a legislative dossier in which the EP took a very high profile in 
terms of promoting fundamental rights. This case is rather different from the 
cases of the PNR and security scanners where the skepticism and criticism of 
the EP was addressed towards the Commission. In the EIO, it was more or less 
targeted towards the Council position due to the fact that the proposal was 
launched by a group of Member States. The EP formed its position on the 
proposed Directive and a draft report on EIO was introduced in January 2011 
in the LIBE committee by rapporteur, MEP Nuno Melo.771 The recitals of the 
draft report already included a great number of proposed changes that touched 
upon fundamental rights. This bulk of comments ranged from giving the 
Charter a stronger position in the text to better incorporating the ne bis in 
idem principle. 
 
In the proposed amendment 2, the EP also suggested to state that the 
Lisbon Treaty introduced appropriate parliamentary scrutiny in the EU 
criminal law legislation. In this regard, the EP was mentioned as the co-
legislator and the national parliaments were mentioned in the context of 
controlling subsidiarity. Furthermore, in this proposed amendment, the 
EUCFR was referred to as a legally binding document and many of its Articles 
were expressly stated in the text.772 Taking into account these amendments, it 
is possible grosso modo to systematize the recitals to a group that concern 
“Lisbonization” of this field and the fundamental rights in this new 
constitutional setting.  
 
The importance of the ECHR and the ECtHR in promoting fundamental 
rights has been underlined, especially regarding the right to fair trial. The 
same goes for the Treaties, the EUCFR and the accession process of the EU to 
the ECHR.773  In the justification part of this amendment, the EP admits that 
this amendment has been inserted on the basis of the opinion of the FRA.774 
 
                                                 
769 Ibid., p. 10. 
770 Ibid., paragraph 55, p. 12. 
771 Draft Report on the Adoption of a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council 
regarding the European Investigation Order in criminal matters. 2010/0817, PE478.493v02-00, 
23.1.2011. 
772 Ibid., Amendment 2, p. 6. 
773 Ibid., Amendment 3, p. 7. 
774 Ibid., p. 8. In this context the EP reminds of serious implications on various fundamental rights 
that the EIO could have by stressing that the Charter refers directly to the understanding of these rights 
as provided under the ECHR. 
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It is quite interesting to see that with regard to mutual recognition in this 
field, the EP also highlights the legal anomalies to the detriment of suspects.775 
The somewhat hesitant approach of the EP towards the issue of mutual 
recognition can also be identified in Amendment 8 where the EP suggested 
dropping references to the principle of mutual recognition.776 In addition to 
these proposed changes, fundamental rights have a prominent place in 
Amendments 9, 10, 11, 14 and particularly in 15 that deals with the principle of 
ne bis in idem. These all related to the considerant-part of the text that very 
much highlighted fundamental rights. How did the EP then proceed with the 
operative part of the text – the real essence of the proposal? If fundamental 
right considerations of the EP are limited to the recitals, the whole legal 
exercise risks becoming an empty shell. We can see that this is not the case. 
The EP, for example, sets some useful conditions for issuing EIO in Article 5 
a. This includes proportionality and necessity. The requirement of the EIO to 
be validated by a judge, a court, an investigating magistrate or a prosecutor 
was also put forward.777  
 
In amendment 35 on Article 10, where grounds for non-recognition or non-
execution of an EIO in the executing state have been set out, the EP suggests 
complementing the list with additional grounds. A significant example of these 
is the requirement respecting the ne bis in idem principle.778 This amendment 
comes directly from the FRA opinion. Additional grounds have been proposed, 
too. These are associated with such fundamental rights as freedom expression. 
Lastly and most importantly, in amendment 40 the EP suggests the last 
ground for refusal, which is infringement of a fundamental right as laid down 
in the EUCFR and the ECHR. The same applies to breaches of fundamental 
national constitutional principles regarding criminal proceedings.779 Overall, 
we can see that the EP very much drew inspiration from the opinion of the 
FRA. The legal analysis of the FRA was crystallized in the EP position. 
 
 
4. EIO and the reserved position of the FRA 
 
The structure of FRA promotes a great deal of interaction between both 
statal and non-statal actors in Member States and organizations of the EU and 
the CoE. This can be considered to be co-operative problem-analysis.780 The 
role of external actors and networks in this is essential. It is set out in Article 
4 of the Council regulation setting up the FRA that one of the tasks of the 
Agency is to “formulate and publish conclusions and opinions on specific 
thematic topics, for the Union institutions and the Member States when 
implementing Community law, either on its own initiative or at the request of 
                                                 
775 Ibid., Amendment 4, p. 8. 
776 Ibid., Amendment 8, p. 11. 
777 Ibid., Amendment 24, pp. 24-25. 
778 Ibid., Amendment 35, p. 30. 
779 Ibid., Amendment 40, p. 33. 
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the European Parliament, the Council or the Commission”. Furthermore, 
recital 13 of the same Agency regulation lays down that the institutions should 
be able to request opinions on their legislative proposals or positions taken 
during the legislative procedures as far as the compatibility with fundamental 
rights is concerned.  FRA formally adopted its opinion on EIO on 14 February 
2011.781 The opinion originated from a request of the EP that had asked the 
opinion of the FRA on the following questions: 
 
1. Does the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union include 
certain standards for an instrument involving mutual recognition of 
investigation orders? 
 
2. Should the EIO Directive provide for review by the executing state of an 
issued measure, due to the current lack of comparability of existing standards 
in criminal procedural law between EU Member States?  
 
FRA therefore tackled these questions and stated in the beginning of its 
analysis that consistency with fundamental rights needs to be ensured 
irrespective of who initiates the legislative proposal.782  Given this fact, the 
FRA also very clearly remarks that the “draft directive is neither based on a 
proper impact assessment nor on an extensive gathering of evidence in the 28 
Member States.”783 In initiatives like this, the lack of adequate impact 
assessments can be a real pitfall. This lack blurs and dilutes the evidence on 
which the proposal in question has been based.  
 
In its opinion on EIO, the FRA considered that the EIO potentially 
interfered with several fundamental rights. It nevertheless concentrated 
mainly on the right to fair trial that was also highlighted in the request of 
opinion by the EP.784 In order to pave the way for deeper analysis on this 
substantial fundamental right, the FRA highlights the interpretation practice 
of the ECtHR, namely the case of Miailhe v. France.785 In this ground-breaking 
verdict, the court held that it must satisfy itself that the proceedings as a whole 
are fair.786 Furthermore, according to the court’s case law no investigative 
measure is acceptable if it would prejudge the right to a fair trial.787 Most 
importantly, the FRA gave particular attention to the ne bis in idem principle, 
which is extremely pertinent in the context of the EIO. This is the case mainly 
because of the eventuality of the suspects to be tried for the same crimes in 
different jurisdictions.788 Another key aspect of the FRA opinion related to 
defence rights. FRA especially found it important to take up the principle of 
                                                 
781 See Opinion of the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights on the Draft Directive 
regarding the European Investigation Order. Vienna, 14 February 2011. 
782 Ibid., pp. 2-3. 
783 Ibid., p. 14. 
784 Ibid., p. 3. 
785 Miailhe v. France, No. 18978/91, 26 September 1996.  
786 See ibid., paragraph 43. 
787 FRA opinion, p. 4. 
788 Ibid., p. 4. It should be noted that double jeopardy rule is set out in Article 50 of the EUCFR. 
Moreover, the Charter connects the principles of legality and proportionality into guaranteeing fairness 
in criminal proceedings in Article 49. 
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the presumption of innocence.789 In addition to this crucial principle, FRA also 
observed other issues related to defence rights, such as the right to be notified 
of criminal charges, access to legal aid and lawyer and most notably the 
effective access to courts.790 All of these aspects were inextricably linked with 
the proposed EIO directive. 
 
The second spearhead of the FRA arguments dealt with issues wrapped up 
in the right to privacy and data protection. The request of the EP was also 
centred in this topic. In connection with the right to the protection of personal 
data, FRA fully supports the EDPS recommendations that were laid down in 
the EDPS opinion. Above all, the lack of the Council Framework Decision on 
the protection of personal data processed in the framework of police and 
judicial cooperation in the text of the EIO has been identified as a major 
handicap leading potentially to legal uncertainty.791 FRA found that, for 
example, the ECtHR has very often considered Article 8 of the ECHR and its 
potential interferences in light of the in accordance with law principle.792 This 
can be seen, for example, in case Malone v. the United Kingdom that dealt with 
a judicial order to telephone tapping in a situation where legislation is not clear 
enough.793 This need to clearly indicate the scope of public authorities has been 
confirmed in consecutive ECtHR rulings. Another legal point to be taken into 
account had to do with the retention of personal data and particularly the need 
to ensure that it is in line with data protection legislation, notably in the case 
of the European data protection system under the Data Protection Directive.794 
 
One of the most important questions in the EIO was the issue of execution 
of EIO and possible fundamental rights-based refusal grounds. The key 
question was if the executing state should be able to refuse to execute an EIO 
on the basis of a breach of fundamental rights.795 FRA found that “a 
fundamental rights-based refusal ground could acts as an adequate tool to 
prevent fundamental rights violations occurring during cross-border 
investigations”.796 On the other hand the FRA expressed misgivings about the 
possibility of the executing state to be totally familiar with criminal law rules 
and procedures of the issuing state. This might – according to FRA – lead to 
time-consuming and complex procedures that might undermine the used 
fundamental right standards.797 The FRA therefore had some concerns in 
relation to different approaches of the Member States in the implementation 
phase of the directive and this would not be a good thing for the system of 
mutual recognition nor the protection of fundamental rights. 
 
The FRA also pinpointed that the proposed Article 10 of the draft EIO did 
not include a fundamental rights-based refusal ground. The FRA was of the 
opinion that as Member States are generally obliged to respect fundamental 
                                                 
789 Ibid., p. 5. 
790 Ibid., pp. 5-6. 
791 Ibid., p. 8. 
792 Ibid., p 9. 
793 See ECtHR, Malone v. the United Kingdom, No 8691/79, 2 August 1984, paragraph 67. 
794 FRA opinion, p. 9. 
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rights, it is arguable that the possible contradiction of fundamental rights 
could be removed by including a reference to Article 1 (3) of the draft EIO that 
confirmed that the directive does not have the effect of modifying the 
obligation to respect fundamental rights as set out in the Treaty.798 The FRA 
was also somewhat sceptical towards the approach of the Council Presidency 
and the Commission to insert the double jeopardy rule into the text.799 The 
FRA, however, also saw merits in this approach, mainly because of its relative 
objectivity. The FRA proposed four types of safeguards in order to ameliorate 
the situation. Firstly, the FRA advised to include a provision in the text that 
would expressly require the executing state to adopt the least intrusive 
investigatory measures regarding interference with fundamental rights when 
executing the issuing state’s request.800 Secondly, due to data protection 
concerns, the FRA deemed it necessary to define the concept of “investigatory 
measures” in order to enable these measures to be carried out in accordance 
with law.801 Thirdly, the FRA called for adequate safeguards to address the 
right to fair trial and eventually the Agency found it necessary to include clear 
provisions on legal remedies and time limits. Similarly, ex post evaluation and 
assessment of the system’s operability was considered to be an important 
element.802 
 
To conclude, the FRA answered the questions put forward by the EP. The 
first question in connection with the EUCFR and fundamental rights 
standards in relation to mutual recognition of investigation orders was 
responded to in the following way. FRA opinion was focused on the existing 
EU standards, concentrating mainly on fair trial, based on the case law of the 
CJEU and the ECtHR.803 The second question was about review of the 
executing state of an issued measure due to the current lack of comparability 
of existing standards in criminal procedural law between Member States. FRA 
paid attention to a potential provision on fundamental rights-based refusal 
ground. The FRA found that this kind of provision would have to be clearly 
defined. FRA emphasized the importance of various safeguards to be 
introduced in the text.804 What is important in the FRA conclusion are the 
critical remarks on the lack of impact assessment of this proposal put forward 
by a group of Member States.805 It is evident that assessment of impacts cannot 
be as complete as evaluation carried out by the Commission on a great variety 
of Member States' systems across the EU. The evidence used for the 
assessment, and its comparability on the Member States' legal systems, is 
questionable. Hence, probably the biggest pitfall of Member States initiatives 
can be found in the field of assessing impacts. 
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799 Ibid., p. 12. 
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802 Ibid., pp. 12-13. 
803 Ibid., p. 14. 
804 Ibid. 
805 See Ibid. 
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5. EIO in the Council 
 
The Council discussed the issue of proportionality in its meeting of 
December 2010.806 The grounds for non-recognition and non-execution were 
also discussed. Handling was already launched in the Working Party on 
Cooperation in criminal matters (COPEN). In April 2011, the Hungarian 
Presidency issued a state of play report on EIO. Grounds for non-recognition 
or non-execution were one key outstanding issue in the negotiations and the 
Presidency concluded that they should be as specific and as limited as 
possible.807 In a ministerial meeting of June 2011, safeguards regarding these 
issues were deemed important in order to protect defence rights of concerned 
persons.808 This was reflected in the partial general approach of the Council.809 
 
The institutions were able to make some progress in the trialogue 
negotiations in 2013. Only fragments of information on the detailed 
negotiations are publicly available.810 It is nevertheless important to point out 
that a sufficient level of political will existed in order to take proportionality 
duly into account in the compromise. The same applies for ne bis in idem. 
 
The EIO Directive was published in the Official Journal of the European 
Union on 1 May 2014.811 In the final version adopted by the institutions, Article 
6 setting out conditions for issuing and transmitting EIO was significantly 
strengthened compared with the initial proposal of a group of Member States. 
In paragraph 1 (a) proportionality was stipulated as a clear condition. 
Moreover, Article 11 on grounds for non-recognition and non-execution now 
includes the principle of ne bis in idem. The recitals of the final text carried 
improvements in terms of fundamental rights and proportionality. 
 
Proportionality was also raised to the discussion by some Member States' 
parliaments. In November 2010, the President of the Austrian Federal Council 
submitted its EU Committee's opinion on subsidiarity of the EIO. The failure 
to establish any minimum requirements that the issuing authority can refer to 
when deciding on an investigation order was criticized. According to the 
Committee, it did not contain legality nor a proportionality test.812 The Senate 
of Italy also took a critical view with regard to proportionality in the text.813 
The UK Parliament, for its part, took a rather skeptical approach towards the 
EIO in terms of fundamental rights.814 
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the European Investigation Order in criminal matters. OJ L 130/1, 1.5.2014. 
812 Council Document 16340/10, 15.11.2010. 
813 Council Document 8055/11, 22.3.2011. 
814 Human Rights Joint Committee: Fifteenth Report. The Human Rights Implications of UK 
extradition Policy. Available at 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/jt201012/jtselect/jtrights/156/15602.htm. Visited on 1 
August 2014. The Committee held that "the lessons from the EAW must be learned when negotiating the 
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6. Assessment of the case in relation to the ex ante review 
of fundamental rights 
 
Many countries and international legal systems have increasingly 
transformed towards judicial review with a significant role given to 
juristocracy as a result of constitutionalisation.815 In the empowerment of ex 
ante review of fundamental rights at the EU level, we can see signs of the 
partial come-back of the legislature to the core of constitutional control, 
however.  
 
Dworkin makes a distinction between principles of integrity. The first part 
of this set is the principle of integrity in legislation. This means that the law-
makers must keep the law coherent in principle. The other principle is the 
principle of integrity in adjudication, according to which those in charge of 
adjudication must enforce the law in a coherent manner.816 Incoherence with 
regard to proportionality, in accordance with law and noting the ne bis in idem, 
were key problems in this piece of legislation that the legislator had to cope 
with. In the course of the proceedings, the institutions managed remove 
significant fundamental right problems, such as that of ne bis in idem, which 
had a significant impact in this case as had in accordance with law criterion. It 
is therefore noteworthy to state that this part of the limitation test as applied 
by the legislator proved useful. 
 
Proportionality can be considered to be a doctrinal tool to establish 
whether an interference with a prima facie right is justified. Furthermore, this 
justification succeeds if the interference is proportionate.817 On the basis of 
examining the various texts regarding EIO, it is relatively easy to conclude that 
biggest problem was proportionality. It is therefore easy to associate oneself 
with views expressed, for example by the UK Parliament on inadequate 
proportionality. A partial explanation to the shortcomings in proportionality 
assessment probably has to do with the lack of the impact assessment.  
 
When addressing the principle of proportionality, one should not deal with it 
in isolation of other legal principles, such as legal certainty, non-
discrimination and subsidiarity. As I tend to approach the selected legal files 
from the point of view of both positive and negative obligations, it is good to 
                                                 
form of the EIO. The Government must ensure that there is an effective proportionality safeguard in the 
Directive, in order to ensure that the EIO operates effectively and that there are not numerous requests 
for information in minor cases". 
815 Hirschl, pp. 214-215. See also Beatty David M.: The Ultimate Rule of Law. Oxford University 
Press. Oxford 2004, pp. 2-3. 
816 See Dworkin Ronald: Law’s Empire. Hart Publishing. Oxford 1998, p. 167. As for the principle of 
integrity in adjudication Dworkin claims that “the second principle explains how and why the past must 
be allowed some special power of its own in court, contrary to the pragmatist’s claim that it must not”. 
817 See Möller Kai: Proportionality and Rights Inflation. LSE Law, Society and Economy Working 
Papers 17/2013. London School of Economics and Political Science. Law Department. 2013. p. 2. In the 
same context Möller discusses the issue of right inflation, i.e. the phenomenon that increasingly 
relatively trivial interests are protected as rights and finds that proportionality is not only compatible 
with rights inflation, but it rather necessitates it. p. 6. 
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admit that in this case the negative obligations prevailed. With such visible 
proportionality concerns, we can hardly avoid the entanglement of negative 
obligation, the limitations to fundamental rights to the proportionality 
considerations. Nevertheless, we should not see positive and negative 
obligations as mutually excluding elements. We can see both these obligations 
even in same provisions in the same legal texts. There were also attempts to 
bring positive obligations into the text in this file, especially by the EP. Why 
did the EIO end up to some extent in difficulties with regard to the above-
mentioned aspects? The absence of an impact assessment must be considered 
the main source of the problem. The same applies for the rather adaptive 
position of the Council, as well as the less significant role of the Commission 
in legislative files with their roots in initiatives of a group of Member States. 
Having no proper impact assessment whatsoever in such a fundamental right 
sensitive file can only lead to problems at a later stage of the process.  
 
In terms of substance, the EP had a key role in pushing for stronger 
safeguards for ne bis in idem. In the end, the EP was able secure in the 
negotiation process this important fundamental right objective. Similarly, 
proportionality was underscored throughout this legislative process by the 
EP. It is worth noting that collaboration of the EP with FRA was intense 
regarding key fundamental right issues in the EIO. As a consequence, many 
positions of the FRA were introduced in the final text through EP positions. 
Therefore, the EIO sheds an interesting light on the practical co-operation of 
technical expert bodies with political EU institutions. 
 
The role of the FRA is also fascinating in ensuring compliance with 
fundamental rights, especially in the Member States’ legislative initiatives that 
are unaccompanied by impact assessments. It is particularly important to have 
the FRA tightly involved in the analyses of fundamental rights aspects in such 
cases. Probably the FRA can be especially useful in compensating for the lack 
of impact assessments in this fundamental rights sensitive field, also bringing 
the necessary institutional neutrality into the process. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 196 
 
 
 
 
IX European Protection Order 
 
Let us now turn to European Protection Order (EPO) – a proposal for a 
directive initiated by a group of Member States under Article 82 (1) (d) of the 
TFEU.818 This initiative concentrated on the important issue of victim 
protection and its application at the European level. The initiative was also a 
step towards the objective set out in the Stockholm programme on protection 
of victims of crime. Especially the scope of the proposed legislative instrument 
raised much discussion. 
 
The initiative by a group of Member States was duly sent for the discussion 
of the EP, and the LIBE committee produced a report on the file.819 We should 
consider that when limiting fundamental rights, one important criterion is the 
need to not touch the hard core of the fundamental right that is being limited. 
When providing for limitations, the very essence of the fundamental rights 
should always be preserved. Particularly when considering the various anti-
terrorism measures that have been taken into use during the last decade, we 
can see that fundamental rights have very often been sacrificed in the name of 
anti-terrorism. A situation in which the purpose justifies the means should be 
avoided and the core of a fundamental rights, even in exceptional 
circumstances, should not be interfered with. 
 
The EPO deals with the effective protection of the victims of crime at the 
EU level. The key point in the proposed legal instrument was the extension of 
protection measures adopted in an issuing Member State to the Member State 
where the protected person moves. Thus the executing State recognises 
protection measures of the issuing State in its jurisdiction and there is no need 
to start the protection order procedure from scratch in the executing state.820 
 
The EPO was hence an important AFSJ initiative that aims to facilitate the 
recognition of protection orders at the wider EU scale. With the increasing 
movement of persons within the EU, the issue of preventing crimes has 
become more topical. The Stockholm Programme paid much attention to 
combatting violence, addressing the situation of victims and facilitating access 
                                                 
818 Initiative for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the European 
Protection Order, PE-CONS 2/10, 22 January 2010. 
819 See Draft Report on the Initiative for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council 
on the European Protection Order. 2010/0802 (COD), 20.5.2010. 
820 It should be noted that the recognised protection measures are listed in Article 2 (2) of the 
proposed Directive i.e. in the scope of the European Protection Order. See Initiative of the Kingdom of 
Belgium, the Republic Bulgaria, the Republic of Estonia, the Kingdom of Spain, the French Republic, the 
Italian Republic, the Republic of Hungary, the Republic of Poland, the Portuguese Republic, Romania, 
the Republic of Finland and the Kingdom of Sweden with a view to the adoption of a Directive of the 
European Parliament and the Council on the European Protection Order, OJ 2010/C 69, 18.3.2010. 
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to justice. All of these goals were confirmed at the European Council level, 
thus, in this sense, the initiative of EPO was more than welcome. The positions 
of institutions and the EDPS in this phase are of particular interest for this 
study. For practical reasons, the Commission’s role has remained somewhat 
unspecified. Interestingly, we can note that the EP was again in the driver’s 
seat in the ex ante review of fundamental rights of this dossier. 
 
 
1. EDPS found no major problems in the EPO proposal 
 
The EDPS also took a stand on the EPO together with its opinion on EIO. 
Therefore, the arguments raised in the context of the EIO are mostly valid, also 
with regard to the EPO. I will concentrate on specific aspects of the EPO 
presented by the EDPS. Seemingly, many of the conclusions are basically the 
same, but there are also points and recommendations that are different. As 
said when discussing the EIO, the main problem identified by the EDPS is the 
lack of impact assessment. The same also applies for the EPO. The EDPS did 
not find the EPO initiative as problematic as that of the EIO, but it found the 
largest shortcomings in the EPO in the field of data protection. It did, however, 
welcome changes made to the text, particularly in the Council proceedings that 
introduced a reference to the Framework Decision 2008/977/JHA that was at 
the time of issuing the opinion lacking in the EIO text.821 
 
The specific recommendations on the EPO initiative included, most 
importantly, the need to state in clear terms that the person causing the danger 
should only be given the personal data of the victim strictly relevant for the full 
execution of the protection measure.822 This finding is important, because the 
contact data of the victim must be kept out of reach of the person causing 
danger. On the other hand, the EDPS also found this issue problematic 
because the person considered to be endangering the victim should know 
where he or she may go in order to ensure compliance with the Directive.823 
The EDPS did not, however, present any concrete proposal on how to tackle 
this problem in practice. The rest of the EPO specific recommendations dealt 
with recitals and are not particularly relevant for this case. Again, as for the 
case of the EIO, the final recommendations were addressed with regard to the 
need to establish a consultation procedure of the EDPS and to establish a 
comprehensive data protection legal framework in the field of the AFSJ.824 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
821 See Opinion of the European Data Protection Supervisor on the Initiative of the Kingdom of 
Belgium, the Republic Bulgaria, the Republic of Estonia, the Kingdom of Spain, the French Republic, the 
Italian Republic, the Republic of Hungary, the Republic of Poland, the Portuguese Republic, Romania, 
the Republic of Finland and the Kingdom of Sweden with a view to the adoption of a Directive of the 
European Parliament and the Council on the European Protection Order, Brussels 5 October 2010, p. 6. 
822 Ibid., paragraph 58, p. 13. 
823 Ibid., paragraph 48, p. 10. 
824 Ibid., paragraph 60, p. 13. 
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2. EP proceedings on EPO with a focus on double 
jeopardy rule 
 
LIBE was the responsible parliamentary Committee in the EP working on 
this file, but the Committee on Women’s Rights and Gender Equality was also 
closely involved in the work. The Committees submitted the report on EPO for 
the consideration of the Plenary on 7 December 2010.825 The EP commenced 
with its amendments by proposing a very significant change to the text. The 
EP found that the legal basis of the proposal was insufficient. Internally in the 
EP, the Committee of Legal Affairs analysed the issue of legal basis and came 
to the conclusion that the proposed legal basis Article 82 (1) (d) “can be relied 
upon as legal basis for the draft Directive, but that in order to give the initiative 
its due weight as an instrument of recognition of judicial decisions, it would be 
appropriate to refer also to Article 82 (1) (a) TFEU”.826 From this we can see 
that the position of the responsible LIBE committee was stronger than that of 
the Committee of Legal Affairs that mainly considered the issue of legal basis 
from the point of view of recognition of judicial decisions. In any case, the EP 
ultimately suggested the extension of legal basis in its amendment.827 Finally, 
the legal basis of the Directive was amended in the trialogue phase according 
to the suggestion of the EP. 
 
As has become evident with other legislative dossiers discussed in this 
study, the EP has been keen to impart a prominent role to the EUCFR, 
especially in the recitals of draft legal instruments. The same is also true with 
the EPO.828 Already in the preamble part, the Council Framework Decision 
2008/947/JHA was also underscored in two different contexts.829 This is 
obviously one of the points that the EP assimilated from the EDPS main 
conclusions on EPO. In this way, this expert opinion received the necessary 
political back-up in order to be realized in the final legal text. If we move to the 
operative part of the text and the EP amendments, we can see that the EP 
proposed a new Article 1 that is about the objective of the Directive. This new 
Article describes the objective of the Directive in a very clear manner, which 
improves the legal certainty of this directive.830 The part in the legislation that 
is always crucial from the point of view of fundamental rights is the Article on 
definitions. It defines the terms used in the legal instrument and hence has an 
impact on the scope of application. Also in this case, namely in Article 1 of the 
EP report text, the EP amendments went largely to the final text adopted by 
the institutions. Additionally, the EP suggests replacing the role of the 
Secretariat General with the role given to the Commission in the provision 
concerning the designation of competent authorities.831 The initial proposal of 
the group of Member States clearly aimed at keeping the Commission out of 
                                                 
825 Report on the draft Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the European 
Protection Order. Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs and Committee on Women’s 
Rights and Gender Equality. A7-o354/2010, PE441.299v03-00. 
826 See EP report 2010, Opinion of the Committee on Legal Affairs on the Legal Basis, p. 44. 
827 Ibid., p. 6. 
828 Ibid., see proposed recital 6j), p. 8 and 11e), p. 11. 
829 Ibid., see proposed recitals 11a) and 11d), p. 11. 
830 See Ibid., Article 1, p. 12. 
831 See ibid., Article 4, p. 13. 
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the process by anchoring the designation process to the Council Secretariat i.e. 
in the control of the Member States. The EP wished to give this role to the 
Commission, in this sense guaranteeing the Union approach, which is a very 
natural choice of the EP in many legal dossiers. This proposal of the EP was 
also entered into the text – most evidently with the help of the Commission 
itself. 
 
The sensitive Article 5 on the issue of the EPO included several proposals 
from the EP specifying the procedure of issuing the EPO.832 Most of these 
clarifications were taken into the final directive text. The same applies to the 
important Article 6 on the form and the content of the EPO. Initially, this 
Article was very restricted and contained only some basic rules for the form 
and content, which in practical terms may become eventually quite important 
for the application of the provision.833 Many of these drafting suggestions were 
taken on board as well. If we then look at the vital Article 9 on the grounds for 
non-recognition of an EPO we can identify further amendments that the EP 
managed to introduce into the final text. 834 The EP first suggested deleting 
paragraph 1 of the original proposal that sets out the obligation to give grounds 
to any refusal to recognise an EPO. This attempt was successful. Secondly, the 
grounds of refusal were complemented, a situation where the protection 
measure relates to an act that does not constitute a criminal offence under the 
law of the executing State.835 This is an important principle and it was included 
in the final text. A significant proposal from the EP that derived from the EDPS 
opinion dealt with the ne bis in idem principle.836 This important text went 
into the final directive together with some less relevant clarifications on Article 
9 in the EP report. 
 
In addition to other successful EP amendments, such as in 9 a) with regard 
to governing law and competence in the executing Member States, it suffices 
here to take up the legal framework that is based on Council Framework 
Decision 2008/947/JHA that the EP aimed to promote in the Article text as 
well.837 These points were introduced into the final text as was the case with 
the new Article 11 a) regarding priority in recognition of a EPO proposed by 
the EP.  This sets the EPO on an equal footing in terms of priority with similar 
national cases.838 
 
 
3. Council proceedings on EPO 
 
The starting point of the Council was that the initiative was introduced by 
a group of Member States whose basic position was apparently positive. The 
role of the Commission is interesting in this file. It was not the initiator of the 
                                                 
832 Ibid., Article 5, p. 14. 
833 See Article 6 of the initial EPO proposal vis-à-vis the EP Report in relation to Article 6, p. 15. 
834 For EP proposals, see Article on p. 17 of the EP 2010 report. 
835 See Article 9 (2) c, p. 17 of the EP report 2010. 
836 Article 9 (2) g, p. 17 of the EP report 2010. 
837 See Article 10 (1) b, p. 19 and Article 11 (1) d, p. 20. 
838 See Article 11 a), p. 20 of the EP report  2010. 
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legal proposal, so it had to push through its arguments during the Council 
discussion phase, first at the working group level and then in Coreper. 
 
On 23 April 2010, the Justice and Home Affairs Council discussed the EPO 
on the basis of two Council working documents.839 The biggest outstanding 
issue in the discussion was the scope of the text. In the Council discussion most 
of the Member States supported the idea that EPOs should be issued and 
executed in all Member States pursuant to their national law. Furthermore, 
the Council considered that EPOs should be issued by any judicial or 
equivalent authority. Additionally, the Council identified a three-step 
approach for the EPO process.840 The line of the ministers was further 
elaborated at the working group level until EPO emerged again on the agenda 
of the JHA Council in June. 
 
On 3-4 June 2010, the EPO was discussed in the Council and at the time 
the main issue was continuing discussions with the EP on this dossier. This 
approach of the Presidency was approved. Another key issue dealt with the 
position of the UK and the possibility of going forward with the decision-
making process without the participation of the UK or Ireland.841 The next 
JHA Council that dealt with EPO was in October 2010, but this occasion was 
mainly used for informing the ministers that the strong majority in the EP 
supported the general aim of the draft text.842 On 20-21 October 2011, the 
Council then adopted a new text of the EPO following the political agreement 
on the text with European Parliament.843 This was based on Council document 
14471/11, where we can see efforts from the side of the Council to move 
towards the EP.844 Then, on 24 November 2011 the Council adopted its 
position with a view to the approval of EPO.845 The work of the Council was 
nearly done. 
 
 
4. Assessment of the case in relation to the ex ante review 
of fundamental rights 
 
Eventually, the EPO Directive was formally adopted on 13 December 2011, 
less than two years after the initiative was launched by a group of Member 
States.846 Given this timeframe, we can conclude that the legislative process 
on the EPO was actually carried out relatively quickly. Usually, the preparatory 
                                                 
839 See Council documents 8703/10 and 8703/10 ADD 1. 
840 For Council discussion Press release 3008th Council Meeting, Justice and Home Affairs, Brussels 
23 April 2010, 8920/10 (Presse 88), p. 10. 
841 See Press release 3018th Council Meeting, Justice and Home Affairs, Luxembourg 3-4 June 2010, 
10630/, Presse 161, PR CO 1, pp. 21-22. 
842 Press release 3034th Council Meeting, Justice and Home Affairs, Luxembourg 7-8 October 2010, 
14423/10, Presse 262, PR CO 22, p. 18. 
843 Press release 3120th Council meeting, Agriculture and fisheries, Luxembourg 20-21 October 2011, 
15581/11, Presse 370, PR CO 62, p. 23. 
844 See Council document 14471/11, Brussels, 21 September 2011. 
845 See Position EU No 2/2012 of the Council at first reading with a view to the adoption of a Directive 
of the European Parliament and of the Council on the European protection order. Adopted on by the 
Council on 24 November 2011. OJ C 10 E/14, 12.1.2012. 
846 Directive 2011/99/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 December 2011 on 
the European Protection Order. OJ L338/2, 21.12.2011. 
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process of legal instruments in the field of AFSJ is longer. At first glance, one 
could think that an initiative that lacks proper impact assessment could end 
up in considerable difficulties in the discussions of the institutions. It may, 
however, be that for very practical reasons, it is easier to roll the draft legal text 
through the Council at least. This is due to the fact that the initial legal 
proposal already in the phase of its introduction has the unconditional support 
of the initiating Member States. If the Commission uses its right of initiative, 
with the exception of smaller decisions not implying significant changes to the 
legislation, it is usually the case that no Member State can support the whole 
proposed legal text as it stands. 
 
Probably the most important finding in the final text was the remarkable 
contribution of the EP. Indeed this directive is one of the examples where the 
EP has exercised its power in the ordinary legislative procedure in a successful 
manner. This is due to the fact that an exceptionally great number of EP 
amendments were integrated into the text. Actually, this is not only about the 
number EP suggestions that were inserted, but about the significance for the 
whole EPO system. Many of the accepted EP amendments dealt with the very 
essence of the directive, such as the legal basis, objective, definitions, 
procedures governing the issue of EPO and above all the grounds for non-
recognition of EPO. So, given the substance of the EP amendments, we can see 
that the EP not only steered the EPO to its preferred direction but entered 
many of its key amendments into the text, very often word by word. In light of 
this development we can conclude that in the legislative case of the EPO, the 
EP effectively utilized its position in the ex ante control of fundamental rights 
in the EU law-making process. Also in the EPO, the EP brought fundamental 
rights concerns into discussion. In some cases, these arguments originated 
from the EDPS, but in fact the EP was willing to go even further than the EDPS 
in its fundamental rights considerations. In this sense, the EP showed a great 
deal of independence from the opinions of expert bodies. It should also be 
noted that the Council was able to bring a positive contribution to the 
discussion on the proposal from the perspective of fundamental rights. 
 
It important to note that in terms of the substance of the amendments 
proposed by the EP, the focus was on probably the most sensitive provisions, 
such as Article 5. It is equally important to see that, in fact, the EP was able to 
shift the balance of the text towards a greater acknowledgement of 
fundamental rights. Again, this suggests that multi-level ex ante review 
functions well. If a technical expert body does not highlight fundamental rights 
in the legislative process to a sufficient degree, its place can be taken by a 
political institution. 
 
As for the case of the EIO, though not so strikingly, some of the key 
problems of the proposal originated from the lack of impact assessment. 
Despite this fact, a proper impact assessment would have brought a sufficient 
amount of neutrality to this legislative project. In the EPO we are faced with 
the same dilemma as in the EPO, which goes back to the role of the 
Commission in legislative files originating from initiatives of Member States. 
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X The case of Data Retention Directive 
 
In order to better understand the role of the CJEU with regard to ex ante 
review of fundamental rights, and the limits of the EU legislator, we must turn 
to a legal Act adopted already before the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, 
the Data Retention Directive. This important CJEU case also originated from 
a request for a preliminary ruling under Article 267 of the TFEU. Despite the 
growing importance of the EU legislator in securing compliance with 
fundamental rights, we should not forget that it is the CJEU who has the final 
say on fundamental rights and the compatibility of EU legislation with 
fundamental rights. It is the duty of the CJEU to ensure observance of 
fundamental rights in the EU law.847 A very recent reminder of this fact was 
provided in the case of Data Retention Directive, which was declared invalid 
by the CJEU due to infringements of the Directive with fundamental rights, 
namely Articles 7 and 8 of the Charter. 
 
Proportionality should be the key driver in avoiding and mitigating 
negative impacts of legislation on fundamental rights. The CJEU took a firm 
stand on EU data protection in the recent landmark ruling in Digital Rights 
Ireland Ltd. and Others declaring the Data Retention Directive null and 
void.848 The Court found that the Directive was against fundamental rights of 
respect for private life and the right to data protection as guaranteed in the 
EUCFR, which makes the case remarkable. The Directive was considered 
invalid as a result of an infringement of a fundamental right, which has not 
often been the case.  
 
In addition to this strong fundamental right argumentation, the Court also 
interestingly concluded that the EU legislature by adoption of the Directive, 
exceeded the limits imposed by compliance with the principle of 
proportionality.849 The Court used Article 52(1) and its case-law as a yardstick 
when analyzing the case. The Court verdict might represent a new start for the 
EU in taking fundamental rights more seriously in the legislative work. The 
                                                 
847 See C-61/84 Cinéthèque [1985] ECR 2605, paragraph 26. 
848 Joined cases C-293/12 and C-594/12 Digital Rights Ireland Ltd and Others. In paragraph 64 the 
Court held "Furthermore, that (data retention, KF) period is set between a minimum of 6 months and 
maximum of 24 months, but it is not stated that the determination of the period of retention must be 
based on objective criteria in order to ensure that it is limited to what is strictly necessary." The Court 
continued in paragraph 65 "it follows from the above that Directive 2006/24 does not lay down clear 
and precise rules governing the extent of the interference with fundamental rights enshrined in Articles 
7 and 8 of the Charter. It must therefore be held that Directive 2006/24 entails a wide-ranging and 
particularly serious interference with those fundamental rights in the legal order of the EU, without such 
an interference being precisely circumscribed by provisions to ensure that it is actually limited to what 
is necessary".  
849 C-293/12, paragraph 69. 
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Court has now shown that fundamental rights count, and should count even 
more, in the law-making process of the EU. It will therefore be interesting to 
see what kind of impact this will have on ex ante review of fundamental rights. 
 
Case Digital Rights is particularly interesting because of the fact that the 
Court has very seldom declared an EU act invalid basing its arguments on 
fundamental rights. This landmark ruling may therefore open a new era in the 
interpretation practice of the CJEU, with clearly more weight being given to 
fundamental right considerations. This particular Court case is also extremely 
significant because of the line taken by the Court on the limits of the EU 
legislature in relation to the principle of proportionality with regard to 
Charter.850 In the judgment, a crucial element for this thesis is paragraph 65, 
where the Court states that the Directive "does not lay down clear and precise 
rules governing the extent of the interference with fundamental rights 
enshrined in Articles 7 and 8 of the Charter".851 This highlights the importance 
of having some sort of sustainability criteria in place for fundamental rights.   
 
In light of this experience, it is critical to remember that the Court has the 
ultimate authority in interpreting whether the secondary EU law is in line with 
primary law, including fundamental rights. The case law of the Court hence 
forms an important bulk of authoritative material necessary for a researcher 
on ex ante review of fundamental rights. We should not, however, be 
comfortable with the idea that the Court will always ultimately cover for the 
mistakes made by the EU legislator, i.e. never mind the fundamental rights in 
the Directives. This would be a dangerous path and the position of 
fundamental rights should receive widespread support to further strengthen 
its position in the legislative process,  bearing in mind limits set on the 
legislature of the CJEU. 
 
In this judgment, the Court sent a very clear set of messages to the EU 
legislature: First, bearing in mind its previous case-law, the Court reminded 
that "the principle of proportionality requires that acts of the EU institutions 
be appropriate for attaining the legitimate objectives pursued by the 
legislation at issue and do not exceed the limits of what is appropriate and 
necessary in order to achieve those objectives."852  Second, the Court drew the 
attention to the limited nature of the extent of EU legislature's discretion in 
the consideration of interferences with fundamental rights.853 Third, and in 
light of its case IPI854, the CJEU held that derogations and limitations with 
                                                 
850 Ibid. In paragraph 69 the Court concludes, that "Having regard to all the foregoing 
considerations, it must be held that, by adopting Directive 2006/24, the EU legislature has exceeded the 
limits imposed by compliance with the principle of proportionality in light of Articles 7, 8 and 52(1) of 
the Charter".  
851 Ibid., paragraph 65. Building on this conclusion the Court continues: "It must therefore be held 
that Directive 2006/24 entails a wide-ranging and particularly serious interference with those 
fundamental rights in the legal order of the EU, without such an interference being precisely 
circumscribed by provisions to ensure that it is actually limited to what is strictly necessary". 
852 Ibid., paragraph 46. 
853 Ibid., see paragraph 47. Reinforcing this argument the Court found in paragraph 48 that in the 
case at hand "the EU legislature's discretion is reduced, with the result that review of that discretion 
should be strict". 
854 See C-473/12. 
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regard to the protection of personal data apply only in so far is strictly 
necessary.855  
 
The Data Retention Directive must be understood as part of a wider EU 
fundamental right discussion. At this stage, we should also note problems 
related to national implementation of the Directive. The Commission referred 
some Member States, such as Sweden, to the Court for non-implementation of 
the directive. Discussion at the national level was vivid due to a visible breach 
of provisions of the directive with fundamental rights. There has also been 
strong resistance from the part of EU Member States. Constitutional courts 
played a major role in this and considered that the act was in breach with 
national constitutions.   
 
 
1. The unproblematic handling in the EU institutions 
 
In the Data Retention Directive at issue was the need for rules guaranteeing 
availability of traffic data for anti-terrorism purposes in the EU. This was in 
the wake of the terrorist attacks in Madrid (2004) and London (2005). The 
European Council had underscored the need for legal instrument in its various 
Conclusions.856 
 
The Data Retention Directive can be considered to have originated from a 
proposal for a Framework Decision on the retention of communications data 
submitted by France, the United Kingdom, Ireland and Sweden.857 This 
initiative by a group of Member States, however, was stuck in the handling of 
the EP due to contradicting views on the legal basis, as well as on the content 
of the proposed Framework Directive. The EP held that the legal basis was 
wrong and co-decision procedure should be applied. The EP also had some 
serious misgivings as to the provisions of the draft Framework Decision.858 
 
The terrorist acts of London in 2005 politically revived the idea of 
legislation in this field. The Commission took the issue of competence in the 
legislative process seriously and in September 2005 presented its draft data 
retention Directive, having the internal market Article 95 TEC as the legal 
basis. This allowed the EP to enter the negotiations on an equal footing as a 
consequence of the proposed co-decision procedure.859 The initiative of the 
four Member States was hence buried. 
                                                 
855 C-293/12, paragraph 52. 
856 The data retention instrument was also an important element in the Hague Programme, see 
Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament - The Hague 
Programme: Ten priorities for the next five years. The Partnership for European renewal in the field of 
Freedom, Security and Justice, COM(2005) 184 final, Brussels, 10.5.2005 
857 Draft Framework Decision on the retention of data processed and stored in connection with the 
provision of publicly available electronic communications services or data on public communications 
networks for the purpose of prevention, investigation, detection and prosecution of crime and criminal 
offences including terrorism, 8958/04, 28 April 2004. 
858 One can note that the proposal failed to include a proper impact assessment, but only a relatively 
general explanatory note, see addendum to the cover note, 8958/2004 ADD1, 20 December 2004.   
859 Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the retention of data 
processed in connection with the provision of public electronic communication services and amending 
Directive 2002/58/EC, COM(2005) 438 final, 21.9.2005. 
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2. The inadequate preparation in the Commission 
 
The Commission very much argued in its explanatory memorandum 
accompanying the draft Directive that the proposal was in line with 
Community law and with the Charter, although an impact on Articles 7 and 8 
of the Charter was detected by the Commission. The Commission, nonetheless, 
justified the interference with the need to limit these rights in this special case, 
according to Article 52 of the Charter. The objective preventing and combating 
terrorism and crime was considered to justify these limitations, which for their 
part were held to be proportionate and necessary.860 Similarly, the purpose 
limitation was considered adequate as was limiting the categories of data 
which need to be retained and limitation on the period of retention. These 
arguments were later to be deemed invalid by the CJEU. 
 
 In the explanatory memorandum, the Commission highlighted the public 
consultation that was conducted. Furthermore, the Commission carried out an 
impact assessment. The most important line taken in the impact assessment 
in light of recent developments was that the Commission held its approach as 
proportionate. The main justification in terms of proportionality was, 
according to the Commission, the strict purpose limitation and the approach 
adopted with regard to the retention period. In the context of proportionality 
the Commission did not foresee any problems in the field of fundamental 
rights.861  
 
 
3. EP and the important minority opinion 
 
The EP finalized its position on the Data Retention Directive in late 
November 2005.862 The forming of the position occurred mainly in the LIBE 
committee. It is noteworthy that the EP started with a call for an impact 
assessment which ought to be conducted before the entry into force of the 
Directive.863 In the proposed Amendment 3, the EP suggested a new recital 
recognizing Articles 7 and 8 of the Charter to be added to the Directive.864 This 
recital did not, however, make it to the final text of the Directive as the EU 
legislature adopted a standard recital stating that the Directive respects the 
fundamental rights, particularly those covered by Articles 7 and 8.865 This 
phrasing was already proposed by the Commission in the first place. This quite 
                                                 
860 Explanatory memorandum, p. 3. 
861 Ibid., p. 7. The Commission stated "The respect of fundamental rights and freedoms, and in 
particular the right to life, and the strict limitation of the invasion of privacy has been the key driver to 
find the most appropriate balance between all interests involved, such as the social, economical, security 
and privacy context".  
862 Draft report. 
863 Ibid., paragraph 2, p. 5. 
864 Ibid., p. 6. 
865 See recital 22 of the final Directive text. Directive 2006/24/EC of the European Parliament and 
of the Council of 15 March 2006 on the retention of data generated or processed in connection with the 
provision of publicly available electronic communications services of public communications networks 
and amending Directive 2002/58/EC. OJ L 105/54, 13.4.2006. 
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small detail also hints that the Commission and the Council can be rather keen 
on sticking to standard formulations with regard to fundamental rights, which 
may prove too rigid.866  The EP did not restrict itself to commenting on the 
recitals. It wanted to clearly bring the right to privacy and the right to data 
protection to the Article 1 of the Directive, setting out the important subject 
matter and scope.867 Again, this effort was in vain. 
 
The EP also took a stand on the issue of proportionality in its amendment 14, 
where it wanted to state that it is unclear whether the Directive "does not go 
beyond what is necessary and proportionate in order to achieve those 
objectives, as also pointed out by the European Data Protection 
Supervisor".868 It would indeed be interesting if the legislator would in legal 
act outspokenly state that it may be the case that the act is not proportionate 
or necessary. It is therefore no surprise that this part of the text was ultimately 
scrapped. We now know that the EP was on the right track with this but some 
later changes to the text convinced the EP that this problem was solved. 
Throughout its position, the EP also sought a more accurate focus on serious 
criminal offences.869 One major bulk of EP proposals was related to the access 
to retained data and the categories of data to be retained. These useful 
additions, bringing preciseness to the Directive, were mostly rejected, 
however. 
 
Finally, let us consider the minority opinion attached to the EP report.870 The 
minority rejected the report and found that the legislation contravenes the 
proportionality principles, even with the amendments proposed in the EP 
report. The minority held that the Directive was neither necessary nor 
effective. According to those MEPs, the proposed data retention period was 
too long and the types of data to be retained were too ambiguous. The 
conclusion was therefore that the "proposal for a directive seriously impinges 
on the fundamental rights of citizens". 
 
In its impact assessment, the Commission strongly argued that the proposal 
was in fact in line with community law and fundamental rights, even though 
an interference with Articles 7 and 8 existed. The Commission also defended 
its approach on longer data retention periods. Finally, the Commission 
concluded that it "is convinced that its proposal can stand the test of 
compatibility with fundamental rights and freedoms".871  
 
 
                                                 
866 In this standard considerant, the EP pushed unsuccessfully for including a reference to the case 
law of the ECtHR but this did not fly. See EP report p. 11. Judgments in cases Amann v. Switzerland and 
Malone v. the United Kingdom were especially mentioned. 
867 See ibid., p. 12, amendment 19. 
868 Ibid., p. 10. 
869 See ibid., pp. 6, 9 and 13. 
870 See minority opinion pursuant to Rule 48(3) of the Rules of Procedure by Giusto Catania, Ole 
Krarup, Sylvia-Yvonne Kaufmann and Kathalijne Maria Buitenweg. 
871 See Annex to the Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the 
retention of data processed in connection with the provision of public electronic Communication 
Services and amending Directive 2002/58/EC. SEC (2005) 1131 made public as Council Document 
12671/05 ADD 1, 27 September 2005, pp. 20-21. 
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4. An uncontroversial discussion in the Council 
 
The Council proceeded quite rapidly with its position. The Presidency was 
ready to launch the first phase of negotiations already in November 2005. The 
single biggest issue with the first trialogue was about data retention periods.872 
Generally, the EP had a more ambitious agenda for the data retention 
Directive than the Council. The Presidency returned to report to the Coreper 
on the outcome of the trialogue. The Presidency noted the various 
amendments put forward by the EP but it seems the Presidency was successful 
in defending the center of gravity achieved in the Council.873  
 
The second trialogue was held on 22 November 2005.874 Central to the EP 
position in this trialogue were concerns about provisions on access, criminal 
sanctions and most notably the need for additional safeguards for data 
protection. The Council was ready to offer the EP some concessions in the form 
of quite cosmetic changes in the text highlighting the importance of the 
Charter in the recital and the role of the CJEU and the position of the ECHR 
and the ECtHR in the Article on obligations to retain data. As a response to the 
EP claims, administrative or criminal sanctions were included in the Article 
on sanctions. Coreper was convened on 30 November 2005 to discuss the new 
Presidency compromise text. The above-mentioned changes were accepted as 
a result of the proceedings. The compromise package was now in place and the 
institutions were ready to proceed on this basis.  In the Council, the Directive 
was adopted at the ministerial level on 21 February 2006. Only Ireland and 
Slovakia voted against.875 Later, Ireland took the Council and the EP to the 
CJEU, questioning the legal basis of the Directive. The Court found contrary 
to the Irish position that the then Article 95 concerning the internal market 
was an appropriate legal basis.876  
 
 
5. EDPS identifies the inadequate level of proportionality 
and necessity 
 
The EDPS was consulted on the draft Directive and issued an opinion in 
November 2005.877 In the beginning of the opinion, interference with data 
protection and privacy was recognized.878 The tone was very critical towards 
the proposal: it was found that "it is essential to the EDPS that the proposal 
respects the fundamental rights. A legislative measure which would harm the 
protection guaranteed by Community law and more in particular by the case-
                                                 
872 See Council Document 14023/05. 
873 See Ibid., p. 5. 
874 See Council Document 14935/05, 24 November 2005. 
875 See Council Document 6598/06, ADD 1, 27 February 2006. 
876 C-301/6 Ireland v Parliament and the Council. 
877 Opinion of the European Data Protection Supervisor on the proposal for a Directive of the 
European Parliament and of the Council on the retention of data processed in connection with the 
provision of public electronic communication services and amending Directive 2002/58/EC. 
29.11.2005. 
878 See opinion, paragraphs 3-4. 
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law of the Court of Justice and the European Court of Human Rights is not 
only unacceptable, but also illegal".879 
 
More importantly, the EDPS drew attention to the importance of finding a 
balance between necessity and proportionality in relation to interference with 
data protection.880 According to the EDPS, the proportionality and necessity 
of the obligation to retain data must be demonstrated.881 The EDPS concluded 
that more safeguards were needed in order to ensure compliance with the right 
to data protection and in fact proposed to set strict conditions for the text to 
comply with necessity and proportionality.882 In light of the necessity of the 
proposal, the EDPS was unconvinced.883 This applied especially to the 
retention of traffic data. In the EDPS opinion it is interesting that he 
considered that if the EP and the Council - after a careful balancing of interests 
- found that necessity of the retention of traffic and location data is 
demonstrated, the retention can only be justified under Community law in so 
far as proportionality is respected.884  
 
Let us now tackle the issue of proportionality. To start with, the EDPS 
found that retention of traffic and location data was insufficient and further 
safeguards were needed.885 In order to fulfill the proportionality requirement, 
the EDPS worked out three proposals. The proposal should: 
1) limit the retention periods. The periods must reflect the demonstrated 
needs of law enforcement. 
2) limit the number of data to be stored. This number must reflect the 
demonstrated needs of law enforcement and it must be ensured that access to 
content data is not possible. 
3) contain adequate safety measures. So as to limit the access and further 
use, guarantee the security of data and ensure that the data subjects 
themselves can exercise their rights.886 
 
With a view to improve the text, the EDPS presented a great number of 
drafting proposals, which brought considerable limitations to the data 
retention periods, data access and the erasure of data. In the forefront of the 
recommendations was the highlighted need to demonstrate proportionality 
and necessity.  
 
 
6. Lessons learned from a difficult implementation phase  
 
Especially Sweden came under fire of the Commission due to non-
implementation of the Directive. In fact, the Commission sued Sweden and the 
CJEU held in its judgment of C-185/09 that Sweden had not transposed the 
                                                 
879 Ibid., paragraph 8. 
880 See ibid., paragraph 5. 
881 Ibid., paragraph 10. 
882 See ibid., paragraph 13. 
883 See ibid., paragraphs 17 and 22. 
884 Ibid., paragraph 23. 
885 Ibid., paragraph 26. 
886 Ibid., paragraph 27. 
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Data Retention Directive and thus identified the breach of EU law.887 In the 
ensuing case and in the face of Sweden's continued lack of transposition, the 
Court found an infringement of EU law in case C-270/11 Commission v 
Sweden and consequently imposed a lump sum payment for Sweden.888 The 
legislation was debated in Sweden to a great length. There was, for example, a 
special investigation with an appointed investigator tackling the options for 
implementation of the Directive. The proposals did not come into existence 
within the timeframe prescribed in the Directive, however. A rather heated 
debate took place also in the Swedish Parliament.889 The Constitutional Law 
Committee of the Swedish Parliament in its opinion annexed to the Legal 
Affairs Committee's report rose to the discussion Article 8 of the ECHR and 
the case law of the ECtHR according to which for limiting this right there has 
to be a pressing social need. Significant concerns were raised. 
 
By the same token, Austria had similar problems in the implementation of 
the Data Retention Directive. Serious concerns were raised throughout the 
process and in fact the Austrian Constitutional Court referred these legal 
issues to the CJEU for a preliminary ruling in order to obtain interpretation of 
whether Article 8 of the EUCFR is violated.890 When the CJEU finally 
invalidated the Data Retention Directive in 2014, the Austrian Constitutional 
Court was the first to declare that national data retention law was in breach of 
Article 8 of the EUCFR and ECHR.891 
 
The implementation phase of the Directive raised considerable concerns at 
the national level and received fierce criticism. The main participants in this 
discussion at the national level were the Constitutional Courts of Germany, 
Romania and the Czech Republic. The main line in the judgments of the 
Constitutional Courts was that the national law implementing the directive 
was unconstitutional. The reason for this was that the proposed legislation was 
in breach of fundamental rights. The main problem was, however, in the 
Directive itself and there was no easy way to circumvent the Directive. 
 
To analyze the situation, and to fulfill the reporting obligations set out in 
the Directive, the Commission issued an evaluation report to the Council and 
the EP on the Data Retention Directive, where it looked at the transposition of 
provisions of the Directive.892 The general conclusion presented in the report 
was that data retention is a useful tool for criminal justice systems and for law 
enforcement in the EU.  
 
The Commission gave an update of the implementation situation in 
Member States, stating that notifications of transposition were received from 
25 Member States. According to the Commission, Belgium had only partially 
                                                 
887 C-185/09 Commission v Sweden. 
888 C-270/11 Commission v Sweden. 
889 See The Legal Affairs Committee report of the Swedish Parliament, Justitieutskottets betänkande 
2010/11:JuU14. Lagring av trafikuppgifter för brottsbekämpande ändamål - genomförande av direktiv 
2006/24/EG.  
890 Der Österreichische Verfassungsgerichtshof, Beschluss G-47/12-11, 28. November 2012. 
891 Der Österreichische Verfassungsgerichtshof, Entscheidung G47/2012-49, 27 Juni 2014. 
892 Report from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament; evaluation report on 
the Data Retention Directive (Directive 2006/24/EC), COM(2011) 225 final, Brussels 18.4.2011. 
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implemented the Directive. What is more important is that Austria and 
Sweden had not transposed the Directive by the implementation deadline and 
the discussion on national legislation in this regard was still on-going. Equally 
important was that the Czech Republic, Germany and Romania had 
transposed this EU legal instrument, but the Constitutional Courts of these 
Member States had annulled the respective national legislation.893 
Consequently, the Directive was not implemented in these Member States and 
alternative methods of transposition, in line with constitutional provisions, 
had to be analyzed. 
 
The Romanian Constitutional Court held that the national law 
implementing the Directive and particularly the obligation to retain all traffic 
data for six months was in breach with Article 8 of the ECHR. The edge of the 
ruling of the German Constitutional Court was the surveillance which could 
impair the free exercise of fundamental rights. Furthermore, the 
proportionality of the data retention period was questioned. Its Czech 
homologue particularly criticized the purpose limitation included in the 
national legislation. Furthermore, similar constitutional concerns were raised 
in the constitutional courts of Bulgaria, Cyprus and Hungary.894 
 
In the evaluation report, the Commission put pressure on those Member 
States who had not yet transposed the Directive and those Member States 
whose constitutional courts had annulled the transposing legislation. 
Moreover, it reminded that the CJEU found that Austria and Sweden had 
violated their obligations under the EU law and made it clear that the 
Commission decided in April 2011 to refer Sweden for the second time to the 
CJEU with a view to putting financial penalties in place due to the decision of 
the Swedish Parliament to postpone the transposing legislation for 12 
months.895 
 
As a conclusion, the Commission expressed its intention to revise the data 
retention framework based on an impact assessment. It is noteworthy that in 
at the conclusion of the report the Commission had raised the issue of 
proportionality and fundamental rights to a very prominent position in 
relation to this review.896 At this stage, the Commission had identified the 
potential fundamental right concerns and the burning issue of proportionality, 
but it had to keep looking for a face-saving way out in terms of a credible 
enforcement of implementation of EU law. The Directive had been approved a 
long time ago and politically the Commission had no other choice but to push 
forward with the implementation. 
 
 
                                                 
893 Ibid., pp. 5-6. See Decision no 1258 of 8 October 2009 of the Romanian Constitutional Court, 
Bundesverfassungsgericht verdict, 1 BvR 256/08 and judgment of the Czech Constitutional Court of 22 
March on Act No. 127/2005 and Decree No 485/2005. 
894 Commission evaluation report, pp. 20-21. 
895 See CJEU cases C-189/09 and 185/09 and evaluation report, p. 21. 
896 See evaluation report, pp. 32-33. 
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7. Assessment of the case in relation to ex ante review of 
fundamental rights 
 
The EP did not get much out of negotiations and the text largely went the 
Council way. Concerns about fundamental rights and proportionality were 
indeed taken up during the legislative process, especially by the EDPS and the 
EP, but these legitimate misgivings were not necessarily taken into account. 
Even the EP majority was ready to accept the compromise. Why was this the 
case? It is possible to explain why the EU legislature went against fundamental 
rights only with the great political pressure to strike a deal on this legal 
instrument. It is always easy to speak wisely after the course of events is 
known, but the case of Data Retention Directive signaled the political 
objectives prevailing for even general principles of constitutional law. 
 
The case Digital Rights can be regarded as a bold move by the CJEU in 
bringing fundamental rights into consideration if a legal act is in line with the 
EU law. Declaring the legal act null and void is a strong measure, but it is 
indeed necessary in ensuring the coherence of the legislation with 
fundamental rights. It is good that the Court has also taken use of this option. 
Another point that proved the failure of the EU legislature in ex ante review of 
fundamental rights in the case of the Data Retention Directive was the 
negligence of proportionality in the face of political bargaining. 
 
The line taken by the Court in its ruling on the Data Retention Directive was a 
very classical one. At the first stage, the CJEU identified which fundamental 
rights are at stake. The second phase was to ask the question of whether the 
fundamental rights concerned were restricted. Third, the Court analyzed if the 
case passed the test on permissible limitations to fundamental rights. The 
main strand of the Court arguments was well recognizable already in the 
opinion of AG Villalón Cruz on the case.897 He took one step further in relation 
to previous case law by assessing proportionality in depth in the case.898 A key 
consideration in the opinion was the proportionality with regard to Article 
52(1) of the Charter, which remained the overarching argument also in the 
eventual Court ruling. 
 
After the Court decision, one has a good reason to ask if there are any 
possibilities for the EU data retention legislation to become materialized. In 
this issue, we come across with the competence which the Court has probably 
not fully taken into consideration. The competence with regard to the data 
retention rests with the Member States and this should be highlighted. 
Moreover, the institutions involved in the legislative process and ex ante 
review failed to apply Article 52(1) correctly. The data retention directive 
experience highlighted that the legislator cannot exceed its limits in the law-
making process. Consideration of how to limit fundamental rights clearly went 
out of bounds in this case. This ruling will most probably have a significant 
impact on the ex ante review. The EU legislature is now aware of the fact that 
                                                 
897 Opinion of Advocate General Cruz Villalón delivered on 12 December 2013 on case C-293/12 
Digital Rights Ireland. 
898 Ibid., see in particular paragraphs 102, 133, 151 and 152. 
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the Court remains vigilant in controlling the proportionality and fundamental 
right aspects of legal texts. The Court does not clearly allow that the political 
objectives of safety and security and anti-terrorism measures are given a 
priority over fundamental rights. 
 
Regarding the essence of fundamental rights, one must pay attention to its 
limits. The CJEU held in its judgment Digital Rights Ireland that the Data 
Retention Directive did not entail violation of the essence of fundamental 
rights: in this case, the right to privacy and the right to data protection. As 
stated by fundamental right experts in SURVEILLE project Paper Assessing 
Surveillance in the Context of Preventing a Terrorist Act, this line taken by the 
CJEU can be criticized for being too conventional.899 This critique mainly 
stems from the blurred distinction between "content data" and metadata of 
today.900 Given the argumentation of the Court, we can conclude it was a close 
call but overstepping boundaries of essence was not detected. 
 
It is important to note that, as stated in the SURVEILLE paper, the fact that 
the CJEU has declared the Directive invalid is not the end of the story. Quite 
the opposite, the CJEU decision imposes a positive obligation on the EU 
legislator to remedy the situation. In the same vein, a similar positive 
obligation falls also on the Member States in relation to their national 
legislation implementing the Directive.901 The positive obligation therefore 
applies both to national and EU level and consequently legislatures at both 
levels have to step in, in order to put the legal framework in line with 
fundamental rights. 
 
Giovanni Sartor points out that in addition to the normative models of 
adjudication, there are also normative models of legislation, which are to some 
extent adopted by the participants in the legislative process and which 
consequently motivate the legislators' behavior.902 As Sartor suggests, it is 
often explained how judges later on correct the wrong legislative choices of the 
legislator and thus protect fundamental rights. This view is plausible but in the 
case of Digital Rights Ireland, nonetheless, the CJEU demonstrated that the 
Court has its place in having the final word on European constitutional issues. 
Even if ex ante review should be strengthened in the EU, there is no way of 
changing the architecture drastically, in my opinion. Ex ante review and 
judicial review should rather be seen as complementary arrangements. The ex 
ante review should be the first line of defence and practicing defence of depth 
thinking the Court should have the final say and take care of — hopefully — the 
very few legislative wrongs and mistakes that have passed the first line.  
 
                                                 
899 SURVEILLE Paper, p. 40. 
900 Ibid. The authors of the paper justify this point of view by considering that "the processing of 
metadata cannot any longer be invariably seen as falling within such "peripheral areas" of privacy and 
data protection where limitations would always be legitimate and permissible". 
901 Ibid., pp. 42-43. 
902 Sartor Giovanni: A Sufficientist Approach to Reasonableness in Legal Decision-Making and 
Judicial Review. EUI Working Papers. LAW 2009/07. Department of Law. European University 
Institute. p. 25. 
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The case of Data Retention Directive should also be seen within the wider 
frame of European constitutionalism and plurality of review mechanisms and 
institutional actors. Political institutions and expert bodies were not able to 
guarantee sufficient observance of fundamental rights. This failure very much 
culminated in the failure to apply necessary test of permissible limitations 
based on Article 52 (1) of the Charter. In this case, the court has to step in to 
fill the vacuum. This illustrates how useful it is to have review mechanisms in 
place at different levels of the EU legal cycle with the ultimate line of defence 
being the CJEU.  
 
We can expect that the case of Data Retention Directive and the subsequent 
court case Digital Rights Ireland will provide important inputs to the EU 
legislature on how to conduct ex ante review. In the core of these lessons 
learned is how to avoid such a situation again by means of better observance 
to proportionality and Article 52 (1) of the Charter.  Eventually, these impacts 
can be purported to be very positive in the long run for legislator's activities.     
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XI Case Schrems: the finest hour of CJEU 
giving guidance to the legislature? 
 
In Autumn 2015 the CJEU came out with an extremely important ruling in 
the case of Schrems.903 It can be regarded as one of the most important rulings 
of the Court ever made. This landmark ruling is  paramount in terms of 
promoting data protection and right to privacy, but less attention has been 
paid in various commentaries to its importance for providing guidance to the 
EU legislature on how to address fundamental right problems in the 
legislation. This guidance is of indirect nature, but nonetheless clearly visible, 
which is why Schrems to some extent makes an exception to series of CJEU 
judgments which are focused on invalidating pieces of EU legislation. 
Declaring the Commission’s US Safe Harbour decision invalid is naturally at 
the apex of the judgement. Nevertheless, the CJEU arguments regarding 
problems of different provisions of the decision are extremely enlightening for 
the EU legislature on how to overcome fundamental rights-based problems. 
 
The Commission’s US Safe Harbour Decision was all about acknowledging 
that in the cases of data transfers from the EU to the US, the level of data 
protection of the US corresponded to that of the EU.904 Pursuant to the data 
protection Directive, the Commission can make the decision about the level of 
protection and the Commission used this option in going forward with the US 
Safe Harbour Decision. 
 
The consequent revelations of Edward Snowden and public discussion 
about intelligence services' access to personal data intensified all over the 
world. Mr. Schrems concerned with the data transfers of Google from Ireland 
to Google in the United States took the case to the national court which in turn 
referred the case to the CJEU for a preliminary ruling. The High Court of 
Ireland presented questions to the CJEU which were related at least indirectly 
to the legality of the safe harbour regime set up by the Commission decision. 
 
For the analysis, one needs to look into both the ruling and the AG opinion. 
Let us start with the latter one which eventually became the basis for the 
Court’s line in the ruling. Throughout his opinion, AG Bot raised serious 
concerns about breaches of fundamental rights. It is worth underscoring that 
especially the limitation Article 52(1) plays a decisive role in the analysis of AG. 
In particular, he draws much attention to the respect of the essence of Articles 
7 and 8 of the Charter and finds that especially broad wording of limitations of 
the decision, which may lead to disapplying safe harbour principles and 
compromise the essence of right to protection of personal data. Furthermore, 
he also took up the issue of US intelligence services' access to data transferred 
which compromises the essence of right to privacy.905 The basic conclusion of 
                                                 
903 C-362/14 of 6 October 2015 Maximilian Schrems v Data Protection Commissioner. 
904 2000/520/EC  Commission Decision of 26 July 2000 pursuant to Directive 95/46/EC of the 
European Parliament and of the Council on the adequacy of the protection provided by the safe harbour 
privacy principles and related frequently asked questions issued by the US Department of Commerce. 
905 Opinion of Advocate General Bot delivered on 23 September 2015 on case C-362/14 Maximilian 
Schrems v Data Protection Commissioner. Paragraphs 176-177 and 181. 
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AG was that the Commission's decision must be declared invalid. He had a 
very clear position that data transferred to the United States from the EU does 
not ensure an adequate level of protection of personal data. The vague wording 
of limitations set out in the provisions and based on national security, public 
interest or law enforcement requirements did not convince AG in light of 
Article 52(1) of the EUCFR.906  
 
Moreover, it is important that AG considered that mass surveillance is 
inherently disproportionate and hence unwarranted interference with the 
right to privacy and right to data protection as stipulated in the Charter.907 
This can be regarded as a reflection of a critical view generally on the access of 
intelligence authorities' to personal data that cannot be found sustainable and 
that such access constitutes an interference with the rights guaranteed in the 
Charter. Unwarranted interference with right to an effective remedy pursuant 
to Article 47 of the Charter was also detected. These issues, together with the 
fact that the Commission exceeded the limits of proportionality, led AG to 
conclude that the Commission Decision should be declared invalid.908 
 
In line with the AG opinion, the Court observes in the ruling that the data 
protection Directive, which forms the basis for the Commission’s decision, 
lacks a definition of the concept of an adequate level of protection.909  This 
leads the Court to argue that “the high level of protection guaranteed by 
Directive 95/46 read in light of the Charter could easily be circumvented by 
transfers of personal data from the European Union to third countries for the 
purpose of being processed in those countries”.910 It follows from the fact that 
there is no definition of adequate level of protection that the Commission 
essentially has a carte blanche in determining what is an adequate level of 
protection in transfers of personal data to third countries. Sufficient criteria 
for such an assessment do not exist. 
 
The Court draws particular attention to the Decision, which raises national 
security, public interest and law enforcement requirements to a primary status 
vis-à-vis safe harbour principles. The Court finds that the Decision hence 
enables interference with fundamental rights of persons whose personal data 
is or could be transferred from the EU to the United States. The basis of such 
interference could be the above-mentioned national security, public interest 
or US domestic legislation.911 This is extremely problematic from a 
fundamental rights point of view. It is hard to imagine that it would be 
sustainable to have such vague reasons legitimizing interference with and, in 
an extreme case, limitation of fundamental rights.  
 
Building on the interpretation practice utilized in judgment Digital Rights 
Ireland, the Court takes a strong stand on the need of derogations and 
                                                 
906 See ibid., paragraphs 183-184. 
907 Ibid., paragraph 200. 
908 Ibid., paragraphs 215 and 237. 
909 C-362/14, paragraph 70. 
910 Ibid., paragraph 73.  
911 Ibid., paragraphs 86 and 87. 
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limitations to the protection of personal data to be strictly necessary.912 
Furthermore, the Court holds that "legislation permitting the public 
authorities to have access on a generalized basis to the content of electronic 
communications must be regarded as compromising the essence of the 
fundamental right to respect for private life, as guaranteed by Article 7 of the 
Charter".913 In addition to these major concerns about right to data protection 
and the right to privacy, the Court states that legislation that does not contain 
legal remedies with regard to an individual's access to personal data and 
obtaining the rectification or erasure of such data does not respect the essence 
of Article 47, which enshrines the right to an effective judicial protection.914 On 
the basis of these findings, the Court concludes that Article 1 of the 
Commission's decision fails to comply with Article 25(6) of the data protection 
directive and read in light of the EUCFR is hence invalid.915 
 
The court then turns to another key provision of the Commission's 
decision, namely Article 3. In its conclusion, the Court reminded that the EU 
legislature has not given competence to the Commission by the means of 
implementing powers to restrict national supervisory authorities' powers. 
Therefore, the Commission has acted ultra vires and this being read in light of 
the Charter, Article 3 of the decision was also considered invalid.916 
 
It is important for the overall consideration that Articles 2 and 4 and 
annexes to the Decision are interlinked and this being the case, the validity of 
the Decision has to be assessed in its entirety. The conclusion of the Grand 
Chamber of the Court was that the Decision is invalid. A particular weight has 
been put on deliberations with regard to Articles 7, 8 and 47 of the Charter.917 
 
 
1. Assessment of the case in relation to the ex ante review 
of fundamental rights 
 
The judgment in case Schrems came out in the aftermath of case Digital 
Rights Ireland which had a considerable impact on the outcome of Schrems. 
It can be argued that in Schrems the Court went one step further in giving 
guidance to the EU legislator with regard to various provisions of the decision.  
 
We can hence conclude that the significance of Schrems is two-fold: it is 
obvious that the most important issue is the substance of the argumentation 
which brings a considerable input to stronger data and privacy protection. 
These fundamental rights can be regarded as having now even more weight in 
the EU legal order. 
 
                                                 
912 Ibid., paragraphs 93-94.  
913 Ibid., paragraph 94. 
914 Ibid., paragraph 95. 
915 Ibid., paragraph 98. 
916 Ibid., paragraph 104.  
917 Ibid., paragraphs 104-106 and the concluding paragraphs 1 and 2. 
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The ruling is also important process-wise. With these substantial 
arguments, the Court points out which provisions of the ruling are problematic 
and furthermore hints, albeit indirectly, how to change the text in order to put 
it in line with the fundamental rights in question. 
 
Schrems turns out to be very significant, because of the effective utilization 
of the limitation test deriving from Article 52(1). Against this background, the 
Court ascertained that any interference of fundamental rights must respect the 
essence of those rights.918 At the heart of this assessment, carried out first by 
the AG and then the Court, is above all the essence dimension of the rights 
concerned. Moreover, proportionality plays a significant role in these 
considerations. The omnipresence of Articles 7 and 8, and to some extent also 
47, is also very visible indeed. 
 
This case study differs from the other cases utilized in this study in a way 
that it sheds light on the court case without opening up the legislative process 
which led to the adoption of the Commission Safe Harbour Decision. It is 
obvious that, similar to other cases of this study, something went wrong with 
this law-making process but the reason why I have chosen Schrems as one of 
the case studies is related to its substantive importance for data protection. 
Even more significant is the how the Court in its argumentation tackles the 
problematic issues in the Articles of the Decision. Therefore, the value of case 
Schrems is not only to be found in invalidating the Decision considered 
problematic from a fundamental rights point of view, but also pointing out to 
the legislature how to carry out ex ante review. In this guidance, the mind-set 
is rightly on the substance of the legal act and the utilization of the test of 
permissible limitations. The most important lesson that the legislature should 
draw from the judgment is how to utilize the test of permissible limitations. In 
this sense, Digital Rights Ireland and Schrems can be regarded as an 
interpretative continuum, which signals to the legislature that a test of 
permissible limitations should be utilized. Building on the limitation Article of 
the Charter the Court elaborates the content of this provision and 
demonstrates how to utilize this test in practice. I envisage that these two cases 
will have a far-reaching impact on the functioning of the EU legislature, in 
particular in fundamental right sensitive legislative files.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
918 According to Ojanen "these statements display that, as legal norms, fundamental rights protected 
by the Charter should not only be treated as principles that may be balanced and weighed against other 
competing principles.", Ojanen 2016, p. 5. 
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XII Horizontal aspects  
 
1. Violations of fundamental rights looming large in the 
austerity measures 
 
It is also important and topical to briefly discuss the impact of the financial 
crisis on fundamental rights, especially on social and economic rights. This is 
because economic pressure resulting from harsh austerity measures can be 
identified as a horizontal driver affecting legislation, both in Member States 
and at the EU level, with far-reaching repercussions on fundamental rights for 
almost a decade. For years, there has been an ongoing discussion about the 
future of “Social Europe”.919 The case of the International Transport Workers’ 
Federation and Finnish Seamens’ Union had to do with a conflict situation 
between internal market rules and social rights in the enlarged EU. At issue 
here was the question of possible social dumping. In this case, the CJEU found 
that “the right to take collective action for the protection of workers is a 
legitimate interest which, in principle, justifies a restriction of one of the 
fundamental freedoms guaranteed by the Treaty and that the protection of 
workers is one of the overriding reasons of public interest recognized by the 
Court”.920 The CJEU, however, stressed that there are limits for these 
collective actions. These notions were further confirmed in Laval un Partneri 
which touched upon basically the same theme as the International Transport 
Workers’ Federation and Finnish Seamens’ Union.921 
 
The austerity measures and handling of the financial crisis has on many 
occasions meant prioritization of the budget over economic and social rights 
of the individuals. In this connection, it should be noted that ICESCR sets clear 
conditions for limiting fundamental rights.922 Article 5 of the Covenant even 
diminishes further the scope for restrictions.923 Given these provisions in the 
                                                 
919 For further discussion on the social dimension of the EU see de Búrca Gráinne and de Witte 
Bruno: Social Rights in Europe. Oxford University Press. Oxford 2005. 
920 C-238/05 International Transport Workers’ Federation and Finnish Seamens’ Union, paragraph 
77. See also paragraphs 44, 45 and 46. 
921 C-341/05 Laval un Partneri, paragraph 103. As the issue of proportionality is particularly 
interesting for the theme of this thesis an exhaustive analysis on the proportionality aspects of cases 
Laval and Viking has been set out in Hös Nikolett: The Principle of proportionality in the Viking and 
Laval Cases: An appropriate standard for judicial review? EUI Working Papers. LAW 2009/06. 
Department of Law. 
922 Article 4 of ICESCR stipulates: “The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize that, in the 
enjoyment of those rights provided by the State in conformity with the present Covenant, the State may 
subject such rights only to such limitations as are determined by law only in so far as this may be 
compatible with the nature of these rights and solely for the purpose of promoting the general welfare in 
a democratic society”. 
923 Article 5 of the ICESCR reads as follows:  
1. Nothing in the present Covenant may be interpreted as implying for any State, group or person 
any right to engage in any activity or to perform any act aimed at the destruction of any of the rights or 
freedoms recognized herein, or at their limitation to a greater extent than is provided for in the present 
Covenant. 
2. No restriction upon or derogation from any of the fundamental human rights recognized or 
existing 
in any country in virtue of law, conventions, regulations or custom shall be admitted on the pretext 
that the present Covenant does not recognize such rights or that it recognizes them to a lesser extent. 
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international regulatory framework, it is possible to conclude that room for 
restrictions is rather limited. 
 
In 2010, in the aftermath of the first wave of the European financial crisis, 
FRA issued a working paper titled “Protecting fundamental rights during the 
economic crisis”.924 The document focused on the various negative impacts of 
the economic crisis on the protection of fundamental rights. In response to the 
challenges of the crisis, both the EU and the Member States introduced fiscal 
consolidation measures, budget cuts and different kinds of austerity measures 
that had far-reaching impacts on fundamental rights, particularly in those 
Member States hit hardest by the economic downturn or in some cases even 
free-fall. In relation to the challenges of the crisis, FRA did not only pinpoint 
phenomena touching the wider walks of life, such as less-public spending and 
unemployment, but it also rightly pointed out the exposure of certain 
particularly vulnerable groups to the effects of the crisis.925 Again, the basic 
point of departure for the FRA in its analysis was the Charter.926 
 
An extremely interesting point in the FRA working paper was the criticism 
addressed especially to the Member States for the lack of ex ante impact 
assessments concerning the impact of fiscal consolidation measures on 
different population groups.927 Later in the document, FRA recommended the 
EU and the Member States to carry out these impact assessments in order to 
ameliorate the situation. In this work, FRA foresaw a role for national human 
rights institutions.928 Human rights can be deemed to enable the 
institutionalization of the process of self-governance of individuals.929 
 
Although the impacts of the economic crisis fall outside the scope of this 
study, it is nevertheless important to acknowledge that legal and policy 
measures springing from the search for the exit from the economic crisis in 
Europe has significantly affected the protection of fundamental rights. We 
should also bear in mind that after the FRA working paper the economic slump 
has continued in spite of quite premature conclusions on the end of the crisis 
drawn in the working paper. This has quite naturally triggered further 
austerity measures and continued to challenge fundamental rights. 
 
When discussing the impacts of the economic crisis, we must also note 
decisions of the European Committee of Social Rights (ECSR) under the CoE 
on the austerity measures introduced by Greece. In spring 2013, the ECSR in 
its five decisions found that the cumulative effect of the Greek austerity 
                                                 
924 European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights: Protecting fundamental rights during the 
economic crisis. December 2010. 
925 See FRA working paper 2010, pp. 3 and 7. 
926 Ibid., p. 5. 
927 Ibid., pp. 4. and 20. 
928 Ibid., p. 47. 
929 Günther Klaus: Von der gubernativen zur deliberativen Menschenrechtspolitik - Die Definition 
und Fortentwicklung der Menschenrechte als Akt kollektiver Selbstbestimmung. In Haller Gret, Günther 
Klaus, Neumann Ulfrid (Hg.): Menschenrechte und Volkssouveränität in Europa. Gerichte als 
Vormunde der Demokratie? Campus Verlag GmbH. Frankfurt am Main 2011, p. 57. 
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measures constituted a violation of social rights.930 This decision can be 
considered to be an important contribution to the discussion on the relation 
between the austerity measures and fundamental rights by such an 
authoritative European body. Simultaneously, it reveals the problems of 
actions designed to meet the terms of the international bailout. 
 
It is also possible to see interesting strands of development at the national 
level in Member States suffering most from the economic crisis. In Portugal, 
the Constitutional Court found in its ruling in August 2013 the new austerity 
measures of Portugal unconstitutional.931 This judgment was actually a part of 
a series of rulings stating the unconstitutional nature of Portuguese actions in 
the containment of the economic crisis. In spring 2013, the Court found the 
budget including severe budgetary cuts unconstitutional.932 On the basis of 
these findings, it is relatively easy to associate oneself with the understanding 
of social constitution as an eternal loser in the turbulent times caused by 
economic downturn.933 The constitutional constellation produced by the crisis 
is in many respects unsatisfactory.934 
 
 
2. Remarks on the duration of ex ante review processes 
 
Another matter that may not have been sufficiently covered in the legal 
research has to do with temporal duration of EU legislative processes. As 
practical, and perhaps unimportant, this may look like prima facie for 
research focusing mainly on the contents of the legal text, I posit that this 
notion is unjustified. Time pressure and strict deadlines for the proceedings 
often have a direct impact on the quality of legal texts. As a consequence, the 
content and the quality also affect the position of individuals. We should 
therefore not overlook the time factor, which constitutes an important general 
issue when analyzing ex ante review. 
 
                                                 
930 See the decisions of the European Committee on Social Rights of the Council of Europe on the 
merits of the following complaints: Federation of Employed Pensioners of Greece (IKA–ETAM) v. 
Greece, Complaint No. 76/2012,Panhellenic Federation of Public Service Pensioners (POPS) v. Greece, 
Complaint No. 77/2012, Pensioners’ Union of the Athens-Piraeus Electric Railways (I.S.A.P.) v. Greece, 
Complaint No. 78/2012, Panhellenic Federation of Pensioners of the Public Electricity Corporation 
(POS-DEI) v. Greece, Complaint No. 79/2012, Pensioner’s Union of the Agricultural Bank of Greece 
(ATE) v. Greece, Complaint No. 80/2012, published on 22 April 2013.   
931 See Ruling of the Constitutional Court of Portugal, Acórdão N. 474/2013, Lisboa 29 de Agosto de 
2013. In this judgment the Court made clear that the proposed measures on deteriorating employment 
conditions of civil servants constituted a violation of constitutional provisions on job security and 
proportionality.  “Pelo exposto, o Tribunal Constitucional decide: a) Pronunciar-se pela 
inconstitucionalidade da norma constante do n.º 2 do artigo 18.º do Decreto n.º 177/XII, enquanto 
conjugada com a segunda, terceira e quarta partes do disposto no n.º 2 do artigo 4.º do mesmo diploma, 
por violação da garantia da segurança no emprego e do princípio da proporcionalidade, constantes dos 
artigos 53.º e 18.º, n.º 2, da Constituição da República Portuguesa;”. 
932 Ruling of the Constitutional Court of Portugal, Acórdão N. 187/2013, Lisboa 5 de abril de 2013. 
It should be noted that the constitutional review of both these cases was initiated by the President of 
Portugal. 
933 See for example Tuori Kaarlo and Tuori Klaus: The Eurozone Crisis. A Constitutional Analysis. 
Cambridge University Press. Cambridge 2014, pp. 231-241. 
934 Ibid., p. 265. This is the case although major economic initiatives discussed in the context of the 
crisis pay at least lip service to the central values of political constitution, namely democracy, legitimacy 
and accountability. See ibid., p. 256. 
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In this section, I will carry out a mapping exercise and concentrate on the 
duration of AFSJ files. A more exact issue to which I seek an answer is how 
long ex ante review processes of fundamental rights have lasted? Does this 
have a significant impact on the overall duration of legislative process? This 
question is important, also because in the concluding remarks of this study I 
will make some suggestions for the development of the ex ante system and in 
this exercise a mandatory ex ante review has an important role to play. It is 
therefore worth gauging whether ex ante review processes that can be 
extremely helpful for realization of fundamental rights, genuinely make the 
difference in terms of time factor. Legal initiatives falling under the AFSJ are 
already time consuming. In the analysis, I will compare the duration of AFSJ 
legal initiatives with that of files from other policy areas. I will first attempt to 
identify and define an average duration of a legislative process and then reflect 
the time period in the AFSJ on the average duration. It is challenging to 
determine the average duration required for a directive to pass through the EU 
law-making process. Even EU legal acts with the same legal form have such 
varying contents that it is very hard to extract some kind of normal duration 
for the process from the multiple legislative processes. 
 
I will also try to address the question of how long the ex ante procedure/s takes 
in the overall legislative process. It is clear that a well-integrated and 
comprehensive ex ante review always takes some time. I will attempt to carry 
out a certain kind of cost-benefit analysis – a method used especially in the 
analysis of costs and benefits in economics. With costs, however, I do not refer 
to financial costs of the ex ante process, but the quality of the legislation. 
Similar to the previous section, we must bear in mind that the time span from 
the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty is still quite short. Thus, these findings 
should be considered as initial outputs from the new legal framework and its 
impact on duration of AFSJ legal files. 
 
The Commission has analyzed the length of the legislative processes under the 
co-decision procedure for the European parliamentary term 2004-2009. For 
the first reading files, the duration ranged from 2 to 48 months. In the same 
time period, the shortest time for a legislative proposal to become an adopted 
piece of EU legislation in the second reading was 12 months, and the longest 
108 months. To conclude the legislative process with the conciliation phase 
took from 29 to 159 months.935 
 
Unfortunately, there is no further statistical information on the years after 
2009, but in light of these statistics we can easily gauge the average duration 
of the co-decision procedure, which has formally been replaced by the ordinary 
legislative procedure. The increasing tendency for first reading agreements 
was already clearly evident in 2004-2009. This trend has continued also 
during the last few years, even though questions have been raised, especially 
in the EP, regarding the democratic coverage and legitimacy of first reading 
                                                 
935 See The co-decision procedure. Analysis and statistics of the 2004-2009 legislature. Available at 
www.ec.europa.eu/codecision/statistics/docs/report_statistics_public_draft_en_pdf. Visited on 
3.7.2013. 
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agreements, which have greatly empowered the role of single rapporteurs in 
different legal dossiers. When looking back to the years up until 2009, we 
should note once again that during that time, the third pillar initiatives did not 
fall under the co-decision procedure. As has been stated several times before, 
it was only after the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty and the creation of 
the AFSJ, that ordinary legislative procedure started to apply to initiatives in 
this policy area. 
 
If we first turn to the European protection order, one of the few legislative 
initiatives originating from a group of Member States after the entry into force 
of the Lisbon Treaty, we can see that closing the case took about 20 months. 
This is not bad for a legislative dossier under the AFSJ. It is impossible to say 
anything about the duration of the impact assessment phase before the 
proposal was introduced. We should, however, bear in mind that although a 
check of compatibility with fundamental rights must have been carried out by 
the drafter, i.e. administrators of national administrations involved, but this 
does not satisfactorily substitute the non-existent impact assessment. In the 
case of the EPO, the most interesting contributions from the point of view of 
fundamental rights came from the EDPS and the EP. 
 
Negotiations on the European investigation order were on-going for a long 
time. If we juxtapose the EIO and EPO, we can see that the EIO was the more 
sensitive file since the beginning. In addition to contributions from the EDPS, 
the FRA also submitted an opinion on the proposed text. The opinion of the 
EDPS on EIO ensued swiftly after the introduction of the draft directive. It 
took less than four months for the EDPS to analyze the proposal and submit 
the opinion. It is not a record time, but given one lost month, August when the 
EU is closed, it is not a bad performance. As the Proposal for an EIO directive 
was published in the official journal in late June 2010, the FRA opinion was 
given out less than 8 months after the introduction of the EIO proposal. One 
should remember that FRA did not start formulating its position directly after 
the directive proposal was published, but it needed some push from the 
institutions, in this case from the EP. The EIO Directive was published in the 
Official Journal of the EU in May 2014. It therefore took almost four years for 
the EIO to be adopted. 
 
The case of ACTA is a strange one in terms of the duration of the process. The 
process of international negotiations on this topic was time-consuming, as is 
standard. Then, when the ACTA text was negotiated, everything happened 
quite rapidly. In the EU adoption process that failed in the end, the ex ante 
review of fundamental rights was at issue. At the EU level, the fundamental 
rights preview happened in a speedy fashion, mainly because of the rapid 
proceedings of the EP. It only took a couple of months for the EP to analyze 
and discuss the proposed the text and subsequently to land to a conclusion to 
reject the ACTA. The fundamental right considerations in the Council on the 
other hand were incomplete and inadequate. 
 
In conclusion, I consider that the ex ante phase does not take that much time 
compared with the overall benefits it provides for the quality of legal texts. The 
ex ante process could even be strengthened at the cost of extended duration of 
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the legislative process. Ex ante review brings such benefits to the law-making 
process in terms of taking fundamental rights more seriously in the legal texts 
that it is worth exploring if ex ante review could even be reinforced. In order 
to avoid delays in the legislative process caused by the strengthened ex ante 
mechanism, it would be advisable to introduce some kind of deadlines for the 
ex ante phase.  
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PART THREE: CONCLUSIONS 
 
XIII Conclusions and implications of the 
study 
 
1. Ten key findings of the study 
 
Ten key findings of this study are presented here, related to the research 
questions and in light of the cases analyzed: 
 
1) Of all the EU institutions, the Commission has been the initiator in 
systematic ex ante review of fundamental rights in the EU law-making process. 
In spite of this, the Commission has sometimes gone out of bounds in terms of 
permissible limitations to fundamental rights. 
 
2) The EP, which obtained an equal footing with the Council in the legislative 
dossiers under the AFSJ as a consequence of the entry into force of the Lisbon 
Treaty, has taken fundamental rights most seriously when drafting EU 
legislation. FRA and EDPS legal opinions have often found their way to the 
legislative process through the EP positions, bringing considerable added 
value to the legal instruments concerned.  
 
3) The biggest gap in the ex ante review of fundamental rights can be found in 
the Council. Despite some positive developments the Council, it is still lagging 
behind. 
 
4) Taking the argumentation to the national level, it should be noted that 
Member States' ex ante review bodies have been, in some cases, very effective 
in detecting fundamental right problems and dealing with them. 
 
5) Ex ante review of fundamental rights has been significantly strengthened 
after the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty. This change illustrates 
European constitutionalism in its pluralistic form, with many actors carrying 
out ex ante review at different levels of EU polity. 
 
6) Proportionality has been a key concern in the preparation of many sensitive 
EU legal acts. Unfortunately, these concerns have not always made it through 
to a thorough consideration of the EU legislature, despite continuous attempts 
of i.a. FRA and EDPS. 
 
7) Negative obligations, i.e. restrictions of fundamental rights, have been a 
predominant feature in the handling of fundamental rights in the EU law-
making process.  
 
8) In order to improve legislative actions related to negative obligations, an 
EU test for permissible limitations to fundamental rights based on Article 
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52(1) of the EUCFR and building on recent case law of the CJEU should be 
fully utilized. 
 
9) Positive obligations in the EU legislative process have become more 
important, but are still over-shadowed by the negative obligations. The 
consistent implementation of positive obligations has not yet been achieved, 
but steps have been taken in the right direction. 
 
10) Co-operation in the review of fundamental rights should be reinforced, not 
only among institutions involved in ex ante review but also between them and 
the CJEU. The CJEU is increasingly providing guidance to the EU legislature 
on how to overcome fundamental rights problems. A good starting point for a 
deeper co-operation can be found in the AFSJ legislative files, most notably in 
dossiers related to anti-terrorism and data protection. 
 
The common thread in these mainly positive developments is the impact of the 
Charter. It has been a major driver in involving EU institutions and other 
stakeholders in the ex ante review of fundamental rights in terms of the 
process. Additionally, the Charter has been important content-wise in 
providing a substantive yardstick for review. Yet there is still a lot of potential 
in the Charter to be unleashed. 
 
 
2. The obliging Charter and institutional implications 
within the frame of constitutional pluralism 
 
Fundamental rights aspects of EU legislative proposals will be taken into 
account in several phases of the law-making process. Furthermore, there are 
many legal technical practices in carrying out the review. This remains 
insufficient, however, even though the initiative of better regulation and 
especially the Charter have provided extremely positive inputs to the ex ante 
review. We still cannot speak about an effective mainstreaming of 
fundamental rights as ex ante review continues to be somewhat fragmented in 
its scale and depth with regard to different EU policy sectors. The biggest gap 
that remains is the omission of initiatives put forward by EU Member States 
under co-operation in police and judicial matters. The institutions of the EU 
should collaborate further to bridge this gap. What should be done next is to 
think about the best practices in dealing with fundamental rights aspects in 
the EU legislative process in a manner that duly takes into account the specific 
features of the EU as a supranational organization that produces legislation. 
 
From the results of the analysis, we can see that strengthening ex ante 
control mechanisms at all levels of the EU legislative process would provide 
considerable advantages. Placing more efforts on preparatory phase control 
would make it less probable that an EU legal instrument would be annulled by 
the CJEU after its adoption for being in breach with fundamental rights. With 
a stronger preparatory phase control it could be possible to ease the current 
workload of the CJEU by providing better quality of legislation and more 
thorough consideration of fundamental rights aspects of draft statutory texts. 
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If we then think about the national level and the protection of fundamental 
rights guaranteed by the national legal system and its relation to the EU 
fundamental rights system, we can note that a reinforced ex ante control at 
national level would decrease tension between national and EU law.936  
 
A stronger preview favourably affects an individual's position because it 
can be foreseen that with more focus on preparatory phase of fundamental 
rights related legislation, an individual’s rights would be taken more 
thoroughly into account as a whole. Fundamental rights oriented preview can 
thus contribute positively to the consideration of the impact of the proposed 
EU legal instrument on an individual’s rights springing from the national, EU 
and ECHR legal systems.  
 
The EU should strive for less, but better regulation. It should be accepted 
that putting more efforts to analysing fundamental rights aspects of draft EU 
legislation may prolong decision-making process on the text. Niilo Jääskinen 
makes the following very correct observations on the characteristics of EU 
legislation and the decision-making that gives rise to it. He considers that two 
antithetic principles, the objective-rational preparation and negotiation-
culture reflecting national interests, are combined more easily in the EU than 
in the nation-state. EU decision-making lacks the rationality ensuing from 
parliamentarism that in the nation-states establishes the political line to steer 
legislative projects all the way to political decision-making. Especially within 
the Council and the EP, the rationality possibly exercised by the Commission 
in the preparation encounters the decision-making that is characterized 
mainly by negotiation culture and compromising with no common values or 
political outsets in the background.937 Sometimes there may be a danger that 
these fundamental rights aspects remain insufficiently addressed due to the 
need to break a political deadlock in some EU dossier. It may well happen that 
in these kinds of cases, for instance, fundamental rights issues may appear 
only at the point of national implementation of EU law, such as adopting a 
parliamentary act that amends current national legislation in order to achieve 
harmony with an EU directive. Finding a way out of a diplomatic impassé may 
sometimes have its consequences. 
 
Ex ante review at the EU level was disregarded for many years. Ex ante 
review has mainly taken place in the form of internal procedures of the 
Commission which is probably not the best solution seen from the perspective 
of openness and transparency. However, there have been positive 
developments overall under the auspices of the better regulation initiative that 
has broken through to the EU legislation. Nevertheless, the Charter is a much 
more important factor in strengthening ex ante review across the wide 
spectrum of EU institutions. It is binding on EU institutions also when 
                                                 
936 For example the cases of Data Retention Directive and European Arrest Warrant indicate that 
with more focus on ex ante review of fundamental rights of the implementation phase problems could 
have been at least partially avoided. 
937 Jääskinen, p. 46. According to Jääskinen these general features of the decision-making reflect in 
the legal-technical, linguistic and systematic quality of the EU legislation. Moreover, it is not possible to 
reconstruct the will of the legislator and this also makes the travaux préparatoires a less useful source 
in the application of law. 
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legislating and it therefore obliges the institutions to pay more attention to 
fundamental rights in the legislative process. 
 
The Council has somewhat enhanced its performance in ex ante review of 
fundamental rights but this remains insufficient. The Council can be regarded 
as having been the loser in terms of competence with regard to law-making in 
the AFSJ. The Europeanisation of this fundamental right sensitive policy field 
has probably led to the situation in which the Council has opted in for resorting 
to the CJEU and strong judicial review as powers slip towards the Commission 
and particularly to the EP. The Council has resorted to strong ex post review 
with anticipation of preserving the traditional third pillar policy driven by the 
Member States. In this sense, Hirschl's theory is very valid and catching. The 
Council has not found it pressing enough to put an emphasis on the Council 
proceedings even in cases where the original proposal has changed 
significantly. Another problem is that, in some cases, even very effective 
national level mechanisms carrying out ex ante review fail to deliver their 
message to the Council proceedings. Furthermore, if the message reaches the 
Council, it is pushed aside by the momentum to go forward with political 
decisions. 
 
I welcome the recent developments within the EP to exercise preview of 
fundamental rights in the draft EU legislation. Great leaps forward have been 
taken in promoting fundamental rights in legal texts and preventing serious 
breaches of fundamental rights in the pursuit of limiting them in the course of 
the legislative process. FRA and EDPS still have not been utilized enough as 
expert bodies in the preview but we can see recent improvements in this. Very 
often, the EP has taken the positions and suggestions of the FRA and EDPS 
seriously. 
 
The EU has throughout its history been a legal system strongly dependent on 
the ultimate authority of the CJEU in constitutional review. The EU is 
nonetheless taking steps towards increasing the role of the EU legislature in 
constitutional review. It may be premature to talk about a strong hybrid model 
of constitutional review but this appears to be the direction we are moving in. 
The direction which was detected by Gardbaum in his new commonwealth 
model is not necessarily the only one and there may be a certain kind of reverse 
flow towards increased role and impact of the legislature in constitutional 
review. Why have we witnessed this development? The main reason can be 
found in the strengthening of supranational and Union elements of the EU 
legislative process.938 The increased competence of the EP is a practical 
expression of this. The same goes for the status of the Charter. Especially the 
impact of the EUCFR on the EU legislative process has been much greater than 
generally perceived. The fragmentation and diversification of the EU 
legislature as a consequence of consecutive enlargements and changes in the 
competences of the institutions in fundamental right sensitive legislation has 
simply increased the pressure towards the legislative phase in order to 
                                                 
938 In this connection especially important are different postures of transnational law. See Jackson 
Vicki C.: Constitutional Engagement in a Transnational Era. Oxford University Press. New York 2010, 
pp. 8-9. 
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establish a constitutionally coherent legal framework. Various fundamental 
right problems in the implementation phase of the EU legislation and strict 
reactions of the CJEU on the validity of some pieces of EU legislation that are 
clearly in breach with fundamental rights are concrete examples of this 
pressure. 
 
With the expansion or sprawl of review of compliance with fundamental rights 
at different levels a justified question is: are juridics in fact running the 
legislative process? An answer to this question can be found somewhere in the 
margins of democracy and fundamental rights. I would not consider that the 
legal aspect has a predominant role in law-making. One should of course 
acknowledge that there has to be a strong part to be played by legal 
considerations when entering, for example, such a fundamental right-driven 
policy area, as the AFSJ. I would in fact rather deem various methods of ex 
ante review to be in line with and to strengthen democratic dimensions of 
policy-making, just to mention the EP, the Council and national parliaments. 
It is a different question if a certain extent of democratic deficit exists. Having 
said this, it should be recognized that we need to utilize all methods available 
in the review, be they ex ante or ex post, or may they spring from democratic 
or juristocratic control. Let us not forget that coordination is the key in this 
sense. 
 
A question that can be raised at this point is whether binding EU 
legislation underscoring the need for comprehensive impact assessments 
would be feasible. I think that we do not need any more “empty legislation” 
that can be regarded as gesture politics in promoting ex ante review. What 
we need instead is deeper understanding of fundamental rights aspects of 
legal texts in the preparation of EU legislation. In the longer term, there is 
neither need for more codes of conduct nor hollow legal obligations. An 
alternative solution is to establish adequate structures for impact 
assessments in a coordinated way. Additionally, fundamental rights issues 
deserve more attention especially from the people drafting horizontal 
legislation. Further educational measures would be necessary for drafters 
in order to achieve the objective of being sensitive towards fundamental 
rights aspects of EU legislation. Even more important would be to make the 
preparation process on EU legislation more sensitive towards fundamental 
rights especially in cases that do not seem to be touching upon fundamental 
rights directly, at first glance. What is needed at the level of the EU is a 
brand new culture of observance of fundamental rights at the preparatory 
phases of the legislative process. Seeds for this culture have probably been 
sown thanks to the continuously growing importance of the Charter but it 
is obvious that this is a long process for all the institutions of the EU.  
 
What is quite challenging for this work in the future is the complexity of 
different legal and also political cultures involved in the EU law-making 
and policy-making processes. There are currently 28 EU Member States 
that have their own specific social, political, legal and economic traditions 
and institutions. Additionally, these countries also have their own notions 
of fundamental rights and fundamental values of the EU as the experience 
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of value discussion in the margins of the failed Constitutional Treaty 
showed.  
 
A practical problem that may also appear as a consequence of the great 
number of actors in the EU decision-making process is the tendency to 
prepare decisions as far as possible in informal negotiations carried out in 
smaller groups of countries having a special interest on the dossier 
concerned. Lobbying and bilateral as well as multilateral talks are of course 
not new in the EU framework, but it is a reality that, for example, practical 
agreeing upon more complex and difficult issues in the Council working 
groups is more difficult and time-consuming than it once was. It is 
therefore very natural that decision-making will be quite automatically 
steered to more informal channels. The most challenging task is how to 
integrate continued observance of fundamental rights aspects of texts in 
this informal type of interaction.939 
 
Regarding the position of a national parliament in EU affairs, Carol 
Harlow very correctly notes that “the degree of control depends essentially 
on two variables: the balance of power inside the national system between 
parliament and government; and the degree of parliamentary control over 
the conduct of foreign affairs, in effect an aspect of the first, larger 
question.”940 As Norton observes we are facing a dilemma. It is obvious that 
national parliaments should play a more significant role in EU affairs but 
until now there is no agreement on which form this evolution should 
take.941 It is important, however, that national parliaments will be kept 
informed of the great variety of EU affairs. More effective information flow 
concerning decision-making processes at various levels of the EU is key for 
enabling all relevant stakeholders to present their views on EU 
instruments, be they legally binding or non-binding. 
 
Regarding evaluation of the current state of affairs, one can notice that 
in the field of fundamental rights the present balance of power between 
spheres of national and European legal systems remains. In today’s 
climate, it is possible to note that Member States are all the more keen on 
preserving the current status quo. In spite of Member States’ reluctance to 
provide the EU with more competence in the field of fundamental rights, it 
is obvious that the European fundamental rights system has penetrated 
into the traditional sphere of the national fundamental rights system. This 
can be seen as a one-way movement with the international legal system 
                                                 
939 This is particularly interesting for the following reasons related to practical conduct of 
international negotiations. First, when faced with a part of a text on which countries indicate to have 
severe problems, the Presidency usually urges these countries or institutions to engage in small group 
negotiations. If this will not help, the issue can be taken to a higher political level which means the 
Coreper, Council meeting at the ministerial level or even the European Council. If a deal will be brokered 
in one of these fora between the interested stakeholders in the decision-making process it is unlikely that 
the text will be opened. This is exactly the point where one has to beware of neglecting fundamental 
rights aspects of draft EU legislation. 
940 Harlow Carol: Accountability in the European Union. Oxford University Press. Oxford 2002, p. 
85. 
941 Norton, p. 221. In my opinion, reinforcement of national parliaments’ role in the EU decision-
making process may undermine the role of the EP in the legislative process and thus indirectly 
strengthen intergovernmental nature of the EU.  
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providing inputs to the national legal system that undertakes to adopt and 
implement them. Nevertheless, an evolution, not a revolution, in this field 
can be foreseen as Member States stick to their interpretation of Member 
States having the ultimate authority, with some considerable restrictions 
though, in the field of fundamental rights. In my opinion it is thus difficult 
to identify some kind of Primat of the international legal system in a 
traditional sense, especially if we deal with the ultimate question of 
competence-competence. Despite this, in the field of fundamental rights 
supranational elements can be expected to gain more ground.942  
 
Kaarlo Tuori argues that political constitutionalization should be seen 
as a reaction to the preceding economic and juridical constitutionalization. 
For him, political constitutionalization contains claims of democracy and 
democratic legitimacy. It should be noted, however, that the issue is not 
transnationalization (of legal order and polity, KF) but transnationalization 
with a promise of democratization.943 The AFSJ, together with 
empowerment of the EP and national parliaments, can be seen within the 
frame of this kind of political constitutionalization with a considerable 
inherent aspect of democracy. This requires that the next steps to be taken 
should be very concrete actions in strengthening ex ante review 
mechanisms. For example the FRA could be given a more effective role in 
ex ante review functions by extending its mandate and allocating it 
adequate resources to fulfil its increased tasks. In tandem with these 
considerations, EU institutions should also examine whether the FRA 
should be given a more significant role with issues related to Articles 6 and 
7 of the TEU. Another – more radical – option might be to establish a 
European level quasi-judicial body dealing with ex ante review of draft EU 
legislation. At this point one could take stock of the work of the 
strengthened FRA and possibly build further on it. This would enable a 
partial move away from the Commission’s internal procedures oriented 
formula of ex ante review towards a more transparent and credible system 
of ex ante review of fundamental rights. Making this idea real could be, 
however, a difficult task. 
 
With the change in the constitutional framework of the EU the 
empowerment of the EP in the AFSJ has mainly happened at the expense of 
the Council. The right of initiative also tends to move towards the Commission. 
Apparently, this will have strong impact at the Member State level. Despite 
this, the Council seems to have approved the strengthened role of the FRA in 
the evaluation of fundamental right aspects of legislative texts. This is of 
course due to the expertise and neutrality of the Agency but it may also be one 
way of balancing especially the ever-growing powers and political aspiration 
                                                 
942 Another perception of the consitutionalization process of the EU has been presented by de Búrca 
and Aschenbrenner. They argue from a Kelsenian perspective that “a change in the Grundnorm would 
imply a move away from the international legal order in which the Member States are the masters of the 
Treaties, towards the recognition of a new pouvoir constituant, and giving a rise to a self-sustaining 
constitution and a genuinely autonomous legal order”. See de Búrca Gráinne and Aschenbrenner 
Beatrix: European Constitutionalism and the Charter. In Peers Steve and Ward Angela (eds.): The EU 
Charter of Fundamental Rights. Politics, Law and Policy. Oxford and Portland, Oregon 2004. p. 12. 
943 Tuori Kaarlo: The Many Constitutions of Europe. In Tuori Kaarlo and Sankari Suvi (eds.): The 
Many Constitutions of Europe. Ashgate Publishing Limited. Farnham 2010. p. 21. 
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of the EP in this particularly sensitive field. For the ex ante control of 
fundamental rights we can notice that no great improvements have taken place 
although the need for impact assessments has been kept quite high on the 
agenda. The Council record in this sense is ameliorating. We should 
nevertheless recognize that the first part of the control from the Council comes 
from the level of Member States that provides inputs to the Council ex ante 
control. This control springs from national preparation mechanisms of the 
Member States and often national parliaments are involved in this. The second 
part of the control comes from the institutionalized bodies of the Council, 
namely the Council Secretariat and notably the Legal Service of the Council. 
 
Practical expertise can also be found at the Member State level: However, 
sometimes this becomes intertwined with political objectives of the Member 
States. Nevertheless, we should not omit the fact that the Member State level 
is more closely involved in the implementation of EU instruments and is thus 
the practical domain where realization of fundamental rights takes place. 
Council Secretariat and particularly Council Legal Service are able and 
objective bodies, but sometimes maybe too keen to declare, in the face of 
challenge cast by the Member States, some legal issue as a political question. 
This may pave the way for political compromise that is badly needed in the 
current heterogeneous EU, but this may also have unexpected legal 
consequences and may prove detrimental when it comes to legal certainty.  
 
Generally speaking, ex ante review of fundamental rights in the law-
making process has been highlighted at the level of political statements, but 
concrete measures in the Council have been scarce and ineffective. Even 
though the Secretariat delivers good work, the practical commitment of the 
Member States in the process has not been strong enough. It is also the case 
that often the input for constitutionally important elements of pieces of 
legislation comes too late, when the pieces of the legislative puzzle are already 
finding their way to the right slots and when the final compromise is about to 
be approved. Even still, transparency could be further improved within the 
Council. 
 
In the previous chapters we have covered ex ante review that takes place 
within the institutions. The real valley of death continues to be the phase when 
substantial changes are made to the Commission original proposals.944 The 
question remains: who should carry out the impact assessment and how 
should it be done? This should be the institutions’ common responsibility. I 
nevertheless strongly believe that FRA should have a stronger role in the 
legislative phase with regard to fundamental rights. The role of the national ex 
ante review systems, such as national parliaments, is also crucial in assessing 
the compatibility of draft legislation with national, EU, and international 
human and fundamental rights. The Commission, the Council and the EP 
                                                 
944 Although the right of initiative is still, to some extent, shared with Member States under the AFSJ, 
the Europeanization of the AFSJ will probably steer the methods of launching EU legislation in this field 
towards the Commission. 
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should take their responsibility in ex ante review more thoroughly into 
account.945  
 
 
3. De lege ferenda conclusions 
 
Although the judicial activity by the CJEU has been, and continues to be, the 
most significant contributor to the development of fundamental rights, 
especially as general principles of law, the legislative action to which also ex 
ante review is interlinked has gained more ground during the last decade. In 
the ex ante review it is often difficult to find a panacea but in the following I 
have identified some possible solutions. We should bear in mind that 
democratic institutions can provide, from the point of view of legitimacy of the 
whole system, an essential counterweight for review springing from case-by-
case review exercised by independent courts.946 In today’s EU, this applies to 
EP and the Council with the first institution representing a direct form of 
democracy and the latter one indirect, although it may be an even stronger 
form of democracy. It also involves the national parliaments in a more robust 
way. 
 
I strongly believe that ex ante review of fundamental rights has to be 
strengthened, especially because ordinary legislative procedure has become a 
general rule, also in the fundamental right sensitive AFSJ. The EP is now 
involved in the AFSJ as a co-legislator and qualified majority decisions will be 
made in issues with utmost constitutional importance and a great deal of 
potential for constitutional collisions. AFSJ also contains initiatives launched 
by groups of Member States and in these initiatives impact assessments are 
non-existent. With these remarks, it is easy to conclude that a reinforced ex 
ante review is very important for normative coherence of fundamental rights 
in the AFSJ legal instruments. In these initiatives an obligatory consultation 
of FRA could be envisaged but this would of course require a change in the 
Treaty. 
 
There is a danger of using fundamental rights as a political emergency break 
to halt unpopular legislative initiatives. This is because the EU legislative 
process is always a political game with conflicting political interests. It cannot 
therefore be ruled out that the reinforced EUCFR and its substantive 
fundamental rights could be used as barriers to stall law-making processes and 
even excluding them from the political agenda. In this case, we may even 
encounter political arguments raising some fundamental right related 
problems in order to hinder the promotion of fundamental rights. In this kind 
of case, the policy is clearly getting out of bounds and the proportionality 
should step into this phase so that fundamental rights can be promoted. The 
evidence does not seem to support this argument. In light of the selected cases, 
we can see that ex ante review has mainly taken place during the legislative 
                                                 
945 The European Council is clearly not meant for ex ante review but it functions as the last and 
highest political resort, should serious fundamental rights concerns arise in the context of the legislative 
process. 
946 See Lavapuro, p. 238. Lavapuro refers in this context to the CLC of the Finnish Parliament. 
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process and not caused delays for the overall legislative process. For example, 
the FRA has prepared it on the legislative proposals when the discussion on 
these legal instruments has been on-going. Quite naturally, it has taken some 
time to consider the contributions of the FRA and possible other stakeholders, 
such as the EDPS, but this has not led to delays. If we consider the "costs" and 
"benefits" of the ex ante processes we can easily come to the conclusion that 
benefits outnumber and outweigh the costs. It is the quality of the legal text 
that is the winner of this process. By taking fundamental rights 
comprehensively into account already in the pre-adoption phase of legislation, 
we can avoid thorny problems in the later phases of the legal cycle, most 
importantly in the courts. If a comprehensive ex ante review integrated into 
the law-making process takes a couple of months more time, but 
simultaneously considerably ameliorates the quality of the legal text it is worth 
it. 
 
I think that FRA would make a significant contribution to the ex ante review if 
it was to be developed to have a greater say and competence in legislative 
proposals, including limitation of fundamental rights. When curtailing these 
rights, the FRA could, for example, have a bigger role in assessing the 
proportionality of the proposal as well fulfilment of requirements of limiting 
fundamental rights. This would require a change in the Agency regulation and 
it might be confronted with negative positions from some Member States. It 
could also be the case that the CJEU would not see this change favourably due 
to the eventuality of partial crumbling of the CJEU competence and the shift 
away from ex post review towards a stronger ex ante review mechanism. A 
solution might be that the revision of the FRA would include robust safeguards 
for at least consultation of the Agency when limiting fundamental rights is at 
stake, even if the position of the FRA would not have a binding effect on the 
EU legislature, which would be difficult to carry out in the current legislative 
framework. Another practical option to strengthen consultation and hence ex 
ante review of the Agency would be that the institutions would adopt an inter-
institutional agreement on the need to thoroughly consult FRA in fundamental 
rights-sensitive EU dossiers. Alternatively, some kind of short-term 
guidelines-solution might reinforce the FRA role in the legislative process. 
Even if this would be a clear soft-law solution, it could serve the purpose of a 
code of conduct for the EU legislator and in the long run it might become a real 
operational guideline. Even a step by step approach would be welcome if a 
great leap forward, the least probable option, would not be doable. By the 
means of a mandatory consultation of the FRA, it could develop into a rather 
independent and neutral ex ante review mechanism with a focus on limiting 
fundamental rights. This would offer potentially big advantages for the 
realization of individuals' rights and by doing this, often lengthy procedures in 
the back end of the legal cycle could be avoided. 
 
For improvement in how the EU ex ante review mechanism functions, one 
could consider introducing a fundamental rights early warning mechanism. 
With this I do not simply mean the mandatory consultation of FRA in case the 
piece of legislation is given under certain Treaty Articles, but the obligation of 
the FRA and maybe the EDPS, too, to examine fundamental right aspects of 
those proposals which are given out under certain Treaty Articles. This would 
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create two categories of legislative proposals, on the one hand those falling 
under the mandatory consultation obligation, and on the other hand those not 
requiring a consultation but would simply alert the FRA of the eventuality of 
potential fundamental right problems. In order to establish this kind of two-
tier mechanism, one would either need to change primary or secondary EU 
law. This, especially the first option, may however be far from reality due to 
the difficulty of amending the Treaty and even secondary legislation, such as 
the Agency Regulation governing the competences and tasks of the FRA. 
Another less complicated legal solution could be to proceed on a basis of an 
inter-institutional agreement on the need to consult the FRA on fundamental 
rights sensitive files. In case this would not work out there would be the 
possibility of adopting some EU soft-law, such as resolutions or guidelines, or 
some political decisions such as Council conclusions in this regard. 
 
The resources of the Agency are still insufficient to cover various activities 
within its remit in an effective way. It is equally important to note that the FRA 
has not been operational for many years, yet and in the life of EU Agencies it 
always takes some time to get things up and running. This has reflected also 
on the work of the Agency on fundamental rights. Despite this, we can expect 
the widening of the role and competence of the FRA as a consequence of 
upcoming changes in legislation. One of the de lege ferenda conclusions that 
could ameliorate the situation is the following: One should have a mandatory 
consultation of the FRA in fundamental right sensitive legislative files. Of 
course the current legal framework already now seeks to involve FRA but this 
aspect could be strengthened. A counter-argument for this may be that this 
would significantly slow down law-making in the EU. I would however argue 
that this obligation could be restricted to legislative proposals under only 
certain AFSJ Articles of the Treaty947 and one could also link to the process 
deadlines for different actors to conclude their processes.948 We should also 
not put concerns about duration before the quality of legislation, especially 
when fundamental rights are at stake. One could even consider giving the FRA 
the right to halt the process if fundamental rights are not taken adequately into 
account, perhaps at least for a given period of time. I can however see critics 
raising possible problems related to the institutional balance and in particular 
the relationship of the FRA and the CJEU. It is also clear that the EU legislator 
cannot introduce fundamental changes in the regime with the means of 
secondary EU law, but Treaties would probably need to be amended. This is 
not a popular theme in today’s EU with memories of turbulent phases of recent 
Treaty reforms in mind. 
 
It is fair to say that probably the thoughts presented here may give rise to 
tension between the legislative institutions and the CJEU. Surely enough, the 
                                                 
947 This procedure could, for instance, be applied to legislative proposals launched by a group of 
Member States under the AFSJ. 
948 We should bear in mind that Recital 32 of the Agency Regulation sets out that “Nothing in this 
Regulation should be interpreted in such a way as to prejudice the question of whether the remit of the 
Agency may be extended to cover the areas of police cooperation and judicial cooperation in criminal 
matters”. After the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty and the subsequent constitutional changes made 
to the competences of EU institutions in the AFSJ it is apparent that FRA can no longer be excluded from 
activities in the AFSJ, including ex ante review of EU legislation under the AFSJ. 
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CJEU will remain as the ultimate interpreter of the EU law and none of the 
institutions wants to contest the authority of the court. We should, however, 
further improve the ex ante control of draft EU legal acts in the law-making 
process. I am certain that there is room for improvement. In the center of all 
this activity we should place the Charter. It is the Charter that makes the 
difference compared with previous years. The position of fundamental rights 
was strong already before the Lisbon Treaty but I would argue that also for the 
legislator it is in practical terms easier to ensure the compliance with the rights 
set out in the Charter than if the fundamental rights were “scattered” in the 
ECHR and the of course the interpretation practice of both the ECtHR and the 
CJEU. 
 
In order to take fundamental rights enshrined in the EUCFR more 
effectively into account I would also encourage the Commission – and in some 
cases under the AFSJ, a group of Member States – to insert some fundamental 
rights safeguard clauses in draft legislative proposal texts. This is not 
concerning standard clauses that re-inserted time and time again using the 
same formula in all legal texts, but tailor-made solutions that could stem from 
impact assessments on fundamental rights aspects of legislative proposals. It 
is also unnecessary in the legal act to deal with the whole list of fundamental 
rights under the Charter but it would be useful to elaborate, for example, in 
the recitals the proposal’s relation to substantial fundamental rights closely 
bound with the proposal. Of course, this does not take away the legislator’s 
obligation to adopt a legal text, whose Articles are totally in line with the 
EUCFR. 
 
For the Council, I would recommend speeding up the better regulation 
initiative and giving more impetus to integrating fundamental right 
considerations in these processes. The Council should furthermore take the 
full use of the expertise of particularly the FRA when drafting Council 
positions for legal texts. I also urge the Council to further develop impact 
assessment processes when it makes considerable fundamental rights relevant 
changes to the Commission’s original proposals. Otherwise, the Council will 
remain the lame duck in the ex ante review of fundamental rights. 
 
When it comes to the EP I recommend it to continue its efforts to address 
fundamental rights in the legal texts and to provide amendments 
strengthening the fundamental rights dimension of the legal texts. It can well 
be argued that the EP was able to stop the inertia in the ex ante review at the 
EU level and set things into motion.949 
 
Regarding FRA, I encourage it to continue producing concrete drafting 
proposals either on its own initiative or at the request of institutions in order 
to solve fundamental right related problems. Even if the FRA is still in its 
consolidation phase and tries to find its way and place also in the legislative 
process, we can see clear indications of the reinforcement of its role. The EP 
                                                 
949 A quite recent example of the high level of ambition of the EP in the field of fundamental rights 
can be found in European Parliament Resolution of 2 April 2014 on the mid-term review of the 
Stockholm Programme. 2013/2024(INI), P7_TA(2014)0276.   
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has provided useful support for the Agency in providing it with a practical 
possibility to do some double-checking of draft legal instruments. This has 
taken the EU ex ante review forward. 
 
As a conclusion in terms of substance of the cases discussed, we can see that 
limiting fundamental rights has been the main source of discussion in the 
related law-making procedures while promoting fundamental rights has not 
received similar attention. There are of course differences between EU 
institutions in this, but in light of the evidence of this study the balance seems 
to be clearly in favour of negative obligations at the cost of positive obligations. 
Another key recommendation would be to use and apply the test of permissible 
limitations to fundamental rights. A possible explanation is that in light of its 
stronger role in the AFSJ, the Commission has had a mission of carrying out 
stronger policies in this field. The pursuit of strong AFSJ policies has 
sometimes caused pressure to limit fundamental rights and, as we have seen 
in the case studies, this has also given rise to overstepping proportionality 
considerations, an essential element to be respected in the restriction. I believe 
that there is room for improvement, especially in the positive obligations. 
Similarly, the Commission could aim at stronger AFSJ policies by proposing 
positive obligations and not simply by concentrating on the limitations. 
 
A shortcoming in the EU legislative process in terms of ex ante review of 
fundamental rights is the visible absence of proportionality considerations at 
the later stage of the law-making process. The discussion on proportionality is 
usually focused in the early phase proceedings, such as dealing with legal basis. 
As has been stated before, the legal texts can change significantly in the course 
of the process and therefore my recommendation would be to have 
proportionality in mind all the way throughout the legislative route. It would 
be recommendable to have some kind of stocktaking at a later stage of the 
process and ask the question: does the legal text in its current form comply 
with the principle of proportionality? If we take this down to the level of 
practice this check could be made by a simple question of the Council working 
group chairman or the EP committee chair at the final stages of the handling. 
Proportionality should be the key driver in avoiding and mitigating negative 
impacts of legislation on fundamental rights. The CJEU took lately a firm 
stand on EU data protection in the recent landmark ruling in Digital Rights 
Ireland Ltd. and Others declaring the Data Retention Directive null and 
void.950 The Court found that the Directive was against fundamental rights of 
respect for private life and the right to data protection as guaranteed in the 
EUCFR, which makes the case remarkable. The Directive was considered 
                                                 
950 Joined cases C-293/12 and C-594/12 Digital Rights Ireland Ltd and Others. In paragraph 64 the 
Court held "Furthermore, that (data retention, KF) period is set between a minimum of 6 months and 
maximum of 24 months, but it is not stated that the determination of the period of retention must be 
based on objective criteria in order to ensure that it is limited to what is strictly necessary." The Court 
continued in paragraph 65 "it follows from the above that Directive 2006/24 does not lay down clear 
and precise rules governing the extent of the interference with fundamental rights enshrined in Articles 
7 and 8 of the Charter. It must therefore be held that Directive 2006/24 entails a wide-ranging and 
particularly serious interference with those fundamental rights in the legal order of the EU, without such 
an interference being precisely circumscribed by provisions to ensure that it is actually limited to what 
is necessary".  
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invalid as a result of an infringement of a fundamental right, which has not 
often been the case.  
 
In addition to this strong fundamental right argumentation the Court also 
interestingly concluded that the EU legislature by adoption of the Directive 
exceeded the limits imposed by compliance with the principle of 
proportionality.951 The Court used Article 52(1) of the Charter and the related 
case-law as a yardstick when analyzing the case. This Court verdict and the 
ensuing case Schrems might really be a new start for the EU taking 
fundamental rights more seriously in the legislative work. The Court has now 
shown that fundamental rights count and should count even more in the law-
making process of the EU. It will therefore be interesting to see what kind of 
impact this will have on ex ante review of fundamental rights. One of the 
firmest conclusions of this study is that proportionality is the key aspect in the 
ex ante review of fundamental rights in the EU legislative process. The case of 
Data Retention Directive demonstrates how important the role of the CJEU 
still is in ensuring the observance of fundamental rights. Despite all the 
positive developments in the EU ex ante review a further change would be 
needed so that the CJEU would not have to come to the rescue of the EU 
legislator.   
 
In order to avoid excess limitations to fundamental rights in the EU 
legislative process Article 52(1) of the Charter should be central to EU 
legislative activities. If limitation of fundamental rights occurs in draft 
legislation, the participating institutions in the law-making should apply this 
provision of the Charter and reflecting on case law utilize a European test of 
permissible limitations. Very good guidelines can be found in the above-
mentioned CJEU cases. The legislature should not consider case-law of the 
court as a separate parcel belonging to the back-end of legal cycle. It is not 
forbidden to go further in considering what kind of directions to follow can be 
found in the CJEU argumentation in legislative cases, which have gone wrong.   
 
A fruitful soil for the application of this test can be found especially in the 
policy Area of Freedom, Security and Justice. As has been demonstrated in the 
previously-discussed cases, very often the fundamental right problems have 
emerged in the context of legal dossiers related to data protection and anti-
terrorism measures. In the wake of the European economic crisis, the 
fundamental right implications of the economic crisis related legislation 
should be duly addressed. Whenever discussing fundamental rights we should 
not only deal with the limitation of fundamental rights. The EU legislature 
should moreover attach increasing weight in its legal texts on its positive 
obligations – the promotion of fundamental rights. It is exactly the 
promotional aspect that has been lacking, or at least lagging behind, in the EU 
fundamental rights discussion. Bold moves by the EU legislature are hence 
required towards positive obligations in light of the Charter. 
 
As it is the institutions that try to strike final deals on pieces of EU 
legislation, fundamental rights should be kept in play. In these cases, a big 
                                                 
951 C-293/12, paragraph 69. 
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responsibility falls on legal services of the institutions both in Coreper when 
the Council prepares its negotiating mandate, and in the EP when the 
rapporteur seeks mandate from especially the responsible parliamentary 
committee. I think that it would be appropriate to ask if some kind of alarm 
bell procedure could be developed for trialogues if fundamental rights are 
compromised by the pursuit of a political compromise. This could nevertheless 
be very difficult, mainly because this kind of procedure could be used for 
political purposes to block the decision-making. It could therefore be worth 
considering to establish some kind of independent panel through which 
fundamental right sensitive EU dossiers should go when a final compromise 
has been found. This should be a very technical body and it should be as 
independent as possible from political pressures. A potential danger in this 
model would be the position the CJEU who has the ultimate right to carry out 
judicial review of secondary EU law with the Treaties. This way to go could 
probably also awaken resistance from the part of the co-legislators probably 
arguing that this limits the legislative functions and prerogatives of the EU 
legislator.  
 
The information and data gathered during this research journey indicates 
that we have a good reason to believe that traditional neo-functionalist 
theories can have their merits also when analysing the impact of fundamental 
rights on the EU legislative process.952 In the course of the strengthening of 
the internal fundamental rights dimension of the EU, we can detect a spill-
over of Charter-based fundamental rights into sectorial pieces of EU 
legislation. In order to encourage the positive impact of this spill-over effect, 
we need ex ante review of fundamental rights. Similarly, and even more so, we 
need the ex ante review to identify fundamental right related problems in draft 
EU legislation. 
 
Finally, the Commission, the Council and the EP should increasingly put 
efforts and resources to training and education in fundamental rights issues. 
This is especially important for officials dealing with sectorial policies, to 
whose portfolio fundamental right issues do not at first glance seem to belong. 
In any case, fundamental rights problems may emerge in rather unexpected 
places. More importantly, in the EU law the devil is often in details. In order 
to avoid problems related to fundamental rights and to spur realization of such 
rights, due attention should be paid to proportionality, utilization of European 
test of permissible limitations and promoting fundamental rights when 
drafting EU law.  
 
 
4. Perfect remedy - a strengthened institutional co-
operation in ex ante review 
 
The importance of fundamental rights and ex ante review has strengthened in 
the EU legislative process over the years. This is very much due to the great 
                                                 
952 Generally, on the issue of neo-functionalism and spill-over in the early European integration 
process, see Haas Ernst B.: Uniting of Europe: political, social, and economic forces 1950-1957. UMI 
books. Ann Arbor, Michigan 1996. 
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impact of the Charter on the EU law-making. It also has connotations with 
European constitutionalism and constitutional pluralism. According to Tuori 
"legal pluralism enters European legal space together with transnational law. 
Diversity turns into pluralism when state law's exclusive jurisdiction is 
challenged".953 This is exactly what has happened in the field of fundamental 
rights. Furthermore, a multi-level system of European law needs an adequate 
degree of flexibility and adaptability, to maintain its basic unity in respect of 
plurality.954 In this multi-level framework an important dimension of 
fundamental right protection is the interplay of ex ante and ex post review. 
One can try to visualize this inter-relationship by examining for example the 
weight of CJEU's rulings with regard to ex ante review and the weight of the 
references of the EU legislature to the relevant court rulings. 
 
First, I would say that probably the most important series of CJEU rulings with 
a paramount importance with regard to ex ante review consists of cases 
Schecke, Test Achats, Digital Rights Ireland and Schrems discussed in 
previous parts of this study. Moreover, the cases Pfizer Animal Health, Spain 
v Council, Kücükdeveci, Afton Chemical, Chatzi, Åkerberg Fransson and El 
Dridi also have interesting interlinkages with ex ante review.955 Review has 
been touched upon in many judgments, but this is not the case specifically with 
ex ante review. When the CJEU has annulled a piece of secondary legislation, 
for example on the grounds of proportionality, it often has simply declared the 
act null and void and not given much guidance to the legislature regarding how 
to remedy the situation in the ensuing legislative process in terms of the ex 
ante review. 
 
We have however witnessed a change in this regard in cases Digital Rights 
Ireland and Schrems. The Court surely is not against data retention as such, 
but had some major concerns how relevant EU legislation tackles the issue and 
how key provisions are formulated. This can be seen in the argumentation of 
the judgments where the court is providing in an increasing manner guidance 
to the EU legislature how to overcome fundamental rights-based problems in 
the legal acts. This guidance is not direct but it is certainly there. 
 
Second, so far the legislature has for very obvious reasons been more 
enthusiastic in referring to CJEU case law with regard to the review of 
fundamental rights. This can be seen for example in explanatory memoranda 
of legislative proposals where justifications for legislation are given. Of course, 
case law is essential in these deliberations. I could imagine that recent 
judgments of CJEU have contributed to a stronger acknowledgement of 
fundamental rights in the preparation of EU legislation. In this way, the 
dialogue has been stronger and the EU legislature has offered greater 
consideration to the positions of the CJEU in the legislative phase. Especially 
proportionality has been raised higher on the agenda as a consequence of the 
case Digital Rights Ireland. References to the Court's case law have been made 
                                                 
953 Tuori 2015, p. 86. 
954 Moccia Luigi: The Making of European Private Law: Why, How, What, Who. Sellier European 
Law Publishers. Munich 2015, p. 61. 
955 See T-13/99 Pfizer Animal Health, C-310/04 Spain v Council, C-555/07 Kücükdeveci, C-343/09 
Afton Chemical, C-149/10 Chatzi, C-617/10 Åkerberg Fransson and C-61/11 El Dridi. 
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in many legislative exercises and the importance of the CJEU has been 
highlighted from the angle of legislative process in many EU policy documents, 
as shown in the discussion on ex ante review carried out by the EU institutions 
involved in EU law-making. 
 
In the pages of this dissertation, the evolution of positions of different EU 
institutions has also been discussed. Nevertheless, ex ante review is not only a 
power-related game with potential winners and losers but also a framework 
for true co-operation for institutions which take fundamental rights seriously. 
Fundamental rights-based review is in the center of this activity. In fact, it is 
possible to see signs of a deeper co-operation between the legislature and the 
CJEU in the field of ex ante review. This is very much due to the impact of the 
Charter. The interplay of different EU institutions and other actors involved in 
ex ante review of fundamental rights in the EU legislative process also 
manifests the growing importance of European constitutional pluralism. In 
tandem, it reflects intermediary theories of constitutional review as presented 
by Gardbaum. The mutual consideration of EU institutions has developed 
significantly, despite the fact that CJEU still is, and should continue to be, the 
driving force for the review of fundamental rights. A strong judicial review 
complemented by a reinforced rights-based ex ante review can significantly 
contribute to achieving stronger fundamental rights in the EU. The Charter 
counts in the EU law-making and this holds the promise of making 
fundamental rights real. 
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